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Glossary
Nine Features of the Japanese Model of Rural Development
1. Institutional changes for an individual-cooperative mixed economy.
2. Government policies supporting rice production and rural development.
3. Construction of rural infrastructure.
4. Higher yields and multiple cropping of rice and other grains.
5. Diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture.
6. Off-farm employment.
7. Peasant migration to cities and work in towns.
8. Agricultural mechanization with small machinery.
9. Persistence of the fragmented small farms.
12 Features of the Chinese Model of Rural Development
1. Institutional changes for a small-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy.
2. Government policies supporting rice production and rural development,
3. Construction of rural infrastructure.
4. Higher yields and multiple cropping of rice and other grains.
5. Diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture.
6. Off-farm employment.
7. Peasant migration to cities and work in town and village firms.
8. Agricultural mechanization with small machinery.
9. Institutional changes for a large-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy.
10. Agricultural mechanization with large machinery.
11. Earlier development in some (chiefly Eastern and costal) rural areas, and its promotion 
in other (mainly Central and Western) areas.
12. Introduction of more advanced technology and management, larger investment, and 
domestic and international markets to agriculture by urban-rural joint enterprises, and external 
and foreign joint and single ventures.
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Relevant Mixed Economies
Individual-cooperative mixed economy. Fragmented small farms under individual land 
ownership, which independently control the direct production process of agriculture, plus 
national rural service cooperatives, which socialistically collectivize forward and backward 
services and financing for the individual farming units. Established in Japan during 1946-50 
and still prevails.
Sub-village individual-collective mixed economy. Sub-village-wide coopera- 
tive/enterprise collective use of physically withdrawable private land shares, exercising 
collective-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the basic operation level 
at one household or at a farming unit including a number of households. Some elementary 
cooperatives in China before 1949 until Apr. 1956, some agricultural production cooperatives 
and urban-rural joint farming in Japan since the 1970s took this form.
Village-wide individual-collective mixed economy. Extension of the individual- 
collective mixed economy from sub-village to village scope. Some elementary cooperatives 
in China before 1949 until Apr. 1956, and some agricultural production cooperatives and 
urban-rural joint farming in Japan since the 1970s took this form.
Corporate-individual mixed economy. Collective use of physically unwithdrawable 
private land shares under corporate ownership, exercising village-individual dual level 
operation of large land units, with the basic operation level at one household or at coopera- 
tive/enterprise including a number of households. Such a corporation could cover one or a 
number of villages. Proposed by the author for Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and other rice- 
based economies under private land ownership in monsoon Asia once their fragmented small 
farms have become an obstacle to sustainable rural development.
Small-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy. Land is collectively 
owned by the village, but contracted to households for fulfilling state procurement output 
quotas of grain and other major agricultural products and disposing of surplus output, which 
is called the Household Contract System . Land is equally distributed as fragmented small 
farms, hence the Equal Land System. The village has the duty of carrying out general 
management and providing services, thus village-household dual level operation of land, with 
the households as the basic level. Created in China during 1978-83 and still exists.
Large-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy. Village-individual dual 
level operation of large land units under collective ownership and the Household Contract
lULUJtlUUXWlj|WWjllj|ffl
XV
System, with the basic operation level at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including 
a number of households. Exercised in China mainly since the mid-1980s under the Dual Land 
System, the Leasing System, the Single Land System, and the Corporate-Holding System as 
the major forms.
Nominal State-individual mixed economy. Land is state-owned (nominally) but 
individually-possessed, and exchangeable, transferable (salable), leasable, inheritable, and 
mortgageable. Founded in Cambodia in 1981 (with residential land privately owned), Laos 
1988, and Vietnam 1993.
Public-individual mixed economy. Land is under the state, or collective or other forms 
of public ownership, but individually managed.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
I. Monsoon Asia
In general, the monsoon climate in Asia causes rains in May-October and 
dryness in November-April. Only rice suits this climate. It has been the major 
crop for at least 4,000 years.1 Up to the end of World War Two (WWII), a 
feudal landlord ownership had been dominant: a few landlords owned large 
estates while most peasants owned little or no land and were either tenants or 
wage laborers, although there were also owner-peasants. Farm work had to be 
done by hand, with simple tools. Reclamation of new land had reached its limit. 
With such traditional institutions and technologies and physical constraints, in the 
rainy half year, rice cultivation required highly labor-intensive, sophisticated and 
coordinated work, resulting in labor shortage. This demanded more labor and 
caused high population growth, low per capita cultivated land, and small size and 
fragmentation of individual (family) farming units.1 2 In contrast, during the dry
1 There arc 19 rice-based economies in monsoon Asia: China (mainland), 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan Province of China (hereafter 
Taiwan) in East Asia; Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), 
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Bangladesh, Bhutan. 
India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in South Asia. Hong Kong and Singapore 
also belong to monsoon Asia. But because little food is produced domestically, 
they are not analyzed in this thesis. (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 1. Oshima 1987:
9. Oshima 1993: 1)
2 "Farm" (or farming unit) means "agricultural holding", which refers to all 
land that is used wholly or partly for agricultural production and is operated by 
one person - the holder - alone or with the assistance of others, without regard 
to title, size or location (FAO-PY 1972: 408).
Fragmentation of an agricultural holding is generally defined as the 
division of the holding into many discrete parcels in a village (Fre-Gov 1950: 56. 
Binns 1950: 5). But some just define it as the situation in which a household 
operates more than one separate parcel of land (Blarel; Hazell; Place & Quiggin 
1992: 233. Vander Meer 1982: 1).
A parcel is defined as all land in the holding entirely surrounded by land 
or water of other holdings or by land or water not forming part of any holding 
(FAO 1981: 92). It may also be called "noncontiguous piece of land", "plot" or 
"land unit".
Fragmentation is measured by the number of parcels of land in the holding
3
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half year, due to insufficient work opportunities, there were serious unemploy­
ment, underemployment or disguised unemployment.* 3 4(Oshima 1987: 18-27). 
Poverty was widespread and persistent. These rice-based economies wen; dual 
economies, predominantly agrarian but with some industries in big cities."1
Since then, with the same natural conditions, such an economic situation 
has been changed in some rice-based economies but still dominates in the others. 
To successfully overcome poverty, there have been basically two models of rural 
development: the Japanese and Chinese models, while other economies under 
private land ownership may be at lower stages along the Japanese model, and 
those based on public land ownership at lower stages along the Chinese one.
II. A Remaining Obstacle Unresolved by the 
Japanese Model
The Japanese model of rural development under private land ownership 
started in 1946 with nine major features or stages. 1. Institutional changes for an 
individual-cooperative mixed economy (1946-50): land reform for individual 
ownership, which brought in huge incentives to peasants for production, but also 
maintained numerous fragmented small farms; and the setting-up of rural service 
cooperatives. 2. Government policies supporting rice production and rural 
development. Besides institutional changes, technological progress also contributed 
to economic growth, which was embodied in features 3-8. Five steps (3-7 below) 
were taken for reaching full employment: 3. Construction of rural infrastructure;
in one village (the case of families holding land in several villages is excluded) 
(Heston & Kumar 1983: 199).
3 Unemployment and underemployment are variously defined in labor force 
surveys, but the fundamental definitions are: (1) Those who are willing and able 
to work but cannot find work are unemployed. (2) Among those employed, those 
who are working less than full time and want more hours of work are underem­
ployed. (Oshima 1993: 103). (3) The part of the population engaged in agriculture 
who could be removed without reducing agricultural output, even though the 
technical methods in use remain unchanged, are disguisedh unemployed (Nurkse 
1953: 32).
4 Although prewar Japan was developed, its industrialization was based on its 
import of foods from and export of industrial goods to colonies. Its agriculture 
was relatively stagnant. (Oshima 1987 : 39, 109)
4. Higher yields and multiple cropping o f rice and other grains’, 5. Diversified 
cropping5 and non-crop agriculture6; 6. Off-farm employment7 and 7. Peasant 
migration to cities and work in towns. As lull employment was achieved, wages 
rose. Hence a post-full employment step: 8. Agricultural mechanization with small 
machinery. In 1960, rice self-sufficiency was achieved, the first transition 
(agriculture to industry) completed. labor shortages appeared, and the second 
transition (industry to services) started8. By this time, all the major obstacles 
imposed by the monsoon have been overcome except for 9. Persistence o f the 
fragmented small farms.
In the high-wage economy, the income from rice production turned out to 
be much lower than that from non-grain agriculture and especially off-farm lines. 
As argued in detail later, in order to make full-time farmers viable9, fragmented 
agricultural holdings should be consolidated, farm si/e enlarged10, so that large
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5 Diversified cropping implies a shift from a monoculture or a few crops 
(mainly grains) to a larger assortment of crops (roots and tubers, pulses, oil crops, 
vegetables, fruits, berries, treenuts, etc.) (Oshima 1993: 125. FAO-YP 1993: iv).
6 Agriculture - depending on the context of the thesis - in a broad sense 
includes cropping (farming), animal husbandry, fishery, forestry and hunting 
(Oshima 1993: 152) (the importance of hunting has been declining due to 
environmental protection); but in a narrow sense may only refer to cropping 
(farming).
7 Off-farm employment of farm families denotes their employment in 
nonagricultural sectors, i.e., industry and services. Industry includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, public utilities, transportation and communication. 
Services comprise banking, real estate, public services which require the highest 
level of education and retail trade, restaurants, domestic and other personal 
services which only need minimal education. (Oshima 1993: 138, 152)
8 In monsoon Asia, the first transition is said to be completed when the share 
of the agricultural labor force in the total labor force (about three fourths) has 
fallen, while the share of the industrial labor force has risen, to a ratio of roughly 
one fourth to one third. The second transition is said to be concluded when the 
service sector overtakes the industrial sector in size of labor force. But there are 
elements of arbitrariness in the definitions and some exceptions may be possible. 
(Oshima 1987: 56, 58)
9 Farms that earn income per farm household member equal to, or above, that 
of non-farm employees who are living in rural areas are "viable units" (Hayami 
1988: 77).
10 "Farm size" may refer to the acreage of the land, or number of households, 
of the farm. The large farm size advocated in this thesis for monsoon Asia rice- 
based economies denotes the large size in land acreage o f a farm  under village- 
individual dual level operation, with the basic operation level at one household 
or at collective/cooperative/enterprise including a number of households as share-
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machinery could be used, labor saved, costs reduced and increasing returns to 
scale gained. However, much land was held by part-time farmers and absentees 
with inefficient use, while the remaining full-time farmers could not get larger 
land to till.
Therefore, in the 1960s, land sale was encouraged as the first major effort 
for enlarging farm size. But, generally speaking, this failed. From 1970 on, the 
second major effort, land lease was promoted, but this did not succeed much. The 
third major effort was land consolidation. This started in 1950 but did not 
promote land sale or lease. The fourth ma jor effort was commissioned agricultural 
work, and the fifth agricultural production cooperatives11 (collective use of 
private farmland as an individual-collective mixed economy, from sub-village to 
village-wide), while the sixth was urban-rural joint farming (also belonging to 
collective use of private farmland as an individual-collective mixed economy). In 
all these experiments, the private land ownership either hindered the achievement 
of land economies of scale, or (under village-wide collective use of private farm­
land) hampered the change of private parcels into non-farmland (dams, roads, 
canals, ponds, etc.) and could not prevent withdrawal with land and re-splitting 
the joined land.
In order to be viable and gain higher incomes, farmers and cooperatives 
lobbied for government protection of the domestic rice production. The ruling 
party yielded, fearing the loss of their votes. Thus costs and prices rose well 
above prevailing international levels. The government subsidies to farmers 
resulted in major budget deficits. Rice import prohibition during 1961-93 caused 
international protests. Following a natural disaster and loss of rice self-sufficiency 
in 1993, since 1994, cheap rice has had to be imported and rice self-sufficiency 
restored by continuous subsidies. Therefore, in Japan, the critical issue is how to
holders and/or employees.
11 There are various types of agricultural production collectives, cooperatives 
and enterprises in the world, many overlaps among them and much confusion in 
using these terms. It is impossible in this thesis to clarify them and put a "correct" 
label on each. Nevertheless, a rough demarcation among them may be seen from 
the land ownership point of view: in a production collective, land is collectively 
owned; in a production cooperative, land is privately owned but collectively used 
to some extent; while a production enterprise is a unit of accounting and operation 
assuming sole profits and losses, thus could be either a collective or cooperative 
or household. *
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7consolidate and enlarge the fragmented small farms.
The fragmented small farms were efficient in a low wage economy since 
they were conducive to development and diffusion of land-saving and scale- 
neutral technology, dispersion of natural risks, and provision of employment to 
peasants without non-grain agriculture and off-farm job opportunities. But in a 
high wage economy, they hamper the achievement of land economies of scale, 
and waste resources of land, labor, capital, management, and technology. This 
problem is common to all rapidly industrializing economies with limited land and 
reduced working population in agriculture (although their degrees of fragmenta­
tion and smallness of farm size may vary). Of other rice-based economies under 
private land ownership in monsoon Asia, Taiwan and South Korea replicated the 
Japanese model. (Hayami & Yamada 1991: 7). Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
the Philippines; Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Bhutan and Nepal are 
generally at lower stages of the model. Once their industrialization has led them 
into the high wage economy, their fragmented small farm structure also would 
prove to be inefficient. (Zhou, Jian-Ming 1996)
Therefore, fragmented small farms have become the remaining or last 
obstacle imposed by the monsoon to sustainable agricultural and rural develop­
ment12 13in monsoon Asia (Oshima 1987: 65). This problem has also been taken 
as an argument against land reform to the feudal landlord ownership in other rice- 
based economies of monsoon Asia, on the grounds that the Japanese experience 
has demonstrated that the benefits of scale economies will be lost if estate 
farming is dissolved. (Koppel 1993:4.Takahashi 1993: 107). Although substantial 
analysis of this problem has been made by many economists in this field for 
many years, fundamental solutions have not yet been found (e.g., Bray 19861'. 
Oshima 1987. Hayami 1988. Rothacher 1989. Hayami & Yamada 1991. Oshima
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12 In 1991, FAO/Netherlands Conference on Agriculture and the Environment 
defined the essential and interdependent goals of sustainable agricultural and rural 
development as "Food security, to be obtained by ensuring an appropriate and 
sustainable balance between self-sufficiency and self-reliance; employment and 
income generation in rural areas, particularly to eradicate poverty; and natural 
resource conservation and environmental protection." (SDD-FAO 1995: 1)
13 Bray recommends to stop rice production as she ends her book with such 
a belief that "The chief problems of Japanese agriculture today seem largely to 
be caused through Japanese farmers* reluctance to abarnbn growing rice." (Bray 
1986: 217)
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III. The Chinese Model
The Chinese model of rural development constituting a third way between 
the centrally planned economy and full privatization of the means of production, 
started in 1978 with 12 major features or stages.
1. Institutional changes fo ra  small-scale fanning and collective-individual 
mixed economy (1978-83). Land was collectively owned by the village, but 
contracted to households for fulfilling state procurement output quotas of grain 
and other major agricultural products and disposing of surplus output, which 
brought about huge incentives for peasants to increase production. Land w'as 
distributed equally in terms of quality, quantity and distance, hence the Equal 
Land System, creating numerous fragmented small farms. The village had the duty 
of carrying out general management and providing services, thus village- 
household dual level operation of land, with the households as the basic level. 2. 
Government policies supporting rice production and rural development. 
(Technological progress was embodied in features 3-8 and 10-12). 3. Construction 
o f rural infrastructure. 4. Higher yields and multiple cropping o f rice and other 
grains. 5. Diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture. 6. Off-farm employment. 
7. Peasant migration to cities and work in town and village firms. 8. Agricultural 
mechanization with small machinery.
These eight features in general are similar to their counterparts in the 
Japanese model (the major differences being the individual land ownership in 
feature 1 and rice import protectionism during 1961-93 in feature 2 of the 
Japanese model) and had achieved similar positive effects hy 1984 as in Japan by
14 Francks admits that her paper "has done no more than raise" questions 
(Francks 1995: 15). Answering my question whether she knew any solutions to 
this problem in her seminar in School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 
Nov. 1995, she said: "If I knew any solutions, I would become someone like the 
Japanese Agricultural Minister."
15 NIRA claims that "For the time being, our objectives should focus on 
easing and on partially solving this issue" (NIRA 1995: 173).
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Also similar to Japan, as the economy entered the high wage stage, 
increasing numbers of part-time farmers and absentees held land in inefficient use, 
while the remaining full-time farmers could not contract more land to be viable. 
Hence a second round of institutional changes around the mid-1980s (in some 
areas even at the beginning of the decade): 9. Institutional changes for a large- 
scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy in the forms of the Dual 
Land System (self-sufficiency land was distributed to everybody, responsibility 
land was contracted to everybody, or every labor force, or every agricultural labor 
force, or expert farmers via bidding for higher output which was the standard 
form), the Leasing System (responsibility land was leased to expert farmers via 
bidding for higher monetary rent), the Single Land System (ordinary households 
were sold grain for self-consumption at lower prices and given family plots for 
vegetables, all the other land was contracted to expert farmers via bidding) and 
the Corporate-Holding System (ordinary households gave contracted land back to 
the village which re-contracted it to expert farmers via bidding and paid 
dividends, sold grain for self-consumption at lower prices and gave family plots 
for vegetables to ordinary households, which in practice also was a kind of the 
Single Land System). In these forms, land was distributed in more compact and 
larger units. There were three main results. 10. Agricultural mechanization with 
large machinery now was possible. 11. Earlier development in some (chiefly 
Eastern and costal) rural areas, and its promotion in other (mainly Central and 
Western) areas could occur, and 12. Introduction o f  more advanced technology 
and management, larger investment, and domestic and international markets to 
agriculture by urban-rural join t enterprises, and external and foreign joint and 
single ventures also became feasible.
The trend of evolution of the land tenure may be from the Equal Land 
System, through the Dual Land System, toward the Single Land System. While 
the necessary condition of land consolidation and expansion was the development 
of non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines which could absorb surplus labor, 
collective land ownership minimized the bargaining power of the part-time 
farmers and absentees who refused to give back land. Thus the Chinese model 
may have found some ways to overcome the last obstacle imposed by the 
monsoon - the fragmented small farms - in achieving sustainable rural develop­
ment, thus may be superior to the Japanese model and significant to other rice-
■ ------ --^----- [; a s i i i i i i
Chapter I 10
based economies in monsoon Asia. This is examined in detail in the following 
argument.
Other rice-based economies under public land ownership in monsoon Asia, 
Myanmar; Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam; and North Korea, may be regarded as at 
lower levels of the Chinese model of rural development. (Zhou, Jian-Ming 1996)
IV. The Agenda of the Thesis
Part 1 "Theories", which contains Chapters 1, 2 and 3, assesses economic 
theories in relation to practical issues.
Chapter 1 "Introduction" not only presents the structure of the thesis, but 
also examines the proximate sources and ultimate causes of the economic growth 
and the analytical approach used in the thesis.
Chapter 2 "Theories o f  Dualism, the Monsoon Asia Rice Economy and 
Variable Mixed Economies" discusses theories of market forces and the dual 
economy, with reference to monsoon Asia rice-based agriculture, the prewar 
"vicious circle" of poverty in monsoon Asia, the postwar initial conditions for 
development in monsoon Asia, and variable mixed economies. It argues that free 
market forces alone could not overcome the "vicious circle" of poverty and realize 
sustainable rural development in monsoon Asia, whereas variable mixed economy 
solutions have registered varying degrees of success. Mixed economy in this sense 
refers to multiple structures of public and private ownership, and government 
intervention. Variable mixed economies imply varying relations between the 
public and private sectors which dynamically change over time in relation to 
changing needs in economy and society. In particular, within the variable mixed 
economies, there is Nuti’s model of market socialism which submits that the 
state-owned means of production could be leased to the individuals to be operated 
efficiently according to market principles. The Chinese model actually is 
compatible with both variable mixed economies and Nuti’s model of market 
socialism.
Hence my hypothesis: the fragmented small farms as the last obstacle 
imposed by the monsoon in sustainable rural development of monsoon Asia may 
be overcome by variable mixed economies, increasingly along three main phases.
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Phase I: sub-village individual-collective mixed economy (sub-village­
wide cooperalive/enterprise collective use of physically withdrawable private land 
shares, exercising collective-individual dual level operation of large land units, 
with the basic operation level at one household or at a farming unit including a 
number of households).
Phase 2: village-wide individual-collective mixed economy.
Phase 3: either large-scale farming public-individual mixed economy or 
corporate-individual mixed economy (collective use of either public land, or 
physically unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, 
exercising village-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the 
basic operation level at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including a 
number of households, as a third way between the centrally planned economy and 
free market system).
This three-phase hypothesis is going to be tested in Part 2. Hence also the 
focus of the thesis: how to consolidate and enlarge the fragmented small farms in 
monsoon Asia under private and public land ownership with reference to the 
Japanese and Chinese models, and under corporate land ownership as a proposed 
new model.
Chapter 3 "Theory o f Property Rights" reviews those theoretical 
viewpoints most relevant to the above-mentioned focus of the thesis, i.e.,
(1) incentives under private ownership and possession of public assets (including 
property rights, ownership, possession, incentive and Pareto efficiency, and 
technological efficiency); (2) achieving Pareto efficiency according to Coase 
(containing externalities and the Coase theorem); (3) reaching Pareto efficiency 
when the hypotheses of the Coase theorem are relaxed (consisting of positive 
transaction costs, income effects, approaches in assignment of property rights, a 
transaction costs approach toward the choice among private, public and corporate 
land ownership); (4) the evolution of property rights structures (referring to the 
timing of changing existing property rights structures and general methods of 
changing the existing property rights structures), and (5) relevant concepts of 
private ownership (capitalist and individual ownership).
Part 2 "Comparative Practical Studies" includes Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4 "The Japanese Model versus the Last Obstacle " analyzes the 
significance of the Japanese model up to feature 8, and the remaining obstacle as
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feature 9, make theoretical discussions, and test my hypothesis. The thesis is not 
aimed at repeating the analysis of the last obstacle already made by many econo­
mists, but intends to solve it. Hence my conjectural Proposal 7: Collective- 
individual dual level operation of physically unwiihdrawable private land shares 
under corporate ownership, contracting land to expert farmers under the Dual 
Land System and Single Land System to achieve economies of scale in land. This 
conjectural new model on a mixed economy basis is different from both the 
Chinese and Japanese ones and may also be useful for other rice-based economies 
in monsoon Asia under private land ownership once the fragmented small farms 
have become an obstacle to their sustainable rural development. (Zhou. Jian-Ming 
1997)
Other rice-based economies under private land ownership in monsoon Asia 
will be roughly put into four groups according to their progress along the 
Japanese model: Taiwan and South Korea together with Japan, to which my 
Proposal 1 would be applicable. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philip­
pines; Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; Bhutan and Nepal, to which 
conjectural Proposals 2-4 will be offered.
Proposal 2. Raising economies of scale of land should be gradual and 
follow the progress of non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines.
Proposal 3. New land reforms could be made by distributing compact 
rather than fragmented land units.
Proposal 4. Population control should be strengthened so as to avoid re- 
fragmentizing farms.
Chapter 5 "The Chinese Model versus the Last Obstacle" studies (I) the 
Chinese model in general; (2) the emergence of the last obstacle (increasing 
smallness and fragmentation of land due to population growth, and inefficient use 
of land by part-time farmers and absentees); (3) a large-scale farming and 
collective-individual mixed economy (Dual Land System, Leasing System, Single 
Land System, Corporate-Holding System, selection of expert farmers, major 
problems, trend of the evolution of land tenure system); (4) the functioning of 
large-scale farming (organizations of large-scale farmers, agricultural mechaniza­
tion with large machinery, optimal size of large-scale farms, subsidies and self- 
reliance, and related major problems), followed by (5) theoretical discussions 
concerning, in particular, overcoming individual bargaining power by collective
land ownership to achieve effective large-scale farming.
Other rice-based economies under public land ownership in monsoon Asia 
will be generally classified into three levels: Myanmar whose land tenure system 
is quite similar to feature 1 of the Chinese model; Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
whose newly established nominal state - but de facto private - land ownership has 
resulted in both newly landless and inefficient land-holding; North Korea which 
still keeps a centrally planned economy. Conjectural proposals 5-7 will be 
submitted for them.
Proposal 5. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are recommended to abolish the 
nominal state - but de facto private - land ownership and pursue the Chinese 
model.
Proposal 6. In the revision of the present land tenure system for a more 
market-oriented rural development, Myanmar is suggested to go alongside features 
2-12 of the Chinese model, and avoid turning to a nominal state - but de facto 
private - land ownership.
Proposal 7. North Korea is the only country in monsoon Asia and the 
world staying with the centrally planned economy. It is advised to pursue the 
various successive features of the Chinese model.
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V. The Approach of the Analysis
Institutions versus Other Variables of Growth
Agricultural production is a function of many variables including 
institutions, technologies, policies, prices, production structures, labor, capital, 
education, health, weather, etc. Not least, the agriculture in China, Japan and 
many other rice-based economies of monsoon Asia is still vulnerable to bad 
weather. These variables, however, play different roles.
Oshima holds that development theories may be distinguished from growth 
theories in that they are concerned with structural changes.'6 Hence, they are 16
16 According to Gillis, Perkins, Roemer and Snodgrass, economic growth 
refers to a rise in national or per capita income and product. Per capita income 
is measured as the gross national product (the value of all goods and services 
produced by a country's economy in a year) divided by the population. Economic 
development implies not only economic growth but also fundamental changes in
more pertinent to developing countries whose structures and underlying 
institutions are the product of centuries of tradition and lack the flexibility to 
change with the times. In previous studies of development theories and strategies, 
the growth of per capita product was explained as owing to either proximate 
sources or ultimate causes. There was a tendency to group various inputs into the 
category of sources (labor, capital, education, structural change, etc.); and to 
group the explanations of changes in the productivity of inputs into the category 
of causes, the major ones being changes in institutions and technologies (broadly 
coinciding with ways or patterns of thinking and doing). (Oshima 1987; 47, 53)
Oshima himself studies the underlying long-term ultimate causes that 
sustain economic growth by assuming that growth is largely the outcome of the 
interplay of institutional and technological changes, as emphasized by Kuznets 
(Kuznets 1966), and found that it is the institutional component that is most 
important in the interaction of institutions and technologies underlying the growth 
of developing countries.
For example, the growth in agriculture, industry and service sectors of 
postwar Japan was all initiated by institutional reforms. (Oshima 1987: 5-6, 1 Ki­
l l  1, 116, 125-127, 134). The land reform was the most important factor among 
the postwar reforms in Japan in opening the path to rapid economic growth and 
in eliminating social unrest (Takahashi 1993: 106).
There are well known, typical and parallel example in China. Since the 
implementation of the combination of collective ownership and operation of land 
in advanced cooperatives during 1956-58, the production of Xiaogang Production 
Team of Liyuan Commune of Fengyang County of Anhui Province had been
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the structure of the economy and people’s participation in these changes. The 
major structural changes are; (1) the rising share of industry, along with the 
falling share of agriculture, in national product; (2) an increasing percentage of 
people who live in cities rather than the countryside; (3) passing through periods 
of accelerating, then decelerating, population growth, during which the nation’s 
age structure changes dramatically; (4) consumption patterns change as people no 
longer have to spend all their income on necessities, but instead move on to 
consume durables and eventually to leisure-time products and services. People of 
the country must be major participants in the process that brought about these 
changes and in the production and enjoyment of the benefits of these changes. 
The benefits should go to the whole people for equity rather than to a tiny 
wealthy minority. (Gillis; Perkins; Roemer & Snodgrass 1992: 8-9)
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declining. All walkable persons including youngsters and girls had been beggars 
outside. By 1979, due to emigration to other rural areas, household numbers 
dropped from 34 to 18 and population from 175 persons to about 100. Annual per 
capita food ranged within 50-100 kg (i.e., an average of only 0.14-0.27 kg a day) 
and annual cash income 15-30 yuan. It became the smallest and poorest 
production team of the County. On Nov. 24, 1978, first in the whole country in 
the reform period, the Team Director and households initiated Bao Gan Dao Hu, 
the major form of the Household Contract System17 in the framework of the 
small-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy. 517 mu (34.46 ha) 
of collectively owned farmland were contracted according to population number 
to households equally, along with 10 farm cattle (one cattle to each two house­
holds). The state tax and compulsory sale quotas, fees to collectives (commune, 
brigade and team), and repayment amount of credits were also allocated in the 
same way. Any surplus output would belong to the households. In the autumn of 
1979, the total grain output jumped to over 66,OfK) kg, equivalent to the sum of 
the past five years; oil crops rose to 17,500 kg, equal to the total in the preceding 
20 years; pigs raised in the current year were 135. exceeding the number in any 
of the previous years. 15,000 kg of grain were sold to the state, the first of such 
sales since 1956, together with 12,466.5 kg of oil crops, as a new sale item. 
Credits were repaid for the first lime in 800 yuan. As a result, the annual per 
capita food reached 510 kg of grain (on average 1.4 kg a day), plus 50.335 kg of 
oil crops. Cash income averaged 200 yuan. (Yang & Liu 1987: 12-13, 112). In 
the summer of 1979, Shannan District of Feixi County of the same Province 
implemented Bao Chan Dao Hu, the minor form of the Household Contract 
System. Although suffering from drought, high winds, pests and flood, some 
production teams achieved a total grain output equivalent to the sum of the past 
five-six years. Some poor teams eliminated poverty even in the same season even 
under such adverse conditions. (Chen; Chen & Yang 1993: 484). The Household 
Contract System proved to be a great success and enabled the provincial authority 
to convince other regions to adopt it (Kojima 1988: 709-710).
Thus, with the same technologies, government policies, prices and weather,
17 The major and minor forms of the Household Contract System will be
elaborated in Chapter 5.
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farmers under different local institutions could achieve different production 
results. Institutional changes giving high incentives to farmers could raise 
production even in the same season and year.
Of course, for achieving sustainable rural development, institutional 
changes are not enough. They need to he followed by technological and structural 
changes, e.g., construction of rural infrastructure, higher yields and multiple 
cropping of rice and other grains, diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture, 
off-farm employment, peasant migration to cities and work in towns, and 
agricultural mechanization with small machinery.
But once production has reached the frontier permitted by the established 
institutions, even though the increase of production is technologically still possible 
(as agricultural mechanization with large machinery), it tends to be hampered by 
vested interests, just as the ninth feature (persistence of the fragmented small 
farms) of the Japanese model has suggested. At this stage, another round of 
institutional changes is needed to allow sustainable rural development, just as the 
ninth feature (a large-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy) of 
the Chinese model has shown.
Therefore, Barker, Herdt and Rose conclude that of so many variables for 
rural development, the institutional changes are the keystone (Barker; Herdt & 
Rose 1985: 157).
Narrative Analysis versus Econometric Models
Oshima points out that in development studies, while the proximate 
sources of the growth were quantifiable, the longer range ultimate causes were not 
easily quantified, and it was necessary to depend largely on narrative analysis or 
analytical description to understand the mechanisms involved. Thus, the "bottom 
lines" in the studies of the growth experience of nations became rather ambiguous 
and indefinite since the major explanatory causes, institutions and technologies, 
were not measurable and their interactions difficult even to identify in a formal 
manner. (Oshima 1987: 53. Also see Matthews et al. 1982 for Britain; Carre, 
Dubois & Malinvaud 1975 for France; Ohkawa & Rosovsky 1973 for Japan and 
Abramovitz 1973 for USA). Econometric models thus proved to be of limited use 
as their results turned out to be highly unstable "in the face of minor modifica-
lions in data specification, observation period and estimation method" (Matthews 
et al. 1982: 202).
All this meant that long-term analysis could not dispense with historical 
narrative analysis or analytical description of the development of institutions and 
technologies as these were important in understanding the role of the parameters, 
especially in long-term studies. To keep this type of analysis from becoming too 
diffuse, it was necessary to cast it in transition stages, to partition historical spans, 
facilitating the analysis of each portion, (Oshima 1987: 53-54)lil
In Chapter 2, the prewar "vicious circle" of poverty in monsoon Asia will 
be assessed which implies historical narrative analysis. Also, keeping in mind that 
so many of the features of the Japanese and Chinese models are important, and 
taking into consideration that this thesis has to focus on how to overcome the 
fragmented small farms, the emphasis of the analysis has to be on the ninth 
feature of the Japanese and Chinese models, both concerning institutional changes. 
Therefore, in this thesis, the Oshima approach o f narrative analysis or analytical 
description is used.
é
VL Tentative Contributions of the Thesis
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f Chapter 2 "Theories of Dualism, the Monsoon Asia Rice Economy and 
Variable Mixed Economies" reviews a number of postwar initial economic and 
social conditions faced by developing economies in monsoon Asia raised by 18
18 Oshima gives two examples of what is meant by historical narrative 
analysis. (1) Contributing to the rise in total factor productivity in the US in the 
early decades of the present century (in contrast to its slow growth in the previous 
century) was the rapid spread from the 1920s of new types of mechanical 
equipment powered by electric motors and internal combustion engines displacing 
large numbers of unskilled workers on farms and in industry. Contributing to the 
quick dissemination of this equipment were the wage increases following 
immigration restrictions enacted as a result of strong pressures from the American 
Federation of Labor, together with the pent-up demand for manufactured products 
from World War One (WWl). (2) In the case of postwar Japan, it was the new 
institutions introduced by the Allied Occupation and later modified by the 
Japanese that democratized and demilitarized basic economic and social 
institutions in the postwar years. Additional institutions were developed that 
succeeded in motivating peasants, workers, managers and bureaucrats to great 
heights of productivity as technologies were efficiently imported, adapted, 
disseminated and utilized. (Oshima 1987: 53-54)
Kuznets, Myrdal and Ishikawa. While these authors put Japan together with 
developed countries in the West, I find that they were also applicable to the 
immediate postwar Japan. This finding paves the way for the later arguments that 
Japan had the similar problems and tasks as other rice-based economies in 
monsoon Asia, and that the Japanese model of rural development is highly 
relevant to them. According to the concept of variable mixed economies, I later 
classify various mixed economies in Chapters 4 and 5. These include (1) 
individual-cooperative mixed economy; (2) sub-village and (3) village-wide 
individual-collective mixed economy; (4) corporate-individual mixed economy; 
(5) small-scale farming and (6) large-scale farming collective-individual mixed 
economy; (7) nominal state-individual mixed economy, and (8) public-individual 
mixed economy. In front of the global wave of privatization and blind worship 
to free market forces, I stress that only by variable mixed economies, rather than 
free market forces alone, can sustainable rural development and sustainable 
economic development in general be achieved. In this sense, the implication of 
this thesis would be beyond monsoon Asia and rural development.
Chapter 3 "Theory of Property Rights" analyzes the importance of negative 
pecuniary externalities and the relationship between the negative technological 
and pecuniary externalities. It identifies four kinds of negative externalities in 
time sequence; the definition of internalization of negative externalities, and the 
distinction between the elimination of negative externalities in financial terms and 
that in physical terms. It provides a more complete list of positive transaction 
costs, and systemizes five approaches in the assignment of property rights for 
eliminating negative externalities. Using the Coase transaction costs approach, it 
explores the fundamental reason why the consolidation and expansion of the 
fragmented small farms have been so difficult under the Japanese model but much 
smoother under the Chinese model, and explains that corporate land ownership 
could be a suitable way for overcoming this last obstacle in the rice-based 
economies under private land ownership in monsoon Asia. Accordingly, 
authorities in the property rights theory field such as Coase, Demsetz, Furubotn 
and Pejovich, Laffont, Milgrom and Roberts, and Varian are assessed and 
criticized.
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In Chapter 4 "The Japanese Model versus the Last Obstacle" and Chapter 
5 "The Chinese Model versus the Last Obstacle", I synthesize the rural
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development approaches in the rice-based economies of monsoon Asia into two 
major models, the Japanese and Chinese ones, display their major similarities 
(features 1-8) and differences (feature 9 and its results), and arguably indicate the 
superiority of the Chinese model in overcoming the last obstacle. Other rice-based 
economies in monsoon Asia under private land ownership are generally grouped 
as at the same stage or lower stages of the Japanese model and those under public 
land ownership at lower stages of the Chinese model. Such system izations are not 
yet found in the literature reviewed and have been appreciated by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as under its invitation I presented 
a paper on this in its workshop held in Godollo, Hungary in Apr. 1996 and 
published by FAO in 1997. (Zhou, Jian-Ming 1996)
In Chapter 4, I maintain that the major efforts - and their limits - in 
overcoming the fragmented small farms obstacle in Japan since the 1970s are not 
actually "a Japanese approach to land extensive farming" as acclaimed by Tabata, 
but a replication of those of the Chinese elementary cooperatives up to Apr. 1956.
I thus have proposed a new model to overcome the last obstacle in Japan, which 
is different from both the Japanese and Chinese ones, and has also been 
appreciated and published by FAO (Zhou, Jian-Ming 1997). For the other rice- 
based economies under private land ownership in monsoon Asia, to those where 
the fragmented small farms have become an obstacle, I also have recommended 
this conjectural model; to those where rural development is still at lower stages,
I point out that not only the refusal to carry out a complete land reform against 
the feudal land ownership is wrong, but also the establishment of large-scale 
farms with large machinery before rural industrialization can absorb surplus 
peasants thus making them landless and crowding them into city slums is 
incorrect.
In Chapter 5, according to material from the beginning of the 1980s until 
1997, I systematically analyze the large-scale farming and collective-individual 
mixed economy to overcome the last obstacle in China. For Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam, I point out that their newly established nominal state ownership - but 
de facto private ownership - of land may not prevent the appearance of new 
landlessness in the low wage economy and inefficient holding of land by part- 
time farmers and absentees in the high wage economy, criticize the designers 
including Hayami, and recommend the abolition of such a nominal state - but de
Chanter 1 2 0
facto private - land ownership.
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Chapter 2
Theories of Dualism, 
the Monsoon Asia Rice Economy and 
Variable Mixed Economies
I. Dualism1
Concept of Dualism
The concept of dualism or dual economy was put forward by Preobrazhe­
nsky in 1924 and re-discussed by Lewis, Jorgenson, Fei and Ranis and many 
others since the 1950s (Preobrazhensky 1924. Lewis 1954. Jorgenson 1961. Fei 
and Ranis 1961). The interpretation of dualism varies according to different 
authors.
In many underdeveloped countries, two basic economic sectors and/or 
regions co-exist with broadly polarized features: modern industry, mainly in cities; 
and traditional agriculture in rural areas. The main features have been set out in 
Table 2.1. In such a dual economy, there might be some modern farms and 
plantations and traditional handicraft as exceptions to the above distinctions. 
(Agarwala 1983: 5). Dual economy or dualism is two-sided by definition, and 
multi-dimensional in its effects.
There is an important difference between densely and sparsely populated 
economies within the terms of reference of the dualism debate. The former stretch 
all the way from Southeastern Europe to Southeastern Asia and also exist in some 
African regions, while the latter exist mainly in South America and Saharan and 
Sub-Saharan African countries. (Nurkse 1953: 32, 49-50). Here, the emphasis of 
analysis is on the densely populated economies, lor they are more relevant to the 
rice-based economies of monsoon Asia.
1 The theory of dualism, in a narrow sense, may refer to "what is dualism". 
In a broad sense, it may also include "how to overcome dualism" which, however, 
overlaps other theories in development economics. Hence, it is used in the narrow 
sense here.
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Table 2.1 Summary of the Interpretations of Dual Economy 
in the Context of Densely Populated Economies
Modem industry Traditional agriculture
1. Highly capitalistic 
system introduced from the 
West.
Pre-capitalistic system of the East.
2. Unlimited wants, 
monetized and 
profit-seeking.
Self-sufficient, limited wants for subsistence; 
either limited markets or non-monetary and 
non-profit-seeking.
3. Capitalist ownership hiring 
wage labor.
In monsoon Asia, exceptional feudal serf- 
holder ownership giving subsistence land to 
serfs; dominance of feudal landlord ownership 
renting out small parcels to tenants; plus small 
owner-peasants, all forming individual farming 
units. (See Table 2.2)
4. Inputs are combined 
according to marginal 
productivity rule, seeking 
economies of scale and scope.
Production is organized on a family-basis; 
tasks are allotted according to sex and age; and 
rewards to members according to average 
product.
5. High mobility of 
factors of production.
Immobility of factors of production.
6. Input with little land but 
much capital.
Input with much land hut little capital.
7. Diversified output as 
manufactures for both 
consumption and investment.
Undiversified or monoculture output of seed 
tor production, forage for animals and food for 
consumption.
8. Developed hard and soft 
infrastructure.
Little hard and no soft infrastructure.
9. Sophisticated banking and 
other modern services.
Little/no banking or other modern services.
10. Good transport and 
telecommunications.
Primitive transport and little/no 
telecommunications for peasant farmers.
11. Electric and gas power 
networks.
Little/no electric and gas power networks.
12. Mechanized equipment. Hand and animal tools.
13. Advanced technologies. Backward technologies.
14. Rich. Very poor.
Sources: 1 & 2. Boeke 1953. United Nations 1955. 3. Myrdal 1972: 198- 
207. 4. Barber 1970: 36-39. 5. Boeke 1953. 6. Jorgenson 1961. Lewis 
1954: 407. 7. Fei & Ranis 1964. 8-11. Own definitions. 12 & 13. Eckaus 
1955. Fukuoka 1955. Higgins 1968. Hirschman 1958. 14. Agarwala 1983: 
3-5.
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Table 2.2 A Brief Interpretation of Feudal Land Ownership
Feudal land ownership refers to a system whereby the feudalists owned 
land and partially held producers. It includes feudal serf-holder ownership 
(typical feudalism) and feudal landlord ownership.
Feudal serf-holder ownership. Feudal landlord ownership.
1. The feudal serf-holder (or serf- 
owner, seigneur, lord) owned land 
(manor). He (she) held villeins 
(serfs) in semibondage.
The feudal landlord owned land. He 
(she) held tenant in semibondage 
not in theory but in reality.
2. The villein held subsistence land 
owned by the lord. The villein must 
pay tribute to, but also gained pro­
tection from, the lord. The villein 
could not leave the lord without his 
permission.
The tenant rented small parcels 
from, and must pay rent to, the 
landlord according to contract. In 
theory, peasants were allowed to 
leave the landlord, but in practice 
had little or no alternative.
3. High tribute in services (typically, 
tilling demesne - land used by the 
lord), in kind and later in money; 
tribute in money is also called neo­
feudalism; but the three forms could 
co-exist.
High rent in services, in kind and 
later in money; rent in money is 
also called neo-feudalism; but the 
three forms could co-exist.
4. Dominant in Europe in the Mid­
dle Ages; in Bhutan and Nepal 
nowadays.
Dominant in monsoon Asia in pre­
war times; still present in South and 
Southeast Asia.
Note: One view treats the serf-holder system as a part of feudalism including the 
English lord-villein system (but Russian serfdom as an exception belonging to the 
slavery system). Another view regards the serf-holder system as a part of the 
slavery system rather than feudalism, and it did not contain the English lord- 
villein system which belonged to feudalism. Both are agreed that the English lord- 
villein system was feudal and Russian serfdom was slavery, but disagree with 
whether the serf-holder system in general belonged to feudalism or slavery. This 
brief interpretation, however, does not intend to be involved in such debates. 
Sources: Chemow & Vallasi 1993: 942-943, 1684, 2480, 2890. Jiang, Xue-Mo 
1985: 12. Cihai 1978: 13-14. Oshima 1993: 10.
Three Characteristics of the Traditional Agriculture in the Densely 
Populated Dual Economy
Disguised unemployment.
Nurkse points out that disguised unemployment (DUN) means that a large 
part of the population engaged in agriculture could be removed without reducing 
agricultural output, even though the technical methods in use (technology,
equipment, machinery, seeds, drainage, irrigation, etc.) remain unchanged. The 
term DUN implies a condition of family employment in peasant communities. A 
number of people are working on farms or small peasant parcels, contributing 
virtually nothing to output, but subsisting on a share of their family’s real income. 
(Nurkse 1953: 32-33)
The unemployment is disguised in the sense that personal identification is 
difficult or even impossible. The people may all be occupied and no one may 
consider himself (herself) to be idle. Thus, this term is not applicable to wage 
labor in capitalist industry, where the unemployed people are identifiable although 
some labor hoarding may occasionally occur. (Nurkse 1953: 33)
In some countries, DUN might be a seasonal phenomenon, for at the peak 
of the harvest season, all the available labor is needed and is actively at work. 
Seasonal unemployment is likely to be significant where an annual crop cycle, 
e.g., of cereal food crops, dominates farm activity and where this activity has not 
developed more advanced forms such as dairy farming. But even where DUN is 
mainly a seasonal matter, making more productive use of labor is still possible. 
In some countries, however, the peak harvest load might still be managed by a 
smaller labor force if organizational changes, such as consolidation of parcels, 
could be carried out (Nurkse 1953: 35)
There are also countries where DUN is more than seasonal and can exist 
throughout the year. In Egypt, for example, the various crops, some of which are 
harvested more than once a year, tend to overlap so that there is hardly any lime 
of year when some crop is not being harvested. In such circumstances, any under­
employment that may exist must be more or less continuous. (Nurkse 1953: 36) 
Unlimited supply o f  labor.
Lewis uses this term to refer to the nature of the supply of labor to the 
advanced sector using modern methods of production. The labor supply curve is 
horizontal at the given wage rate over a considerable range. It means an infinitely 
elastic labor supply at the prevailing wage. The supply of labor is unlimited so 
long as the supply of labor at this price exceeds the demand. (Lewis 1954: 401- 
403. Agarwala 1983: 6-7)
Wage gap.
Agarwala conceptualizes this term in two senses. In its first sense, the 
wage gap represents the excess of the earnings of labor over its marginal
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productivity in traditional agriculture. In its second sense, it refers to the gap 
between the earnings of labor in advanced industry and the earnings of labor in 
traditional agriculture. In the first sense, the marginal productivity of labor in 
traditional agriculture is zero or very low, but it is still paid a positive wage, 
causing a wage gap. In the second sense, the industrial wage rate may lie above 
the wage in agriculture, forming a further wage gap. (Agarwala 1983: 7)
The particular characteristics of disguised unemployment, unlimited supply 
of labor and wage gap in monsoon Asia will be discussed later in this chapter.
The Significance of Dualism
It should be shown that in certain circumstances, a dual economy can grow 
spectacularly and flourish.
The most evident example is Japan, where the transformation of dualism 
between industry and agriculture has brought huge changes in the economy, 
society and Japan's international power within 40 years. However, Japanese 
dualism also implies the co-existence of bigger, large-scale, capital intensive, high 
wage enterprises and smaller scale, comparatively labor intensive, low wage 
businesses. Therefore there has been dualism within industry as well as dualism 
between it and agriculture. Other examples include Italy during the period of the 
so-called "miracle" of 1948 to 1973, as well as Taiwan and South Korea over the 
last 30 years. The further case, of course, despite the range of false starts and new 
starts of different policies, has been China itself. In fact, the issue of dualism is 
highly relevant to the exploration for land tenure systems suitable to the 
sustainable agricultural and rural development of China, as well as other rice- 
based economies of monsoon Asia.
However, none of this in itself contradicts the mainly negative analysis of 
the mechanisms and effects of dualism of the original postwar literature of 
Nurkse, Lewis, Myrdal and others as analyzed in this chapter. Moreover, it is 
strongly arguable that these economies which have managed to exploit dualism 
have done so by countering its negative effects by economic or social policies. 
We characterize such policies as a "mixed economy" framework (see later in this 
chapter), using the concept to refer to the symbiotic relations of public and private 
economic power, rather than simply to ownership per se.
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II. Market Forces and the Dual Economy
The "Vicious Circle" of Poverty
Free market forces alone may not overcome, hut reinforce, dual economy 
or dualism, hence could realize sustainable rural development. This is intrinsic to 
the theory of dualism in the various senses as indicated above.
The "vicious circle" o f poverty within poor rural areas.
Nurkse states that the "vicious circle" of poverty implies a circular 
constellation of forces tending to act and react upon one another in such a way 
as to keep a poor country in a state of poverty. Thus, in a famous human analogy, 
a poor man may not have enough to eat; being under-fed, his health may be 
weak; being physically weak, his working capacity is low, which means that he 
is poor, which in turn means that he will not have enough to eat; and so on. A 
situation of this sort, relating to a country as a whole, can be summed up as: "A 
country is poor because it is poor.” (Nurkse 1953: 4)
The ' vicious circle" in capital formation in economically backward areas. 
According to Nurkse, there are matters of unilateral causation that can 
keep a country or area poor, for instance, lack of mineral resources, insufficient 
water or barren soil. Some of the poor areas are poor partly for such reasons. But 
in all of them, their poverty is also attributable to some extent to the lack of 
adequate capital equipment, which can be due to the small inducement to invest 
as well as to the small capacity to save. (Nurkse 1953: 5)
Further, for Nurkse, the inducement to invest is limited by the size of the 
market. The factors determining the size of the market are not simply money 
demand, number of people or physical area. Transport facilities are important. 
Reductions in transport costs (artificial as well as natural) do enlarge the market 
in the economic as well as the geographical sense. But reductions in any cost of 
production tend to have that effect. So the size of the market is determined by the 
general level of productivity. In its turn, the level of productivity depends largely 
on the use of capital in production. But the use of capital is inhibited, to start 
with, by the small size of the market. (Nurkse 1952: 256)
In Nurkse’s model, the supply of capital is governed by the ability and 
willingness to save; the demand for capital is governed by the incentives to
invest. A circular relationship exists on both sides of the problem of capital 
formation in the poverty-ridden areas. On the supply side, there is a small 
capacity to save, due to the low level of real income. The low real income is a 
reflection of low productivity, which in its turn is due largely to the lack of 
capital. The lack of capital is a result of the small capacity to save, and so the 
circle is complete. On the demand side, the inducement to invest may be low 
because the small size of the market makes it unprofitable to apply modem capital 
equipment by any individual entrepreneur in any particular industry to produce 
products or services. The small size of the market is due to the small buying 
power of the people, which is due to their small real income, which again is due 
to low productivity. The low level of productivity, however, is a result of the 
small amount of capital used in production, which in its turn may be caused at 
least by the small inducement to invest. The low level of real income, reflecting 
low productivity, is common to both circles. (Nurkse 1953: 4-5)
Even though in economically backward areas. Say’s Law - "Production 
creates its own demand” - may be valid in the sense that there is no "deflationary 
gap" through excessive savings, it never is valid in the sense that the output of 
any single industry, newly set up with capital equipment, can create its own 
demand. The people engaged in a new industry, say, shoe industry, will not wish 
to spend all their income on their own products. If in the rest of the economy 
nothing happens to increase productivity and hence buying power, the market for 
the new product is likely to prove deficient. If people outside the new industry 
do not have enough food, clothing and shelter, they cannot let go the little they 
have of these elementary necessities in order to buy a pair of shoes, the new 
product, every year. (Nurkse 1953: 9)
"Backwash Effects" and "Spread Effects"
"Backwash effects".
Myrdal argues that if market forces were unhampered by any policy 
intervention, industrial production, commerce, banking, insurance, shipping and 
almost all those economic activities which in a developing economy tend to give 
a bigger than average return, and science, art, literature, education and higher 
culture generally would cluster in certain localities and regions, leaving the rest
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of the country more or less in a backwater (Myrdal 1957: 26). The expansion in 
an advanced industrial locality tends to have "backwash etiects" in other localities 
via "economic factors" and "non-economic factors".
The "backwash effects" via "economic factors", Myrdal claims that by 
themselves, the movements of labor, capital, goods and services tend to have 
positive results for the advanced industrial localities, and negative ones in the 
poor rural areas, thus enlarging the inequalities between them. (Myrdal 1957: 27)
(1) Migration. The localities and regions where economic activity is 
expanding will attract net immigration from other parts of the country. (Myrdal 
1957: 27). This movement of the labor force may have two negative results.
* Senilization and feminization o f the agricultural labor force. Both 
Myrdal and Holland argue that migration is always selective, at least with respect 
to the migrant's age and sex. As more and more young males emigrate, 
senilization and feminization will happen in the agricultural labor force. This 
movement by itself tends to favor the rapidly growing communities and disfavor 
the others. [Myrdal 1957: 27-28. Holland 1976 (a): 109-110]
* Urban congestion. Holland further makes the analysis that while 
enlarging the inequalities between the advanced urban areas and the backward 
rural ones, the migration can also create problems for the former, such as urban 
congestion. It is clear that modern urban problems are not caused exclusively by 
immigration. For one thing, internal and external economies of scale in production 
can congest sites without notable expansion of lahor. This will occur if the 
substitution of capital for labor has reached a point where output can be expanded 
without job creation, which now is increasingly a feature of Western manufactur­
ing industry. [Holland 1976 (a): 111]
- Indirect social costs. Such costs will aggravate urban problems when the 
social infrastructure needs of immigrant labor are not fully paid for by those firms 
which employ the immigrants. In practice, firms will pay some of the costs of 
providing social infrastructure to the extent that they are reflected in higher local 
taxation. But the precise incidence of costs will depend on the relative share of 
firms and individuals in the local taxation system. In some cases, firms are not 
obliged to contribute to local taxes and therefore avoid the costs of social 
overhead capital (SOC). [Holland 1976 (a): 112].
- Insufficient housing or health facilities fo r  immigrants. Although local
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authorities may be responsible for such SOC facilities as transport, sewage and 
power supply, they may not be responsible for, or able to provide, enough 
housing or health facilities for immigrants. The immigrants may have to meet 
these costs from their earnings, which they cannot afford. Hence a slum problem. 
[Holland 1976 (a): 112, 118]
- Higher social costs. The costs of providing SOC facilities increase 
substantially with urban size, from the viewpoint of interregional resource use. In 
other words, the SOC costs for an immigrant and his dependents in a large urban 
area of labor inflow can be higher than in smaller urban areas in the region from 
which they have migrated. [Holland 1976 (a): 112]
Such urban congestion problems are dramatically evident in the densely 
populated countries of monsoon Asia.
(2) Capital movements. Myrdal also discovers that in the centers of 
expansion, increased demand for capital will spur investment, which in its turn 
will increase incomes and demand and cause a second round of investment, and 
so on. Saving will increase as a result of higher incomes but will tend to lag 
behind investment in the sense that the supply of capital will steadily meet a brisk 
demand for it. (Myrdal 1957: 28)
In other regions the lack of new expansionary momentum implies that the 
demand for investment capital remains relatively weak. Also, the supply of 
savings will be low since incomes are low and tending to fall. (This is a standard 
enough argument in Keynesian demand theory and multiplier analysis. But 
Myrdal’s contribution is, first, to give it a spatial dimension and second, to argue 
that the process is asymmetric and may be irreversible.) But this is not the only 
problem. The banking system, if not regulated to act differently, tends to become 
an instrument for siphoning off the savings from the poorer regions to the richer 
and more progressive ones where returns on capital are high and secure. (Myrdal 
1957: 28)
(3) Trade. Myrdal claims that the freeing and widening of markets will 
often confer competitive advantages on the industries in already established 
centers of expansion, which usually work under conditions of increasing returns, 
and that the handicraft and industries existing earlier in the other regions are 
thwarted. For example, after Italy’s political unification and the pulling down of 
the internal tariff walls in the last century, industry in the northern provinces had
Chapter 2 31
Chapter 2 32
such a lead and was so much stronger that it dominated the national market and 
suppressed industrial efforts in the southern provinces which, as a result, remained 
mainly agricultural. Holland analyzes both this and another example on a still 
larger scale - the long economic stagnation after the Civil War up to WWII of the 
southern states of the US. This systematic bias of trade between regions forms 
also a part of the mechanism of exploitation in the economic relations between 
a metropolitan country and its colonies. [Myrdal 1957: 28-29. Holland 1976 (a): 
56-59. Holland 1976 (b): 97-110]
(4) Transportation.2 Myrdal writes that if left to themselves, those regions 
which had not been touched by the expansionary momentum could not afford to 
keep up a good road system, and all their other public utilities would be inferior, 
thus increasing their competitive disadvantages. Railways will be built so as to 
meet the effective demand for transport, i.e., without much consideration for the 
needs of those regions. (Myrdal 1957: 29)
The "backwash effects" via "non-economic factors". Myrdal mentions that 
these "non-economic factors" are various. Here, health and education are taken 
as examples. The poor regions, unaided, could hardly afford much medical care 
and their population would be less healthy and have a lower productive 
efficiency. They would have fewer schools and their schools would be grossly 
inferior, keeping the population largely illiterate. (Myrdal 1957: 30)
”Spread effects".
Myrdal stresses that against the "backwash effects" there are, however, 
also certain centrifugal "spread effects" of expansionary momentum from the 
centers of economic expansion to other regions. The whole region around a nodal 
center of expansion should gain from the increasing outlets of agricultural 
products and be stimulated to technical advance all along the line. (Myrdal 1957: 
31)
There is also another line of centrifugal "spread effects" to localities 
further away, where favorable conditions exist for producing raw materials for the 
growing industries in the centers. If a sufficient number of workers become 
employed in these other localities even consumer goods industries will be given
2 Myrdal regards transportation as a non-economic factor, but it would be
more appropriate to treat it as an economic factor.
a spur there. These, and also all other localities where new starts are being made 
and happen to succeed, become in their turn new centers of self-sustained 
economic expansion, if the expansionary momentum is strong enough to 
overcome the "backwash effects" from the other center. (Myrdal 1957: 31) 
Accordingly, knowledge of science, technology and management can also spread.
The interaction o f the "backwash effects" and "spread effects".
There are three main outcomes o f the interaction. Myrdal submits that the 
"spread effects" of momentum from a center of industrial expansion to other 
localities and regions, operating through increased demand for their products, 
weave themselves into the cumulative social process by circular causation in the 
same fashion as the "backwash effects" in opposition to which they set up 
countervailing changes. In the marginal case, the two kinds of effects will balance 
each other. But this balance is not a stable equilibrium, for any change in the 
forces will start a cumulative movement upwards or downwards. (Myrdal 1957: 
31-32)
In reality, (1) expanding, (2) stagnating and (3) regressing localities 
interact continuously on different levels, with multiple graduations between the 
extremes (Myrdal 1957: 32).
Insofar as the net "spread effects" are positive, economic standards in the 
whole country are given a lift. It is quite possible that all the regions in a country 
may be inside this margin of balancing forces - if the initial starts are many and 
strong and successful enough and if the centrifugal "spread effects" work 
relatively effectively. The problem of inequalities then becomes a problem of the 
different rates of progress between regions in the country. Ordinarily, however, 
even in a rapidly developing country, many regions will be lagging behind, 
stagnating or even becoming poorer. There would be more regions in the last two 
categories (stagnating and regressing) if market forces along were left to decide 
the outcome. (Myrdal 1957: 32)
Myrdal claims two trends exist as follows. First, in rich countries, the 
"spread effects" are stronger. The higher the level of economic development that 
a country has already attained, the stronger the "spread effects" will usually be. 
For a high average level of development is accompanied by improved transporta­
tion and communications, higher levels of education, and a more dynamic 
communion of ideas and values - all of which tends to strengthen the forces for
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the centrifugal spread of economic expansion or to remove the obstacles for its 
operation. With the extinction of abject poverty on a large-scale goes a fuller 
utilization of the potentialities of the human resources in a nation. This is one of 
the reasons why rapid and sustained progress becomes an almost automatic 
process once a country has reached a high level of development. (Myrdal 1957: 
34)
Second, in poor countries, "backwash effects" are stronger. Part of the 
curse of a low average level of development in an under-developed country is the 
fact that the "spread effects" there are weak. This means that as a rule the free 
play o f the market forces in a poor country will work more powerfully to create 
regional inequalities and to widen those which already exist. That a low level of 
economic development is accompanied as a rule by great economic inequalities 
represents itself a major impediment to progress. It tends to hold the underdevel­
oped countries down. This is one of the interlocking relations by which in the 
cumulative process "poverty becomes its own cause". (Myrdal 1957: 34)
Therefore, in the interaction of advanced industry and poor agriculture, the 
market itself normally tends to increase the inequalities between these two sectors. 
The free play by the market forces and laissez-faire may not overcome the dual 
economy in underdeveloped countries; they will tend to reinforce it. Thus, the free 
market forces alone could not realize sustainable rural development,
III. Monsoon Asia Nature and Rice Culture
Section II has argued that free market forces alone may not overcome the 
"vicious circle" of poverty and realize sustainable rural development. Before going 
on to Section IV which will outline evidence that, in particular, they could not 
overcome the prewar "vicious circle" of poverty in monsoon Asia, background 
material on monsoon Asia nature and rice culture is provided here.
Geography and Climate
Monsoon distribution among regions o f  the world.
The word monsoon derives from the arabic "mansin", meaning seasonal 
wind (Robinson 1967: 20). A monsoon climate is one that is dominated by
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seasonal winds that blow for half of the year in one direction and then reverse 
themselves (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 22). Ginsburg claims that each continent 
exhibits the seasonal reversal of winds and rains known as the monsoon effects, 
but nowhere are these reversals as notable as in Asia. In North America there is 
a smaller relevant land mass. In South America only a small part of the continent 
lies in the higher latitudes and the winter monsoon effects are minimized. In 
Africa, no part of the continent lies within the higher latitudes and the monsoon 
effects are restricted to relatively limited areas. Europe's western areas are most 
strongly influenced by the Gulf stream westerly winds of the upper middle 
latitudes, and the climate is predominantly maritime all the year round, except in 
the Mediterranean. Of the vast land mass of Australia, too. a relatively small area 
is involved. (Ginsburg et al 1958: 8)
However, in Asia, there is not just one monsoon, but three distinct 
monsoon patterns: the Indian, the Malayan and the Japanese (Spencer & Thomas 
1971: 175). The Indian monsoon controls air movements over Pakistan, India, Sri 
Lanka, and the west coast of Myanmar. The Malayan monsoon affects Indonesia, 
the Philippines, most of mainland Southeast Asia, and most of China. The 
Japanese monsoon impacts Korea, part of northern China, most of northeast 
China, and Japan. (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 22-23). The monsoon countries 
include nearly all of Southeast Asia and the densely settled portions of China, 
Japan, Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh. The monsoon regions exclude Hokkaido 
and Manchuria in the northeast, Mongolia in the north, western China, Afghani­
stan, and Pakistan in the west, the southeastern islands of Indonesia, and India 
west and south of New Delhi. (Oshima 1987: 20)
Major cause o f  the Asian monsoon.
Oshima explains that the reversal in direction of winds and rains in Asia 
is due to the heating and cooling of the world’s largest land mass, especially in 
the "vast complex of mountains and plateaus" centered in Tibet and bounded in 
the south by the Himalayas, in the west by the Pamirs, in the north by the 
mountains of Xinjiang, and in the east by the southwestern mountains of China - 
a range of mountains and plateaus extending 5,000 miles. (Oshima 1987: 19). 
The seasonal heating and cooling of this world’s largest land mass makes for 
major seasonal variations in climate. In winter, when the interior regions are cold, 
a semi-permanent high pressure belt forms within the northern interior of the
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continent, and strong, cold winds, outflowing as polar continental air masses from 
the anticyclones within the belt, bring winter to most of the continent. In summer, 
the rapid and continuous heating of the interior results in lower pressures and in 
the inflow of tropical maritime air from the continent’s margin. Since the 
outflowing winds are land-originated and usually do not pass over large bodies 
of water, they are dry, and the winters also tend to be dry. Conversely, in the 
summer the generally weaker inflows of air from the eastern and southern seas 
are humid and carry with them the moisture that for much of Asia makes summer 
the rainier season. (Ginsburg et al 1958: 7). Commonly in Asia, as Barker, Herdt 
and Rose note, the monsoon season is referred to as the wet season since the rest 
of the year is usually relatively dry (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 22).
Weather patterns and population distribution in monsoon Asia.
Oshima stresses that although the typical climate of the region is divided 
between a wet season and a dry season, the weather patterns are varied. Calcutta, 
Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Guangdong and Manila have heavy rains in the 
summer months. Toward the equator (Singapore), the rainfall pattern is less 
distinct, and it is reversed south of the equator. Colombo experiences two peaks 
of precipitation, one coming in the late fall. In much of the temperate zone, the 
summer is less pronounced (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 22-23). In Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka, as in Japan and Taiwan, there are light rainy months before the 
summer monsoons. (Oshima 1987: 20)
The mountain core of the huge land mass acts as "the hub of a colossal 
wheel", the spokes of which are formed by some of the greatest rivers of the 
world, spiralling outward from the rain-catching and snow-capped slopes of the 
Hindu Kush, Pamirs, Himalayas, Karakorum, Altyn Tagh, Tian Shan, and the 
other ranges of the highland core. The great rivers flowing eastward and 
southward define the Asia that is populous and developed. These rivers are the 
Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Irrawaddy, the Mekong, and the Yangtze, 
besides a number of smaller rivers. Within the valleys of many of these rivers, the 
cultural cores of lasting civilizations and modern nations have developed, and it 
is in them that most of the peoples of Asia live - and multiply. Nonetheless, not 
only is most of Asia unattractive to settlement, but much of it is virtually 
unoccupied, although there are more people more densely concentrated in Asia 
than in any other continent. (Oshima 1987: 19-20)
37
The Diversified Rice Economy
Paddy and Rice.
Wickizer and Bennett describe paddy as the term commonly applied to (1) 
the rice plant as it grows in the field, (2) the cut and harvested stalks, (3) the 
grains that are detached by threshing (rice in the hull) and (4) the Hooded field 
in which the plant grows. Rice is the name given to the grain of the rice plant 
from the time the hard, rather tight-fitting hull surrounding the kernel is removed 
by milling until it is ultimately consumed as cooked food or until it is otherwise 
used. However, when referring to a type of agriculture, paddy, rice or paddy rice 
are often used interchangeably. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 9. Barker; Herdt & 
Rose 1985: 15)
There are several thousand more or less distinct cultivated varieties of rice, 
more than are known for any other cereal. Details of the different varieties of rice, 
however, are of minor significance here. It suffices to distinguish between (1) 
common rice and (2) glutinous rice from the botanical perspective; and (1) upland 
rice, (2) irrigated lowland rice and (3) swamp lowland rice according to cultural 
types. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 9-10)
Common rice and glutinous rice.
Wickizer and Bennett state that common rice comprises the varieties 
whose kernels can be cooked and still remain separate: sinica (indica and 
japonica) and javanica.3 It is the type of rice ordinarily referred to in discussions
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3 Below are selected characteristics of the three subspecies of common rice.
Characteristics Indica Japonica Javanica
Tillering High Low Low
Height Tall Medium Tall
Lodging Easily Not easily Not easily
Photoperiod Sensitive Nonsensitive Nonsensitive
Cool temperature Sensitive Tolerant Tolerant
Shattering Easily Not easily Not easily
Grain type Long-to-medium Short and round Large and bold
Rice texture Non-sticky Sticky Intermediate
Source: Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 16.
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of rice production, trade and consumption. It constitutes the great hulk of 
production and consumption everywhere. Glutinous rice is far less important and 
is mostly produced and consumed in restricted localities especially in China. 
When boiled it forms a gluey, sticky mass. This stickiness is not objectionable in 
the preparation of special foods such as pastries and confections, but detracts from 
the desirability of glutinous rice as a cereal for consumption as such. (Wickizer 
& Bennett 1941: 10)
Upland rice and lowland rice.
Wickizer and Bennett further point out that upland (dryland) rice, 
whatever its variety, is grown without irrigation or not in surface water, hence 
known as "hill" or "mountain*' rice. Upland methods of culture are mostly 
primitive; the yields obtained are characteristically small, and the crop uncertain. 
Lowland (wetland) rice, whatever its variety, is grown under irrigation (as 
irrigated lowland rice) or in natural swamps (as swamp lowland rice) where there 
is standing water in the appropriate season, thus known as "irrigated" or "swamp" 
rice. Commonly, the varieties grown as upland rice are not the same as those 
grown as lowland rice, for some varieties do relatively well in the drier 
environment, others relatively well in the moister environment. (Wickizer & 
Bennett 1941: 10-12. Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 15). Table 2.3, summarizing 
the main types of rice culture by water regime, shows a classification system 
developed in the late 1970s by scientists at the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) in collaboration with scientists in national programs throughout 
Asia.
Very little of the world’s and Asia’s rice crop is upland rice, very little is 
glutinous rice, and very little is grown in natural swamps. Hence common rice 
grown under artificial systems of irrigation is the outstandingly important type of 
rice in the world economy. No other grain crop, and perhaps no other major crop 
o f any sort, is grown under irrigation to the extent that is characteristic of rice. 
(Wickizer & Bennett 1941; 11).
Natural Conditions and the Rice Economy
Although varieties differ one from the other, in general, the rice plant must 
have high temperatures, an abundant supply o f water and heavy soi\ for germina-
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tion and growth.
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Table 2.3 Classification of Rice Cultures by Water Regime in Asia
in the Late 1970s
Water
regime
Description of culture Dominant
varietal
type
Typical
yield
mt/ha
1.
Upland
Rice is grown on flatland, terraces or 
slopes without levelling, bunding and im­
pounding standing water in fields.
Medium
-to-tall
traditional
(130-150
cm)
1.0
2.1
Irrigated
lowland-
wet
season
Fields are bunded and puddled. Rice is 
transplanted. Water is added to the fields 
from canals, river diversion, pumps, 
tanks, etc. to supplement rains.
Modern
semidwarf
-to
-medium
(100-130
cm)
3.0
2.2
Irrigated
lowland-
dry
season
Similar to wet season, but water must be 
supplied from storage reservoirs or from 
pumps. Solar energy levels arc normally 
much higher in wet season.
Modern
semidwarf
(100-120
cm)
3.5
3.1
Swamp
lowland-
shallow
rainfcd
Maximum water depth from tillering to 
flowering ranges from 0 to 30 cm. Fields 
are bunded and puddled. Rice is trans­
planted.
Modern &
traditional
semidwarf
(100-130
cm)
2.0
3.2
Swamp
lowland-
deep
water
Maximum water depth from tillering to 
flowering ranges from 30 to 100 cm. Rice 
is either broadcast in dry fields or trans­
planted in bunded or puddled fields.
Traditional
(all
(150 cm)
1.5
3.3
Swamp
lowland-
floating
Maximum water depth from tillering to 
flowering exceeds 1 m and may run as 
high as 6 m. Rice seeds are 
normally broadcast in dry, unbunded 
fields before the onset of rains.
Floating
rice
with
elongating
potential
1.0
or
higher
Source: Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 15.
High temperature.
Wickizer and Bennett report that for germination, rice seems to require 
higher temperatures than the other major grains. Minimum temperatures 
permitting germination are described as ranging between 1" and 5” C. for wheat, 
rye, barley and oats, and between 8 and 10 for corn and millet. The minimum
temperature for the germination of rice varies with the variety. Those found at the 
northern limit of culture can germinate at temperatures as low as 10 "- 13"C., while 
those grown near the Equator may require 15‘*-20"C. Too low a temperature not 
only delays germination, but also seems to interfere with formation of the crown 
roots. Rice germinates as well under water as in the air, provided that the seed 
has previously absorbed enough moisture. During its growing season, lowland rice 
typically requires at least two months, and preferably three, of temperatures of 
about 20“C. Upland rice thrives at somewhat lower temperatures, and is therefore 
grown at relatively higher elevations - up to 7,500 feet in the tropics. (Wickizer 
& Bennett 1941: 18)
The heat requirement of rice is commonly assumed to be the principal 
factor determining the geographical limits of rice culture, and certainly this is the 
factor that restricts it to the tropical and subtropical /.ones, rather than the 
temperate zones, of the world (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 17, 19).
Abundant water.
Bray claims that as an advantage, rice does not necessarily require 
fertilizers, although it does respond well to their use. Water provides nutrients 
naturally. If there is sufficient water, rice can produce as many as three crops a 
year without exhausting the fertility of the paddy Held. (Bray 1986: 25-26)
Wickizer and Bennett write that the minimum amount of water necessary 
for lowland rice is very large, though it varies with the soil, the presence of 
hardpan, and the climate. Under various conditions and evaporation, the 
requirements are massive (even if not all of the rain falls directly on the fields) 
and seem to run from 15 to about 35 inches per month - about 15 in part of the 
tropics, 19 in Thailand, 21 in Bombay and Sind, 25 in Spain, 26 in northern Italy, 
up to perhaps 36 in Russian Asia where humidity is low. Rainfall as such is 
important for irrigated lowland rice mainly in so far as it may determine 
deficiency or excess of water for irrigation. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 19). 
Rainfall must be heavy enough during at least three months of the year so that 
lakes of water can collect for the rice seedlings to take root and then for the 
transplanted seedlings to grow to maturity (Oshima 1987: 20). It is easier to 
collect and distribute water adequate for lowland rice in the moister regions 
without building vast and expansive irrigation projects. Broadly, not much rice is 
grown where the annual rainfall is less than 40 inches. But the rice plant does not
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require high humidity and thrives in dry heat if there is abundance of irrigation 
water. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 19)
The water requirements of rice are so high that the desert, semi-arid, and 
sub-humid parts of the tropical and sub-tropical zones, except for such areas that 
are very easily irrigated, are much less favorable for rice cultivation than the 
humid parts. The typical form, lowland rice, grows in a Hooded field. A 
consequence of the high water requirement is that rice culture tends to concentrate 
on level or gently sloping land with soils characteristically heavy in type.4 Hence 
the relatively flat lowlands, river basins, and deltas of the world’s moist tropical 
and subtropical regions are best adapted to the rice plant and its cultivation. Such 
regions are particularly favorable when they are characterized by a seasonal 
rhythm of rainfall involving concentration of precipitation in the growing season 
and a relatively dry season at the time when the rice matures. Little rice is grown 
in tropical forest regions of very heavy rainfall having no dry season at all. Not 
only is the soil less adaptable and the topography largely unfavorable, but the 
absence of some dry weather hampers maturing of the rice grain and harvesting. 
(Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 17-18)
Heavy soil.
Wickizer and Bennett indicate that rice apparently makes no special 
demands to soil, but the circumstances of lowland rice cultivation favor 
concentration of production on soils of heavy type (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 
21). Rice thrives on some decidedly alkaline soils, which are improved for other 
crops by rice culture, as the water removes some of the alkali. Some varieties 
endure a very considerable concentration of common salt. (Copeland 1924: 50). *40
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4 Soils are commonly classified according to the percentage of clay which 
they contain: sandy soils (less than 5 % clay), sandy loams (5-10 %), loams (10- 
20 %), clayey loams (20-30 %), clay soils (30-40 %), and heavy clay soils (over
40 %). The tabulation below shows for several tropical crops the soils found from 
experience to be most suitable:
Cotton - light sandy loam
Maize - sandy loam
Tapioca - light loam
Rubber - light clay loam
Coffee - medium clay loam
Coconuts - clay loam
Rice - heavy clay
(Tempany & Mann 1930: 57, 65.)
Tobacco - light sandy loam 
Sisal hemp - sandy loam 
Sugar cane - fairly heavy loam 
Tea - medium clay loam 
Cacao - heavy clay loam 
Oil palms - clay loam
In such localities salt-tolerant varieties of rice are of prime importance (Wickizer 
& Bennett 1941: 22).
Bray stresses, however, that soil type is much less important than the 
water supply (Bray 1986: 28). "Whether the land be good or poor, if the water is 
clear then the rice will be good", says the sixth century Chinese agricultural 
treatise "Qi Min Yao Shu". Grist also claims that water is the most important 
factor in rice-growing, the water-soil relationship largely determining the ability 
of the soil to develop its full potentiality for rice production. (Grist 1975: 20). 
Hence the importance of water conservancy.
Natural Disasters in Rice Growing
(I) Drought is by far the most serious threat (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 
23). (2) Excessive rainfall, however, is disadvantageous too; if it comes at harvest 
time, the crop may be damaged and the cost of harvesting increased without 
compensatory improvement in quality. The danger of rain damage during harvest 
is the chief reason why varieties giving relatively low yields of poor quality, but 
maturing early, are cultivated in some localities. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 19). 
Where the rainfall is much heavier, as in parts of Sumatra and parts of Africa and 
Latin America, paddy rice growing is not feasible (Oshima 1987: 20). (3) 
Unseasonable or excessive floods are destructive. (4) Deficiency o f light is 
harmful. Rice wants all of the illumination that it can gel naturally. Generally, 
cloudy weather is bad for it. Weeds which rival or exceed it in height are 
especially injurious. And in the shade o f trees practically no crop is produced. 
(Copeland 1924: 16, 44. Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 23). No amount of manure 
can make up for the deficiency of light in such cases. (Tempany & Mann 1930: 
19). (5) In the typhoon belt, storms also cause loss (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 20. 
Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 24). (6) Night frosts, cold winds and cold rains are 
injurious to growing rice (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 18).
The Rice-Dependence of Agriculture
A rice-based agriculture in monsoon Asia.
A  rice-based agriculture exists, not in Africa, North and Central America, 
South America, Europe and Oceania or the rest of Asia, but in monsoon Asia, as
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the much higher percentage of rice area in the total crop-producing area in 
monsoon Asia shown in Table 2.4 indicates. There are two major reasons.
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Table 2.4 Area Percentage and Yield of Rice, Wheat and Coarse Grains * 
in Various Parts of the World in 1992
Percentage of harvested area 
in total crop-producing area #
Yield
Kg/hectare
Rice Wheat Coarse
grains
Rice Wheat Coarse
grains
World 10.3 15.3 22.9 3557 2550 2625
Monsoon 
Asia A
33.9 16.4 19.8 3215 2044 1843
Rest of 
Asia
1.0 31.4 17.8 2951 1794 2390
Africa 4.0 4.4 35.5 1970 1656 872
North &
Central
America
0.7 14.7 21.1 5319@ 2510 5671
South
America
5.6 6.3 19.2 2597 2109 2462
Europe 0.3 18.5 28.1 5849 4543 3582
Oceania 0.2 15.8 9.3 7879 1796 2041
Notes: * Coarse grains include barley, maize, rye, oats, millet and sorghum.
# Total crop-producing area refers to area of arable land and land under permanent 
crops. Arable land is land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are 
counted only once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market 
and kitchen gardens (including cultivation under glass) and land temporarily 
fallow (less than five years) (the abandoned land resulting from shifting cultivation 
is not included; the data are not meant to indicate the amount of land that is 
potentially cultivable). Land under permanent crops is land cultivated with crops 
that occupy the land for long periods and need not be replanted after each harvest, 
such as cocoa, coffee and rubber; this category includes land under shrubs, fruit 
trees, nut trees and vines, but excludes land under trees grown for wood or timber. 
@ In 1979-81, 1991 and 1993, however, the yields of rice are all higher than 
those of coarse grains in North and Central America.
A Total crop-producing area of Hong Kong and Singapore and the rice yield of 
Hong Kong are also counted into the data for monsoon Asia.
Source: FAO-YP 1993: vii, viii, xiv, 3, 6-7. 9-11, 68-74.
First, no other cereal crop is suited to the pattern of rainfall and humidity 
of monsoon Asia (Oshima 1987: 18). Wickizer and Bennett claim that few 
agricultural alternatives present themselves. Neither wheal, barley, rye, nor oats
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will thrive as summer crops under such conditions of moisture and heat. Millets, 
grain sorghums and maize do better, but can equal rice only in areas of lower 
summer rainfall. None of these grains can be stored as successfully as rice in a 
hot and moist climate. None can produce as much food per unit of land in the 
places where lowland rice thrives (this statement by Wickizer and Bennett in 1941 
is supported even today by Table 2.4 which shows that the yield of rice is 
generally higher than that of wheat and coarse grains not only in monsoon Asia 
but also in the rest of the world). Even if such crops as sugar cane, cassava and 
yautia (a tropical tuber allied to taro) produced more food per acre, they would 
require a longer growing season and therefore be suitable only in certain places, 
or they would be less adaptable in the diet or probably more difficult to store 
between harvests. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 26-27. Copeland 1924: 338-40)
Second, there is not much difference between rice and other cereals in 
terms of nutrition. Barker, Herdt and Rose report that Asians who eat rice-based 
diets will consume sufficient protein if their caloric levels are adequate (Barker; 
Herdt & Rose 1985: 169-170). Table 2.5 shows the nutritional composition of rice 
and other cereals consumed in Asia, along with egg as a reference for protein 
quality. Most cereals have about the same caloric-supplying value. The protein 
content of rice is somewhat lower than that of wheat and maize, but offsetting 
that is its higher "biological value", defined by Whyte as "the proportion of 
absorbed nitrogen that is retained in the body for maintenance and growth" 
(Whyte 1974: 96). When both factors are considered, there is little difference in 
the protein per 100 grams of cereal.
This is also the view of Payne, who says that the crude protein in cereal 
diets cannot be compared directly with the requirement scale, which is expressed 
in terms of completely utilized protein, but must first be corrected for quality. His 
review of studies with rats, which were fed diets based on a number of Asian 
staples, shows that with the exception of cassava, sago and plantain, all provide 
sufficient utilizable protein to meet requirements after the age of one year. Several 
years of careful and exacting work by Swaminathan and his associates at Mysore 
shows that very simple diets based upon cereals with minimal additions of pulses 
and vegetables have current NDpCAL (net digestible dietary protein expressed in 
calories) values measured with eight to 12 year old children which are in 
excellent general agreement with those in the rat assays. (Payne 1971: 23-24)
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Table 2.5 Major Nutrients in Rice and Other Selected Foods
Calories
per
100 gm
Percent
protein
Biological 
value of 
protein
Percent
fat
Egg 173 13.3 100 13.3
Rice, milled 345 6.8 67 0.5
Wheat flour 348 11.0 52 0.9
Maize 342 11.1 56 3.6
Sweet potato 120 1.2 n.a. 0.3
Sources: Whyte 1974. Perera; Fernando; De Mel & Poleman 1973.
Compared with rice, the yields of other cereals are lower, less suitable to 
the climate and are not superior in nutrition. Therefore monsoon Asians had no 
choice but to evolve paddy rice agriculture over many centuries (Oshima 1987: 
18). In classic Chinese, rice culture is synonymous with agriculture, and in many 
Asian languages rice and food are synonymous. This would suggest that rice 
originated long before recorded history. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 14). Asian 
rice is believed to have evolved from an annual progenitor in a broad belt 
extending from the Gangetic plain below the foothills of the Himalayas, across 
upper Myanmar, northern Thailand, to North Vietnam and South China. 
Domestication could have occurred independently and concurrently at many sites 
within this area. (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 14). Numerous archaeological 
investigations throughout Asia have established that rice was domesticated as 
early as the fifth millennium BC (Lu & Chang 1980).
Within the zones of monsoon Asia where temperatures are sufficiently 
high and rainfall abundant, the rice acreage lies mostly along the valley plains of 
great rivers and in deltas and other costal plains. Here the construction of level, 
floodable and fertile rice fields is simplest and least costly for reasons both of 
topography and soil. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 24)
Areas not for rice planting.
Rice culture is, however, not spread throughout all parts of any of the 
countries of monsoon Asia. Because of the need for an annual rainfall of more 
than 40 inches, there is not much rice culture at land elevations exceeding 3,000 
feet, or in areas where average January temperatures fall below the freezing point.
There are no extensive and heavy concentrations of rice production in lands lying 
directly upon and within five degrees north and south of the Equator, a region 
including most of Sumatra, Malaya, Borneo, the Celebes, and the northwestern 
part of the great island of New Guinea. Here the annual rainfall is very heavy and 
distributed throughout the year so that no season is dry. Dense tropical forest, 
difficult to clear, is the typical natural vegetation, and the topography even at the 
lower elevations is largely very uneven and steeply sloping. Relatively little rice 
is grown also in large stretches of western China, and parts of Vietnam, Thailand, 
and Myanmar where the rainfall and temperature conditions might seem to satisfy 
the requirements of the rice plant. The relatively high elevations and the irregular 
terrain are probably important factors in reducing the importance of rice among 
the crops produced. (Wiekizer & Bennett 1941: 24-25)
Culture of other crops.
Other crops are also produced in monsoon Asia where and when natural 
conditions are suitable for them but not for rice. According to Wiekizer and 
Bennett, in the drier and/or cooler parts of China (the north and west) and India 
(the central strip and the northwest), the principal grain crops tend to be either 
millets and sorghums or wheat, less commonly maize or barley, and rarely oats. 
These are crops with much lower water requirements than lowland rice, and most 
of them thrive with less heat. Rye is nowhere an important grain crop in monsoon 
Asia. (Wiekizer & Bennett 1941: 24)
Various cropping practices fo r  rice.
They are determined by the availability of water and heat. Cropping 
systems based on rice are the most common form of agriculture in Asia, and a 
single crop of rice per year may be the most widely practiced land use pattern in 
Asia (World Bank 1976). There may be enough water in some places to produce 
two or three successive rice crops under irrigation [e.g., in the tropics, where 
water for irrigation is available in adequate amounts, two crops of rice are grown 
(Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 24)]. On the other hand, especially in the flood 
plains of rivers, the prevalence and duration of floods may preclude the 
cultivation of more than one crop in a year. Hence some of the land in a given 
region may be double-cropped to rice and some single-cropped. (Wiekizer & 
Bennett 1941: 20)
Barker, Herdt with Rose state that in the temperate areas, cold weather
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limits rice production to one crop per year. In Korea and Japan some rice paddies 
are diversified to barley in the winter months. In the warmer areas, other crops 
are planted after or before rice on some fraction of land. Except for the high- 
latitude countries, the availability of adequate water is the main factor determining 
when rice is planted. Because of the pronounced monsoon and dry season, even 
the two-crop locations usually produce a second crop of rice only where irrigation 
is available. In most places, the cultivation season begins in May or June with the 
onset of the main monsoon showers. The first crop is sowed in parts of Central 
Thailand, Lower Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, or transplanted 
in most other areas during June, July and August. If it is a traditional variety, four 
or five months may be needed for it to mature, while some modern varieties 
mature in three months. The second modern rice crop is usually planted in 
November, December, or January, maturing before the hottest and driest months 
of April and May. (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 24)
It is common to find a wide range of upland crops planted in rotation with 
rice. This normally occurs where rainfall is not adequate for a second rice crop 
or where a third crop can be grown after the second rice harvest. Maize is 
common in some places; root crops such as sweet potato, and various legumes 
like green gram, cowpeas and soybeans are common in others. However, in 
general, the area rice farmers use to plant crops after rice is much smaller than 
the area planted with the main rice crop. (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 24)
IV. The Prewar "Vicious Circle" of Poverty in 
Monsoon Asia
The purpose of dealing with this topic is to try to show that free market 
forces alone could not overcome the "vicious circle" of poverty and realize 
sustainable rural development before WWII, and a number of underlying 
conditions still exist in various parts of monsoon Asia nowadays. It is analyzed 
as follows. Under the natural monsoon conditions, there were (l) highly 
labor-intensive rice culture leading to labor force shortage in the peak seasons, 
population densities, and fragmented small farms; (2) little employment in the 
slack seasons; (3) unfeasibility of capitalistic large-scale farming, and (4) feudal
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landlord ownership strengthened the poverty. While (1), (2) and (3) are mainly 
traditional productive and technological conditions, (4) is an institutional one.
Labor-Intensive Production
Highly labor-intensive nature o f paddy rice culture.
In the prewar period, very little machinery was used in monsoon Asian 
rice-producing countries. Tractor cultivation was attempted, but did not meet with 
much success in the places where it was tried. Tools and implements were 
generally of the simplest type. Under such traditional technologies, rice growing 
in the Orient was one of the most labor-intensive types of agriculture known. 
(Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 50)
Bray argues that the nature of the inputs required to raise output in wet- 
rice cultivation in monsoon Asia was such that capital played a subordinate role 
to labor in developing the forces of production. The historical material shows 
clearly how over time Asian systems of wet-rice cultivation became progressively 
more intensive in their use of labor, while relying on relatively low levels of 
capital investment. In large part this is because the general trend in technological 
development has been toward the concentration of resources on raising the 
productivity of land. (Bray 1986: 149). Ishikawa and Taylor showed that broadly 
speaking yields of wet rice correlate positively with labor inputs. (Ishikawa 1981: 
2-3, 22. Taylor 1981: 89)
Oshima indicates that labor requirements per hectare of paddy rice grown 
varied from country to country in monsoon Asia, depending mainly on the extent 
to which work animals were used, the extent of irrigation and of available 
transportation, and so on. Labor required per hectare in the prewar years was 
about 50 man-days in the Philippines, 80 in Thailand and Bombay, 1(H) in West 
Bengal, and 150 in Madras, China and Japan. The lower figures for Southeast 
Asia (except Java) reflected the more extensive use of work animals and the 
limited extent of irrigation and transportation, though even these figures were 
considerably higher than those for the wheat culture of the US as early as 1800. 
For the US in 1900, before mechanization, only five man-days for wheal and 10 
days for corn were needed. (Oshima 1971: 63-97. Oshima 1987: 24)
Oshima holds that the major reasons for the heavy labor requirements
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could be seen throughout the three stages of rice cultivation (Oshima 1987: 24).
The first stage was planting. There was the need (in order to gel high 
yields) to prepare seedling beds and to transplant seedlings instead of broadcasting 
or drilling seeds as in wheat. Typically» in Asian paddy fields, when the first rains 
came, the seedling beds were plowed and harrowed several times. The soil of the 
seed bed was hoed, plowed, or trampled into fine, soft mud before sowing. In 
most countries, the seeds were soaked in water and then sowed after the water 
was drained. The water was replaced in the paddy after the seeds had germinated. 
After about a month, the young rice plants were pulled out, tied in bundles, 
topped, and taken to the paddies to be planted in the main fields. If the monsoons 
came too late, the seedlings became too old and might have had to be replaced 
with new ones. For example, in Japan, in 1954, before mechanization made 
headway, plowing per hectare took 10 hours, preparing seedling beds and 
transplanting 17 hours, weeding 15 hours, reaping 18 hours, threshing 10 hours, 
and irrigating 11 hours; transplanting and reaping/lhreshing were concentrated in 
a brief period. (Oshima 1987: 24)
The second stage was harvesting. The rice harvest usually began three - 
six months after transplanting, depending upon whether the varieties planted 
matured early or late (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 53). The methods of using a 
small knife or at best a sickle was time-consuming. Reaping with a larger cradle 
or scythe as in the Western wheat culture of the 19th century was not feasible in 
the wet or moist paddy soil: moisture could spoil the grain as it fell to the ground 
after scything. Moreover, with the long-stalk indica rice used extensively in 
Southeast Asia, lodging was a common problem, leading to uneven maturing so 
that the heads had to be cut singly with small knives to avoid heavy losses due 
to shattering, lodging and uneven maturing. Unlike other grains, the mature rice 
grain readily shattered. Thus, it is reported that before the war the Javanese 
peasant refused, despite strong urgings by the Dutch, to use the sickle in place of 
his small knife. (Oshima 1987: 24-25). Due to labor shortage, outside labor was 
imported in some areas especially for the harvest and the helpers commonly 
received compensation in the form of a certain portion of each day’s harvest. For 
example, in Lower Myanmar, some 200,(KX)-3(X),(X)0 Indians came for the harvest 
each year, many remained and worked in the mills, and finally returned, mostly 
to the famine areas of southern India. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 53)
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The third stage was threshing. This was usually done by hand with the aid 
of some simple device. Bundles of harvested ears and attached stalks were carted 
to the threshing floor. In some areas bullocks, carabaos or oxen tread out the 
grain; in other places humans performed the same operations. In still other areas 
the grains were beaten with Hails (long sticks - usually bamboo - at the end of 
which were attached stout reeds which swung freely as the operator alternately 
raised his pole and then brought it down hard on the threshing floor). The 
tramped or beaten material was winnowed by allowing it to fall gently from a 
platform while the wind carried away the chaff, dust, short pieces of straw, and 
the lighter kernels. Sometimes threshing consisted merely of pounding the rice 
heads on a log. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941; 50, 54-55)
Tight work schedule.
Oshima says that for various operations during these stages, the monsoon 
rains which came and went at only certain periods of the year enforced a rigid 
work schedule. The early rains of the monsoon season were insufficient to soften 
the clay soils, hardened by the dry months. The brick-hard earth could not be 
plowed even with buffalo power until the heavier rains began to flood the 
paddies. This called for timely and concentrated plowing, in addition to long 
hours of work with seed beds, so that transplantation would not be delayed 
beyond the optimal stage of seedling growth. Harvesting also must be carried out 
at the appropriate time; otherwise large losses would be incurred as over-ripe 
grain was more liable to shatter. (Oshima 1987: 26)
Labor force shortage in peak seasons and increasing population densities.
Oshima argues that the heavy concentration of labor required during the 
few months of the monsoon and the tight work schedule meant that labor required 
for optimal yields typically exceeded by a wide margin the available adult male 
working population. (In areas where labor was available, both labor inputs and 
yields were highest, as in China, Japan and Java; they were lowest in countries 
like Thailand where labor was not available for intensive cultivation.) This called 
for the use of young, old, and female workers. These heavy labor reepdrements 
must have contributed to the rapid rise o f population in the major, more 
temperate Asian regions such as China, India and Japan, as the technology of 
monsoon paddy culture became increasingly labor-intensive in the centuries of the 
second millennium, with deeper and more careful plowing, more intensive
transplanting, multiple cropping ami more intensive reaping. Two rice crops on 
the same land during the year meant that with the same labor force much more 
could be produced and more people could be fed. But the increased hands could 
be put to more intensive cultivation to get higher yields per crop, so that in the 
latter case population and food supply went up more or less simultaneously. None 
of these operations (except for plowing) could use work animals, so that the 
demand for hands rose. (Oshima 1987: 26)
Fragmented small farms.
Oshima points out that high population densities in the rural areas with 
limited availability of new land and the labor intensity of agricultural operations 
meant that farms were small (Oshima 1987: 25). Moreover, the small farms were 
fragmented (which Oshima does not note). In Japan, many farmers had their 
pieces of farmland scattered over the village (Nishimura & Sasaki 1993: 74-75). 
In China, the average size of most farms was about 1 ha. Such a small farm was 
composed of many irregular (so-called fish-scale shaped) parcels smaller than 
0.067 ha especially in the mountain and hill areas. (Huang, Xi-Yuan 1986: 371). 
In India it was common to find a holding of 4-5 ha scattered into 20-30 parcels 
(Menon 1956: 597). In Uttar Pradesh of India, a village with an area of 60.705 
ha contained more than 1,000 plots, on average 0.06 ha each, and a cultivator 
with 0.8094 ha of paddy land possessed more than 150 plots, on average 0.005 
ha (Sahi 1964). The same situation existed in Malaya, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka (Ceylon), Taiwan as well as other rice-based economies of monsoon Asia 
(Wilson 1958: 82. Ahmed & Timmons 1971: 59. 63. COP 1965: 205. Michael 
1953: 40. Vander Meer & Vander Meer 1968: 147). The major specific causes of 
fragmentation of small farms and its disadvantages and advantages perceived in 
monsoon Asia may be summarized as follows.
(1) Supply-side causes o f fragmentation.
* Reclamation. When a new area was reclaimed, only the best pieces of 
land were exploited and the intervening areas left unoccupied. Subsequently, when 
pressure on land increased, the poorer soils were also taken over but usually by 
others than the pioneers. The original cultivator or his successor in such a case 
found new cultivators in occupation of areas in between his parcels of land. 
(Zaheer 1975: 87)
* Inheritance. Limited land, increasing population, and little off-farm
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employment made peasants dependent on tilling land. This led to the property 
right to freely subdivide the existing land (rather than primogeniture). Fair 
division of the parents' farm among heirs concerning land productivity (fertility, 
acreage, access to water, distance to village, flatness, etc.) resulted in fragmenta­
tion. Inheritance in this way generation after generation contributed to more and 
more fragmented farms. (Binns 1950: 10-12, 14)
* Division. When a joint large family disintegrated, the sub-families tended 
to insist on fair and equitable division of the assets of the family, thus parcelling 
out land with various levels of productivity. (Zaheer 1975: 87)
* Acquisition. The existence of property rights to freely transfer or add to 
existing agricultural holdings also caused fragmentation. Marriage could bring 
dowry land (Vander Meer 1982: 1). An owner-peasant, due to limited financial 
resources, might not be able to afford to buy large estates at once and have to 
purchase cheap land piece after piece. A peasant who owned land but also rented 
land might have had to surrender his owned land to a feudal landlord if he could 
not hand in rent. A moneylender could acquire the land of a debtor if he could 
not repay the debt. The newly gained parcels were generally located in different 
places. (Binns 1950: 11-12)
* Lease. Some feudal landlords (especially warlords) could seize large 
areas of land by forced occupation or cheap purchase, but they then had to rent 
it out in small pieces (Huang, Xi-Yuan 1986: 171) since large-scale farming was 
not feasible (as analyzed below). There also were owners who were loath to lease 
land and would do so only in small parcels when absolutely necessarily (Fals- 
Borda 1955: 160-161). Owners of land generally had a right to resume land and 
also to re-let land to others. Thus, a cultivator might be divested of the parcel he 
rented earlier and the same parcel might be leased to another tenant. Consequently 
a tenant could possess parcels in different places. (Zaheer 1975: 87). A tenant also 
might not have enough family labor force to justify renting more land. After his 
children became part of the labor force, he could rent more, but only parcels in 
different places, since those contiguous to his were already rented out to others.
* Sale. Due to debt or other reasons, some owner-peasants might be 
compelled to sell parcels of land. These were usually choice areas which could 
readily command a good price with the minimum area being parted. (Zaheer 
1975: 87)
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* Use. Under some communal or feudal serf-holder land systems, members 
or villeins were given fragmented subsistence parcels on the basis of equality 
concerning fertility, acreage, access to water, distance, etc. (Binns 1950: 12)
* Construction. Construction of infrastructure like roads, canals, railways, 
and other rights-of-way might separate land (Wilson 1958: 84-85).
* Incomplete irrigation also could contribute to land fragmentation. For 
example, in Pul Eliya Village in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), the channels extended 
downslope from the water tanks, and the fields lay on one or both sides of the 
channels so that they could receive water. In some years, however, the water was 
insufficient to reach the lower fields. To insure a harvest, therefore, farmers had 
to have both higher and lower fields. To hold land only in the lowest areas would 
have been extremely hazardous. (Leach 1961: 171)
(2) Demand-side causes o f fragmentation.
* Risk diversification. To diversify risk, peasants needed varieties of soil 
and different places to avoid being dependent on one parcel or tine product (Binns 
1950: 22, 31. Heston & Kumar 1983: 200).
* Natural needs. One of the factors promoting excessive fragmentation 
was the wide variation in the fertility or productivity of land. Farmers needed land 
suitable for seed nurseries and land for growing of rice. There were seasonal 
reasons for working both an upland parcel and a parcel on river banks and islands 
at different times of the year. (Binns 1950: 22, 31). Many farms in mountain 
regions consisted of three separate estates - in the plains, in the middle levels and 
on the high levels (Swi-Gov 1950: 90).
(3) Disadvantages o f  fragmentation.
* Diseconomies o f scale were bound to apply: below the optimum size, the 
smaller the size the higher the cost of raising crops on it and lower the income 
(Zaheer 1975: 87-88).
* Waste o f time and energy was typical in transporting material inputs to 
the parcels and in bringing the output to the threshing ground. Workers on the 
land had to make long and unnecessary trips from one parcel to another for 
various agricultural operations. (Zaheer 1975: 87-88)
* Sub-optimization o f land use. If parcels were widely separated or some 
were distant from the farmstead, the demands on available time and energy might 
force the farmer to cultivate a lower labor-demanding crop, especially on more
Vdistant fields, or devote less time to such work as weeding and fertilizing. Under 
such circumstances, the land was not optimally utilized and profits were less than 
their full potential. (Chisholm 1962: 59)
* Prevention o f use o f machinery and animals. The use of machinery 
would be impracticable on such small fields even if it were available. Where 
animals were plentiful, their use for plowing was often precluded because of 
small parcel size. In the more densely populated areas of monsoon Asia, land was 
not available for growing both food and feed; hence beasts of burden tend to be 
relatively scarce. Most of the work in connection with the production of rice and 
its preparation for consumption had to be done by people. (Wickizer & Bennett 
1941: 50-51)
* Obstacles to land improvement. Making physical improvements was 
generally more costly on a scattered farm than on a single-parcel farm. Longer 
fences to control stray livestock movements were needed per unit of area enclosed 
(Smith 1959: 149), whose higher cost prevented farmers from building fences in 
monsoon Asia (Buck 1937: 185). Individual initiative in the construction of 
irrigation facilities was discouraged by the high unit costs of the area served. 
(Buck 1937: 185). Soil conservation on the tiny parcels was also difficult. (Zaheer 
1975: 87-88)
* Waste o f land was typical because of the plethora of demarcation- 
boundaries. (Zaheer 1975: 87-88)
* High cost o f supervision. In fragmented farms, the cost of inspection of 
crops was high and even then uniform supervision became almost impossible due 
to the dispersed locations of the parcels. In areas where crops were subject to the 
depredations of animals and birds, keeping them free from this menace became 
very difficult. (Zaheer 1975: 87-88) As the harvest period approached and crops 
required protection from insects or thieves, more field watchers were needed 
(Fals-Borda 1955: 156).
* Difficult coordination. Devising a practical drainage system became 
difficult since any such scheme had to be coordinated with numerous other land­
holders. (Zaheer 1975: 87-88). Individual farm management practices were hard 
to improve. The farmer who used insecticides on his several parcels could be 
discouraged if even a few of his many field neighbors failed to control insects on 
their land, so that his insecticide application was ineffective. (Fals-Borda 1955:
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152). In general, the smaller the parcels worked by a farmer, the more he was 
bound by and locked into the cropping pattern and time schedules of the other 
farmers in his locality, and the more he was hampered in his ability to change his 
ways in response to changing technological and market conditions. (Floyd 1964: 
101)
* Neighbor problems. That the cultivator of a fragmented farm had more 
field neighbors naturally increased opportunities for problems between neighbors 
(Smith 1959: 149). It was difficult to keep stray animals from disturbing the crops 
of other fanners (Buck 1937: 185). Access of fields to roads or to irrigation water 
sources was complicated by the presence of intervening landowners (Fals-Borda 
1955: 152). Construction of irrigation facilities also was extremely difficult 
because channels had to extend long distances past neighbors’ fields (Buck 1937: 
185).
(4) Advantages o f fragmentation.
* Diversification. Different parcels located in different soils or micro-cli­
mates could support a greater diversity of crops (Lehrer 1964: 31), which could 
provide the farmer with both greater income and security of income (Fals-Borda 
1955: 158-159). Working parcels in several locations also spread the risks of 
natural disasters (Abler; Adams & Gould 1971: 482-483. Lehrer 1964: 31).
* More exchanges of ideas could occur as a farmer met other farmers 
adjacent to his many parcels of land (Lehrer 1964: 31).
* It was more socially desirable, with little off-farm employment and 
insufficient rural infrastructure especially irrigation, to provide peasants with 
relatively equitable access to farmland and facilities than to concentrate them on 
a few farmers.
* Development o f intensive fanning techniques was promoted in monsoon 
Asia due to increasing population pressure and decreasing field size (Huang, Xi- 
Yuan 1986: 20-22), which will be analyzed later on.
In comparison with the disadvantages, the advantages were minor. All of 
these reflected backward economic, technological and social conditions. In other 
words, farmers were forced to accept the fragmented small farms because they 
had no other choices. In fact, wet-rice farmers in monsoon Asia generally 
preferred having all their land in one contiguous parcel (Vander Meer 1982: 93).
In sum , the wet monsoons imposed on Asians a labor-intensive form of
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agriculture which over the centuries created greater and greater demand for labor 
during the peak seasons. The increasing population densities meant decreasing 
size and fragmentation of farms, as crop land began to be scarce and diminishing 
returns set in. As a result, during the first half of the 20th century, agricultural 
productivity grew slowly. (Oshima 1987: 26-27, 45)
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Table 2.6 Agricultural Densities and Average Farm Sizes 
in Various Parts of the World during 1960-70 @
Region/
Continent
Agricultural 
population 
/agricultural 
land *
Agricultural 
population 
/arable land 
(persons 
/hectare)
Area of 
agricultural 
holdings # 
(million 
hectares)
Number of 
agricultural 
holdings 
(million)
Average area 
of
agricultural
holdings
(hectare
/holding)
World 0.4 1.4 2387.6 138.5 17.2
Monsoon
Asia
1.3 3.1 201.2 92.3 2.2
Africa 0.3 1.4 227.8 7.3 31.0
North &
Central
America
0.1 0.2 710.0 7.0 102.0
South
America
0.1 1.0 544.2 6.8 80.0
Europe 0.2 0.4 221.3 24.7 9.0
Oceania 0.01 0.1 483.1 0.4 1316.1
Notes: @ "FAO Production Yearbook" of the 1980s and 90s no longer provides 
data on area and number of agricultural holdings.
* Agricultural land = Arable land + Land under permanent crops + Permanent 
meadows and pastures. Definitions see Table 2.4.
# Agricultural holding refers to all land that is used wholly or partly for agricul­
tural production and is operated by one person - the holder - alone or with the 
assistance of others, without regard to title, size or location (livestock kept for 
agricultural purposes without agricultural land is also considered as constituting a 
holding).
Source: FAO-PY 1972, based on I960 and 1970 agricultural censuses of 
each country.
In the postwar period, although this highly labor-intensive culture has been 
replaced by agricultural mechanization in some economies like Japan and Taiwan, 
it is still dominant in the others. Agricultural population densities, and fragmented 
small farms prevail. In Japan and China, fragmentation is more serious (see 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively). Table 2.6 shows that during 1960-70, among all
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parts of the world, the area of agricultural holdings in monsoon Asia was the 
smallest, reflecting the scarcity of land; the number of holdings the largest, 
implying higher agricultural population densities; as a result, the average farm 
size was the smallest.
If those parts not under the monsoon climate (western Pakistan, western 
and most of northern China, about half of India and parts of Indonesia) are 
excluded, the monsoon Asian densities will rise to nearly 10 persons per hectare 
of agricultural land, or about 30 times that of Africa, 40 times that of Europe and 
over 100 times that of the Americas (in 1975). In those parts under the monsoon 
climate, if the less labor-intensive plantation crop areas are not taken into account, 
i.e., if agricultural population is divided by arable land (with temporary crops) 
only, densities will rise further because most of the population is concentrated in 
the valleys and basins of the great and small rivers where paddy rice is grown. 
(Oshima 1987; 19-21)
Seasonal Employment
The seasonality of the monsoon limited the use of the liny holdings to 
only about half of the year, unless irrigation brought water during the dry seasons. 
Therefore, according to Oshima, the majority of Asian peasants traditionally 
undertook non-crop agricultural work (animal husbandry, fishery, hunting and 
forestry) or off-farm activities (such as handicraft production) when the dry 
months came, and some also after the busy months of planting and before 
harvesting, as crops growing in water did not require as much care as those crops 
grown in dry fields, such as wheat (Oshima 1987: 17, 25). However, neither the 
non-crop agricultural work nor off-farm activities could provide sufficient 
employment for them.
In Western countries, the sparsely settled, low-density rural areas, together 
with the evenness of rainfall throughout the year, permitted farmers to comple­
ment their agricultural production with livestock raising as land (when wheat or 
other cereals were not being grown) was sufficient to allow growing of crops to 
feed livestock during the winter months. Beginning with enclosures for sheep 
raising, and then livestock raising for food, increasing amounts of land were put 
into the growing of livestock feed (grasses, turnips and clover). The growing of
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crops for winter feeding of livestock enabled the English farmers to combine 
farming with animal husbandry - a combination which generated economies of 
scale as labor requirements per hectare diminished. The rise of capitalistic 
agriculture, especially in England from the 18th century, hastened the combination 
of agriculture with animal husbandry. Agriculture also separated from handicraft 
which promoted the growth of industries to provide sufficient jobs for farmers 
leaving agriculture. In contrast, such combination and separation did not occur in 
monsoon Asia. (Oshima 1987: 25, 36)
Agriculture’s combination with animat husbandry was impossible.
Oshima claims that the high population densities and the dry season 
precluded the development of animal husbandry as a seasonal complement to crop 
culture despite the year-round warm weather. As mentioned above, in the more 
densely populated areas, land was not available for growing both food and feed; 
hence beasts of burden tend to be relatively scarce. Thus, the great population 
densities demanded that all arable land be devoted to the growing of food for 
human beings. Whatever feed was available had to be fed to the oxen and 
buffaloes used in plowing. In places as densely settled as Java, the amount of 
available feed for buffaloes was insufficient, and most plowing had to be done by 
hand. And everywhere the average Asian had to pull his own cart or carry 
produce on his back before the advent of bicycles, railways and other modern 
means of transport. As one foreign observer in Japan noted in the 1880s, when 
the Meiji government* ordered the raising of a horse in each farm, the farmers 
complied at the sacrifice of food for the family. (Oshima 1987: 25, 36-37). 
Therefore, animal husbandry could not provide sufficient jobs to peasants in the 
slack seasons.
Non-separation and the lack o f handicraft development.
As Oshima argues, traditional handicraft did not develop into modern 
industries as in the West, since it did not separate from agriculture. Further, 
neither urban factories nor rural handicraft could offer enough work to peasants 
in the dry half of the year.
In terms of the demand for labor, due to the high cost and low productivi- 5
5 The Meiji Reformation (Restoration) of Japan started in 1868 and the Meiji 
era lasted until 1912. (CED 1980: 799. NECD 1985: 716)
ty of machines and other overheads of the steam-powered machines of the First 
Industrial Revolution of the 18th/19th century, the factories had to he operated 
year-round to be profitable, unlike hand spindles and looms (Oshima 1987: 40).
In terms of the supply of labor, however, as long as the basic traditional 
village structure remained largely intact, the vast peasant population was needed 
for the peak seasons of agricultural work, and traditional transportation was 
inadequate for commuting to work in the cities during the seasonal slack. 
Therefore, the unlimited supply o f  labor was only in the dry half year. For 
example, the Dutch used to interpret the backward-sloping supply curve of 
Indonesian workers as indolence, but it was largely a reflection of workers going 
back to the villages during the busy seasons. (Oshima 1987: 38, 40)
To attract the labor for year-round work, the factories would have had not 
only to pay wages equal to those for cloth making but also to make up the cost 
of food production. Until the factories became much more productive, with more 
and better machines - such as the eJectricity/gas-driven ones of the Second 
Industrial Revolution in the early decades of the 20th century - and greater 
economies of scale, the wage gap offered was not sufficiently attractive to tempt 
village laborers to abandon the farms.6 Therefore, despite the lower productivity 
of hand-operated spindles and looms, the opportunity-cost of working on them in 
the village was low. There was no choice for the peasants but to continue to carry 
on with traditional off-farm work, principally hand spinning and weaving. 
(Oshima 1987: 38-40). Until the spurt of rapid growth beginning in the mid- 
1950s, the emigration of the labor force to urban occupations had not been large 
enough to significantly reduce the absolute size of the labor population in 
agriculture (Hayami & Yamada 1991: 4).
Such a slow release of workers from agriculture impeded industrialization. 
For example, Japan emerged from feudalism in the 1880s. The first textile 
factories in early Meiji period had to turn to the daughters of the unemployed 
samurai who found no place for their traditional warrior skills as their labor force. 
But due to the low agricultural productivity, not enough food could be pared for
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6 The migration of Chinese to Malaysia was for full-time work in the tin 
mines, and that of Indians was for full-time work on the rubber plantations of 
Malaysia and tea plantations in Sri Lanka - all of which paid more that part-time 
work in the rice paddies of India and China. (Oshima 1987: 40)
industrial workers, and so the pace of industrialization was sluggish. Around 
1900, the acceleration of Japan’s industrialization was possible only with the 
import of large amounts of rice from its colonies Taiwan and Korea which it 
occupied in 18951945 and 1910-45 respectively. There was little or no industrial 
growth in the rest of Asia. Thus, the growth of modem industry was hampered 
and Asia fell behind in industrial production. (Oshimu 1987: 38-40, 44-45, 106. 
Oshima 1993: 5)
But although handicraft was not separated from agriculture, with the 
importation of cheaper products made by Western machines in the last few 
centuries, the peasants lost their urban markets, and their production of handicraft 
was confined to village needs (Oshima 1987: 25). Therefore, village handicraft 
provided much less employment than before during the slack seasons.
Oshima finds that even today, in most monsoon Asian economies, this 
separation has not yet occurred, except in plantation crops such as rubber and tea 
which require labor all year around. The growing rural population found less to 
do during the dry months as the larger population sought more work. Much of the 
available work was marginal, intermittent, irregular, of short duration, and of low 
intensity, and with so much labor competing for so little work in the dry months, 
remuneration was low. In Indonesia, per capita incomes are lower in the rural 
areas of Java and Bali (where densities are much higher) than in Sumatra, 
Kalimantan and Sulawesi; similarly, in the Philippines incomes are higher in 
Mindanao, which is less densely settled, than in most parts of the country. 
(Oshima 1987: 25,27). Therefore, in monsoon Asia, although at the peak seasons 
all the available labor was needed and actively at work, there were serious 
underemployment, unemployment and disguised unemployment in the slack time, 
which gravely contributed to the poverty.
The Obstacles to Large-Scale Farming
In Western Europe, the favorable climate - more even rainfall - and plenty 
of land made it easy to convert small strip farms into large capitalistic farms even 
with simple technologies such as multiple-horse-driven iron plows in the 16th 
century. Technological progress, especially in England after the 15th/l6th century, 
displaced labor-intensive production. The combination with animal husbandry
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generated economies of scale as mentioned before. Using the technologies of the 
First Industrial Revolution represented by steam-powered machines and those of 
the Second Industrial Revolution led by electricity/gas-driven ones, the Western 
countries were growing rapidly with capitalistic agriculture and industry. (Oshima 
1987: 35-36, 38 ,41 ,45)
In contrast, although the civilizations of China and India were second to 
none during most of the first millennium A.D. and into the first half of the second 
millennium A.D., they began to fall behind the West. By the end of the I9th 
century, monsoon Asia became one of the poorest regions in the world, densely 
packed with tiny farms and traditional handicraft and, eventually, falling prey to 
the stronger West. Monsoon Asia’s rice farms were not transformed into 
capitalistic operations, remaining essentially peasant agriculture depending on 
family labor. Oshima held that the reason for this was that the agriculture of these 
countries was a different type from that of the West, and that for this type of 
agriculture capitalism was not a suitable form of organization, and it w'as the 
complexity of Asian agricultural systems that blocked the transfer of the 
technology and institutions emerging in the post-medieval centuries in Europe to 
Asian rice farms. (Oshima 1993: 4. Oshima 1987: 35-36). Similarly, Bray argues 
that the reason must lie in the conditions of rice production (Bray 1986: xiii-xiv). 
To monsoon Asia, the following trend might be perceived. (1) The monsoon 
climate led to a sophisticated rice culture. (2) The technological innovations of 
the West up to the First Industrial Revolution were almost entirely irrelevant. (3) 
Therefore, capitalistic large-scale farming was not feasible before WWII.
Sophisticated rice culture.
Oshima points out that even in the centuries before Christ, the technologi­
cal movement of paddy rice cultivation was toward sophistication, with deep 
plowing, terracing, green and organic manuring, ratooning and small- and 
large-scale irrigation and drainage appearing in northern China. Then, in the early 
centuries of the first millennium, transplanting began raising not only yields but 
also labor requirements, as seedling beds, transplanting, thorough land preparation, 
water management, careful cultivation and time-consuming reaping called for 
more labor. And in the first century of the second millennium came multiple 
cropping with the use of short-duration, drought-resistant seeds from Vietnam, 
raising even further the complexity (and the labor intensity) of land and
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seedling-bed preparations, transplantation, water management, reaping and 
threshing with tight schedules as one crop was harvested and the next put in 
immediately and with greater crop diversification. (Oshima 1987: 36). Elvin 
believes that by the 13th century China thus had what was probably the most 
sophisticated agriculture in the world, India being the only conceivable rival 
(Elvin 1973: 129). In the centuries following, each of these began to be further 
improved, largely by the use of more labor. These improved technologies and 
methods were diffused over wider areas of China and beyond. (Chang; Vegara & 
Yoshida 1976)
Bray argues that the techniques were as such that farmers themselves have 
been able to select for desirable traits through the centuries, so a very wide range 
of cultivation could be developed. By keeping a range of varieties in stock the 
farmer could protect himself in fair measure against the risk of drought or Hood. 
Actually, rice farmers usually grew several different varieties of rice in any one 
season, partly to provide for different requirements and partly as a means of 
minimizing their risks. The farmer could also increase his income, either by 
producing more rice, or by combining rice cultivation with more profitable 
activities like cash-cropping. (Bray 1986: 16-17, 25-26)
King went to China, Japan and Korea in the early 19(H)’s to find out how 
people could farm the same fields for 4,(XX) years without destroying their fertility 
and how farmers could support families of 12 to 15 people on less than two acres, 
and do it generation after generation without buying fertilizer. What King saw 
was an essentially intensive and sophisticated agriculture and a farm system where 
nothing was wasted. (King 1911: covers. The following arguments concerning 
canals, multiple and diversified cropping, combination of irrigation and dry 
farming methods, biological fertilizers are derived from King 1911: 8-11)
Canals. A conservative estimate would place the miles of canals in China 
at fully 200,000. The miles of canals in China. Korea and Japan were probably 
greater than those of railroads in the US.
Multiple and diversified cropping. China alone had as many acres in rice 
each year as the US had in wheat. Its annual product was more than double and 
probably threefold the US annual wheat crop. Yet the rice area produced one or 
two other crops each year. The Oriental fanner was a time economizer beyond 
all others. He utilized the first and last minute and all that were between. The
foreigner accused Chinese of being always long on time, never in a fret, never in 
a hurry. This was quite true and made possible for the reason that they were a 
people who definitely set their faces toward the future and led time by the 
forelock. They have long realized that much time is required to transform organic 
matter into forms available for plant food. Although they were the heaviest users 
of the organic manure in the world, the largest portion of this organic nutter was 
predigested with soil or subsoil before it was applied to their fields, and at an 
enormous cost of time and labor. But it lengthened their growing season and 
enabled them to adopt a system of multiple cropping which would not otherwise 
be possible. By planting in hills and rows with intertillage it was very common 
to see three crops growing upon the same Held at one lime, hut in different stages 
of maturity, one nearly ready to harvest; one just coming up. and the other at the 
stage when it is drawing most heavily upon the soil. With heavy fertili/er and by 
supplemental irrigation, the soil was made to do full duty throughout the growing 
season.
Combination o f irrigation and dry farming methods. This was made by the 
Far East farmers with rare wisdom to an extent and with an intensity far beyond 
anything the Western people have ever dreamed, in order to maintain dense 
population. The selection of the quick-maturing, drought-resisting millets as the 
great staple food crops to be grown wherever water was not available, and the 
almost universal planting in hills or drills, permitting intertillage, thus adopting 
centuries ago the utilization of earth mulches in conserving soil moisture, has 
enabled these people to secure maximum returns in seasons of drought. The 
millets thrived in the hot summer climates; they survived when the available soil 
moisture was reduced to a low limit, and they grew vigorously when the heavy 
rains came. Every spear of rice was transplanted. They saved in many ways 
except for labor, which they had in excess. By thoroughly preparing the seed bed. 
fertilizing highly and giving the most careful attention, they were able to grow on 
one acre, during 30 to 50 days, enough plants to occupy 10 acres and in the mean 
time on the other nine acres crops were maturing, being harvested and the fields 
being fitted to receive the rice when it was ready for transplanting. In effect, the 
interval of time was added to the growing season.
Biological fertilizers. Although in these countries the soils were naturally 
more than ordinarily deep, inherently fertile and enduring, judicious and rational
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methods of fertilization were everywhere practiced; but not until recent years, and 
only in Japan, had mineral commercial fertilizers been used. For centuries, 
however, all cultivated land, including adjacent hill and mountain sides, the 
canals, streams and the sea have been made to contribute greatly to the 
fertilization of cultivated fields. All but the inaccessible portions of their mountain 
and hill land have long been taxed to their full capacity for fuel, lumber and 
herbage for green manure and compost material.
The ash of fuel and lumber used at home found its way to the fields as 
fertilizer. Canal mud of enormous quantity was applied to the fields, sometimes 
even 70 and more tons per acre in China. Compost was made by carrying soil and 
subsoil into villages in China. Between the intervals they were composted with 
organic refuse and often afterwards dried and pulverized before being carried back 
and used on the fields. Japan's production of fertilizing material, regularly 
prepared and applied to the land annually, amounted to more than 4.5 tons per 
acre of cultivated field exclusive o f the commercial fertilizers purchased.
Manure of human and animal was saved and applied to the fields. In Japan 
the amount of human waste was 23,950,295 tons, or 1.75 tons per acre of 
cultivated land in 1908. In the same year, the International Concession of 
Shanghai sold to a Chinese contractor the privilege of entering residences and 
public places early in the morning of each day and removing the night soil, 
receiving more than $ 31,000 in gold for 78,000 tons of waste. All of this the 
Western people not only threw away but spent much larger sums to do so.
Leguminous plants acting as hosts for lower organisms living on their 
roots are largely responsible for the maintenance of soil nitrogen, drawing it 
directly from the air to which it is returned through the processes of decay. It was 
not until the 1910s, generated by the best scientists of all Europe, that this was 
finally conceded. But centuries of practice had taught the Far East farmers whom 
the Western people regarded as ignorant, that the culture of these crops is 
essential to enduring fertility, and so the growing of legumes in rotation with 
other crops was extensive. Just before, or immediately after the rice crop was 
harvested, fields were often sowed to clover which was allowed to grow until near 
the next transplanting time when it was either turned under directly, or more often 
stacked along the canals and saturated with soft mud dipped from the bottom of 
the canal. After fermenting 20-30 days, it was applied to the field.
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Therefore, Oshima argues that it is the complexity. rather than "the 
simplicity (as Marx holds) of the organization for production in these self-suffic­
ing communities that constantly reproduce themselves in the same form ... that 
supplies the key to the secret of the unchangeablencss of Asiatic societies, an 
unchangeablencss in such striking contrast with the constant dissolution and 
refounding of Asiatic States, and the never-ceasing changes of dynasty." (Oshima 
1987: 34-36. Marx 1887: 338-339)
Unsuitability o f  the Western technologies.
The technological innovations of the West up to the First Industrial 
Revolution were almost entirely irrelevant to monsoon agriculture. Oshima writes 
that drilling in place of transplanting would have caused yields to fall substantial­
ly; drainage systems were far more advanced and intricate in Asia; and it was 
multiple cropping rather than crop rotation and fallowing systems that Asia 
needed. Nor were improvements in scythes and cradles of any use as the easily 
shattered and lodged rice plant required knives and smaller sickles. The 
steam-powered machines of the First Industrial Revolution were not suitable 
either. They require large boilers, shafts, transmission lines, and other equipment, 
which the Asian factories and farms were too small to afford. (Oshima 1987: 37. 
Oshima 1993: 4-5). Therefore, the Western technologies up to the 19th century 
could not be adopted in the monsoon Asia rice economy.
Unfeasibility o f capitalistic large-scale farming.
The most important Western institutional innovation, capitalistic 
large-scale farming, was not feasible before WWII. Oshima states that the rice 
culture of monsoon Asia was too complex. To feed the enormous population with 
so little arable land, the technology that evolved became not only intensive but 
intricate: deep and thorough plowing several limes, the fine puddling and 
harrowing, elaborately prepared seedling beds, properly spaced transplantation, 
finely tuned watering, weed and insect controls, careful reaping of a crop prone 
to lodge and shatter - and all this carried out within a tight schedule imposed by 
the coming and going of monsoon rains. This is not the kind of work which can 
be done well by low-paid wage workers or adequately supervised by a few 
managers on a large farm. Nor could work animals and the steam-powered 
machines of the First Industrial Revolution be substituted for the highly 
labor-intensive operations of transplanting and reaping. With the traditional
technologies, only on small farms with close coordination and the cooperation of 
highly motivated family workers who received all the returns after paying taxes, 
rents and costs could productivity per hectare rise to high levels in the arduous 
and demanding husbandry of monsoon paddy agriculture. (Oshima 1987: 37)
Bray writes that rice yields are directly related to the efficacy of 
management of the water supply and until very recently this imposed restrictions 
on the size of wet-rice fields and was an important barrier to mechanical 
rationalization of the European type. Given the large investment in labor and time 
required to develop a productive rice field, there was instead a strong incentive 
to evolve land-saving skills in both technical and managerial terms. Effective 
supervision of such skilled work is highly demanding, and as rice cultivation 
systems became more productive there was a marked tendency for units of 
management to become smaller rather than larger, usually taking the form of 
family farms supplying the bulk of their own labor. (Bray 1986: 150)
Oshima further indicates that large-scale agriculture (capitalistically 
managed or otherwise) could not produce the necessary yields per hectare and 
capitalistic rice-growing was a low-productivity undertaking, as the Japanese 
found to their dismay when they attempted to introduce Western technologies 
after the Meiji Restoration. In the 1870s and 1880s, the new Meiji government 
attempted to establish Western agricultural methods in Japan but found that the 
large machines were not suited to small farms and had to abandon the efforts, 
although some successes were achieved in spacious Hokkaido. Japan’s northern­
most island, which lies outside the monsoon zone. As a result, Japan had to 
colonize Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910) in order to produce the rice for its 
industrial workers and create markets for its industrial products. In the Philippines 
beginning in the 19th century, plantations were operated capitalistically with a 
hired labor force for the growing of less labor-intensive commercial crops like 
sugar, coconut, rubber and bananas, but the large rice estates of the Spanish friars 
and Filipino oligarchies were rented out to tenants in small parcels for their 
families to work on. (Oshima 1987: 37-39, 42)
Berry, Cline, Binswanger, Deininger and Feder claim that there is an 
inverse relationship of farm size to land productivity in monsoon Asia which is 
evidence that large-scale farms are less productive than the smalt ones under the 
traditional technologies (Berry & Cline 1979. Binswanger; Deininger & Feder
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1993).
Therefore, with the traditional technologies or the steam-powered machines 
of the First Industrial Revolution, large-scale farming was impossible. The 
electricity/gas-driven machines of the Second Industrial Revolution of the 20th 
century were suitable to both the fragmented small farms and large farms of 
monsoon Asia, but their introduction to monsoon Asia was mainly after WWII. 
Even in the present era, the traditional technologies still dominate the agriculture 
of most rice-based economies in monsoon Asia, which together with other factors 
determine the small farm size.
Feudal Landlord Ownership and Persistent Poverty
The three previous sections have dealt with the "vicious circle" of poverty 
of prewar monsoon Asia mainly in terms of the productive and technological 
conditions. This section touches its institutional aspects, especially the feudal 
landlord ownership. It will be relatively brief, granted that (1) it is already 
well-known that feudal landlord ownership was one of the major causes of rural 
poverty and that most monsoon Asian economies have undertaken land reform; 
(2) there is a huge literature on this topic but it seems difficult to analyze this 
issue for so many economies in one section. Wickizer and Bennett only use some 
quotations and believe that they have properly indicated the desperately 
poverty-stricken position of farmers in many monsoon Asian countries (Wickizer 
& Bennett 1941: 168-169). This method is in accordance with the Oshima 
approach of narrative analysis or analytical description, which is also used here.
As Oshima points out, with the old structure of the peasant production 
unchanged, the traditional structure of power (with the imperial system on top, the 
bureaucracy below, and the gentry in the towns and villages) remained intact 
through most of the latter half of this millennium. This power structure did 
everything to preserve the old mode of production of which it was part and parcel 
and without which it would have become redundant. Thus, it was inconceivable 
for the agricultural revolutions of the West to be transplanted to Asian soil in 
prewar times. (Oshima 1987: 42)
Up to the end of WWII, feudal landlord ownership had been dominant: a 
few landlords owned large estates while most peasants owned little or no land and
had to be tenants or farm workers. The poverty of rice growers and the hopeless 
position under the feudal landlord ownership were mainly caused by tenancy and 
loss of land ownership; usury and growing debt; and unfavorable marketing 
machinery (Wickizer & Bennett 1941; 169). The tenancy system thus constituted 
serious barriers to agricultural growth (Ash 1976: 50).
Tenancy and loss o f land ownership.
In Myanmar, the tendency for a large tenant class to develop was 
unmistakable. Much of the lands had passed into other hands from previous 
owner cultivators, who then had been reduced to the position of tenants on land 
formerly held by themselves. In 1929, nearly 45 % of the total occupied area in 
Lower Myanmar was let to tenants. (Wickizer & Bennett 1941: 169)
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Table 2.7 Structure of Rural Land Ownership and Use
in the 1930s
in China
Rural class Rural
population
%
Rural land 
ownership
%
Feudal
tenancy
%
Capitalistic
operation
%
Landlords 4 50
Rich peasants 6 18
70 30
Middle peasants 20 15
Poor peasants 60
Farm laborers It) 17
Note: Landlords did not labor and lived by renting out land. Rich peasants hired 
wage labor but also labored, as agricultural capitalists. Middle peasants normally 
tilled their own land, as owner-peasants. Poor peasants generally rented land, as 
tenants. Farm laborers mainly worked as wage laborers.
Sources: Sun, Wu-Xia 1986: 21. Huang, Xi-Yuan 1986: 148. PD 1992. Mao, Ze- 
Dong 1926: 4-10. Mao, Ze-Dong 1933: 113-115.
In Korea, if part-owners were included, almost four out of every five 
Korean farmers were tenants. The large proportion of tenancy in Korea had few 
parallels in the world. (Lee 1936: 159). This country used to be referred to as the 
"land of spring hunger" (Oshima 1987: 29).
In China in the 1930s, as Table 2.7 shows, the landlords accounted for 
only 4 % of the rural population but owned 50 % of the rural land. Poor peasants 
and farm laborers accounted for 60 % and 10 % of the rural population 
respectively but they together owned only 17 % of the rural land. 47 % of the
land owned by the landlords and rich peasants were lor tenancy. The level of rent 
in kind and money was very high, as Tahle 2.8 shows. Besides, there was also 
rent in services. For example, the tenants had to work for their landlords on 
ceremonial occasions or Festival Days (Pan & Chuan 1952: 8).
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Table 2.8 Average Rents on Paddy and Dry-crop Land 
in Jiangsu Province, East China # and China in 1930
Paddy land Dry-crop land
Jiangsu East China China Jiangsu East China China
Cash rent as percentage of land value
Good
land
8.1 8.7 10.3 8.6 10.6 10.5
Medium
land
8.2 8.7 11.3 9.5 11.4 10.9
Poor land 8.7 10.1 12.0 10.4 13.2 12.0
Fixed crop rent as percentage of gross output
Good
land
44.3 42.2 46.3 39.4 44.2 * 45.3
Medium
land
48.6 46.1 46.2 42.0 43.5 * 44.6
Poor land 49.9 49.7 45.8 38.3 41.0 + 44.4
Share crop rent as percentage of gross output
Good
land
46.7 55.5 51.5 44.2 44.6 47.8
Medium
land
45.4 53.9 48.0 44.5 43.2 45.3
Poor land 43.4 52.9 44.9 46.8 43.2 * 43.6
Notes: # That is Jiangsu, Anhui and Zhejiang provinces. 
* These figures are for Jiangsu and Zhejiang only. 
Sources: SA 1942: 76-77. Ash 1976: 34-35.
Usury and growing debt.
For many years the plight of the Filipino tenant or small farmer had been 
the lot of the down-trodden. For every peso that he borrowed, he paid interest that 
was confiscatory, more than usurious. For every sack of rice that he got at P 6 to 
P 7, he paid in palay (rough rice) when the price was as low as from P 1.20 to
P 1.50, or about five sacks of palay for a sack of rice. Compelled hy poverty to 
convert into ready cash his usually small share of the crop, he sold it at prices 
below production cost. He went deeper into debt with no hope for salvation. 
(Buencamino 1937: 2-3)
The cultivator in India working on tiny parcels had to borrow, while the 
creditor pounced on any portion of the land he could secure. Even the very rights 
which the cultivator had in his land stood in the way of an adjustment between 
labor supply and demand. For the cultivator did not renounce those rights and go 
in search of employment in the industrial centers except in the last extremity. The 
tendency of the non-agriculturist to take possession of the agriculturist’s land was 
increasing in every province. (Mukerjee 1926: 64)
Ash records that in the 1920s-30s, in south of Jiangsu Province of China, 
there was a folksong: "Two knives are at a peasant’s back: The Grain is heavy, 
the interest is high. Three ways before him stand: To drown, to hang or to 
languish in gaol." (Ash 1976: 3). The small peasant in China, as in other 
countries, was often unable to survive the interval between sowing and harvesting 
without borrowing. Indebtedness was a major source of rural discontent. Buck 
reports that 39 % of the farmers surveyed in 1929-33 were in debt (Buck 1937: 
464). The National Agricultural Research Bureau estimates that in 1933, 56 % of 
farms had borrowed cash and 48 % had borrowed grain for food (CR Apr. 1934: 
30). A third national estimate noted that 43.87 % of farm families were in debt 
in 1935 (NLC 1937: 51). All observers agree overwhelmingly that the rural debt 
had been incurred to meet household consumption needs rather than for 
investment in production, and that for the poorer peasants indebtedness was the 
rule (Buck 1937: 461, 464). Interest rates were high. This was a reflection of the 
desperate needs of the peasant, the shortage of capital in rural China, the risk of 
default and the absence of alternative modern lending facilities of either the 
government or cooperatives. On small loans in kind, an annual rale of 100 9c to 
200 % might be charged. The bulk of peasant loans, perhaps 2/3, paid annual 
rates of 20 % to 40 %; about 1/10 paid less than 20 9c\ and the rest, more than 
40 %. About 2/3 of all loans were for periods of six months to one year. (CR 
Nov. 1934: 108-109). Agricultural credit came largely from individuals - 
landlords, wealthier farmers and merchants (Feuerwerker 1983: 87).
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Unfavorable marketing machinery.
The cultivation of rice had been continuously and universally carried on 
in Japan proper from very early times, but the methods of production and 
marketing, which were handed down by tradition, had not been much improved 
upon. All who were informed on rural conditions knew well how greatly in need 
of cash these farmers were. They put their rice on the market as soon as it was 
harvested, causing thereby a glut in the market, and consequently found that they 
must sell their products at a terrible discount. More than half of the total amount 
of rice sold by cultivators was marketed from November to January. This fact 
alone would account fully for any great seasonal fluctuations in the price of rice. 
The fact that so many farmers had to buy their own rice was contrary to the 
common belief that the farmer consumed the rice which he cultivated. (Tobata 
1935: 161-165)
On the average about 60 % to 70 % of the total quantity of polished white 
rice marketed in Wuchin, Jiangsu Province, China, was sold in the months of 
December to April. In 1929, farmers in Nanjing sold nearly all of their product 
at $ 0.124 per sheng in September and October just after harvest lime. Then in 
the next spring, having nothing to eat, they were forced in April and May to buy 
or borrow from the grain merchant at $ 0.162 per sheng. The price had risen 30 
%. In 1930, two units of products were only enough to pay one unit of debt. 
Interest was generally 20 % to 30 % annually. The poor became poorer and the 
rich richer. (Chang 1932: 15-16)
Feudal barriers to agricultural growth.
Ash holds that such barriers inherent in the institutional framework of the 
rural sector were considerable. Increased inequality in land ownership and 
growing numbers of landless peasants, increasing indebtedness among the 
peasantry and neglect of the economic infrastructure were the factors held 
responsible for China's agricultural stagnation and rural impoverishment before 
1949. For example, in Jiangsu Province in the 1920s and 30s, lack of security of 
tenure, high rents and other exploitative practices as well as a one-sided 
relationship between landlord and tenant gave rise to a situation in which both the 
incentive and the material means to undertake net farm investment were lacking. 
The obligation to pay rent affected a peasant’s expenditure on both subsistence 
and production. To this extent, the tenancy system posed a serious constraint upon
1productive farming activities. (Ash 1976: l, 50-51)
Up to WWI, labor shortage in the peak seasons was the rule throughout 
Asia. But during the depression of the 1930s (and the labor force explosion from 
the late 1960s on) large pools of surplus labor made their appearance as much of 
the labor force was not needed even for the busy months. (Oshima 1987: 40, 49). 
In China before 1949, under the dominance of feudal landlord ownership in 
agriculture, the growth of rural population higher than that of cultivated land 
brought competition in renting land and hence an increase in land rent. There 
were three major harmful externalities.
First, this was favorable to the landlords because facing excessive numbers 
of peasants competing for renting land, they could charge higher land rent so that 
they were encouraged to annex more land. Therefore, the feudal landlord 
ownership was strengthened and concentration of land ownership was accelerated.
Second, this was unfavorable to even the small-scale capitalistic farmers. 
The higher land rent hampered them from renting land from landlords for 
operating capitalistic farms by hiring farm laborers. In China, as the rich peasants 
(agricultural capitalists) accumulated more capital, instead of enlarging capitalistic 
farms, owning more advanced production tools and technology and employing 
more farm laborers, they tried to buy and then rent out more land for more land 
rent. This was essentially because the feudal land rent was very high and stable. 
Renting out land to earn secured high land rent was much more beneficial and 
comfortable than renting land to operate it as a capitalistic farm by doing 
management, participating in labor and bearing natural and market risks. 
Therefore, they retrograded toward landlords. For example, in five counties of 
four provinces (Jiangsu et al), of all rich peasants, those who rented out land for 
feudal rent increased from 0.3 % -18.8 % in 1928 to 0.4 % - 20.7 % in 1933. In 
Xiangyang County of Hubei Province, during 1924-36, rich peasants and 
operating landlords (landlords who also hired wage labor) decreased by 30 %. 
(Zhang, You-Yi III: 832, 836-837). By the same reason, the high and secured land 
rent also induced capitalists in industry, commerce and handicraft to invest in 
buying land for feudal tenancy. Hence it retarded the development of capitalism 
in all fields.
Third, this was much more unfavorable to the peasants. The landlords only 
rented out land to those bidding for the highest rent, due to more peasants
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competing for relatively less land, hence driving many peasants to be vagrants. 
Those who had got tenancy could not maintain a minimum living with the 
after-rent residual either. Some of the peasants who left reclaimed wasteland in 
the cold and high mountains of the Northeast, where population was scarce and 
land available. But in so doing, they were still under the exploitation of the local 
landlords and, during 1937-45, under the suppression of Japan. Some went to 
cities to become coolies. Others went abroad to be the cheapest laborers. (Huang, 
Xi-Yuan 1986: 269). Many of them just became vagrants so that there was a 
vagrant stratum in both countryside and cities before 1949 (Mao, Ze-Dong 1926: 
8-9).
Since WWII, the feudal ownership has been completely reformed in 
Cambodia, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Myanmar, Taiwan and 
Vietnam, but remained incompletely changed or even intact in some other 
economies.
In India, in most areas, the largest land holdings were redistributed, but 
relatively smaller landlords still exist (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 35). These are 
very powerful and have their own security forces (Oshima 1987: 226. Oshima 
1993: 246).
In the Philippines, after the 1972 land reform, relatively few rice farmers 
owned their land (Barker; Herdt & Rose 1985: 35). The landed oligarchy was 
even more powerful, as they owned private armies and dominated local politics 
(Oshima 1993: 246-247). In 1988, new land reform to cover all land was started, 
but was criticized for its vulnerability to manipulation at local level. In 1995 the 
program was consequently significantly behind the target (Hodgkinson 1996:913).
In Bangladesh, land reform has been pursued, the largest estates were 
acquired, individual ownership founded, land-holding ceilings established and 
minimum wages for agricultural labor determined (Hussain 1995: 79, 91, 112). 
But the ownership pattern is still characterized by considerable inequality in 
landholding (Khan 1997: 122).
In Sri Lanka, the 1972 Land Reform Act fixed a ceiling of 10.1 ha on 
paddy holdings per family, which was so large that the previous paddy ownership 
was practically untouched (De A. Samarasinghe 1997: 990).
In Malaysia, while Malays and other indigenous people concentrate on the 
traditional subsistence agriculture, other races hold larger land (Bray 1986; 185.
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Edwards 1997: 572-574, 579).
In Thailand, in many rural areas, there is an acute shortage of land, with 
a few rich owning large land alongside many landless people (Dixon 1997: 1028. 
Richardson 1997: 1).
In Pakistan, there have been only very limited steps taken to reduce the 
size of the largest holdings and to transfer land rights to the actual cultivators 
(Taylor 1997: 875).
In Indonesia* land reform laws of 1960 and 1961 were not implemented 
after 1966 and landlessness was an increasingly severe problem (Bray 1986: 187- 
188, 191). There is a variety of distributional imbalances (Hobohm 1997: 372).
In Bhutan and Nepal, the serf-holder and landlord systems stay largely 
intact. The rural poverty in these countries is related to such systems. (Oshima 
1993: 247. Khanal 1995: 41-44)
Moreover, slavery - a system historically more backward than feudalism - 
still is flourishing, especially in South Asia. Poverty drive peasants to usury which 
in turn make them debt-bonded. Bonded workers agree to sell their labor in 
exchange for a lump sum to pay, e.g., a big medical bill. But the line is easily 
crossed into slavery, when low wages, high interest rates and cheating make the 
debt impossible to repay. In South Asia, many people are illiterate, ignorant of 
their rights, and thus easily deceived. For example, in Nepal and Pakistan, 
millions of bonded laborers work in farming. Bonded debts can be passed on to 
the next generation. Those who are deemed not to have paid their debt can be 
sold to another landlord. If a man escapes his place of slavery, his family can be 
held until he returns, or sold if he does not. Bonded peasants can be sold into 
marriage. Bonded slavery can also be found in prostitution and industry as well. 
Although laws have been passed to forbid slavery, little has been done to enforce 
them. (Eco 1996: 45-46)
"Vicious Circle" of Poverty within Agriculture and between Agricul­
ture and Industry
In sum, as Oshima indicates, before the end of WWII, there was a "vicious 
circle" of poverty in monsoon Asia (Oshima 1993: 4). It existed not only within 
agriculture but also between agriculture and industry.
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"Vicious circle " o f poverty within agriculture.
Heavy monsoon rains fall for six months of the year, while there is little 
rain during the other six months, giving rise in monsoon Asia to an agriculture 
different from that of the West and other regions, i.e„ paddy rice culture, which 
over the centuries has become very labor-intensive. Up to the end of WWII, for 
maximum yields, many workers were needed for planting, harvesting and 
threshing. As population increased faster than available land, farm size diminished 
and densities rose to the greatest in the world, rice culture became more and more 
labor-intensive and sophisticated, which demanded even more labor. But in the 
dry half year, this enormous labor force was unable to find sufficient work. Some 
found work in handicraft which was never separated from agriculture but also 
declined facing the cheaper products made by machines from the West. (Oshima 
1993: 3). The more labor force was needed in the wet seasons, the more labor 
force was underemployed, unemployed or disguisedly unemployed in the dry 
seasons, which in turn called for even more labor force in order to produce more 
food for the population to survive the dry seasons or "spring hunger”, which again 
caused smaller and more fragmented farms, greater densities and higher under- 
, un- an disguised un-employment in the dry half year. Hence a "vicious circle" 
o f poverty within agriculture.
"Vicious circle" o f poverty between agriculture and industry.
The development of industry required year-round supply of labor, but the 
unlimited supply of labor was only in the dry half year. In order to induce 
peasants to abandon farming, a high enough wage gap was needed, which the 
factories, with the steam-powered machines of the First Industrial Revolution and 
low productivity, were unable to provide. Even if it could be provided, the labor 
force shortage in the peak seasons would reduce the agricultural output. And even 
if industry could acquire labor from other sources (e.g., the daughters of the 
unemployed samurai in Japan after the Meiji Restoration), agriculture could not 
provide enough food due to its low productivity. The industrial sector also needed 
a huge rural market for its products, but the poverty of peasants impeded the 
establishment of such a market. Therefore, the emergence of modem industry was 
hampered. The slow growth of industry could not generate enough wealth which 
might then be used to aid agricultural development. Hence a "vicious circle" o f  
poverty between agriculture and industry.
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Capitalistic large-scale farming was not feasible, because the technological 
innovations of the West up to the First Industrial Revolution were almost entirely 
irrelevant to the highly labor-intensive and sophisticated rice culture. The 
electricity/gas-driven machines of the Second Industrial Revolution were suitable 
but they needed education and technological help, of which the illiterate peasants 
themselves could not partake. More serious was the institutional and power 
structure, especially the feudal landlord ownership system, which strengthened the 
"vicious circle” of poverty. The free market forces alone could not shatter the 
"vicious circle" and realize sustainable rural development. Therefore, it was 
necessary to resort to a mixed economy in the postwar era.
V. The Postwar Initial Conditions for Development 
in Monsoon Asia
In the initial postwar era, the three above-mentioned traditional productive 
and technological conditions, i.e., (1) highly labor-intensive rice culture leading 
to labor force shortage in the peak seasons, high population densities, and 
fragmented small farms; (2) little employment in the slack seasons; (3) unfeasibil­
ity of capitalistic large-scale farming, still existed; and one institutional condition, 
i.e., feudal landlord ownership, still remained in some countries. These were 
particular to monsoon Asia and different from the characteristics of Europe.
Besides, there were a number of initial economic and social conditions 
which were also very important and of which Kuzncts, Myrdal and Ishikawa have 
done special analyses. Their common point of view is that the initial conditions 
facing the postwar developing countries in monsoon Asia were different from 
those for the advanced countries at their past comparable stages of economic 
development. (Kuznets 1960. Myrdal 1972; 49-50. Ishikawa 1967: 1, 4). This 
section reviews those initial conditions most relevant to rural development, 
excluding those in culture, politics, industry and foreign trade. In comparison with 
these authors, my finding in this section is that these initial conditions were also 
applicable to the immediate postwar Japan, which they do not note.
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Low Per Capita Income
Kuznets takes up eight industrialized countries: US, UK, Canada, France, 
Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Italy and compares their per capita national 
incomes around the years 1840 to 1850 with those in postwar underdeveloped 
countries. He finds that the per capita incomes for most of these countries were, 
expressed in the US dollar value in 1949 prices, between $ 150 and $ 300, with 
the exception of Sweden and Italy, where they were $ 110 and $ 90 respectively. 
In contrast, per capita incomes for most developing countries in Asia in 1949 
were less than $ 60. (Kuznets 1954: 144). Japan’s position in the early Meiji era 
seemed in this regard in between the Western European countries and the postwar 
developing countries. The per capita income in the early Meiji era (in the 1870s) 
was roughly $ 65 at the postwar rate of exchange as counted by Ohkawa and 
Rosovsky. (Ohkawa & Rosovsky 1965: 54). But in the initial postwar period it 
was also low as Japan suffered from devastation. With acute food shortage and 
hyperinflation the majority of Japanese people only maintained a subsistence. 
(Hayami 1988: 43)
Myrdal’s broad impression is that on the Indian subcontinent the masses 
lived in worse poverty than did those in the Western European countries at any 
time during the several centuries before the Second Industrial Revolution. In 
Malaya, the average economic level may have been higher than in the Western 
European countries at the time the Second Industrial Revolution began. The other 
South and Southeast Asian countries fell somewhere in between. But on the 
Indian subcontinent, social inequality was more pervasive and more detrimental 
to free competition, in the wider sense of the term, than anywhere in the Western 
world in recent centuries. He recognizes that it was true that the great poverty in 
South and Southeast Asia, particularly in those countries with the bulk of its 
population, was in itself a major barrier to development. The foreseeable increases 
in population would lead to further lowering of living standards unless resolute 
development policies were pursued, and this trend implied another difference in 
initial conditions, detrimental to all the South and Southeast Asian countries. 
(Myrdal 1972: 53-54)
Ishikawa points out that the causes may be that the positions of both per 
capita natural resources and accumulated capital have been much more unfavor­
Chapter 2
able in the postwar developing countries, and these were closely related to the 
initial conditions described below (Ishikawa 1967: 10-11). Myrdal also remarks 
that (relative to the science and technology at the beginning of the postwar 
period) South and Southeast Asia, as a region, was poorly endowed with 
resources. Only India was known to have enough coal and iron ore to support 
heavy industry. With the exception of Indonesia, there did not seem to be much 
oil in the region. Land resources were often poor, either because they were that 
way to begin with or because they had been damaged by overcrowding and 
climate. There were exceptions, however. Sri Lanka had excellent, though limited, 
land for producing tea, coconuts and rubber. Malaya and Indonesia also had 
excellent and less limited land for growing rubber. There were large forested 
areas in Malaya, Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Philippines not yet fully 
utilized. (Myrdal 1972: 50-51)
This initial condition was likely to bring about special problems in 
economic development. On one hand, it tended to bring down the potential rate 
of growth (the maximum growth rate attainable through the development 
mechanism without foreign aid) of the economy by raising the consumption ratio 
of national income or pressing down the savings ratio, when the institutional 
conditions governing the income distribution was given. On the other, however, 
it tended to raise the required rate of growth (the minimum rate of growth to be 
attained in order to make economic development itself possible), since people's 
expectations for a higher per capita income would be higher under this state as 
the price for the same degree of bell-tightening during the period of deliberate 
economic development. (Ishikawa 1967 : 8-9, 11)
Vast Population and a Huge Labor Force
Kuznets notes that the population of the present developed countries in 
their developing stages was much less and could emigrate to America and 
Australia in large numbers. In contrast, the postwar developing countries had a 
rapid population growth but emigration in such a dimension was impossible. 
(Kuznets 1954: 147-155, Kuznets 1960). Myrdal points out that in pre-industrial 
times, population growth in the West was comparatively slow. By contrast, 
population growth in South and Southeast Asia had been increasing over a very
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long period, and was increasing even faster in the postwar period. The population 
explosion constituted a very important difference between monsoon Asian 
developing countries and the West in terms of their initial situation. (Myrdal 
1972:51-52)
Regarding the annual rates of population increase, in contrast to only 9 eAc 
during 1880-1900 and 12 %o during 1900-20 in Japan, those in the postwar 
monsoon Asian developing countries were 12 %o during 1950/51-59/60 and 16 %c 
during 1960/61-62/63 in Myanmar; 27 %o during 1960-63 in Sri Lanka; 20 9?c 
during 1953-57 in China; 33 %o during 1957-60 and 34 %c during 1961-63 in 
Taiwan Province of China; 18 %o during 1951/52-55/56,22 ^ d u rin g  1956/57-60- 
/61, 24 %o during 1961/62-65/66 in India; 25 %c during 1960-63 in South Korea; 
34 %c during 1961-62 in Malaya; 23 %v during 1950/51-59/60 and 26 %r during 
1960/61-63/64 in Pakistan; 32 %o during 1960-63 in the Philippines; and 30 %c, 
during 1961-63 in Thailand. (United Nations 1964: 3. Ishikawa 1965. Planning 
Commission 1964. Banister 1987: 156, 352). For Japan, after WWII, the territory 
reduced by almost one-half and population increased by repatriates from colonies. 
Up to the mid-1950s, as the repatriates and demobilized soldiers did not have 
sufficient employment opportunities in cities, agricultural population increased by 
20 % - 30 % over the prewar figure and the rural community was overcrowded. 
(ESJ 1955-56: 95-96. Hayami 1991: 83)
Ishikawa assumes that the basic difference between the past experience of 
the industrialized countries and the present state of the postwar monsoon Asian 
developing countries is that, in the former the rise in the rate of increase of 
population was via a decline in the crude death rate occurred after a substantial 
rise in per capita income, while in the latter a population explosion had taken 
place before any rise in per capita income. In the West, a decline in the rate of 
increase in population occurred in the past with a lag of several decades after the 
decline in the death rate via a decline in the crude birth rate. But in the postwar 
developing countries, in moving from a long period of high fertility and mortality 
levels to low levels of fertility and mortality, mortality fell first. Before fertility 
decreased, there was a period with both low mortality and high fertility, hence 
high population growth rates. (Ishikawa 1967: 11-12. Higgins 1959: 315-323. 
Oshima 1987: 56)
Essentially, because of the impact of these two initial conditions upon the
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development process, the annual additions to the supply of labor force exceeded 
the additional employment which the economy was capable of providing at an 
existing wage rate. Such an imbalance, as it occurred, threatened economic 
development. The population explosion, together with existing surplus labor, 
created a serious social and political problem because of the ensuing employment 
imbalance. (Ishikawa 1967: 12-13)
The magnitude of the problem of productive employment of the total labor 
force in the postwar developing countries in monsoon Asia therefore was vastly 
greater than that of the advanced countries at their development stages (Ishikawa 
1967: 18). Myrdal says that while industrialization is unquestionably of crucial 
importance for long-term development, the more immediate problem is agriculture 
(Myrdal 1972: 55). Ishikawa also thinks that for solving this problem, although 
the rapid growth of the urban industrial sector is a long-term measure and very 
important, some effective means of increasing productive employment within the 
rural sector as a short-term measure should be taken (Ishikawa 1967: 18).
Low Productivity in Peasant Agriculture
Kuznets further claims that there was a low per worker productivity in 
agriculture in the postwar developing countries (Kuznets 1960).
Ishikawa explains that in monsoon Asian agriculture, there were three 
distinct institutional patterns of production and management units: (1) small 
peasant agriculture (either in the form of owner-cultivator or under landlord-tenant 
relations), (2) collective farm agriculture (i.e., the agricultural producers’ 
cooperatives and the people’s communes of China) and (3) plantation agriculture.
The difference between the first two patterns and the last corresponded 
also to the difference between subsistence crop agriculture, centering around food 
grains (though in some countries, a substantial part of its output was exported) 
and specialized export crop agriculture. However, since the plantation sector was 
technologically and managerially advanced and its problems were mainly related 
to foreign trade, it is not taken into consideration here.
Moreover, the collective farm agriculture should be treated as a variant o f 
peasant agriculture. This is because the form of collective farm in China was still 
substantially a cooperative of individual peasant farms, and the technological
foundation of these collective farms did not seem to have changed fundamentally 
from that in the peasant farm agriculture. Therefore, the analysis here will bo 
confined to subsistence crop agriculture carried on in the peasant sector in a wider 
sense.
Peasant agriculture existed even in such export economies as Malaya and 
Sri Lanka. Increasing attention was paid to the problems of this agriculture alter 
independence, under a policy of emphasizing self-sustaining food grains. This 
policy was needed, granted a relatively declining demand in the world market for 
plantation products as well as by a sudden increase in population grow th. In such 
rice-exporting countries as Thailand and Myanmar, although the problem might 
appear subtle, it was becoming, as industrialization proceeded, urgent. This was 
due also to a declining demand for rice abroad and the "population explosion". 
(Ishikawa 1967: 19)
There were two basic, initial conditions specific to this peasant agriculture 
in monsoon Asia: (1) the virtual disappearance of the arable land frontier 
[similarly, Kuznets points out a much lower per capita and per agricultural worker 
supply of agricultural land (Kuznets 1960), and Myrdal remarks that the heavily 
populated areas started out with a considerably higher man/land ratio than did the 
European countries (Myrdal 1972: 51)] and (2) the lack of basic investment in 
water conservancy (such as flood control, irrigation and drainage). Due to 
condition (2), land productivity has remained very low in many developing 
countries of monsoon Asia, especially in those of South and Southeast Asia. Yet 
in prewar years, since condition (l) was not yet prevalent, it was possible for 
many countries to increase total agricultural output simply by extending the arable 
land frontier. Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam were typical examples of this.
However, this course of increasing agricultural output has now been 
virtually stopped. To increase the per hectare output, basic investment in water 
conservancy seemed to be almost a precondition in those countries with very low 
land productivity. (Ishikawa 1967: 19-20)
Similarly, Myrdal notices the importance of climate conditions for 
development. Generally speaking, the extremes of heat and humidity in most 
South and Southeast Asian countries contributed to a deterioration of soil and 
many kinds of material goods; it bore partial responsibility for the low productivi­
ty of certain crops, forests and animals; and not only caused discomfort to
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workers but also impaired their health and decreased the participation in. and 
duration and efficiency of. work. It was possible in some small ways to alter the 
climate; more important, the effects of climate on productivity could be changed 
in many ways, and both production and consumption could be better adapted to 
the climate. But this required expenditure, often of the investment type. (Myrdal 
1972: 51)
A serious problem arising from the combination of a low per capita output 
and a high propensity to consume farm products in farm households was that the 
resulting small quantity of surplus or marketable farm products (defined as that 
part of farm products which remains after subtracting the self-consumed part o f 
the farm products from the total products) tended to limit the possibility o f 
industrialization to a narrow range. Because the non-farm labor force depends 
upon the marketable farm products for its subsistence and because the propensity 
to consume farm products of this labor force was also very high and inflexible, 
the number of workers who could be employed in the non-farm sector was largely 
determined by the availability of the marketable farm products. Moreover, insofar 
as this high propensity to consume held true over a fairly wide range of per capita 
output variation, a small increase in per capita output might not offer the solution 
to a limited quantity of marketable products, since most of such an increase was 
likely to be consumed on the spot where it was produced. (Ishikawa 1967: 21). 
Such consumption was necessary, according to Myrdal, because low incomes 
probably hampered development more by keeping down consumption than by 
limiting savings, since inferior living conditions reduced labor efficiency (Myrdal 
1972: 53).
In order to solve the above bottleneck of the limited amount of marketable 
products by considerably raising land productivity, one problem arises. For such 
a solution, capital requirements would be substantial, since the productivity 
increase must be technologically preceded by a substantial amount of basic 
investment in water conservancy in the existing cultivated land. Here, the initial 
condition regarding the low saving and investment ratios comes in. Because of 
this, it may not be easy to rely fully upon local savings for meeting such capital 
requirements; but it may also be difficult to expect non-farm savings to flow into 
the farm sector without sacrificing the rate of development of modern industry. 
(Ishikawa 1967: 21)
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The above initial conditions of monsoon Asian agriculture and the 
resulting problems are clearly in contrast to those of Western Europe in its early 
industrialization stage. When Rostow, in his familiar stage theory, considered as 
one of the preconditions for "take-off" the increased productivity in agriculture 
(Rostow 1960: 6, 21-24), what was in his mind was the European experience. In 
England, between 1730 and 1760, the medieval three-field system was almost 
replaced by new systems of continuous crop rotation, side by side with the 
introduction of new farming technologies such as drainage, manuring, deep- 
plowing and cattle- and sheep-breeding (Mantoux 1961: 156-163). Both labor and 
land productivity attained a considerable degree of progress before the First 
Industrial Revolution. Such technological innovations gradually spread over the 
continental countries in Europe toward the end of the 19th century. During the 
"take-off periods, agricultural output and productivity moved markedly upward. 
(Boserup 1963: Chapter 12). In Japan also, economic development since the Meiji 
Restoration was accompanied by a considerable expansion of agricultural output 
and increase in productivity. With respect to agricultural inputs, progress was 
marked in the early Meiji period, especially in the nationwide spread of better 
technologies which had been developed and applied only locally in the Tokugawa 
era. The use of better seeds and more fertilizer was part of this technological 
progress. Basic investment in water conservancy had laid a foundation for the 
upsurge of agricultural production in the later Meiji period. (Ishikawa 1967: 
21-22). In contrast, the postwar monsoon Asian developing countries did not 
possess these favorable conditions. Even in Japan, it became evident in the 1910s 
that the technological potential in agriculture exhausted when the rate of growth 
in agricultural output and productivity began to decelerate. During the interwar 
era, agriculture was relatively stagnant. New technological potential emerged, but 
militarism diverted the resources to wage WWII and stagnation lasted to the 
immediate postwar period. (Hayami 1988: 43. Hayami 1991: 77-83)
New Institutional Settings
Myrdal emphasizes that attitudes and institutions are more important than 
levels of income per se. However, the attitudes and institutions in South and 
Southeast Asian countries were less favorable than were those in the now
developed Western countries at the start of the Second Industrial Revolution, or 
even in the centuries before. (Myrdal 1972: 53-54). Among many new institution­
al settings, two are reviewed below.
Colonialism has been denounced.
Kuznets notes that the postwar developing countries had gained political 
independence after decades of colonial or semi-colonial status (Kuznets I960). 
Therefore, as Ishikawa stresses, colonialism, spheres of influence or any other 
form of control of one nation by other nations can no more be implemented. In 
prewar days, most industrialized countries depended on colonies or spheres of 
influence to provide protected markets for product exports, raw material imports, 
or fields for capital investments. However, it was impossible for the postwar 
developing countries to adopt this approach. (Ishikawa 1967: 26)
The landlord-tenant system has been criticized or reformed.
In those countries where such a system developed (in Thailand and 
Malaya, the landlord-tenant system had been relatively minor), agrarian reforms 
of varying degrees have been enforced. These included land redistribution with 
or without compensation, abolition of intermediary tax collectors, reduction of 
land rent and security of tenancy contracts. In prewar days, this system was 
relatively secure. In Japan, the government in the Metji era even extended 
protection to this system. The landlords in the early Meiji era, improved farming 
technologies and raised yields in their leased-out land. However, in postwar 
monsoon Asia, in those countries where extreme land redistribution has been 
made, landlords as well as capital investment by them no more exist. In those 
countries where agrarian reforms have been milder, a fear of further reforms has 
made the existing land tenure system insecure, thus preventing the landlords from 
attempting investment in agriculture. (Ishikawa 1967: 26). Therefore, new sources 
for capital investment in agriculture have to be found.
The Interactions of the Initial Conditions
Myrdal stresses that all of the differences in initial conditions made the 
problem of economic development more difficult for the nations of South and 
Southeast Asia than it once was for the Western nations (Myrdal 1972: 54). 
Ishikawa also addresses the problem that there were no ready measures to solve
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the difficulties caused by the above-mentioned four categories of initial 
conditions, and any possible measures may be conflicting (Ishikawa 1967: 28).
For example, some of the most fundamental tasks for postwar economic 
development were: (1) to give employment to the increasing number of new 
entrants in the labor force as well as to eliminate the backlog of existing visible 
or disguised unemployment, and (2) to increase agricultural productivity so as to 
provide an adequate amount of agricultural surplus for the expanding industrial 
sector. Each of these tasks represents a new problem in economic development 
for which a ready-made prescription does not exist. (Ishikawa 1967: 28)
Moreover, these tasks are liable to conflict one another. (1) Measures to 
meet the first task regarding employment tend to require a higher speed of 
industrialization. If such measures are adopted, the marketable food products may 
become a bottleneck. When the requirement of such speedier industrialization 
deprives agriculture of part of the centralized investment funds otherwise to be 
allocated to it, this bottleneck will become more serious. (2) In order to make the 
above bottleneck disappear, a larger amount of basic investment in water 
conservancy would be required. However, when such investment requires 
diverting part of the centralized investment funds to agriculture, the speed of 
industrialization will be slowed down, and unless some additional labor-using 
technologies are developed, this is likely to result in a continuation of the 
unsolved employment problem. The result of reconciling these mutually 
conflicting tasks is a general slowing down of the rate of economic progress; thus 
the possibility arises in which the required rate of growth tends to approach, or 
even become larger than, the potential growth rate. (Ishikawa 1967: 28-29)
However, although very difficult as Ishikawa anticipates, the tasks of 
raising per capita income, employing a huge labor force, increasing productivity 
in peasant agriculture, finding new growth and investment sources under the new 
institutional settings, etc., would have to be fulfilled by the postwar monsoon 
developing economies (as well as Japan with a stagnant agriculture). Free market 
forces alone could not overcome the dual economy and realize sustainable rural 
development as the prewar experience had shown, so it was natural for them to 
turn to and strengthen the mixed economy.
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VI. Variable Mixed Economies
Concept of Mixed Economy
Multiple structures o f  public and private ownership.
Holland has illustrated the multiple ownership in the postwar Western 
welfare states. He says that the postwar increases in welfare did not always take 
the form of growth plus redistribution through state welfare policies. Much of it 
came from structural shifts (i.e., shifts out of agriculture into industry and 
services) which had major social effects and especially the historic once-off 
transition from a peasant-based to an industrial economy. In Italy (as in Japan, 
Taiwan and South Korea) the increases in welfare were accompanied by a 
significant degree of land reform. Such changes in the ownership base in 
agriculture, rather than nationalization of industry or utilities, were important to 
the context within which welfare gains could be achieved. (Holland 1993: 8)
The postwar models of economic and social cohesion in Europe have 
depended on a nexus of cooperative horizontal and vertical links which have been 
crucial to ensuring that small and medium firms and farms - have been able to 
survive and by and large flourish for decades. In France and Italy this has 
included a major role for agricultural cooperatives in both production and 
distribution. In Italy, cooperative associations of small producers in Tuscany, 
Emilia Romagna and Veneto formed interest groups which worked in successful 
symbiosis with local and regional governments and local trade unions. Social 
partnerships in such cases, at the micro and local level, reinforced the sense of 
purposeful interaction between private interest groups and public institutions. This 
included not only regional public credit institutions, but also mutual credit 
institutions between small producers. (Holland 1993: 8)
Intervention rather than ownership.
Holland points out that while in postwar France and Italy, the mixed 
economy used more public planning and ownership, Germany adopted a model 
which was different - on ownership - but more effective - on planning. The 
German reconstruction involved extensive economic planning through the 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW or KW - Reconstruction Loan Corporation). 
The underlying strength of the German economy lay in its big business groups.
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its network of medium sized firms (Mittelstand) and public institutions. Through 
the chairmanship of Deutsche Bank President Herman Abs and with the 
representation on the KfW of all the main banks, which in turn were share­
holders in all the leading companies in the economy, the KfW arguably was able 
to plan the allocation of Marshall Aid and counterpart finance as effectively - 
albeit with virtually no public profile - as did the much publicized First French 
Plan under the high profile leadership of its first director, Jean Monnct. (Shonfield 
1969: 242, 253, 262, 276-282). Such planning for German reconstruction needed 
major public spending through Marshall Aid. But it did not need public 
ownership. Nor did it need a formal planning structure within the state rather than 
a symbiosis between a key public credit agency (the KfW) and the main private 
banks which, through their supervisory board membership on leading firms, knew 
where the strengths were which should be reinforced and the bottlenecks which 
needed widening. (Holland 1993: 6-8)
Concept of Variable Mixed Economies
According to Holland, there is a matrix of the mixed economy which 
includes varying relations between public and private economic power; public and 
economic interest groups; public and private institutions; public and private credit 
and finance; public and private regulations; public and private planning; public 
and private spending; public and private enterprises; public and private manage­
ment. The relative balance and effectiveness of such factors in the public and 
private sectors varied both between economies and societies, and within them over 
time. The result was not one, two or three models but a range of discrete 
outcomes within a general paradigm of the mixed economy. (Holland 1993: 5-6). 
In this sense, Nuti’s model of market socialism as outlined below also belongs to 
various mixed economies.
Various mixed economies not only imply varying relations between the 
public and private sectors, but also mean that dynamically, they should change 
over time in relation to changing needs in the economy and society. For example, 
in Japan, the Meiji dynasty achieved basic industrialization through public 
ownership, including some manufacturing firms. It was only with evidence of 
take-off that some of these were privatized. The model in this respect was similar
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to that of the US after independence, when the post colonial states in several 
cases not only owned banks and financed infrastructure but also owned 
manufacturing companies. In fact, the US was one of the first countries to exhibit 
the modern tendency to extend the activity of the state into industry. (Holland 
1994: 75, 188. Callender 1902: 111. Holland 1976 (b): 114-120)
In the postwar era, the South Korean government implemented what Wade 
calls a "Governed Market" policy (Wade 1990: 297). It fundamentally reshaped 
ownership through land reform and a publicly owned banking system. It created 
an enclave of relative stability for long-term investment decisions through its 
control of key parameters (foreign exchange rales, interest rates and aggregate 
demand). It modulated the economy's exposure to international competitive 
pressures in the domestic market through protection and exchange control. It 
imposed conditions on the activities of foreign companies in the country so as to 
gain benefits in terms of trade and technology transfer. It subsidized and 
promoted national champions. (Hamilton 1986). It also planned outcomes through 
the Economic Planning Board (Wade 1990: 2(H)). Not least, an ostensibly private- 
enterprise economy utilized public ownership to an extent which parallels that of 
many countries advocating a socialist pattern of society (Jones & Sakong 1980: 
141). In 1972, 12 of the 16 biggest industrial enterprises were public enterprises 
(Jones & Mason 1982: 38).
From the mid-1970s to early 1980s, the government promoted petrochem­
icals and other heavy and chemical industries (HCIS) including petrochemicals, 
steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, automobiles, shipbuilding and electronics.
But this too changed over time. During the 1980s, the government moved 
toward a follower rather than a leader role with the major South Korean 
companies, as they showed themselves capable of casting global shadows. It since 
has been concentrating more on basic research and development (R & D), leaving 
commercialization and marketing to the firms and setting its R & D agenda in 
consultation with them. (Wade 1990: 312-319)
NutVs Model of Market Socialism
Of various arguments in Nuti's model of market socialism, the one most 
relevant to this thesis is as follows.
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Nuti criticizes Mises’s point of view that private ownership of the means 
of production was a precondition of markets, because only ultimate owners have 
the incentive to control their efficient use (Mises 1951). Hence, for Mises there 
was the dilemma: either socialism or markets, and there could not be such a thing 
as market socialism. Nuti believes that Mises was both right and wrong. He was 
right in that the appropriation of all, or a sizable fraction, of the capital gains 
deriving from successful enterprise seems a necessary precondition for the 
mobilization of entrepreneurial initiatives; but he was wrong in that this is all that 
is needed. (Nuti 1992: 22)
Nuti suggests a pluralist ownership. There can be a large but not exclusive 
or even necessarily predominant public ownership of productive capacity (state, 
local and cooperative) coexisting and competing on equal terms with a non-public 
sector. One form of privatization of management is the maintenance of a large 
state stake in national capital through state share-holdings in private companies. 
(Nuti 1992: 22-23)
Nuti also imagines an economy where the ownership of all means of 
production and their further reproduction is in the hand of the state, but these 
means are leased in competitive leasing markets to private entrepreneurs who 
retain a residual claim to both income and capital gains and are able to transfer 
those claims. Capital leasings - present on a small scale under the New Economic 
Policy during 1921-26 in the USSR - have reappeared widely in the recent 
reforms in East Europe, unfortunately on too small a scale.
There is a model of "entrepreneurial socialism" by the Hungarian 
economist Tibor Liska (Liska 1963) based precisely on the competitive leasing 
of state assets and their compulsory surrender to the highest bidder (however, 
with the additional bids belonging to bidders, not to the state), all citizens having 
a capital stake to invest or to use to exercise entrepreneurship (Barsony 1982: nos. 
3-4. Nuti 1988: 2-6). Leasings, instead of privatization, are worthy of greater 
consideration than they have attracted in economic reform to date. Nuti stresses 
that this model of market socialism is a "Third Way" between the centrally 
planned economy and free market system. The exploration of such a model 
should be of interest to socialists and non-socialists alike, also in the West. (Nuti 
1992: 17, 19-20, 22-23)
There may be different models of market socialism. In this thesis, market
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Hence my hypothesis: the fragmented small farms as the last obstacle 
imposed by the monsoon in sustainable rural development of monsoon Asia may 
be overcome by variable mixed economies, increasingly along three main phases. 
Phase 1: sub-village individual-collective mixed economy (sub-village-wide 
cooperative/enterprise collective use of physically withdrawable private land 
shares, exercising collective-individual dual level operation of large land units, 
with the basic operation level at one household or at a farming unit including a 
number of households). Phase 2: village-wide individual-collective mixed 
economy. Phase 3: either large-scale farming public-individual mixed economy 
or corporate-individual mixed economy (collective use of either puhlic land, or 
physically unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, 
exercising village-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the 
basic operation level at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including a 
number of households, as a third way between the centrally planned economy and 
free market system). Hence also the focus of the following chapters: how to 
consolidate and enlarge the fragmented small farms in monsoon Asia under 
private and public land ownership with reference to the Japanese and Chinese 
models, and under corporate land ownership as a proposed new model.
Government’s Role in Economic Development and Agro-Industrial 
Transition of Monsoon Asia
Kuznets points out that the role of the nation-state in modern economic 
growth with its continuous technological and social innovations and its rapid rate 
of structural change is an important factor in modern economic growth, and asked 
whether the delay in the rise of a modern nation-stale was a factor in the failure 
of underdeveloped countries to enter the modern growth process (Kuznets 1971: 
346-347).
Abramovitz indicates that the process includes the displacement and 
redistribution of the population among regions, the abandonment of old industries 
and occupations, the qualification of workers for new and more skilled occupa­
tions and extension of education. The growth of very large-scale enterprise 
establishes new types of market power and alters the relations of workers and
Chapter 2 91
employees. These imply a great change in the structure of families and in their 
roles in caring for children, the sick and the old. These and other changes alter 
the positions, prospects and power of established groups. Conflict and resistance 
are intrinsic to the growth process. To resolve such conflict and resistance in a 
way which preserves a large consensus for growth, yet does not impose a cost 
which retards growth unduly, a mechanism of conflict resolution is needed. The 
national sovereign state necessarily becomes the arbiter of group conflict. 
(Abramovitz 1981: 2)
Oshima further stresses that it is abundantly clear that the role of 
government in monsoon Asian development is of the utmost importance, 
especially during the agro-industrial transition. Governments in monsoon Asian 
agriculture have a greater role to play than in other regions: land is scarce, and 
many farmers own little or no land, so agrarian reform is needed. Rents charged 
to tenants and interest rates on loans tend to be high, requiring regulation. But 
often governments fail to intervene, fearing the landowning class. Irrigation is 
needed to supply water during the dry season, and drainage is needed in the wet 
season. (Oshima 1993: 226)
During the early stages of the agro-industrial transition, there are other 
functions to be performed by government. Government is crucial in the 
construction of modern physical infrastructure, the import and supervision of 
technologies, the development of human and natural resources, the mobilization 
and channeling of savings, and the reduction of unemployment and poverty. 
Moreover, traditional institutions must be modernized, and the foundations of new 
organizations, such as labor unions, farmers’ cooperatives, industrial and 
commercial associations, and banks, must be laid. (Oshima 1993: 227)
Bray holds that the state has several areas in which it may invest to foster 
agricultural growth. The first is infrastructure: land reclamation; provision of 
transport facilities; and most importantly water conservancy. The second is capital 
including capital inputs especially fertilizers; and capital goods such as tilling, 
harvesting and processing machinery. The third is provision of credit facilities. 
(Bray 1986: 158-161)
Oshima notes that there are some who are impatient with the inefficiencies 
of government and want to shift to the market, which they consider the most 
efficient allocator of resources. But the market is only as efficient as the forces
making up the market. It took some time for the West to evolve and nurture these 
forces. It is well known that the (former) socialist countries are encountering 
difficulties in shifting from a planned to a market economy. It will take some 
time before market forces are developed, especially the ability of entrepreneurs 
to finance and market their production. Indeed, an important historical function 
of government in the process of development is to mold these forces so that the 
market becomes an efficient resource allocator. One reason for the rapid growth 
of East Asian economies was the efficiency of their governments. They were 
more effective in raising productivity, in promoting saving, in generating 
employment through agricultural diversification, multiple cropping, and off-farm 
employment, and in developing human resources. In addition, they supplied the 
necessary urban infrastructures such as roads and public utilities, secured political 
and social stability, and motivated the populace to work energetically to develop 
the economy. The governments of East Asia regulated the market deeply without 
disturbing the market unduly or weakening market forces. (Oshima 1993: 227) 
Gordillo de Anda argues that markets do not function by themselves. It is 
naive to assume that the removal of government interventions will result in 
reasonable approximations of perfect markets. It does not follow that social 
welfare will rise as a consequence of the removal of some or all government 
interventions. On the contrary, the impact of structural reform and liberalization 
has negatively affected the poorest. The virtues of the market are exaggerated in 
line with the vices of the state. Markets must be managed and market failures 
compensated for. For development to work, people have to feel that they directly 
benefit; and for that to work, there has to be a mix of market, civic society (such 
as fanners’ cooperatives or associations) and government. Each of these three 
parts needs the other parts. Such a mix could release something far more powerful 
than the energy of each: the synergy of "collective imagination and action" that 
results in sustainable development. (Gordillo de Anda 1997: 1-3, 7-8). Riddell 
further presents that "There exists a wide range of examples of public sector and 
private sector cooperation. The challenge that all nations are facing is to identify 
and implement solutions that respond to their own situation." (Riddell 1997: 2) 
These points of view are in accordance with the variable mixed economies. 
However, systematically reviewing and discussing all patterns of mixed 
economy in agriculture, industry, finance, trade, etc. and their interrelationship in
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all countries of the West and East in their developing and developed Mages are 
a task not permitted by the length of the thesis. Thus, Chapters 4 and 5 
concentrate on the two variants of the mixed economy in agriculture in postwar 
monsoon Asia: the Japanese one and the Chinese one. examining whether they 
could overcome the last obstacle to sustainable rural development in monsoon 
Asia, plus a new proposed model.
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Chapter 3
Theory of Property Rights
Modem property rights theory appeared at the beginning of the 1960s. Of 
its many branches» this chapter can only review those most relevant to the major 
task of the thesis, i.e., how to consolidate and enlarge the fragmented small farms. 
They will be applied later into economics analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, although 
some brief reference also will be made in this chapter to show their relevance to 
the Chinese and Japanese models of rural development.
Unsurprisingly, the literature contains a range of different views and 
perspectives. There is no single universally accepted statement of the theory 
(Weitzman & Xu 1993: 5). This chapter adopts those which the author thinks 
appropriate and makes criticism on incorrect views, especially those in some 
widely-used economics textbooks and dictionary.* 1
1 In the literature, the terminology differs but some of the main concepts are 
similar. For example, the authors variously use terms such as "property rights" 
(Demsetz 1967: 31), "property relations" (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 2), "rights", 
"entitlements" (Alchian 1974: xiii), "ownership" (Demsetz 1988: 12), "right of 
ownership" (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 4), "ownership rights” (Demsetz 1988: 
12), "ownership title" (Demsetz 1967: 33). Few explicit differences are explained 
clearly in the literature and there is no substantive difference in the main 
conceptual framework of the various authors. Therefore, in this text, when 
expressing a general concept of property rights or ownership, I will use the term 
"property rights", and when showing the concept of property rights to or 
ownership of an asset, I will use the term "ownership".
I also find that the terms "property rights (or ownership) assignments", 
"property rights (or ownership) system", "property rights (or ownership) struc­
tures", "property rights (or ownership) configurations", "patterns of property rights 
(or ownership)" (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 1, 3), sometimes even "property 
rights (or ownership)" (Demsetz 1967: 32) are used by different authors to 
express the same concept, i.e., property rights (or ownership) structures.
Thus, in this thesis, when presenting the concept of property rights (or 
ownership) structures, I will mainly use the term "property rights (or ownership) 
structures", but sometimes also use the term "property rights (or ownership) 
assignments" as it is relevant in a specific context.
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I. Incentives under Private Ownership and 
Possession of Public Assets
Property Rights
Furubotn and Pejovich define the concept of property rights as the 
sanctioned behavioral relations among people that arise from the existence of 
goods and pertain to their use (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 3).
These relations, as Demsetz emphasize, convey the right to benefit or harm 
oneself or others. For example, harming a competitor by producing superior 
products may be permitted, while shooting him may not. (Demsetz 1967: 31-32). 
They specify the norms of behavior with respect to goods that each and every 
person must observe in his (her) daily interactions with other persons, or bear the 
cost of non-observance (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 3)* They also specify ways 
in which persons may be benefitted and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay 
whom to modify the actions taken by persons (Demsetz 1967: 32).
Furubotn, Pejovich and Demsetz indicate the basic implications of the 
concept of property rights as follows.
Property rights are an instrument of society. In the world of Robinson 
Crusoe, they play no role. (Demsetz 1967; 31). This applies to all scarce goods 
and encompasses both the rights over material things (to sell my typewriter) as 
well as human rights (the right to vote, to publish, etc.). Here, the term "good" 
refers to anything that yields utility or satisfaction to a person. The prevailing 
property rights structure in the community is the sum of economic and social 
relations with respect to scarce resources in which individual members stand to 
each other (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 3).
Ownership
Furubotn and Pejovich claim that ownership of an asset is the best known 
of the many sub-categories of the general concept of property rights. It implies 
the following three elements. (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 4)
First, the right to use the asset (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 4). Especially, 
as Milgrom and Roberts stress, it includes the right to residual control - that is, 
the right to make any decisions concerning the asset’s use that are not explicitly
controlled by law or assigned to another by contract (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 
289). For example* Japanese owner-peasants can decide whether or not to 
produce* what product and how much to produce on their own land, which are not 
explicitly controlled by law.
Second, the right to appropriate returns from the asset (Furubotn & 
Pejovich 1974: 4), or the right to refuse use of the asset to anyone who will not 
pay the price the owner demands. Particularly, it contains the right to residual 
returns - the net income an asset brings after all revenues have been collected and 
all debts, expenses and other contractual obligations have been paid. Thus, the 
owner of an asset is the residual claimant - the one who is entitled to receive any 
net income the asset produces. (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 290-291)
Third, the right to change the asset’s form and/or substance. This element, 
the right to bear the consequences from changes in the value of an asset* is the 
fundamental component of ownership. It implies that the owner has the legal 
freedom to transfer all rights (e.g., to sell a land), or some rights (e.g.. to lease 
the land), in the asset to others at a mutually agreed-upon price. (Furubotn & 
Pejovich 1974: 4)
Ownership is an exclusive but not unrestricted right in the sense that it is 
limited only by those restrictions that are explicitly slated in the law; or, 
sometimes* in the customs and mores of a society (Demsetz 1967: 31). Such 
restrictions may range from substantial to minor. For example, on one hand, there 
is the serious case where an individual’s ownership of an asset cannot be 
transferred for a price higher than the ceiling price established by the government; 
on the other, there is the situation where a land owner is constrained from 
building a fence within two feet of the property line. (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 
4)
This statement is especially relevant to this thesis. As shown in Chapters 
1 and 4* the land reform in Japan during 1946-50 restricted the acreage of private 
land ownership, protected tenants from eviction and controlled land rent. In 
China, as presented in Chapters 1 and 5, a village owns the land but cannot sell 
it without the state’s permission.
Chapter 3 105
Chanter 3
Possession
H ) 6
Possession of an asset refers to the holding of an asset either by ownership 
control or in other ways. Three relevant features are considered here.
1. The owner also is possessor. If the owner holds the asset completely 
with him (her), he (she) is also its possessor. Here, ownership is also possession. 
For example, those Japanese small farmers who till their own land are both 
owners and possessors of the land.
2. The owner is not possessor. Two cases are considered here. (1) Leasing 
of land. If the owner (as lessor) leases the asset (land) to another party (as lessee), 
then, during the lease period, the owner is no more its possessor, nor is the 
possessor its owner. This is the case under the leasing of private land in Japan. 
(2) Contracting output for using land. If the owner (as contractée) contracts a 
complete task using the asset (land) to another party (as contractor), and the 
owner has the duty to provide the contractor with services, then, during the 
contract period, the owner is no more its possessor, nor is the possessor its owner. 
(There are numerous forms of contracting. Here it refers to that under the Chinese 
Household Responsibility System as outlined in Chapters 1 and 5. "Contracts a 
complete task" means to contract the whole agricultural production process, rather 
than a part or parts of the task, e.g., harvesting only.)
The major difference between leasing and contracting is that the lessor has 
no duly to provide services while the contractée has.
3. The ordinary owner is not direct possessor. There is cooperat- 
ive/enterprise engaging in both Chinese and Japanese agriculture with land shares 
by land owners, capital shares by investors, distributing revenue among land 
shares, capital shares and labor contribution. Here, if there are many land owners, 
then possession is by the board of directors (representing all land owners, making 
major decisions) and managers. Some of the land owners may operate land as 
employees of the cooperative/enterprise, but not as land owners. In this thesis, I 
call such a cooperative/enterprise as a share-holding one, if land is physically 
withdrawable when a member quits; and a corporate-holding one, if land is 
physically not withdrawable. In Table 3.1, only the case of share-holding is 
shown.
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Incentive and Pareto Efficiency
Milgrom and Roberts point out that the institution of ownership 
accompanied by secure property rights is the most common and effective 
institution for providing people with incentive to create, maintain and improve 
assets. Tying together residual returns and residual control is the key to the 
incentive effects of ownership. These effects are very powerful because the 
decision maker bears the full financial impact of his choices. (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992: 288, 291)
Suppose a transaction involves several people supplying labor, physical 
inputs, and so on. If some of the parties involved receive fixed amounts of value 
specified by a contract and there is only one residual claimant, then maximizing 
the total value received by the residual claimant is just the same as maximizing 
the total value. If the residual claimant also has the residual control, then just by 
pursuing his own interests and maximizing his own returns, the claimant will be 
led to make the decisions reaching Pareto efficiency. Efficiency usually means not 
wasteful, or doing the "best" one can with available resources. An allocation of 
resources in the economy is Pareto efficient if there is no other productively 
feasible allocation which makes all individuals in the economy at least as well 
off, and at least one strictly better off, than they were initially (Pareto 1927. 
Lockwood 1987: 811).2 When it is possible for a single individual to both have 
the residual control and receive the residual returns, the residual decisions made 
will tend to be Pareto efficient ones. For example, the owner of a car receives 
both the residual control and residual returns. If he exercises his right not to 
maintain his car, then he suffers the diminished services it provides and the 
reduced selling price it eventually commands. (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 291- 
292). Thus, he will have incentive to maintain the car well.
In contrast, if only part of the costs or benefits of a decision accrue to the 
party making the decision, then that individual will find it in his personal interest 
to ignore some of these effects, frequently leading to inefficient decisions.
Chapter 3
2 Efficiency is always defined relative to a specific set of individuals and 
available options - this is what “economy” means in the definition. Efficiency 
criteria can never be applied to resolve ethical questions about whether it is 
justified or worthwhile to help one person at another’s expense (this point will be 
further discussed later). (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 22)
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Milgrom and Roberts give striking examples in the case of car hire. In the case, 
there is extreme difficulty in performance measurement - the virtual impossibility 
of establishing exactly how much the car’s value has depreciated during any 
particular rental. For this reason, the rental company is unable to base its charges 
on its actual costs. Instead, it bases them on the things it can observe (such as 
days and hours of the rental, miles driven and obvious collision damage). Such 
a charge is necessarily less than perfectly sensitive to any single actual use and 
its effects, so careful use is not fully rewarded and rough use is not fully charged. 
The one who decides on how the asset is actually used - the person renting it - 
has residual control (for a time) but is not the residual claimant. Therefore, he 
will not have much incentive to do his best in caring for the car during its use. 
For general assets, as long as performance measurement is imperfect, a user who 
does not receive the residual returns is unlikely to take the value-maximizing level 
of care in maintaining its value and even more unlikely to do much to add to the 
asset’s value. (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 291-292)
As Table 3.1 shows, not only private ownership and possession of an 
asset, but also possession (leasing, contracting, share-holding in coopera- 
tive/enterprise) of an either public or private asset (e.g., land), may tie residual 
control and residual returns together, thus giving incentives to producers (as 
possessors) for profit-maximization to reach Pareto efficiency. In leasing, 
contracting and share-holding, although the possessors (lessee, contractor and 
cooperative/enterprise) have no ownership of the physical asset (e.g., land), they 
have the ownership of the enterprise which uses that asset. The appropriation of 
both profits as residual returns and any increment in the value of the enterprise 
gives incentive to the possessor. (Of course, the minimum amount of the residual 
returns should not be lower than the subsistence. Otherwise, the possessor would 
not be able to make a living, as is the case under the exploitative feudal landlord 
system presented in Chapter 2). Free transfer of long-leasing, contracting and 
shares of land in the market is a sufficient condition for the functioning of a 
market economy.
Relevance to Japanese and Chinese agriculture. The nine main features 
of the Japanese model of rural development (identified in Chapters 1 and 4) and 
twelve main features in the Chinese counterpart (introduced in Chapters 1 and 5) 
are relevant in this context. The huge incentive to efficient production by owner-
peasants and tenants after the land reform in Japan in the late 1940s and 1950s, 
and by peasants contracting collectively owned land in China in the late 1970s 
and the first half of the 1980s (feature 1 in both the Japanese and Chinese 
models), and experiences in share-holding agricultural cooperatives/enterprises as 
efforts for large-scale fanning since the 1970s in Japan and 1980s in China 
(feature 9) are evidences for the above-discussed property rights theory. This 
theory also supports the mixed economy and Nuti’s model of market socialism 
introduced in Chapter 2. It is compatible with my hypothesis raised in both 
Chapters 1 and 2 - the fragmented small farms as the last obstacle imposed by the 
monsoon in sustainable rural development of monsoon Asia may be overcome by 
variable mixed economies, increasingly along three main phases. Phase 1: sub­
village individual-collective mixed economy (sub-village-wide coopcrative/enterp- 
rise collective use of physically withdrawable private land shares, exercising 
collective-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the basic 
operation level at one household or at a farming unit including a number of 
households). Phase 2: village-wide individual-collective mixed economy. Phase 
3: either large-scale farming public-individual mixed economy or corporate- 
individual mixed economy (collective use of either public land, or physically 
unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, exercising village- 
individual dual level operation of large land units, with the basic operation level 
at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including a number of households, 
as a third way between the centrally planned economy and free market system).
Technological Efficiency
Varian argues that a production plan is (technologically) efficient if there 
is no way to produce more output with the same inputs or to produce the same 
output with less inputs (Varian 1992: 4). This is actually a kind of Pareto 
efficiency. Putting parentheses around "technologically” implies that technology 
is more important in this respect than in the classic Pareto condition, although the 
role of the institutional changes is not excluded.
Static or short-run technological efficiency could be attained without 
changing technologies but with higher incentives and/or better division and 
coordination of labor through institutional changes. It could also be reached by
Chapter 3 111
adopting already invented more advanced technologies which were not used 
before peasants gained incentives and/or achieved better division and coordination 
of labor.
For example, as presented in feature 1 of both the Japanese and Chinese 
models, the land reform and setting-up of cooperatives in Japan in the late 1940s 
gave huge incentives and better division and coordination of labor to peasants, 
and the economic reform in China in the late 1970s also highly motivated 
farmers. They increased production quickly with the technologies they used 
before, and then also adopted the existing more advanced technologies unused 
before.
Dynamic or long-run technological efficiency needed for achieving 
sustainable growth depends heavily on the technological progress embodied in 
construction of rural infrastructure, higher yields and multiple cropping of rice 
and other grains, diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture, off-farm 
employment, peasant migration to cities and work in towns, agricultural 
mechanization with small or large machinery (features 3*8 in the Japanese model 
and features 3-8 and 10 in Chinese one respectively), as well as regional transfer 
of development (feature 11 and 12 in the Chinese model), which have taken 
longer time (e.g., finding a higher yielding variety of rice, constructing a big dam, 
or educating peasants may take several years).
Institutional changes still play a critical role in this long-run process. In 
a high wage economy, it is only by consolidating and enlarging fragmented small 
farms that large machinery can be used and labor saved, so that producing more 
agricultural output with the same inputs or producing the same output with less 
inputs becomes possible. Institutional problems may inhibit the achievement of 
technological efficiency in this respect. It is on this (feature 9 in the Japanese and 
Chinese models) that the thesis focuses. The theory of technological efficiency, 
especially the dynamic or long-run one, is consistent with the variable mixed 
economies indicated in Chapter 2 and my hypothesis.
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II. Achieving Pareto Efficiency according to Coase
In the light o f Pareto efficiency, inefficiency means that there is an
alternative allocation of resources that would improve one party without harming 
any other in the economy. The existence of negative externalities which have no 
market, causes inefficiency. The Coase theorem provides one of the approaches 
to achieve Pareto efficiency with the introduction of market mechanism, so that 
the (future) negative externalities are either eliminated or efficiently produced, just 
like ordinary goods.
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Externalities
Concept o f externalities.
Demsetz finds that externality is an ambiguous concept (Demsetz 1967: 
32). Although it seems impossible to discuss the many different definitions of it 
in the literature here, it is necessary to briefly review some of them.
Externalities are positive (beneficial) or negative (harmful) effects that one 
economic agent’s consumption activity or production activity has on another’s 
welfare (including the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a 
consumer, the production function of a producer, or the production set of a 
producer3) that are not regulated by the market system of prices (technological 
externalities) or function through the price system {pecuniary externalities).* 
Such an externality on the consumption set or utility function of a consumer is 
called consumption externality, and that on the production function or production 
set of a producer production externality (Vanan 1992: 433).s For the purpose of 
the thesis, major attention is paid to negative externalities hereafter.
Negative technological externalities.
The typical example of negative technological externalities is pollution: 345
3 Consumption set refers to a set of possible consumption bundles. Utility 
function is a way of assigning a number to every possible consumption bundle 
such that more-preferred bundles get assigned larger numbers than less*preferred 
bundles. Production function shows the maximum possible output for a given 
level of input. Production set indicates a set of all combinations of inputs and 
outputs that comprise a technologically feasible way to produce. (Varian 1987: 
53, 310. Varian 1992: 94)
4 Definition transformed by the author from those by Varian (1987: 542-543. 
1992: 432), Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 75), Demsetz (1967: 32) and Laffont 
(1987: 264). Varian, Milgrom and Roberts exclude pecuniary externality while it 
should be included as done by Demsetz and Laffont.
5 But Varian’s definitions exclude consumption set and production function 
which should be included as done here.
normally, there exists no market to buy and sell noise, smoke or other pollution. 
Suppose there are two firms. Firm 1 (say, a steel mill) produces an output which 
it sells in market However, the production yields pollution on firm 2 (say, a 
fishery). Firm 1 takes into account the internal cost (private cost) - the cost it 
imposes on itself - but ignores the external cost - the cost it imposes on the other 
firm. (Varian 1987 : 542-543, 549. Varian 1992: 433)6. A similar case is that a 
chemical dye factory pollutes water and deposits chemicals on agricultural land 
which uses the water for irrigation.
Pareto efficiency implies that competitive equilibrium would yield an 
efficient allocation of resources. His arguments were much refined and extended 
over the years by Barone, Lerner, Hicks, Samuelson, etc. The current version of 
the proposition is essentially based on the work of Arrow and Debreu who 
generalized and clarified the mathematics of the result. They indicate that it is in 
fact a two-fold proposition: an equilibrium allocation achieved by a set of 
competitive markets will necessarily be Pareto efficient (the First Theorem of 
Welfare Economics); and if all agents have convex preferences, then there will 
always be a set of prices such that each Pareto efficient allocation is a market 
equilibrium for an appropriate assignment of endowments (the Second Theorem 
of Welfare Economics). (Arrow 1963. Debreu 1959. Varian 1987: 495, 499-500. 
Lockwood 1987: 811)
"Competitive" in the context of this literature means that resources can 
move smoothly in response to prices (i.e., without being monopolistically or 
oligopolistically held with bargaining power); all firms or agents take prices as 
given; firms maximize profits and consumers maximize personal utility (Milgrom 
& Roberts 1992: 62). Under such circumstances, the sufficient conditions for the 
First Theorem are (1) that there are no externalities (because they have no market) 
and (2) that there are contingent markets for all commodities, i.e., markets at all 
present and future dates and states in all contingencies. Implicit in (2) is the 
assumption that all agents are equally and perfectly informed about all aspects of 
their environment. The reason why the first condition is sufficient (and generally.
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6 Varian slates that Firm 1 "ignores the social costs - the private cost plus 
cost that it imposes on the other firm" (Varian 1992: 433). This may be inaccurate 
since Firm 1 does not ignore the private cost - the internal cost, but only ignores 
the "cost that it imposes on the other firm" - the external cost.
necessary) is simply that externalities are in this framework products for which 
no markets exist, so there is no mechanism lor the marginal benefits of the 
externality-producing activities to be equated to the marginal damages they 
impose on others. (Lockwood 1987: 811-812)
Internalization o f  negative externalities is a process of taking into account 
the external cost by the externality-yielding party (therefore, strictly speaking, 
taking into account partial external cost by the externality-yielding party can only 
be called partial internalization of negative externalities). If the polluting firm 
could do that, then Pareto efficiency would be reached. One way of internalizing 
externalities is for the two firms (polluting and polluted) to merge, so that social 
costs which now equal private costs will be computed to determine the efficient 
output of both products (say, steel and fish) and efficient amount of pollution. In 
this way, the new firm may produce less steel thus less pollution, but more fish, 
so that it would not be worse off. (Varian 1987: 549-550). (Other ways of 
internalization will be discussed later.)
Internalizing externalities is for establishing the sufficient conditions for 
Pareto efficiency, i.e., introducing market mechanism into the production of 
externalities. Before the market mechanism has been established, Pareto efficiency 
may not always be applicable. In the process of establishing market mechanism, 
the externality-yielding party may have to bear the external cost it imposes on 
others and thus be worse off than before [e.g., rather than merging, the steel firm 
may be imposed a tax equal to its external cost on the fishing firm, called 
Pigouvian tax (Pigou 1920), which will be discussed later].
It is necessary to note that Pareto efficiency excludes externalities because 
they have no market. If market mechanism is introduced into their production, 
Pareto efficiency does not exclude them and sets them at levels such that their 
social marginal benefit equates their social marginal cost. (Laffont 1987: 264) 
When there are externalities, however, even if the private market economy 
has been introduced in, equilibria will not be in general Pareto efficient since the 
private decentralized optimizations of economic agents lead them to take into 
account only private costs through the price system (Laffont 1987: 264). Thus, it 
is necessary to examine negative pecuniary externalities as below.
Negative pecuniary externalities.
One example of the negative pecuniary externalities is that consumer A
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affects consumer B’s welfare hy increasing A’s consumption of whisky which 
leads to the increase in price (Laffont 1987: 264). Another example is that some 
firms decrease output of a product» resulting in its higher price.
However, according to competitive market equilibrium, prices only equate 
supply and demand. Therefore, pecuniary externalities do not matter. (Laffont 
1987: 264). If some firms have reduced the output of a product, the resulting 
higher price would lead other firms to increase their production of that product 
until market equilibrium is reached.
But, recall that Pareto efficiency is based on the assumption that market 
is competitive which means that resources can move smoothly in response to 
prices, all firms or agents take prices as given, firms maximize profits and 
consumers maximize personal utility. In contrast, in many cases of reality, as well 
known, the market is not perfect or competitive; especially, the bargaining power 
of some agents plays strong role in transactions (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 
316). Under such circumstances, by affecting prices, some agents affect the 
welfare of other agents. Pecuniary externalities do matter for welfare economics 
and Pareto efficiency cannot be attained. (Laffont 1987: 264)
The relationship between technological and pecuniary externalities. For 
technological externalities, there exists no market; while for pecuniary externaliti­
es, the market is there, but cannot function properly. Therefore, once the market 
mechanism has been introduced into the production of technological externalities, 
if they still cannot be eliminated or efficiently produced as ordinary goods, they 
become pecuniary externalities. (This relationship is not pointed out in the 
literature reviewed.)
Not enough importance, if any, however, has been attached to pecuniary 
externalities in the literature reviewed. For example, in the two textbooks by 
Varian (1987 & 1992), the term is not used at all. In the textbook by Milgrom 
and Roberts, the definition for externalities is just that for technological 
externalities. Accordingly, only pollution is cited as an example of what 
externalities an incomplete and imperfect market, and bargaining power, in reality 
will result in. (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 75, 316). In "The New Palgrave - A 
Dictionary of Economics”, after mentioning pecuniary externalities in only two 
paragraphs, Laffont focuses on technological externalities in the following 19 
paragraphs (Laffont 1987: 264-265). Since these textbooks and this dictionary are
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widely used, readers, especially economics students, are misled to such a wrong 
conception that pecuniary externalities are not so important. Here, I would like 
to correct this misunderstanding.
Demsetz stresses that in a lawful society, the prohibition of voluntary 
negotiations makes the cost of transacting infinite (Demsetz 1967: 32). He 
actually means that negative technological externalities cannot he eliminated 
because market exchange is not permitted. His implication is that once voluntary 
negotiations are allowed, the cost of transacting would be abundantly less. 
However, he ignores that once voluntary negotiations are legalized in a lawful 
society, the externality-yielding party can still impose negative pecuniary 
externalities, thus making the cost of transacting infinite as well. Indeed, after 
most of the former socialist centrally planned economies have adopted a market 
economy, and most capitalist countries have implemented deregulation, it is 
negative pecuniary externalities which are the major negative externalities. They 
outweigh negative technological externalities in the current real world.
In Japanese and Chinese agriculture, for example, the absentees or part- 
time farmers had no incentive to maximize profits on farming due to seeking 
higher income from off-farm employment and/or psychological reasons.7 In 
Japan, farmers had the right of neither tilling their land, nor earning rent or 
revenue from land shares by leasing or joining cooperative/enterprise. This had 
been a negative technological externality since there was a land holding ceiling 
before 1962 and permanent tenancy and rent control before 1970. But in these 
two years, they were lifted respectively. Now that it still could not be eliminated 
by voluntary negotiations, it became a negative pecuniary externality.
In China (before the Dual Land System was introduced), after fulfilling 
the quota (by either producing on the land or simply purchasing products from the 
market), contractors could not only stop production but also refuse to sublet their 
land to full-time farmers, although they were allowed to sublet. Thus starting from 
the beginning it was already a negative pecuniary externality.
This would raise the prices of rice as well as other agricultural products
7 Although the goal most commonly ascribed to firms in economic analyses 
is profit maximization, for the self-interested owners of a firm would seem to 
unanimously favor such a goal, actually, there are many cases in which owners 
might have other objectives (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 40).
if cheap foreign food were not imported; hut if it were imported, the food prices 
in the world market would rise, as already happened in the 1990s. If land were 
not scarce, or the idle land could be transferred easily to the full-time farmers, the 
latter could operate larger land and increase output, so that such pecuniary 
externalities could be removed and Pareto efficiency achieved.
But land is an extremely scarce good. In Japan the land was privately 
owned and in China the public land was contracted to households. Thus the full­
time farmers could not easily get more land from the earth nor had the right to 
till the idle land of the others. Because the market of land transfer was not perfect 
or competitive, the pecuniary externalities could not be removed and Pareto 
efficiency not be achieved. Therefore, it is negative pecuniary externalities that 
have played the major role in hampering the efficient use of land and achievement 
of large-scale fanning.
How to solve this problem? We start from the Coase theorem which 
provides one of the approaches.
Coase Theorem
In his theory of social cost, Coase assumes that transaction costs are zero; 
income effects of different distributions of wealth are neglected; and property 
rights are well defined. Then the output mix that results when the exchange of 
property rights is allowed (1) is Pareto efficient; (2) is independent of who is 
assigned the relevant property rights initially and (3) the (future) externalities are 
either eliminated or efficiently produced. (Coase 1960: 1-44. Varian 1987: 546- 
547. Demsetz 1967: 33. Demsetz 1988: 262). (Demsetz does not notice that the 
externality can be efficiently produced. None of them pay attention to the point 
that it is the future externality that is eliminated or efficiently produced, as 
discussed below.)
The smoking example.
Due to its simplicity and clarity, this example is preferred in the literature. 
Here, the reference is from Varian (1987: 543-546), but I have modified it and 
suggested new and potentially significant applications.
Suppose persons A and B share a room. A likes smoking but B does not. 
When A smokes, he imposes a (negative technological) externality on B. Now,
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assume B is assigned the right to clean air, and A is given $20. If A prefers to 
keep $20 for other purposes without smoking, then this externality will not be 
produced. But A may prefer to pay B $1 for smoking one cigarette and up to $20 
for a full pack of 20 cigarettes. In so doing, the externality is eliminated 
(internalized) by A because he has borne the social cost: the private (internal) cost 
- A pays to buy cigarettes, plus external cost - A ’s payment to B. A is better off 
but B is not worse off, so that Pareto efficiency is attained.
In this case, B may ask for more payment from A until he feels fully 
compensated, just as in free market negotiations. But in reality, wealth is always 
limited to a certain amount. Thus, for simplicity reason, here it is limited to $1 
for one cigarette and $20 for 20 cigarettes.
B may also refuse to exchange at all, fot believing that no amount of 
money - no matter how much - can eliminate the damaging negative externality 
of smoking on his lungs and life span in physical terms. In free market 
transactions, A cannot force B to exchange. But here, let us just suppose B is 
willing to accept up to $20 for A ’s smoking up to 20 cigarettes and regard the 
externality as eliminated in financial terms. (Attention is not paid by Varían on 
the distinction between elimination of negative externalities in physical terms and 
financial terms.)
Alternatively, if A is awarded the right to smoke a pack of cigarettes, and 
B is distributed $20. B may prefer to keep $20 and bear the externality from A’s 
smoking. In so doing, the externality is Pareto-efficiently produced, because no 
one can be made better without harming the other (this case is not considered by 
Varían). B may also prefer to trade money with A for reducing/removing A’s 
smoking, by paying A $1 for reducing one cigarette and up to $20 for A’s no 
smoking at all (in a free market negotiation, A may refuse to exchange; but here 
we suppose A is willing to exchange). In so doing, the cost of A’s externality on 
B is also borne by B (this seems unfair, but Pareto efficiency does not necessarily 
imply social justice). In this sense, the externality is not eliminated since it only 
changed its form from smoke to money. Nor is it internalized, because the 
external cost by A on B (in smoke form) was borne by B (in monetary form). But 
it is now Pareto-efficiently produced because B is better off while A is not worse 
off. The payment of B to A is a kind of redemption fee  for B’s temporary 
freedom from A’s smoking (Varian does not note the temporary redemption fee
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either, which is my concept).
If everyday B prefers to pay A up to $20 for less or no smoking, then 
everyday, the externality by A on B is Pareto-efllciently produced, but. again, 
neither eliminated nor internalized: it still exists, although in the form of B’s 
daily or temporary redemption fee. If B prefers and could manage to pay A a 
much larger sum for A’s no longer smoking in the future, the payment is a 
redemption fee for B’s permanent freedom from A’s smoking. Pareto efficiency 
is achieved. After the permanent redemption, new or future externalities will not 
be created either in smoking form or monetary form. But the permanent 
redemption fee is also an externality of A on B, because it simply transformed 
A’s future externality on B in smoking form to the present externality in monetary 
form borne by B (again, Varian neglects the permanent redemption fee, which is 
also my concept).
Four kinds o f  negative externalities in time sequence.
The significance of the temporary and permanent redemption fees exceeds 
the smoking example. I call the temporary and permanent redemption fees as 
redemption externalities, which are not found in the literature reviewed.
As mentioned above, my definition of internalization of negative 
externalities is a process of taking into account the external cost by the 
externality-yielding party (and hence, strictly speaking, partial internalization of 
negative externalities means taking into account partial external cost by the 
externality-yielding party). But Demsetz defines it as a process that enables the 
external cost "to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting persons". He gives the 
following example. "It might be thought that a firm which uses slave labor will 
not recognize all the costs of its activities, since it can have its slave labor by 
paying subsistence wages only. This will not be true if negotiations are permitted, 
for the slaves can offer to the firm a payment for their freedom based on the 
expected return to them of being free men. The cost of slavery can thus be 
internalized in the calculations of the firm." (Demsetz 1967: 32)
However, Demsetz’s definition is arbitrary and his explanation in this 
example confusing. "Internal" is relative to "external". Among "all interacting 
persons", someone (the externality-yielding party) has imposed an external cost 
on others (the externality-receiving party). Internalization should mean withdrawal 
of such a cost by the yielding party. If it were still borne by the receiving party
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(in greater degree or not), it would remain external, which is contradictory to the 
term "internalization".
In general, I propose four kinds of externalities over lime: present, 
historical, redemption (either temporary and permanent, but in this example 
permanent) and future externalities (I have not yet found such a division in the 
literature reviewed).
(1) Present externality is the external cost that the externality-yielding 
party is currently imposing on the receiving party (which, for avoiding confusion, 
does not include redemption externality that is actually a future externality but is 
turned to a present one). It may have started recently (e.g., being unable to repay 
a usury, a person has just fallen into the hands of the usurer) or a long time ago 
(e.g., a person borne to a slave family has inherited the slave status for decades). 
The present externality will be turned to historical externality once the yielding 
party has stopped imposing it on the receiving party (due to, e.g., personal 
redemption or social liberation).
(2) After the slaves have got freedom through redemption, the historical 
externality or external cost on the slaves before the redemption still remains with 
them and has been neither eliminated nor internalized by the firm (or, more 
appropriately, farm). But this does not mean that the historical externality could 
not or should not be internalized by the externality-yielding party. For example, 
during WWII, the Japanese troops forced numerus women of other Asian 
countries to be their sexual slaves. This historical externality has always remained 
with the "Asian comfort women" after WWII. But they have had no reason to 
bear it, although required to do so by the definition of Demsetz because they were 
"interacting persons". Thus, they have been demanding the Japanese government 
to compensate them (as the German government did to people in other countries). 
If the payment were sufficient, this historical external cost could be eliminated, 
internalized, fully compensated or fully borne in financial terms by the external­
ity-yielding party. (If the payment were not sufficient, it would be partially 
eliminated, internalized or compensated.)
Here, one question arises: can such a historical externality like sexual 
slavery be eliminated? If an ordinary car has been damaged but then replaced by 
a new one, the historical externality may be regarded as eliminated, internalized, 
fully compensated or fully borne by the car damager in both physical and
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financial terms. In contrast, if a person’s eyes have been made blind, then no 
matter how much money is paid to him by the destroyer of his sight, this 
historical externality, in physical terms, can never be eliminated, internalized or 
fully compensated. But if a compensation payment were sufficient (obviously 
always limited to a certain amount), then in financial terms the externality might 
be considered as eliminated, internalized or fully compensated. Therefore, it is in 
financial terms (neither physical nor spiritual terms) that we may say that if the 
Japanese government sufficiently paid to the "Asian comfort women", this 
historical externality would be regarded as eliminated, internalized or fully 
compensated.
(3) The permanent redemption fee is also an externality (redemption 
externality), which has transformed the future slavery externality into the present 
monetary form, borne by the slaves rather than being eliminated or internalized 
by the firm/farm, although it was Pareto-efficiently produced since the slaves 
preferred to pay it for buying freedom. (Of course, a slave might pay a temporary 
redemption fee for a freedom of a short period. But here, we concentrate on 
permanent redemption.) Again, this does not mean that the slaves must always 
bear a redemption externality to get freedom. For example, the US Civil War and 
the Anti-Japan War liberated the southern slaves and "Asian comfort women" 
respectively without requiring them to pay redemption fee to their masters, 
although they were "interacting persons" and should have paid according to 
Demsetz’s definition.
(4) After the slaves have paid a permanent redemption fee for future 
freedom, if the firm/farm wants to continue production, it will have to lake into 
account the social costs: the internal (private) cost - the cost it imposes on itself, 
and external cost - the cost on the former slaves which was previously ignored 
but is now eliminated or internalized by the firm/farm through paying them 
normal wages. That is to say, future externality (except for that which has been 
turned to redemption externality and borne by the slaves) of this kind will be 
borne or eliminated by the firm/farm.
Bearing the historical and redemption externalities by the slaves is not 
internalization, nor a necessary pre-condition of internalizing the future externality 
by the slave-holders, although in some cases the slaves either "preferred" or had 
to do this. Therefore, internalization of negative externalities should be defined
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as a bearing of the external cost by the externality-yielding party, rather than by 
"all interacting persons”.
Similarly, for solving the pollution problem, the fishing firm could be 
given the right to clean water and let the steel firm pay it for its pollution, so that 
the negative externality is eliminated in financial terms. Alternatively, the steel 
firm could be given the right to pollution, and let the fishing firm pay it to 
produce less or no pollution, thus the negative externality is Pareto-elficiently 
produced. Both would reach Pareto efficiency via market exchange according to 
the Coase theorem. (Varian 1987: 555-556). The latter choice is not fair, hut, 
again, Pareto efficiency does not imply social justice. Sometimes, this might even 
be the only efficient choice. For example, in some regions controlled by 
gangsters, the incompetence of police actually gives them a "right” to charge 
shopkeepers a regular “protection fee” or kill them. The shopkeepers "prefer” to 
pay a "protection fee", under which the negative externality is Pareto-elTiciently 
produced. Similarly, an unarmed pedestrian may prefer paying to a couple of 
armed bandits to being slain in the night, under which the negative externality is 
also Pareto-efficiently produced. These two realistic examples show that despite 
criticism to the contrary, the Coase theorem is not always unrealistic.
Proper definition o f property rights.
Varian claims that the practical problems with externalities generally arise 
because of poorly defined property rights. In the smoking example, if A believes 
that he has the right to smoke and B believes that he has the right to clean air, 
then who should pay whom? The negotiation is difficult. Cases where property 
rights are poorly defined can lead to inefficient production of externalities - which 
means that there would be at least one way to make one party belter off while 
another party not worse off by changing the production of externalities.“ If 
property rights are well defined, and mechanisms are in place to allow for 
negotiation between people, then people can trade their property rights to produce 
externalities in the same way that they trade rights to produce and consume 8
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8 Varian claims "inefficient production of externalities - which means that 
there would be ways to make both parties involved belter o ff  (Varian 1987: 546). 
This statement seems inaccurate. Thus I modified "ways" into "at least one way" 
and "both parties involved better o ff  into "one party better off while another 
party not worse off’.
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ordinary goods. (Varian 1987: 546)“*
Hence, for reaching Pareto efficiency, there is Approach J: permission fo r  
the relevant parties to exchange property rights through a political or legal 
process, followed by market exchange. (Demsetz 1967: 33)
Relevance to Japanese and Chinese agriculture.
Applying Approach 1 to the problem of pecuniary externalities imposed 
by the Japanese absentee and part-time peasants, we may see that, as presented 
in Chapters l and 4, in 1962, the land holding ceiling was lifted, so that peasants 
acquired the right to buy more land (exchange between money and land). In the 
1970s, protection of tenants from eviction and rent control were removed, so that 
landlords did not need to worry about losing leased land to tenants and could 
charge higher rent (exchange between rent and land use). They could also join 
share-holding cooperative/enterprise to earn revenue from land shares. Thus, 
voluntary sale, lease may, if carried out, could eliminate the negative technologi­
cal externalities which existed before such market exchanges were allowed, so 
that Pareto efficiency could be achieved: full-time farmers and the whole society 
would be better off, but the absentee and part-time peasants would not be worse 
off. They might even be better off since, e.g., they could now earn rent through 
leasing or revenue from land shares through joining cooperative/enterprise.
Applying Approach 1 to the problem of negative pecuniary externalities 
imposed by the Chinese absentee and part-time peasants, we could see that, as 
shown in Chapters 1 and 5, the right to voluntarily transfer contract was already 
established at the beginning. In those cases where it was carried out, the absentee 
and part-time peasants could be discharged from fulfilling quotas, while the full­
time farmers could contract more land - also an exchange. Pecuniary externalities 
could be eliminated and Pareto efficiency attained: full-time farmers and the 
whole society would be better off, but the absentee and part-time peasants would 
not be worse off. They might also even be better off since they could now 
concentrate on off-farm activities to earn higher income. 9
9 Should property rights be well defined in all economic activities of all 
societies? Weitzman and Xu say no because they find that the Chinese township 
and village enterprises as vaguely defined cooperatives have been quite successful 
(Weitzman & Xu 1993). But this topic is not directly related to this thesis.
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III. Reaching Pareto Efficiency When the Hypotheses 
of the Coase Theorem Are Relaxed
Even Coase himself admits that in the real world, transaction costs are 
positive, and distribution of wealth has income effects. Therefore the assignment 
of property rights matters. None of this, however, is taken into consideration in 
the Coase theorem. (Coase 1960: 15-16). Therefore, Milgrom and Roberts warn 
that it is important to remember that the Coase theorem and its various 
implications depend on restrictive hypotheses regarding preferences and the ability 
to make transfer payments between the parties. The implications do not hold 
when some of the parties have very limited capital to make payments. Thus, 
although it would be reasonable to apply this analysis to study the terms of a 
contract between General Motors and Toyota, it would be a mistake to apply it 
uncritically, for example, to study land tenure in a developing country or the 
institutions of slavery in the pre-Civil War American South. (Milgrom & Roberts 
1992: 39). The question of how to achieve Pareto efficiency when the hypotheses 
of the Coase theorem are relaxed should thus be considered.
Positive Transaction Costs
Assignment of property rights matters because transaction costs are 
positive. According to Coase, Furubotn, Pejovich and North, the major positive 
costs in transacting property rights are: (1) the costs of discovering who it is that 
one wishes to deal with; (2) the costs of informing the people one intends to deal 
with; (3) the costs of defining property rights (determining who owns what 
property, who holds which rights); (4) the costs of measuring property rights 
(assessing precisely the specific attributes of the properties to be exchanged); (5) 
the costs of bargaining over property rights (negotiating on what terms to make 
the transaction, refusing to exchange or demanding unbearable prices by the 
externality-yielding party and overcoming the bargaining power of the yielding 
party by the receiving party and society); (6) the costs of drawing up the contract 
for transacting property rights; (7) the costs of exchanging property rights 
(exercising physical transactions); and (8) the costs of policing property rights 
(enforcing the newly established property rights). (Coase 1960: 15. Furubotn &
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Pejovich 1974: 46. North 1990: 28-33, 48-49). Each of these authors, however, 
has only noted part of this list. Coase does not note the costs of defining, 
measuring and exchanging, and Furubotn and Pejovich only mention the costs of 
defining, exchanging and policing. Moreover, they have neglected some important 
costs. Therefore, even this list is not complete. There would be (9) the costs of 
organizing transactions (sometimes even some special organizations may have to 
be set up to organize all or a part of the above eight steps); (10) the costs of time 
(all transactions cost time; for achieving the same purposes, under some property 
rights structures, certain transactions may either be avoided or cost less time, 
hence Pareto efficiency); and (11) the opportunity costs (for reaching the same 
purposes, under other property rights structures, certain transactions may either 
be unavoidable or cost more time, whose costs could otherwise be saved and used 
on other productive activities, hence inefficiency).
Relevance to Japanese agriculture. For example, in Japan, land consolida­
tion under private land ownership leads to (1) the costs of discovering who it is 
that one wishes to deal with, e.g., finding who hold fragmented small farms in a 
village or district; (2) the costs of informing the people one intends to deal with, 
e.g., notifying all farm households that the village or local government intends to 
launch land consolidation; (3) the costs of defining property rights, e.g., 
examining the current farmland cadastral records to determine who owns which 
parcels; (4) the costs of measuring property rights, e.g., assessing the value of 
each parcel; (5) the costs of bargaining over property rights, e.g., educating public 
opinion and discussing the necessity of land consolidation and voting to decide 
whether to carry it out in the village or area concerned [this should be done after 
the above step (2)]; refusing to exchange or asserting too high a value for one’s 
parcels by some land owners, which will hinder the process of land consolidation 
and thus incur costs to the society; and obliging them to exchange at reasonable 
valuation of land by the authorities, which will also tend to incur legal and 
possibly enforcement costs to society; (6) the costs of drawing up the contract for 
transacting property rights, e.g., designing and finalizing the scheme of land 
redistribution; (7) the costs of exchanging property rights, e.g., physically 
reorganizing parcels to form compact land units, removing and/or re-constructing 
buildings on land; and (8) costs of policing property rights, e.g., notarizing the 
newly established land holdings; (9) the costs of organizing transactions, e.g..
legislation, setting up special committees at administrative levels, and their 
activities; (10) the costs of time, e.g., each of the above steps costs time; and (11) 
the opportunity costs, e.g., if agricultural land were turned to corporate ownership 
to be reorganized into compact form and operated under a Dual Land System or 
a Single Land System recommended in my Proposal 1, then most of the above 
costs could be saved and used on other productive activities.10
The importance of transaction costs can be seen from the following 
example. Measuring the size of transaction costs that go through the market (such 
as costs associated with banking, insurance, finance, wholesale, and retail trade; 
or, in terms of occupations, with lawyers, accountants, etc.) in the US economy. 
Wallis and North found that more than 45 % of national income was devoted to 
transaction and, moreover, that this percentage had increased from approximately 
25 % a century ago (Wallis & North 1986. North 1990: 28).
Income Effects
Assignment of property rights matters also because different property 
rights assignments have different income effects. According to Dcmsetz, the 
income effects include three basic aspects.
First, altering the assignments of property rights changes the distribution 
of wealth, because under different assignments of property rights, different 
persons are made richer or poorer (Demsetz 1988: 15).
In the example of a chemical dye factory polluting farmland, if the dye 
factory is given the right to pollution, then the farm has to pay to the factory for 
reducing or stopping production. Thus the factory is made richer and farm poorer. 
If the farm is given the right to clean water, then the factory has to pay the farm 
for its pollution. Thus the farm is made richer and factory poorer.
Second, because each person’s propensity to consume or save may be 
different, different distribution of wealth may result in different levels of 
consumption and saving. Thus, the total mix of consumption and saving in the
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10 In a separate paper which will be published by FAO (Zhou, Jian-Ming 
1998), I undertake a comparative international survey of the general methods of 
land consolidation under private farmland ownership, which discloses its very 
high transaction costs compared with the land consolidation under public land 
ownership and corporate land ownership.
economy must change if the distribution of wealth changes. (Demsetz 1988: 15)
In the above example, it the chemical dye factory is made richer, it may 
spend more. If the farm is made richer, it may save more.
Third, even if each person’s propensity to consume or save were the same, 
because their marginal rates of substitution between goods may be different, the 
persons made wealthier may purchase goods in different proportion from the 
persons made poorer. Thus, the total mix of outputs in the economy must change 
if the distribution of wealth changes. As long as those who are made wealthier 
and those made poorer, taken as two groups, have different marginal rates of 
substitution, alternative distributions of wealth imply different efficient mixes of 
output. (Demsetz 1988: 15)
In the above example, even though the chemical dye factory and farm 
have the same propensity to consume or save, once the factory is made richer, it 
could purchase more chemical materials; once the farm is made wealthier, it could 
buy more agricultural inputs. Accordingly, the society would have different mixes 
of production of chemical materials and agricultural inputs.
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Approaches in Assignment o f Property Rights
Due to the positive transaction costs and income effects, assigning 
property rights or changing property rights structures is not negligible, but plays 
a major allocative function in internalizing externalities (Demsetz 1967: 34) or 
efficiently producing externalities so as to reach Pareto efficiency (Demsetz does 
not note the latter point). Hence the following Five Approaches of assigning 
property rights under different circumstances of positive transaction costs and 
income effects. Some elements of these Approaches could be found here and 
there in the literature. But the summarization and systemization are made by the 
author.
Approach 1.
If both externality-yielding and externality-receiving parties are witling to 
exchange their relevant property rights, and could afford their respective 
transaction costs and income effects. Approach 1 (as above-mentioned) could be 
adopted, i.e., permission for the relevant parlies to exchange property rights 
through a political or legal process, followed by market exchange. The already
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cited examples include voluntary land sale, lease, and joining cooperative/enterpr- 
ise in Japan, and voluntary transfer of contracts for using public land in China.
Approach 2.
Under some circumstances, market mechanism has been introduced, hut 
the externality-yielding party, by its stronger social, political, or economic 
bargaining power, may refuse to make exchange, and thus keeps imposing 
negative externalities on others. As Milgrom and Roberts emphasize, even if a 
Pareto efficient allocation of resources has been identified, it is still necessary to 
ensure that the parties involved play their part in bringing it about. The problem 
is that there will often be inefficient allocations that are better for one person or 
a subgroup than the target efficient allocation, and these people may be able to 
effect the inefficient outcome that they prefer. (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 23). For 
example, slave/serf-holders could refuse to accept payment by slaves/serfs to buy 
their freedom and land according to the prevailing market prices.
Thus, although the market mechanism has been set up for the production 
of negative technological externalities, it may not function. Consequently, they 
turn to be pecuniary externalities. However, there are other social institutions such 
as the legal system, or government intervention, that can "mimic" the functioning 
of the market mechanism and thereby reach Pareto efficiency (Varian 1987: 543). 
This is consistent with the theoretical views that free market forces alone could 
not overcome the "vicious circle" of poverty and realize sustainable rural 
development.
Hence, if both the externality-yielding and receiving parties could afford 
the respective transaction costs and income effects, there is Approach 2: 
implementation o f social actions (law, tax, etc.) to oblige the externality-yielding 
party to exchange properly rights, followed by market exchange.
In so doing, in some cases, the externality-receiving party would have to 
bear a redemption fee (or redemption externality) and the historical external cost 
in exchange for not creating the future externalities by the yielding party. 
Examples would be the forced agreement of slave/serf-holders to accept full 
payment to redeem permanent freedom by slaves/serfs; or obligatory sale of extra 
land at market prices by slave/serf-holders to slaves/serfs. Here, the negative 
pecuniary externality is Pareto-efficiently produced by the slaves/serfs.
Moreover, Furubotn and Pejovich claim that if the existing property rights
structures are to be modified by social action to reduce or eliminate an external­
ity, taxes must be imposed on those who will gain from the proposed legal 
change, and compensation paid (also as an incentive) to those who will suffer 
capital loss as a result of the new law. Presumably, agreement on the terms of the 
tax-compensation scheme can be reached through a political process, hut the basic 
mechanism here is one of trade, a market process (Furuhotn & Pejovich 1974: 
46), although apparently not a pure one. In so doing, the negative pecuniary 
externality is Pareto-cfficiently produced not only by the slaves/serfs, but also by 
other people who pay the taxes and the government which pays compensation to 
the externality-yielding party (slave/serf-holders).
Then the questions arise: Could the occupation of slaves/serfs by 
slave/serf-holders be justified? If not, why should such externality-yielding parties 
be fully compensated by the externality-receiving parties? Furuhotn and Pejovich 
do not give reasons. But for this, a basic reason must be to keep social stability 
in the process of elimination of future externalities, so that the losers may not 
resist in a manner jeopardizing the outcome.
In other cases, there will be no capital losers after the exchange. For 
example, in my Proposal I fo r  Japan, private land owners could turn land to 
corporate ownership, in exchange for private land shares which could earn 
permanent remuneration (housing land, self-sufficiency land or family plot would 
be owner-used, while production land shares could earn revenue from the village), 
be inherited or sold in financial terms in the market, while the village could 
physically possess land and reorganize land into compact form and contract land 
to full-time fanners, expert fanners or cooperative/entcrprise for large-scale 
fanning.
Approach 3.
Approach 1 is a pure free private market exchange at market prices. 
Approach 2 is socially enforced but also based on market exchange, sometimes 
even with compensation higher than market prices paid by the externality- 
receiving party to the yielding party as an incentive. By these approaches, both 
parties should bear the respective transaction costs and income effects. However, 
some people, especially those within the externality-receiving party, may not 
afford the high transaction costs and unfavorable income effects. Thus, Furuhotn 
and Pejovich further argue that whenever the private terms of exchange fail to
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account for some harmful or beneficial effects to the contractual parties or to 
others, the market solution will appear inconsistent with the social value of the 
bundle of property rights that is exchanged. Such private-social divergences tend 
to arise due to high transaction costs. Government intervention may be required 
if transaction costs are so high as to prevent private exchange. (Furubotn & 
Pejovich 1974: 46).
Thus, when the externality-yielding party, by bargaining power, refuses to 
exchange and/or demands unbearable prices, or market prices are too high for the 
externality-receiving party to bear, there is Approach 3: reform o f property rights 
structures through a political or legal process, followed by exchange at prices 
lower than the market levels. In this case, only partial compensation will be paid 
by the externality-receiving party to the yielding party, and the latter will have to 
partially internalize the redemption externality, for not creating the future 
externality.
For example, slaves/serfs could be allowed by law to acquire freedom 
from the slave/serf-holders by a partial redemption fee and purchase land from 
them at prices lower than the market levels. During the Japanese land reform of 
1946-50, the state compulsorily purchased and resold the farmlands of the feudal 
landlords to peasants at prices which soon became minimum due to inflation, so 
that the landlords were actually not fully compensated. In Italy and some other 
countries, private land can be bought by the authorities for public projects at 
prices much lower than the market levels.
Approach 4.
When the externality-yielding party, by bargaining power, refuses to 
exchange and/or demands unbearable prices, or market prices are too high for the 
externality-receiving party to afford even partial compensation to the external ity- 
yielding party, or due to ethics reason the society regards it unfair to ask the 
receiving party to pay the yielding party, there is Approach 4: reorganization o f  
property rights structures without market exchange through a political or legal 
process, i.e., the authorities award the relevant property rights to the externality­
receiving party (Demsetz 1967: 33).
An example would be an obligatory merger of the polluting and polluted 
firms - in our example, steel and fishing firms (obliged because the steel firm 
may have no incentive to merge the fishing firm); or imposition on the polluting
firm of a Pigouvian tax equal to its external cost on the polluted firm and society; 
or compulsory payment directly by the polluting to the polluted firm - all of 
which would force the polluting firm to internalize the external cost. Other 
examples were the US Civil War and Anti-Japan War which liberated slaves and 
"Asian comfort women" respectively without requiring them to pay a redemption 
fee. A further case was distribution to peasants of extra land from feudal 
landlords without compensation in the Chinese land reform of 1949-53. There was 
also obligatory transfer of inefficiently used land from absentee and part-time 
peasants to full-time farmers in the Chinese Dual Land System, Leasing System, 
Single Land System and Corporate-Hoi ding System since the 1980s.
Approach 5.
In Approaches 1-4, the externality-yielding party is not required to 
internalize its historical external cost on the externality-receiving parly. This could 
be changed by Approach 5: re-establishment o f  property rights requiring the 
externality-yielding party to fully or partially internalize its historical external 
cost on the externality-receiving party without market exchange through a 
political or legal process. Again, this is mixed economy.
For example, if person A has wrecked person B’s land, the court could 
force A to not only cease destroying B’s land (eliminating the future externalities) 
but also cover B’s expenses on restoring the land and income loss (internalizing 
the historical externality). After WWII, Germany had to pay the invaded countries 
war compensation. The Japanese government should officially do the same to the 
"Asian comfort women".
The above Five Approaches of assigning property rights are generalized 
in Table 3.2 with the example of slaves/serfs acquiring freedom from 
slave/serf-holders.
These approaches may be used in different combinations. For example, 
voluntary land consolidation (100 % agreement by land owners) uses Approach 
1, compulsory consolidation (0 % consent by land owners) adopts Approach 2, 
while partly voluntary one is a mixture of Approaches 1 and 2.
Relevance to Japanese agriculture. In Japan, although the 1949 Land 
Improvement Law prescribed that agreement by 50 % of landowners representing 
50 % of land acreage of the village was sufficient for carrying out land 
consolidation and the 1992 new policies raised it to two thirds majority, due to
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the efforts of officials and peasants in most cases UK) 9c consent was attained 
before starting it, hence a mixture of Approaches 1 and 2.
In some cases, the externality-receiving party may not he able to afford 
the positive transaction costs and unfavorable income effect. Thus, the govern­
ment may have to bear some and even a major part of the transaction costs. For 
example, in the US Civil War, to force the southern slave-holders to emancipate 
slaves, the government and society bore huge and bloody bargaining costs to 
overcome the bargaining power of the slave-holders. The same argument holds 
for the Anti-Japan War to liberate the "Asian comfort women" and Japanese 
occupied countries.
Even in a purely or primarily private market exchange (as in Approaches 
1 and 2 respectively) in which the externality-yielding and receiving parties are 
supposed to bear the respective transaction costs, the government should also 
financially help the receiving party. For example, the government could give 
subsidies and long-term credits to slaves/serfs to buy extra land from the slave/s- 
erf-holders, so as to facilitate the process.
These Five Approaches and the government sharing of transaction costs 
are in accordance with the thesis that free market forces alone cannot realize 
sustainable rural development in monsoon Asia and that variable mixed economy 
outcomes are needed.
Private, Public or Corporate Land Ownership? A Transaction Costs 
Approach
What is the major factor that determines which of the aforementioned 
approaches of assigning property rights should be used? The above analysis has 
shown that it is the transaction costs. (Of course, transaction costs reflect income 
effects. The more the income of a party is affected, the more strongly it will resist 
the exchange of relevant property rights or the more compensation it will demand 
for such an exchange. Keeping this in mind, the discussion can focus on 
transaction costs.)
Originally, Coase finds that it is the transaction costs which determine 
whether a product should be produced by a firm or procured through market 
transactions. Coase stresses that within the firm, individual bargains between the
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various cooperating factors of production are eliminated and that for a market 
transaction is substituted an administrative decision by an "entrepreneur" who 
directs resources with authority. It does not follow that the administrative costs 
of organizing a transaction through a firm are inevitably less than the costs of the 
market transaction which are superseded. But where contracts are peculiarly 
difficult to draw up and an attempt to describe what the parlies have agreed to do 
or not to do (e.g., the amount and kind of a smell or noise that they may make 
or will not make) would necessitate a lengthy and highly involved document, and 
where, as is probable, a long-term contract would be desirable, a firm could be 
a solution to deal with the problem of harmful effects of individual bargains 
among market transacting parties. This solution would be adopted whenever the 
administrative costs of the firm were less than the costs of the market transactions 
that it supersedes, and the gains which would result from the rearrangement of 
activities greater than the firms’ costs of organizing them. (Coase 1937: 392-393. 
Coase 1960: 16-17)
Coase further indicates that transaction costs also determine whether a firm 
should become larger or smaller. A firm becomes larger as additional transactions 
(which could be exchange transactions coordinated through market price 
mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he 
abandons the organization of such transactions. A firm will tend to be larger (1) 
the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase 
in the transactions organized; (2) the less likely the entrepreneur is to make 
mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the 
transactions organized; and (3) the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the 
supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size. (Coase 1937: 393, 
396-397)
Relevance to monsoon Asia agriculture. Using the Coase transaction costs 
approach, I find that by comparing the transaction costs incurred in land 
consolidation and expansion to overcome the fragmented small farms as the last 
obstacle imposed by the monsoon under private and public land ownership, the 
answers to the following two questions may be given: 1. Should rural land in 
monsoon Asia be privately, publicly or corporately owned? 2. If it should be 
publicly or corporately owned, then in Japan and other rice-based economies 
already under private land ownership, should rural land be turned to public or
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corporate ownership?
Concerning question 1, section I of this chapter already pointed out that 
not only private ownership and possession of an asset, but also possession 
(leasing, contracting, share-holding in cooperative/entcrprise) of an either public 
or private asset (e.g., land), may tie residual control and residual returns together, 
thus giving incentives to producers (possessors) for profit-maximization to reach 
Pareto efficiency. In fact, features 1-8 in the Japanese and Chinese models of 
rural development show that both private and public land ownership could 
succeed in overcoming most obstacles imposed by the monsoon in rural develop­
ment of monsoon Asia (one may argue that public land ownership may have a 
certain superiority over private one even in this process in such a big economy 
like China, but this is not the topic of this thesis). However, in overcoming the 
last obstacle - the fragmented small farms - a sharp difference has been exhibited 
between private and public land ownership.
Japan established the family fragmented small farms under individual land 
ownership during 1946-50, and China popularized them upon village land 
ownership during 1978-82. As much agricultural labor force transferred to off- 
farm activities, part-time farming and absenteeism happened in Japan at the end 
of the 1950s and in (some areas of) China at the beginning, and especially in the 
middle, of the 1980s. The part-time farmers and absentees became rich with high 
off-farm income, while the remaining full-time fanners found it difficult to be 
viable in a high wage economy. Thus, the part-time farmers and absentees should 
let the full-time farmers use their land, so that from both a resource optimization 
and social justice point of view, the full-time farmers could enlarge farm size, 
gain returns to scale and increase their incomes. From a national economy point 
of view, waste of resources of land, labor, management, capital, machinery, etc. 
could be avoided, sufficient rice and other agricultural products produced, their 
prices lowered, stabilized or not much raised, and government subsidies reduced 
or saved. From an international economy view point, no or less import of grain 
(rice) would lead to no or less increase of grain prices which would benefit other 
grain-importing countries, especially the poor ones.
However, as already briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. and to be elaborated 
in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, the progress of consolidation and expansion of 
the fragmented small farms in Japan and China has been conspicuously different.
Chapter 3
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In Japan, the process started in 1960 and was pushed by the central government. 
But, after more than three and a half decades, little progress has been achieved, 
and effective ways feasible to Japan have not yet been found or confirmed 
(meanwhile there have been costs of government subsidies, costs of lime, and 
opportunity costs - hence the possible value of my Proposal 1 for Japan in 
Chapter 4). In China, in contrast, mainly due to the efforts of grass-roots officials 
and peasants themselves, as early as at the beginning of the 1980s, the Dual Land 
System, then also Leasing System, Single Land System and Corporate-Holding 
System were already invented. Of course, since China is so large, the progress of 
land consolidation and expansion has been gradual and uneven especially in the 
Central and Western parts, where off-farm activities are not yet developed. But 
at least suitable ways have been found and successful when properly implement­
ed. There are various causes (also in non-agricultural sectors but related to 
agriculture) which have contributed to the increase of prices and import of grains. 
But this thesis focuses on the fragmented small farms issue.
So, why have land consolidation and expansion been so difficult in Japan? 
The fundamental reason is that private land ownership incurs higher transaction 
costs chiefly because private land owners exert a strong bargaining power from  
ownership. They can refuse to sell or lease their inefficiently-used dispersed 
parcels or join cooperative/enterprise. For carrying out land consolidation, the 
governments and villages have made enormous efforts. The process led to high 
transaction costs mainly owing to individual bargains. After consolidation, owners 
still resist land expansion in forms of leasing or joining cooperative/enterprise, 
which again requires great endeavor by governments and villages to resolve, if 
resolvable at all. The experience of Taiwan is similar. Expansion through 
individual lease may lead to new fragmentation since the compact land units of 
the lessor and lessee may not be contiguous. Termination of lease may reduce 
farm size again. A cooperative/enterprise with private land physically withdraw­
able is not a typical "firm" in which individual bargains are eliminated and 
everybody follows the authority of the entrepreneur as Coase supposes, but a 
special "firm" composed by individual land owners with strong bargaining power. 
Due to various problems within a cooperative/enterprise, rather than settling them 
within the "firm" which may also incur high transaction costs to them, some 
members may choose to use their right to quit so as to operate land individually
or form another cooperative/enterprise which may re-fragmentize the joined land 
and would certainly reduce the farm size.
In comparison, the major reason why China could achieve much smoother 
land consolidation and expansion is that public land ownership leads to lower 
transaction costs mainly because private land users did not have strong 
bargaining power. The village as the land owner could behave like a real "firm" 
to reduce/eliminate individual bargains between the various cooperating factors 
of production. Under the (standard) Dual Land System, a self-sufficiency land was 
given to all households including those of the part-time farmers and absentees as 
a (back-up) basic social welfare, but responsibility land was contracted only to the 
expert farmers for production for the state and market. Land was not only 
consolidated, since both these two types of land could be reorganized into 
compact form, but also enlarged because each of the remaining expert farmers 
could now contract larger land. Once the off-farm jobs of the part-time farmers 
and absentees have been secured, then even their self-sufficiency land could be 
given to the expert farmers whose farm size was thus further enlarged under such 
a Single Land System. Under the Corporate-Holding System, households gave 
their contracted land back to village which re-contracted land in compact form to 
full-time farmers or expert farmers and paid households dividends. Coopera- 
tive/enterprise could also be formed among full-time or expert farmers, even 
together with urban industrial and foreign companies which could introduce 
investment, advance technology and widen domestic and international markets. 
The revenue could be distributed among land shares of the village, capital shares 
of the internal and external investors, and internal and external wage laborers.
Of course, there may also be problems with public land ownership. In 
China, under the initial Equal Land System (each household contracted equal 
dispersed parcels in terms of quality and quantity according to its population for 
both self-consumption and  the state and market). Those households which have 
increased their family size could be given additional land which had to be taken 
away from the village reserved land (if any) or from other households, thus 
violating contracts. This method, although may not be opposed by villagers on 
equality grounds, would discourage long-term land improvement by the 
contractors and encourage a higher birth rate. The Dual Land on Account System 
provided a solution to such frequent land transfers: as family size becomes larger
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(smaller)» the ratio of the self-sufficiency land to responsibility land of the 
household would be increased (reduced), while the whole land of the household 
is not changed.
Village officials as the "entrepreneur" of the "firm" may also improperly 
use their directing authority under the Dual Land System. For example, some 
officials were so eager to expand farm size that they contracted the responsibility 
land only to the expert farmers, making the less skilled full-time farmers who 
could not yet find off-farm jobs subsist on self-sufficiency land. One case was 
reported that in 1993 the leader of a village selected expert farmers not via 
bidding, hence corruption could be involved (see Chapter 5). But because the 
village officials are only representatives of the public land but not land owners, 
their "bargaining" power, although stronger than that of the ordinary villagers, is 
also limited: peasants could appeal to the media and the government or sue them 
in the courts. Some officials of the lower level governments may be involved in 
corruption or bureaucracy as well, but they are also supervised by the higher 
governments which oblige them to eradicate rural poverty and promote 
development as the means of keeping their posts and gaining promotion. 
Therefore, they have incentives to correct the wrong doings of the village 
officials. Although not surprisingly corruption can not be underestimated in the 
young market economy of China just as in many other developing countries, it 
should not be overestimated either, for the corruption anyway has been combated 
to a degree that has permitted world-widely recognized continuing buoyant 
economic growth. As the market economy and judiciary system become more 
mature, it may be more effectively controlled and the legal rights of peasants 
more soundly protected.
For Japan, my Proposal 1 recommends the collective use of physically 
unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, in which private 
shares for housing land, self-sufficiency land or family plot would be owner-used, 
while shares for production land could earn permanent revenue from the village. 
Shares could be inherited and sold in financial terms in the market. But share­
holders could not withdraw land physically or claim financial reimbursement from 
the village. The village physically possesses land and could reorganize and 
operate land in a Dual Land or Single Land System. Under such a system, the 
village - as entrepreneur - could reduce or remove individual bargains just as in
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a real "firm”, as under public land ownership.
Therefore, my answer to question 1 is that, according to Coase’s 
transaction costs approach, granted that transaction costs incurred in land 
consolidation and expansion for overcoming the fragmented small farms as the 
last obstacle imposed by the monsoon are much higher under private land 
ownership than under either public or corporate land ownership, rural land in 
monsoon Asia should be either publicly or corporately owned (managed at village 
level).
Regarding question 2, if rural land in monsoon Asia should be publicly or 
corporately owned, then in Japan and other rice-based economies already under 
private land ownership, should rural land be turned to public or corporate 
ownership? The answer again depends on the transaction costs involved. Rural 
land may be turned to public ownership (state, regional or village collectives) 
with or without compensation and operated at village level in either a Dual Land 
or Single Land System. In the contemporary era, facing increasing land prices and 
global wave of privatization, under the scheme with compensation, the public 
institutions may not be able to afford to pay (high exchange costs), while private 
land owners may not wish to sell (strong bargaining power). Under the scheme 
without compensation, owners may not agree either (also mighty bargaining 
power). In contrast, in turning land to corporate ownership as mentioned above, 
it is not necessary for villages to buy land while private land share-holders could 
get permanent remuneration. This would incur much lower transaction costs and 
be more feasible. Hence the answer to question 2 is that, in Japan and other rice- 
based economies already under private land ownership, rural land should be 
turned to corporate ownership.
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IV. The Evolution of Property Rights Structures
The above section has shown that in order to eliminate (internalize) or 
efficiently produce externalities, the property rights structures may have to be 
changed. According to both Furubotn and Pejovich and also to common sense, at 
any given moment, there is a legally sanctioned structure of property rights in 
force (Furubotn & Pejovich 1974: 46). This section will first discuss when to
change the existing property rights structures so as to eliminate (internalize) or 
efficiently produce (mainly negative) externalities. This reflects the views of 
Demsetz, Furubotn and Pejovich (however, they have only mentioned internaliz­
ing externalities and have no concept of efficiently producing externalities w hich 
I have introduced). I then also consider the genera! methods of how to alter the 
existing property rights structures.
Timing of Changing Existing Property Rights Structures
Demsetz claims that every cost and benefit associated with social 
interdependencies is a potential externality. One condition is necessary to make 
a potential externality a real one: the cost of a transaction in the property rights 
between the parties concerned must exceed the gains from internalization 
(Demsetz 1967: 32) or efficiently production of externality.
Furubotn and Pejovich argue that there is no basis for believing that all 
existing externalities should be corrected. Only when the gains of correction 
exceed its costs, should the existing externalities be internalized (Furubotn 
Pejovich 1974: 46) or efficiently produced.
Therefore, the evolution, adjustment or change of property rights 
structures, can be best understood by their association with the emergence of new 
or different beneficial and harmful externalities.’' Changes in knowledge and 
innovation result in changes in production functions, market values, and 
aspirations. New techniques, new ways of doing the same things, and doing new 
things - all invoke either harmful or beneficial (or both) externalities to which the 
society has not been accustomed. The property rights structures evolve in 
response to the desires of the interacting persons to internalize or efficiently 
produce externalities for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities when the 
gains of internalization or efficient production become larger than its cost. 
(Demsetz 1967: 34)
Demsetz cites Leacock’s following finding as an example (Leacock 1954). 1
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11 Demsetz states that "the emergence of property rights can he best 
understood by their association with the emergence of new or different beneficial 
and harmful externalities" (Demsetz 1967: 34) as if there existed no property 
rights before the latter emergence. Therefore, I have amended "the I'mcrgentT of 
property rights" into nevolution, adjustment or change of property rights".
Primarily, in the American Indians, the land was commonly owned. Hunting was 
basically for the family’s need of food and a few furs and could be carried out 
freely. Under this ownership structure of land, overly intensive hunting exerted 
external costs on the subsequent hunters. Thus it was in no person’s interest to 
invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of game. But people did not care 
much about these external costs, because the value of furs was so low that there 
was no need to husband fur-bearing animals. (Demsetz 1967: 35)
Following the advent of the fur trade at the beginning of the 18th century, 
the value of furs increased considerably, so the scale of hunting rose sharply. 
Thus the Indians established private ownership of land so that each group of 
families could make hunting and husband fur-bearing animals in their private 
territory. They did this gradually, from the first step - temporary allocation of 
hunting territories, to the second - seasonal allotment, and by the middle of the 
century the third - permanent distribution. Under the new ownership structure, 
people could no more hunt freely except on their own land (internalization of 
negative externalities). Nevertheless, a starving Indian could kill and eat another’s 
beaver if he left the fur and tail (efficient production of negative externalities). 
(Demsetz 1967: 35-36)
The principle that associates the changes of property rights structures with 
the emergence of new, and réévaluation of old, harmful and beneficial externali­
ties suggests in this example that the fur trade made it economic to encourage the 
husbanding of fur-bearing animals. Husbanding requires the ability to prevent 
poaching and this, in turn, suggests that changes in the ownership structure in 
hunting land would take place (Demsetz 1967: 36), hence a new legal framework 
for respect and enforcement of such rights.
Thus, we can see the following trend: (1) the development of production, 
technology and market, which induces (2) new benefit-cost possibilities, which 
in turn shows (3) gains of internalization (or efficient production) of negative 
externalities that exceed its costs, which subsequently raises (4) the need for 
internalization (or efficient production) of negative externalities, which finally 
requires (5) a change of the existing property rights structures and (6) a new 
institutional and legal framework for enforcement.
Relevance to Japanese and Chinese agriculture. The fragmented small 
farms were more advantageous than disadvantageous for the mono-culture of rice
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in the low wage economy of Japan and China. Large-scale farming was 
economically not suitable. The steam-powered large agricultural machinery 
reflecting the technologies of the First Industrial Revolution was technically not 
workable» and the electricity/gas-driven large machinery representing the technolo­
gies of the Second Industrial Revolution was technically feasible but economically 
not proper» as indicated in Chapters 2 and 4. However, as diversified cropping, 
non-crop agriculture and off-farm employment developed, wages rose. The 
agricultural labor force diminished. Thus large-scale farming with the electrici­
ty/gas-driven large machinery became profitable. The construction of rural 
infrastructure especially irrigation strengthened the ability of peasants to resist 
natural disasters. Therefore the fragmented small farms became more disadvanta­
geous than advantageous. In turn this promoted the case for large-scale farming 
and land tenure reform in these two countries.
General Methods of Changing Existing Property Rights Structures
There are two general methods in the evolution, adjustment or change of 
property rights structures.
The first general method is to make gradual changes in social mores and 
common law precedents. At each step of the ad justment process, it is unlikely that 
externalities per se are consciously related to the issue being resolved. The moral, 
practical and legal experiments may be hit-and-miss procedures to some extent 
but in a society that weights the achievement of efficiency heavily, their viability 
in the long run will depend on how well they modify behavior to accommodate 
to the externalities associated with important changes in technology or market 
values. (Dcmsetz 1967: 34)
The second general method is to make a conscious collective endeavor 
(Dcmsetz 1967: 34), such as a major reform or revolution at a certain stage of the 
gradual changes in the first general method.
The Five Approaches outlined so far are actually specific methods of 
assigning property rights, and could be either moral and legal experiments in the 
first general method or conscious collective endeavor in the second.
< In the above American Indian example, the temporary allotment of private 
hunting territories was a change in social mores and common law precedents.
while the permanent distribution was a conscious collective endeavor. It used 
Approach 4 - reorganization of property rights structures without market 
exchange. Rights were directly assigned to households, historical externality was 
not repaid, redemption externality was waived, hut future externality was 
internalized.
The US Civil War, as a conscious collective endeavor, was at least in part 
the result of change in moral attitudes - slave-holding was gradually and 
increasingly regarded as immoral.
Relevance to Chinese and Japanese agriculture. Resolving the fragmented 
small farms problem in the high wage economy in China and Japan was also a 
process combining these two general methods: the society realized fragmentation 
was no more acceptable, then the local experiments in seeking solutions, and 
finally the conscious collective endeavor - the establishment of the Dual Land 
System, Single Land System and Corporate-Holding System, as happened in 
China during the 1980s. In Japan, as early as since I960, the society has already 
made experiments for achieving large-scale farming but did not succeed much. 
This shows that the first general method is not sufficient and the second is 
necessary. Hence my Proposal 1 for land consolidation and expansion as 
conscious collective endeavors in Japan.
The timing and general methods of changing the existing properly rights 
structures examined in this section are also consistent with the theory of dynamic 
efficiency discussed in the first section and that of variable mixed economies 
reviewed in Chapter 2 as well as my hypothesis.
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V. Relevant Concepts of Private Ownership
Private ownership may be divided into slave-holder ownership, feudal 
ownership (including feudal serf-holder ownership and feudal landlord ownership 
as explained in Chapter 2), individual ownership and capitalist ownership. For the 
purpose of the thesis, it may be necessary to discuss the relationship between the 
individual ownership and capitalist ownership.
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Concept of Capitalist Ownership
Capitalist ownership or capitalist private ownership (often just called 
private ownership in the reform period in China so as to avoid sensitive political 
problems) has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions, both of which were 
appreciated by Marx.
In qualitative dimension, it includes two basic factors: 1. private ownership 
of the means of production, and 2. employment of wage laborers.
In quantitative dimension, a certain minimum amount of money or of 
exchange-value must be pre-supposed in the hands of the individual possessor of 
money or commodities, in order that the number of laborers simultaneously 
employed by him the whole year through, day in, day out, and consequently, the 
amount of surplus-value produced, might suffice three conditions so that he can 
become a capitalist: (1) to liberate him from manual labor, (2) to enable him to 
live better than an ordinary laborer (say, twice as well as the latter) and (3) to 
increase the production by turning a part (say, half) of the surplus-value produced 
into capital. (Marx 1887: 291-292, 312)
In qualitative terms, factors 1 and 2 are related each other. If someone 
owns the means of production but does not employ wage laborers, then he cannot 
earn surplus-value, so that it is not a capitalist private ownership. If someone 
employs wage laborers but does not own means of production, so that his wage 
laborers can work upon nothing and produce no surplus-value, this is not a 
capitalist private ownership either. Nevertheless, such a situation should be noted: 
private possession, without ownership, of the (public or private) means of 
production (through leasing, contracting, etc.) plus employment of wage labor can 
also extract surplus-value, and thus is also capitalist behavior. In practice, 
however, capitalist private possession without ownership is put under the general 
title of capitalist private ownership, because the latter is more typical.
In quantitative terms, the three conditions form a direct criterion to judge 
if a person is a capitalist or not. However, there are also two alternative indirect 
criteria.
Marx supposes that (at his time) eight working-hours a day are sufficient 
for the reproduction of the means of subsistence for an ordinary laborer, and a 
capitalist needs to employ eight laborers simultaneously, each working for 12
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hours each day, or totally 96 hours each day. Among them. 64 hours are for the 
reproduction of their means of subsistence (i.e., eight hours for each of the eight 
laborers); 32 hours for the surplus-value, in which, 16 hours for the means of 
subsistence of himself (i.e., he can live twice as well as an ordinary laborer), and 
16 hours for the increase of his production (i.e., he can turn half of the surplus- 
value produced into capital). (Marx 1887: 291-292)
Thus, not every sum of money, or of value, is at pleasure transformable 
into capital. In order to meet the three conditions, a minimum amount of money 
should be held as capital which should include variahle capital to pay for 64 
working-hours each day for the reproduction of the means of subsistence of eight 
ordinary laborers, and constant capital to buy means of production sufficient for 
96 working hours each day. (Marx 1887: 291-292)
Hence, there come two alternative indirect criteria to define a capitalist:
1. he owns such a minimum amount of money as capital, or 2. he employs a 
certain number of wage laborers, so that he can meet the three conditions.
Concerning criterion 1, in order to metamorphose himself into a capitalist, 
the minimum of the sum of value that the individual possessor of money or 
commodities must command, changes with the different stages of development 
of capitalist production, according to their special and technical conditions. (Marx 
1887: 293)
Concerning criterion 2, Marx says, the value of labor-power is the value 
of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance, continuation and 
development of this special article. Particularly, in contradistinction to the case 
of other commodities, there enters into the determination of the value of labor- 
power a historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a given country, at a given 
period, the average quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for the laborer 
is practically known. (Marx 1887: 167-168)
Relevance to Chinese agriculture. In China, until 1956, criterion 1 was 
adopted in industry and commerce: an industrial capitalist had to own 3,(XX) Yuan 
and a commercial capitalist 2,fXX) Yuan [Huang, Qiang-Hua 1980 (a): 99. Huang, 
Qiang-Hua 1980 (b)]. Criterion 2 was adopted in handicrafts and agriculture: in 
handicrafts, a capitalist must employ at least four wage laborers (Bo, Yi-Bo 1991: 
439); in agriculture, as long as a person attended labor and hired one laborer, he 
was classified as rich peasant (Huang, Xi-Yuan 1986: 150) or an agricultural
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capitalist (more properly, quasi-capitalist since he also labored). This was mainly 
because capitalism in handicrafts and agriculture was much weaker than in 
industry and commerce, so that employment of even less than eight laborers was 
still regarded as capitalist.
In China’s present economic reform, capitalist ownership has been allowed 
(although called private ownership). Due to inflation, criterion 1 has not been 
adopted into law. Although some researchers use it, there is no consensus on the 
minimum requisite to define a capitalist. Instead, criterion 2 has been taken into 
law.
However, in present China, how many working-hours a day are sufficient 
for the reproduction of the means of subsistence for an ordinary laborer? And, 
therefore, how many wage laborers has one to employ simultaneously so as to 
become a capitalist? Rather than "practically known", there is no consensus, 
because no one can convince others of his calculation. Therefore, the readiest 
benchmark in China was that put forward by Marx over a century ago: eight wage 
laborers to be employed simultaneously. In the event, this was stipulated in 
"Temporary Regulations on Private Enterprises of the People’s Republic of 
China" by the State Council and enforced on Jul. 1, 1988 (SC 1988: 17).
The management activity by a capitalist is regarded as exploitative (Marx 
1887: 292. Xu, He 1973: 92). Thus, as long as one employs eight wage laborers, 
he is regarded as a capitalist, no matter whether he himself is the manager or he 
hires a manager. However, the management activity by a manager who is not a 
capitalist but hired by a capitalist is regarded as labor.
Concept of Individual Ownership
Individual ownership or non-capitalist individual ownership (often just 
called individual ownership in China) refers to such an ownership whereby a 
person (or persons) individually or privately owns the means of production and 
employs no wage laborer - type 1, in which there is no capitalist factor, or 
employs less than eight wage laborers - type 2, in which the difference between 
such an employer and a capitalist is the quantity of the wage laborers employed 
and the means of production owned sufficient for the use of the wage laborers. 
Because quantitatively he has possessed some, but not enough, capitalist factors,
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qualitatively he is not yet a capitalist but still belongs to the laboring class. 
However, citing Hegel’s "Logic", Marx argues, merely quantitative differences 
beyond a certain point pass into qualitative changes: once the wage laborers he 
employs and the means of production he owns have become enough for him to 
meet the three conditions, he becomes a capitalist. Thus, Marx calls such a person 
"small master" - a hybrid between capitalist and laborer. (Marx 1887: 292). In 
China, such a person (in either type 1 or 2) is called "Xiao Ye Zhu" which means 
"small proprietor" or "petty proprietor". I call a person employing one to seven 
wage laborers quasi-capitalist.
Individual ownership has existed in all the slave, feudal, capitalist, and 
socialist societies (in China during 1956-78 only type 1 was allowed). The central 
point in the individual ownership is that the owner of the means of production 
does not (in type 1), or cannot yet (in type 2), live upon the suiplus-value of the 
wage laborers he hires.
In other rice-based economies of monsoon Asia, hiring how many wage 
laborers simultaneously could be regarded as capitalist? Apparently, there is no 
consensus. Therefore, in this thesis, I use the term "capitalistic" to refer to either 
capitalist or quasi-capitalist or both.
References
1. Alchian, A. 1974: "Foreword" to Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. (ed.) "The 
Economics of Property Rights", Ballinger.
2. Arrow, K. J. 1963: "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”, 
"American Economic Review", No. 53: 941-973.
3. BO, Yi-Bo. Jun. 1991: "Review of Some Important Decisions and Events", 
Publishing House of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, 1st edition, vol. 1. (In Chinese)
4. Coase, R. H. Nov. 1937: "The Nature of the Firm", "Economica", vol. 4, No. 
16: 386-405.
5. Coase, R. H. Oct. 1960: "The Problem of Social Cost", "Journal of Law and 
Economics", vol. 3: 1-44.
6. Debreu, G. 1959: "The Theory of Value", Wiley, New York.
Chapter 3 148
7. Demsetz, H. May 1967: ‘Toward a Theory of Properly Rights", American 
Economic Review 57: 347-359, reprinted in Furuhotn, E.G. and Pejovich. S. (ed.) 
1974 "The Economics of Properly Rights", Ballinger.
8. Demsetz, H. 1988: "Ownership, Control, and the Firm", Basil Blackwell.
9. Furuhotn, E. G. and Pejovich, S. 1974: "The Economics of Property Rights", 
Ballinger.
10. Huang, Qiang-Hua. 1980 (a): "Explanations to Questions about the First 
Volume of ‘Capital’ by Marx", Political Economy Section of Political Education 
Department of East China Normal University. (In Chinese)
11. Huang, Qiang-Hua. 1980 (b): Lessons on "Capital" by Marx, Political 
Education Department of East China Normal University. (In Chinese)
12. Huang, Xi-Yuan. Nov. 1986: "The Modern and Contemporary History of the 
Agricultural Economy of China", People’s Publishing House of Henan, 1st 
edition. (In Chinese)
13. Laffont, J. J. 1987: "Externalities", in Eatwell, John; Milgate, Murry and 
Newman, Peter (ed.) "The New Palgrave - A Dictionary of Economics", 
Macmillan.
14. Leacock, E. 1954: "The Montagnes ‘Hunting Territory’ and the Fur Trade", 
"American Anthropologist", No. 56.
15. Lockwood, B. 1987: "Pareto Efficiency", in Eatwell, John; Milgate, Murry 
and Newman, Peter (ed.) "The New Palgrave - A Dictionary of Economics", 
Macmillan.
16. Marx, Karl. 1887: "Capital", vol. 1, English edition, 1st published 1954, 
reprinted 1977, Lawrence & Wishart.
17. Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John. 1992: "Economics, Organization and 
Management", Prentice-Hall International, Inc.
18. North, Douglass C. 1990: "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance", Cambridge University Press.
19. Pareto, Vilfredo. 1927: "Manual of Political Economy", translation 1971, 
Macmillan.
20. Pigou, A. C. 1920: "The Economics of Welfare”, Macmillan.
21. SC. 1988: Articles 2 and 3 of "Temporary Regulations on Private Enterprises 
of the People’s Republic of China” of the State Council enforced on Jul. 1,1988, 
“New Laws and Regulations", Publishing House of Shanghai Academy of Social
Chapter 3 149
Chapter 3 150
Sciences, vol. 8. (In Chinese)
22. Varian, Hal R. 1987: "Intermediate Microeconomics - A Modern Approach", 
Norton.
23. Varian, Hal R. 1992: "Microeconomic Analysis", 3rd edition, Norton.
24. Wallis, John J. and North, Douglass C. 1986: "Measuring the Transaction 
Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970", in Engerman, S. L. and Gallman. 
R. E. (ed.) "Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth", University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago.
25. Weitzman, Martin L. and Xu, Cheng-Gang. Apr. 22, 1993: "Chinese 
Township and Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives", manuscript, 
revised version.
26. Xu, He. Nov. 1973: "Introduction to Political Economy", People’s Publishing 
House, 1st edition. (In Chinese)
27. Zhou, Jian-Ming. 1998 (forthcoming): "How to Carry out Land Consolidation 
- An International Comparison", "Land Reform, Land Settlement and Coopera­
tives", Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
Part 2
Comparative Practical Studies
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Chapter 4
The Japanese Model versus the Last Obstacle
I. The Significance of the Japanese Model
The Japanese model of rural development started in 1946'. It combines 
nine major features or stages1 2 3.
1 . Institutional changes fo r  an individual-cooperative mixed economy :
(1) The land reform during 1946-50 (Hayami & Yamada 1991: 83) was 
imposed by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers. The government compulsorily purchased the farmlands of resident 
landlords over 1 ha and those of absentee landlords, and resold them to peasants 
for individual ownership, at prices 40 times the annual rent in kind in lowland 
paddy fields and 48 times in upland fields, the rents being evaluated by the 
commodity prices of Nov. 1945, which became negligible due to rapid inflation 
in 1945-49. The government also protected tenants from eviction, set land rents 
at very low levels; and imposed a 3 ha ceiling on land holding in order to prevent 
the revival of landlordism through repurchasing (Hayami 1988: 45. Hayami & 
Yamada 1991: 84-85. Rothacher 1989: 16-17)’. This gave huge incentives for 
peasants to increase output.
In the land reform, farmlands were generally sold to the former tenants 
who already possessed, and thus were familiar with, them. This was conducive 
to keep production order, but also maintained the fragmentation of small farms 
which had existed before (as presented in Chapter 2). On average, the farm size
1 The Meiji era (1868-1912) already carried out some land reform on the 
feudal landlord ownership. Technological progress and rural development had 
been made even in the Tokugawa period (16(H)-1868) and continued since then. 
(Smith 1966. Francks 1984). They all exerted important impacts on the postwar 
progress. But due to the length limit, this chapter has to concentrate on the 
postwar era.
2 Summarized by the author from Oshima 1987: 60-65 and others indicated 
below. Oshima, however, does not note fragmentation.
3 The farm size and fragmentation data in this chapter exclude those of 
Hokkaido which is outside the monsoon region and has much larger farm size and 
fewer fragmented parcels.
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was 0.8-1 ha, number of parcels per farm 10-20, parcel size 0.06 ha, and the total 
one-way distance to parcels about 4 km (Hyodo 1956: 558) - also see Table 4.2.
(2) The setting-up of national rural cooperatives left the direct production 
process to the individual farms, but collectivized forward linkage, backward 
linkage and finance. In forward linkage, farm machinery, chemical fertilizers, 
agricultural chemicals, market information and seeds were supplied, and technical 
guidance given, via them. In backward linkage, farm produce, marine products, 
forestry goods, etc. could only be sold through the agricultural, fishery, forestry 
cooperatives respectively, as they held ties with the consumer markets. Rural 
financing was provided for forward linkage, the direct production process, and 
backward linkage. (Kojima 1988: 725-726)
In particular, the national rural cooperatives supplied superior seeds, semen 
and seedlings for improving productivity and increasing value added. To raise the 
quality of farm produce and livestock, establish uniform standards and win 
markets, the cooperatives designated certain species for cultivation by individual 
farms, distributed manuals for farms to follow, and eliminated sub-standard farm 
produce found at the grading sites before shipment. Farms which failed to follow 
the policies of the cooperatives could not operate successfully. Thus, although 
being mainly service cooperatives, they were extremely powerful. Individual 
farms had almost no self-management rights in these aspects at all. In other 
words, with the exception of the private land ownership, Japanese agriculture was 
organized more "socialistically" than the Chinese counterpart after the dismember­
ing of the people’s communes. (Kojima 1988: 725-726)
However, because the individual farming units were based on the private 
land ownership and controlled the direct production process, they also held the 
power of producing less or not producing at all. It was this, plus the formidable 
demand for labor from rural areas by industry, that contributed to the later part- 
time farming and absenteeism.
I summarize this form of mixed economy as an individual-cooperative 
mixed economy.
2, Government policies supporting rice production and rural development 
included rice self-sufficiency, rice price support, farm credit and subsidies, 
technological research and extension services, rice import protection during 1961- 
93, and policies supporting features 1 above and 3-8 below.
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Besides institutional changes, technological progress also contributed to 
economic growth and rural development, which was embodied in features 3-8. 
Five steps (3-7 below) were taken for reaching full employment in rural areas:
3. Construction o f rural infrastructure - mainly irrigation, land 
improvement, transportation, communication, electrification, education - 
established the technical basis for further rural development.
4. Higher yields and multiple cropping o f rice and other grains (much 
of this was made possible by high-yielding varieties and fertilizers) raised both 
land and labor productivity and released labor from grain culture.
5. Diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture increased peasants’ 
income, changed agricultural structures, and necessitated the establishment of rural 
enterprises for processing, transporting and marketing products of crops, livestock, 
fishery and forestry.
6. Off-farm employment offered peasants jobs in both urban and rural 
enterprises, further raised peasants’ income, changed rural structures, and 
promoted urbanization.
7. Peasant migration to cities and work in towns was mainly by able- 
bodied males, leaving the aged and women in agriculture.
As peasants could get jobs also in the dry half year, full employment was 
achieved and wages rose. Hence a post-full employment step:
8. Agricultural mechanization with small machinery. Chapter 2 pointed 
out that the steam-driven machines of the First Industrial Revolution of the West 
in the 18th/19th century, were not suitable to the tiny paddy farms of monsoon 
Asia. But the electric/gas-powered machines of the Second Industrial Revolution 
developed since the early 20th century were due to their size, cheapness, 
efficiency, and the ease to connect to electricity. The gas-driven internal 
combustion engines could be inserted into small cultivators and used to run the 
small harvesters of Asian farms. (Oshima 1984: 44. Oshima 1993: 4-5).
As full employment was approached and reached, the widespread use of 
power cultivators, threshers, sprayers, pumps, weeders, driers, and motorized 
transport saved farm work. As the young people left for urban jobs, even the most 
labor-intensive operations of monsoon paddy farming, transplanting and reaping, 
began to be mechanized. Mechanical transplanters and reapers released a large 
number of workers at the busiest time of monsoon rice growing, so that the labor
force on ihe farms began to shrink sharply without reducing output, another 
landmark event in monsoon Asia.
In 1960, rice self-sufficiency was achieved, per capita product raised, 
equity in income distribution reached, poverty eradicated, the first transition (from 
agriculture to industry) completed, and shortage of labor appeared. (JSY 1993/94: 
272. ESJ 1960-61: 70. YLS 1963: 38-39. Oshima 1987: 115. Oshima 1993: 112. 
125). These eight features continued to function beyond 1960. The second 
transition (industry to services) was concluded in 1974 (FEA 1975-76: 824). 
Except for rice import protection in 2 above, they are significant for other 
economies. At this high stage of rural development, all the major obstacles 
imposed by the monsoon have been overcome except for 9. persistence o f  the 
fragm ented small farm s (Kristof 1996: 4) which will be analyzed later.
Theoretical Discussion4
The success of the Japanese model of rural development in features 1-8 
is consistent with the theory of the long-term ultimate causes for economic growth 
examined in Chapter 1, theories of dualism, monsoon Asia rice economy and 
variable mixed economies reviewed in Chapter 2 and theory of property rights 
discussed in Chapter 3.
At the end of WWII, under the natural monsoon conditions, Japan, like 
other Asian rice-based economies, inherited (1) a highly labor-intensive rice 
culture leading to labor shortage in the peak seasons, population density, and 
fragmented small farms; (2) little employment in the slack seasons with 
unemployment, underemployment and disguised unemployment, and unlimited 
supply of labor; (3) unfeasibility of capitalistic large-scale farming, as three 
traditional productive and technological conditions, and (4) feudal landlord 
ownership as an institutional condition. There were also initial postwar economic 
and social conditions, i.e., (1) low per capita income, (2) vast population and a 
huge labor force, (3) low productivity in peasant agriculture with wage gap, (4) 
denunciation of colonialism and feudalism. The Japanese economy was a dual
4 All the theoretical points of view examined in Chapters l, 2 and 3 are 
relevant to issues analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5. But writing all of them into the 
theoretical thinking sections is not permitted by the length limit of the thesis. 
Thus, only some major theoretical views are referred to.
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economy dominated by traditional agriculture. The rural areas did not enjoy much 
"spread effects"* but suffered from "backwash effects" from the advanced big 
cities. Free market forces alone had been unable to overcome the "vicious circle" 
of poverty and realize sustainable rural development.
By 1960, with the same natural monsoon conditions, such an economic 
situation had been fundamentally changed in Japan by a mixed economy solution 
- multiple structures of public and private ownership, and government interven­
tion. The General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
imposed the land reform* which was a conscious collective endeavor for changing 
the legally sanctioned structure of property rights in force - the feudal landlord 
ownership. It used Approach 3: reform of property rights structures through 
political or legal process, followed by exchange at prices lower than the market 
levels. The state, overcoming the bargaining power of the feudal landlords, 
forcibly bought and resold their land to peasants at prices which soon became 
minimal due to inflation, so that the landlords were not fully compensated in real 
terms. The externality-yielding party had to partially internalize the redemption 
externality* for not creating the future externality, so as to establish the sufficient 
conditions for Pareto efficiency. It established an equitable individual land 
ownership which brought huge incentives to peasants for production. The govern­
ment set up powerful national rural cooperatives which not only collectivized 
overall services to the individual farming units* but also "socialistically" restricted 
them from buying, producing and selling inferior products. Such institutional 
changes, as one of the long-term ultimate causes, played a keystone role in 
sustaining economic growth.
For sustaining economic growth, there are not only institutional changes, 
but also technological changes as two long-term ultimate cause, and proximate 
sources (labor, capital, education, and structural change, etc.). Thus, the 
government further promoted technological efficiency especially dynamic 
efficiency, by supporting technological progress. Although "backwash effects" 
were not completely avoided (e.g., senilization and feminization of the agricultural 
labor force as reviewed in Chapter 2), "spread effects" were strengthened by 
constructing rural infrastructure, developing higher yields and multiple cropping 
of rice and other grains, diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture and off-farm 
employment, which led to full employment of peasants also in the slack seasons
and significantly lowered the wage gap. Peasants’ migration to cities and work 
in towns further raised their income. The development of towns strengthened the 
"spread effects", constrained the "backwash effects" and lessened urban 
congestion. Agricultural mechanization with small machinery reduced labor- 
intensity in rice culture, released more labor and paved the way for capitalistic 
large-scale farming. The "vicious circle" of poverty was overcome.
II. The Remaining Obstacle
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The ninth feature of the Japanese model of rural development is the 
persistence of the fragmented small farm. In Japan, as people became richer, rice 
consumption, although still necessary, declined. In the high wage economy, the 
income from rice production turned out to be much lower than that from 
diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture and off-farm employment. If rice 
farmers could not be viable, they would have to abandon rice production, so that 
rice self-sufficiency could not be kept. In order to make them viable and gain 
international competitive strength, the income from rice production should be 
raised through removing fragmentation and enlarging farm size so that large 
machinery could be used, labor saved, cost reduced and increasing returns to land 
scale gained, as Table 4.1 shows.
Large machines like riding tractors, combines and rice transplanters were 
introduced into agriculture in the late 1960s. Thus, as Table 4.1 reveals, up to 
1965, under the dominance of small machinery, larger faims had higher 
machinery and power costs, as well as lower labor costs and total costs, although 
not significantly. From 1970 on, however, by using large machinery, larger farms 
significantly lowered labor costs, machinery and power costs and total costs - the 
total costs of farms over 3 ha were nearly one-half those of farms below 0.3 ha. 
This contrast shows that the agricultural mechanization with large machinery is 
characterized by increasing returns to land scale.5 (Hayami 1988: 97)
Concerning supervision of labor, when farm work had to be done by hand 
with simple tools, or by small machinery, it was difficult to standardize and
5 The observations in Table 4.1 are not large enough for running regressions. 
More detailed data, however, are unavailable.
supervise the varied work of individual farmers. Thus, the head of a farm could 
not use or hire many farm workers, and thus could not run a large farm. Family 
farms would be more suitable. This was one of the major reasons why even a 
large feudal landlord had to lease land to tenants in small parcels as household 
farms, rather than employing the same number of tenants as his wage laborers in 
a capitalistic farm of large acreage to be managed by himself, as Chapter 2 
already indicated.
With large machinery, however, it becomes much easier to standardize 
farm work and supervise workers. Thus, enlarging farm size and employing more 
wage laborers to run a large capitalistic farm became possible.
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Rice Production Costs 
by Farm Size in Japan 1953-94
Cost
item
Farm
size
(ha)
Index of production cost per kg 
(below 0.3 ha = 100)
1953 55 60 65 70 75 80 84 89 94*
Total
costs
Below
0.3
100 100 too 100 100 100 100 100 100 too
0.3-0.5 96 103 106 102 95 93 93 90 94 92
1.0-1.5 89 98 96 88 78 75 70 67 71 72
2.0-3.0 79 88 92 82 67 61 57 54 63 59
A bove
3 .0
75 90 87 93 69 60 51 51 54 51
Labor
costs
B elow
0.3
100 100 100 100 100 100 KM) 100 100 100
0.3-0.5 93 100 106 100 98 93 92 92 95 83
1.0-1.5 83 91 91 87 79 72 66 62 67 66
2.0-3 .0 66 74 83 80 63 52 50 49 55 48
A bove
3.0
60 73 78 90 68 50 42 43 46 38
M achin ­
ery & 
pow er
costs
Below
0.3
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.3-0.5 87 138 135 134 104 102 103 91 96 93
1.0-1.5 92 156 146 127 89 90 81 72 86 85
2.0-3.0 89 143 137 108 72 82 64 54 77 86
A bove
3.0
89 144 121 123 69 76 55 51 63 71
Sources: 1953 & 1989: N ishim ura & Sasaki 1993: 77. 1955-84: JM A FF (c); llayam i 
1994: JM A FF 1994 (* index o f  production cost per 60 kg).
1988: 9 8.
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Therefore, from 1961 on, as the first major effort toward large-scale 
farming, farmers' purchase o f land was subsidized by the government. In 1962, 
the land holding ceiling was relaxed. However, not enough land sales occurred. 
On the supply side, part-time farming became dominant. Many able-bodied males 
commuted to off-farm employment, while their wives and old parents farmed. 
Absenteeism also occurred. But the part-time farmers and absentees had no 
incentive to sell land: off-farm income was high and a rural place for their 
retirement was preserved. For the part-time farmers, the distance between towns 
and villages was short, transportation convenient, they had no need to pay high 
rent for city dwellings and enjoyed less pollution. Moreover, as industrialization 
proceeded, land prices soared. Land sales in the future would be more profitable 
than now. On the demand side, because land prices went well over income 
surplus from rice production, it became unprofitable for full-time farmers to 
enlarge farm size through land purchase. (Hayami 1988: 80-89. Oshima 1993: 
172-173). In effect, it was the shortcomings of private land ownership which 
hampered land sales.
Hence the resort to land lease as the second major effort toward large- 
scale farming. In 1970, rent control was removed, and land could be returned to 
landlords upon termination of contracts of more than 10 years. In 1975 and 1980, 
leases for shorter period were also legalized. Land lease occurred more than sale 
and formed some large-scale farms6. As not only older farmers in mountainous 
areas but also part-time farmers in lowland regions increasingly faced the lack of 
young successors for farming, they have been more willing to lease land (Tsuge 
1997). But the progress was stow and limited. On the supply side, land owners 
were rich enough from off-farm income and did not have much incentive to rent 
out land. If the rent was not sufficiently high, the part-time farmers and absentees 
had no incentive to lease land; but if it was high enough to satisfy the lessors, the 
full-time farmers could not afford it. There was a strong equalitarianism among 
village people, who felt uncomfortable if a specific villager expanded his farm 
and became competitive in the market. This resulted in entrenched inefficiency
6 For example, in Saitama Prefecture, some large scale rice-wheat farms were 
formed by owned and leased lands with the acreage from 3 ha to 27 ha and on 
average 10 ha, but operated by senior farmers often without young successors 
(Kurita 1994: 511,519).
a
and vested interests. (Hayami 1988: 86-88, 108, 126). Farm households had a 
solid preference for permanent residence which has continued for generations, and 
regarded agricultural land as a valuable asset handed down from the ancestors 
which should be passed on as it is to the offspring. They still feared that once let. 
land would be lost, as happened in the land reform. Thus, people tended to avoid 
renting out land. On the demand side, because the small farm was composed of 
many fragmented parcels located in different parts of the village, it was not 
always possible for the lessee to join them into large land units (since the parcels 
of other land owners could be interspersed amongst them) or change them to non­
farmland (dams, roads, canals, ponds, etc.) (since the ownership belonged to the 
lessor) for using large machinery. (Tabala 1990: 18, 22). Even if the owned and 
leased parcels were contiguous, once the lease was terminated, the lessor may 
shift the lease to another lessee, hence re-splitting the joined land and reducing 
farm size. Here, private land ownership and free market forces constrained both 
land lease and the efficient use of leased land.
In parallel, there was the third major effort - land consolidation under 
private farmland ownership, which refers to an exchange of the private ownership 
and location of spatially dispersed parcels of farms to form new holdings 
containing just one (or as few as possible) parcel(s), with the same (or similar) 
wealth in land as that before the exchange. No land owner would be a loser after 
the consolidation. (Oldenburg 1990: 183). In Japan, land consolidation was 
sporadically carried out in ancient times before the 20th century. In 1901, the law 
on cultivated land consolidation was established to enable owners of agricultural 
land to organize cooperatives for the consolidation of their lands. Hut the feudal 
landlords hampered the progress. The postwar government decided to promote 
land consolidation after the land reform. Thus, in June 1949, the Land Improve­
ment Law was introduced. (Hyodo 1956: 558-559). During 1950-92, of the total 
3,957,000 ha of farmland outside Hokkaido (data for 1992), 1.880,(XX) ha had 
been consolidated in Honshu (major part of Japan) (JSY 1993/94: 225. Tsuge 
1997). It was strengthened in 1992 as a part of the nt-vc policies, as "The Basic 
Direction of New Policies for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas" of the Japanese 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (JMAFF) declared that "To foster 
farm management bodies that will operate on large-scale, aggregated farmland, 
methods to promote land improvement projects will be implemented that allow
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land to be exchanged" (JMAFF 1992: 15). The aim was to create compact land 
units of 1, 2 or 3 ha. Since 1993, of the total 3,879,000 ha of farmland outside 
Hokkaido (data for 1994), 50,000 ha per year have been consolidated in Honshu 
(JSY 1996: 229. Tsuge 1997). Although the 1949 Law prescribed that agreement 
by 50 % of landowners of the village was sufficient for carrying out land 
consolidation and the 1992 new policies raised it to two thirds majority, in most 
cases 100 % consent was attained before starting it, but great efforts had to be 
made by officials to overcome serious difficulties in adjusting interests among 
peasants (Hyodo 1956: 559. Tsuge 1997. NIRA 1995: 174. Zhou, Jian-Ming 
1998).
Land consolidation could turn farms from fragmented to compact units, 
expand parcel size, and make sale, lease, and other forms of joint use of land 
physically easier. But it did not enlarge farm size [e.g., a farm previously 
composed of 10 dispersed parcels (on average 0.1 ha each) could now hold one 
compact parcel of 1 ha]. Nor did it ensure efficient use of the consolidated land 
by the full-time farmers. A part-time farmer or absentee who previously had no 
incentive to sell or lease his fragmented farm may now still be unwilling to do 
so for his compact farm.
Since the 1970s, the fourth major effort to achieve large-scale farming was 
commissioned agricultural work (also called custom work) - commissioning or 
contracting a part or the whole process of rice cultivation primarily by small 
households holding land up to 0.5 ha to other farmers for using the latter’s 
machinery, labor and management. The fifth major effort was agricultural 
production cooperatives - groups of farm households mainly holding land of 2-5 
ha and over, accomplishing all or a part of agricultural production process by 
jointly using machinery and assigning members to commissioned work (this was 
already collective use of private land). Some production cooperatives were joined 
by farm households of a whole village, exercised village-wide collective use and 
management of private farmland and machinery, eliminated boundaries among 
parcels, thus enlarged farming scale (NIRA 1995: 172-174, 176-177). The sixth 
major effort was urban-rural joint farming - enterprises other than farm 
households organized joint management, joint venture, production corporation and 
limited companies in farming including receiving commissioned work. These 
three forms all had advantages in tilling otherwise idle land, achieving economies
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of scale in using machinery, labor and management, and reducing cost of 
machinery. (Tabata 1990: 20-22)
But except for the village-wide collective use of private land, these three 
forms were less successful in achieving economies of scale of land. Without the 
agreement of all land owners concerned, they were unable to form large land 
units or change parcels to non-farmland (such as dams, roads, canals, ponds, etc.). 
Fragmentation was still a barrier. In the case of village-wide collective use of 
private land, cooperative members could agree to remove boundaries among 
parcels. But as long as private land was physically withdrawable, there could be 
three problems. (1) If the village needed to change parcels into non-larmland. 
members may disagree or demand high compensation. At enough transaction 
costs, the village may succeed in persuading them to accept other parcels as an 
exchange, but may also not succeed. (2) Due to various personal and organiza­
tional reasons/problcms, some members may quit to operate land individually or 
organize another cooperative. Thus, the joined land would be re-split. At high 
transaction costs again, the cooperative may make a quitting member agree to 
accept a land in the periphery as an exchange with his original land so as to keep 
all lands of the remaining members together, but he may also refuse to accept. (3) 
Quitting with land would certainly reduce the farm size operated by the remaining 
full-time farmers of the cooperative, to which there may be no easy solution. In 
fact, historically, setting up of land use cooperatives and their breaking down have 
repeatedly happened (Tsuge 1997).7
A tax might be imposed on those absentee tandowners and part-time 
farmers who are unwilling to lease land or join cooperatives/enierprises, as 
proposed by, e.g., Schiller (1956: 563). Possible shortcomings may be that 
bureaucracy would be involved, it may not be possible to impose tax on those 
full-time farmers who quit a cooperative/enterprise to operate land individually, 
and the ruling party may even not dare to initiate such a lax for fearing loss of 
peasants’ votes. These may explain why such a tax has not been imposed thus far. 
Therefore, farm expansion may still be constrained by the free market forces.
Table 4.2 shows that not much success in economies of scale of land has
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7 It is a pity that in the English literature reviewed in this chapter, no example 
was given. But the statements by the Japanese authors should be trustahle.
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Table 4.2 Farm Size (ha) 1950-95 and 
Fragmentation 1988 in Japan (in percentage)
Year Under
0.5
0.5-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 Over
5
Total Average 
farm size
1950 41.0 32.0 21.7 3.4 1.2 0.8 100 % 1.0
1960 38.3 31.7 23.6 3.8 1.5 1.0 too % 1.0
1970 38.0 30.2 24.1 4.8 1.7 1.3 100 % 1.1
1980 41.6 28.1 21.2 5.3 2.2 1.5 100 % 1.2
1985 42.7 27.1 20.4 5.5 2.5 1.7 100 % 1.2
1990 41.7 28.1 20.9 9.3 100 % 1.1
1994 21.7 37.2 27.9 13.3 100 % 1.4
1995 24.6 85.9 26.5 13.1 MX) % 1.5
Parcels per farm over 5 ha
1988 1-4 5-8 9 and more
100 % 28.4 39.1 32.5
Sources: For 1950-85: Kayo 1977; JMAFF (a); JMAFF (d); Hayami 1988: 
27. For 1990 and 1994: JSY 1992: 161; JSY 1996: 223, 229. For 1995: 
JSY 1997: 225, 231. For 1988: JMAFF 1988: 250.
been achieved. Fragmentation was preserved even in those farms enlarged to over 
5 ha. Much land still remained with part-time farmers and absentees in inefficient 
use. In 1995, of all farm households, full-time households accounted for only 15.3 
%, part-time 1 (mainly farming) took 18.3 %, and part-time 2 (mainly on other 
jobs) 66.5 %8 9; of all farm household population, persons engaged in family- 
operated and custom farming 61.4 %, persons mainly engaged in farming 33.8 9r, 
principal persons engaged in farming (core farmers) only 20.6 % and male 
principal persons engaged in farming 11.0 % (JSY 1997: 226)’. Utilization rate
8 Full-time farm households refer to those farm households whose members 
are exclusively engaged in farming. Part-time ones denote those whose one or 
more members are engaged in jobs other than farming. Part-time I (mainly 
farming) mean those part-time households earning income mainly from farming. 
Part-time 2 (mainly other jobs) indicate those earning income mainly from jobs 
other than farming. (JSY 1997: 219)
9 Persons engaged in farming refer to those household members 16 years of 
age and older who have been engaged in any work in farming for one year or 
more. Persons mainly engaged in farming contain those engaged exclusively in
of cultivated land decreased from 133.9 % in I960 to 99.3 9< in 1994 as Table 
4.3 shows.
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Table 4.3 Utilization Rate of Cultivated Land in Japan 1960-94
(in percentage)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993 1994
133.9 123.8 108.9 103.3 104.5 105.1 102 100.8 100 99.3
Sources: JSY 1986: 159. JSY 1997: 235.
Table 4.4 Changes in the Number and Shares of 
Viable Farms in Japan 1960-94 *
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1994
Total farms (1000) 6057 5342 4661 4376 3835 2787
Viable farms (1000) 521 353 242 232 253 198
Share of viable farms (%)
Household number 8.6 6.6 5.2 5.3 6.6 7.1
Agricultural output 23 25 30 31 39 32
Arable land 24 18 19 21 26 23
Agricultural labor force 16 19 21 22 29 26
Agricultural fixed capital 19 19 21 24 29 23
* Including Hokkaido.
Sources: 1960-85: JMAFF (a); JMAFF (b); JSY 1996: 223; Hayami 1988: 
81. 1990-94: JSY 1996: 223; JMAFF 1995: 179.
As a result, the number of viable farms diminished (see Table 4.4), and 
farmers and cooperatives organized political lobbying for protection. The ruling 
party had to yield, fearing loss of votes. (Hayami 1988: 49. 51). In 1960, a "cost- 
of-production and income-compensation scheme" was designed. The government
farming and those engaged in farming for more days than in other jobs. Principal 
persons engaged in farming (core fanners) denote those mainly engaged in 
farming for more than 150 days per year. (JSY 1997: 219. Hayami 1988: 82)
It is important to note that core farmers include but do not equal full-time 
farmers since the non full-time core farmers still spend a part of lime on other 
jobs which could otherwise be used on agriculture as well. Therefore, this thesis 
recommends the promotion of full-time farmers, rather than of core farmers as 
advocated in Japan (e.g., by Saito; Fukukawa; Tada & Kajiya 1995: 81).
as the monopsonist buyer (through the national cooperatives) bought rice at a 
predetermined price and sold it at a lower price, thus subsidizing rice farmers. 
The 1961 Agricultural Basic Law prohibited rice imports. Rice prices increased 
to 10 times the world level in the 1980s. Stimulated by the price distortion, rice 
was overproduced until 1992. (Rothacher 1989: 162-163. Schaede 1994: 388. 
Schaede 1997: 427)
Consequently, in the 1980s, the budget deficit on rice rose to more than 
US$ 7,000 million. Internationally, protests flowed, especially from the US. The 
GATT Uruguay Round of 1993 stipulated that rice imports gradually increase up 
to 10 % of the total consumption size per year until 2005. Following a disastrous 
harvest and loss of rice self-sufficiency in 1993, cheap rice had to be imported 
for the first time after I960, in 1994, from Australia, China, Thailand and the US 
(Schaede 1997: 427). In 1996, two thirds of what the Japanese consumed was 
imported cheaper food. Further liberalization is expected (Kristof 1996: 4). World 
market rice prices were pushed up, thus affecting other grain importing countries 
especially the poor ones of the Third World. Domestically, with the fragmented 
small farms, it is difficult for rice farmers to subsist and for the government to 
establish a competitively surviving rice self-sufficiency. Subsidies have to 
continue. In late 1994, the government decided to spend 6,000 billion yen over 
six years from 1995-96 to 2000-01 for farmers to adjust to the new regime. In 
1994-95, the government purchase price was maintained at the same high level 
as before, which again caused overproduction that, with the imported cheap rice, 
led to a glut in inventories. (Schaede 1997: 427. FEA 1997: 435). In contrast, the 
self-sufficiency rates of other agricultural products, being given less or no 
subsidies, all declined to below 100 % in 1994 (most of them have been so even 
since the 1960s), as Table 4.5 demonstrates. Thus, how to effectively consolidate 
and enlarge the fragmented small farms has become a critical issue in the 
sustainable rural development of Japan.
Similarly, Taiwan completed the first and second transitions during 1970- 
73 and 1994 respectively (SYAP 1970: 77. FEA 1977-78: 342. FEA 1997: 267). 
Land consolidation under private land ownership was promoted into law in 1936, 
started in 1959 [Huang, Chieh 1967: (Appendix) 1, 37-38, Foreword] and 
strengthened in 1975 as "the second land reform". By 1982, 300,000 ha, or two 
thirds of 446,000 ha farmland planned for consolidation had been reorganized into
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large, rectangular fields more suitable for mechanized farming. By 1989, however, 
88.6 % of farming households were still part-time farms, which earned 62.8 % 
of their income from off-farm activities. (Myers 1996: 260). In 1994,4.4 ha were 
the rice farming area that enabled a full-time farm family to earn an income from 
its farming to balance off its consumptive expenditure. But those who held this 
or larger land scale only accounted for 7 % of all the farm families. (Cheng, Shy- 
Hwa 1994:94-95). This and the above-mentioned Japanese case clearly show how 
free market forces could lastingly constrain farm expansion.
Table 4.5 Self-Sufficiency Rates of Foods in Japan 1960-94
(in percentage)
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 91 92 93 94
Rice 102 95 106 110 100 107 too 100 101 75 120
W heat 39 28 9 4 10 14 15 12 12 10 9
Barley 104 57 28 8 13 14 12 10 10 10 8
Naked barley 112 123 73 98 98 100 92 70 92 100 86
M iscellaneous
cereals
21 5 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Potatoes & 
sweet pota­
toes
100 100 100 99 96 96 93 91 91 89 88
Starches 76 67 41 24 21 19 13 12 13 12 12
Pulses 44 25 13 9 7 8 8 7 6 4 5
Vegetables 100 100 99 9*9 97 95 91 <90 ‘90 88 86
Fruits 100 90 84 84 81 77 63 60 59 53 47
M eat 91 90 89 77 81 81 70 67 65 64 60
H en’s eggs 101 100 97 97 98 98 98 98 97 96 <96
Cow  m ilk & 
m ilk products
89 86 89 81 82 85 78 77 81 80 73
Fishes & 
shellfishes
110 109 108 102 104 96 86 86 83 76 73
Seaw eeds 92 88 91 86 74 74 72 70 75 70 70
Sugar 18 31 22 15 27 33 33 36 35 33 29
Fats & oils 42 31 22 23 29 32 28 24 19 17 15
M ushroom s 115 l i t 110 109 102 92 91 87 81 78
Sources: JSY 1993/94: 272. JSY 1997: 276.
As an opposite solution to private land ownership, rural land may be 
turned to public ownership (state, regional or village collectives), just as in
Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam. But lacing increasing land 
prices and a global wave of decolleciivization and privatization, under a scheme 
of paying compensation, the public institutions may not afford to buy and land 
owners may not wish to sell; under a scheme without compensation, owners may 
not agree either.
Therefore, the fragmented small farms have become the remaining or last 
obstacle imposed by the monsoon to sustainable agricultural and rural develop­
ment in monsoon Asia.
Theoretical Discussion
In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that in the prewar era, in comparison with 
the disadvantages (negative externalities) of the fragmented small farms, their 
advantages were much less and all related to backward economic, technological 
and social conditions. In other words, farmers were forced to accept them because 
they had no other choices. In fact, wet-rice farmers in monsoon Asia generally 
preferred having all their land in one contiguous parcel. During the postwar 
period up to the early 1960s, however, due to the implementation of features 1-8 
of the Japanese model, farmers could overcome poverty with fragmented small 
farms. According to Chapter 3, there is no basis for believing that all existing 
negative externalities should be corrected. Only when the gains of correction 
exceed its costs, should they be internalized. Therefore, there was no urgent need 
to change this land tenure situation as the legally sanctioned structure of properly 
rights in force.
In the late 1960s, however, on one hand, part-time farming and absentee­
ism developed further, leading to waste of land and other resources, and the high 
wage economy made small rice farmers difficult to be viable; on the other, the 
introduction of large agricultural machinery made large-scale farming profitable 
and could reach technological Pareto efficiency by producing more output with 
the same inputs or producing the same output with less inputs. Thus, the 
fragmented small farms became more disadvantageous than advantageous, and the 
time was ripe to change the existing property rights structures to internalize their 
negative externalities.
According to the Coase theorem, with the introduction of market
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exchange, negative technological externalities could he internalized and Pareto 
efficiency reached. Thus, during the I960s-80s, Approach I (permission for the 
relevant parties to exchange property rights through a political or legal process, 
followed by market exchange) was adopted by the Japanese government. The land 
holding ceiling was relaxed, rent control removed, land could he relumed to 
landlords upon termination of contracts, and the first general method of changing 
the existing property rights structures (gradual changes in social mores and 
common law precedents including moral, practical and legal experiments) was 
used to encourage voluntary land sale, lease, or joining cooperatives/enterprises. 
In those cases where they were carried out, the negative externalities of the 
fragmented small farms could, to some extent, he eliminated and large-scale 
farming achieved. Since 1950 land consolidation has also been carried out which 
used both Approaches 1 and 2 [implementation of social actions (law, tax, etc.) 
to oblige the externality-yielding party to exchange property rights, followed by 
market exchange] and made large-scale farming physically easier.
Chapter 3, however, also stressed that when there are externalities, even 
if the private market economy has been introduced, equilibria will not be in 
general Pareto efficient since the private decentralized optimizations of economic 
agents lead them to take into account only private costs through the price system. 
Thus, after the market exchange had been allowed, the externality-yielding party 
might refuse to exchange relevant property rights, so that the previous negative 
technological externalities now became to be negative pecuniary ones. Because 
of private land ownership, part-time farmers and absentees could exert strong 
bargaining power by either refusing to exchange or demanding high prices, which 
in turn incurred higher transaction costs, especially huge costs of government 
subsidies to rice farmers, costs of time (more than three and a half decades since 
1960), and opportunity costs (Zhou, Jian-Ming 1998).
Farm expansion through both land sale and individual lease was 
constrained by private land ownership and free market forces even after land 
consolidation. As stressed in Chapter 2, this shows that free market forces alone, 
or private use o f  private land, may not realize sustainable rural development.
As Chapter 1 pointed out, of the many variables for rural development, the 
institutional changes are the keystone. It is the institutional component that is 
most important in the interaction of institutions and technologies as the underlying
long-term ultimate causes that sustain economic growth of developing countries. 
But once production has reached the frontier permitted by the established 
institutions, even though the increase of production is technologically possible, it 
would be hampered by the vested interests, just as the case of fragmented small 
farms - the ninth feature of the Japanese model - has suggested. At this stage, 
another round of institutional changes should take place to allow sustainable rural 
development. Hence variable mixed economies were needed - varying relations 
between the public and private sectors, and their dynamic change over time in 
relation to changing needs in economy and society - for reaching dynamic or 
long-term Pareto efficiency.
In fact, variable mixed economies have been spontaneously practiced by 
village officials and peasants, using the first general method and proceeding from 
the first to the second phase of my hypothesis. In the fifth major effort {agricul­
tural production cooperatives), the sub-village collective use of private land was 
actually at phase 1: sub-village individual-collective mixed economy (sub-village- 
widc cooperative/enterprise collective use of physically withdrawable private land 
shares, exercising collective-individual dual level operation of large land units, 
with the basic operation level at one household or at a farming unit including a 
number of households). The fourth major effort (commissioned agricultural work) 
was at threshold of phase 1. Once the commission receivers were organized, it 
became the fifth major effort. The sixth major effort (urban-rural joint farming) 
was the inclusion of urban enterprises into phase 1. These three forms all had 
advantages in tilling otherwise idle land, achieving economics of scale in using 
machinery, labor and management, and reducing cost of machinery, but were less 
successful in achieving large-scale farming since still seriously constrained by the 
private land ownership and free market forces.
In order to overcome the shortcomings at phase 1, the sub-village 
collective use of private land was extended village-wide, just as phase 2: village­
wide individual-collective mixed economy. It could remove boundaries among 
parcels and achieve large-scale farming, but still maintained three shortcomings, 
owing to the withdrawability of private land.
Thus, a higher phase of the variable mixed economies, combination of the 
first general method with the second (conscious collective endeavor), and joint 
use of Approaches 1 and 2 are needed to eliminate the negative pecuniary
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externalities imposed by the part-time farmers and absentees.
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III. A New Model for Overcoming the Last Obstacle
Conjectural Proposal 1: Collective-Individual Dual Level Operation 
of Physically Unwithdrawahle Private Land Shares under Corporate 
Ownership.
Whereas all the other means of production could be privately, publicly or 
jointly owned, land of each household could he turned to private land shares to 
earn permanent remuneration. While private land share-holders own land 
financially, the village corporation possesses land physically and could reorganize 
it. Private land shares could be inherited and sold in financial terms in the market. 
But share-holders could not withdraw land physically or claim financial 
reimbursement from the village (although if the village wished, it could buy 
private land shares when offered into collective land shares).
Private land could be divided into three types: housing land, either self- 
sufficiency land or family plot, and production land. Housing land shares would 
not receive revenue from the village because the owner gets remuneration from  
using the land. Agricultural land could be operated in a Dual Land System where 
most off-farm work engaging peasants have not secured their jobs. (1) Self- 
sufficiency land could be distributed in compact form equally to each household 
for self-sufficiency production, as a back-up basic social welfare (its significance 
may be seen from the recent reappearance of homeless people in cities who were 
mainly from rural areas10). (2) Production land for the market should be
10 For years, affluent Japan prided itself on the tiny numbers of people living 
on its streets and never envisaged "An Army of Homeless Rises Up in Tokyo".
The first record of homeless people dates from the Nara Period in the 
eighth century. They remained a common sight in big cities for more than 1,000 
years. But they largely disappeared between the early 1950s and the late 1980s, 
when Japan experienced its economic "miracle".
Since the collapse of real estate and share prices in the early 1990s, 
however, Japan has experienced acute economic changes. The unemployment rate 
reached 3.4 % in early 1997, a record high. Although this rate is still low by 
international standards, the number of homeless people in Tokyo has already risen 
by about four-fold, to 10,000. They have also appeared in small cities recently for 
the first time. Thus, government officials, activists and academics expect that
contracted in compact form as well in long term to full-time farmers, or to expert 
farmers who bid for higher output of rice and other products, so that large land 
units could be formed and large machinery used. Contract could be transferred 
and renewed according to market principles of competition. If, within the contract 
period, other than owing to natural disaster, the output target is not reached, or 
the land quality diminished, or production abandoned, etc., the contract could be 
stopped and sanctions engaged. If the land has been improved, awards could be 
given. If some production becomes surplus, fields could be used for other (even 
non-agricultural) productive purposes. Production cooperatives/enterprises could 
also be set up, in which full-time or expert fanners could work together. Urban 
companies could participate. Wage labor could be hired. Revenue (dividends} 
could be distributed among production land shares, capital shares of the internal 
and external investors and labor contribution of the internal and external wage 
laborers.
Alternatively, where most off-farm work engaging peasants have secured 
their jobs, a Single Land System could be adopted. (1) A family plot much smaller 
than the self-sufficiency land could be given in compact form to each household 
for growing some vegetables to accommodate the peasant tradition of not buying 
them from the market. (2) Production land could be operated in the above- 
mentioned ways. Self-sufficiency land is no more needed since full-time farmers 
could operate production land for both self-sufficiency and the market, and off- 
farm workers could earn off-farm income; family plot is negligible from the 
quantitative point of view. Thus agricultural land is no longer divided into the 
Dual Land. Hence a Single Land System. Reducing self-sufficiency land to family 
plots correspondingly makes the farming scale of the production land much larger 
than under the Dual Land System. If those off-farm work engaging peasants have 
lost jobs there, they could regain full-time employment as farmers to independent­
ly contract production land or join production cooperative/enterprise, so that a 
back-up basic social welfare could be guaranteed (that is to say, there should be 
concern that once turned to shares, land would be lost). Shares for self-sufficiency
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homeless people may soon become a common sight.
The bulk of the homeless are poor, old, ill and unskilled people who were 
absorbed by the previous brisk economic growth from rural areas. (Kattoulas 
1997: 2)
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or family plot would not receive revenue from the village also because the owner 
gets remuneration from using the land.
One of the major advantages in this model is that it is not necessary for 
villages to buy land while private land share-holders could get permanent 
remuneration and keep a back-up basic social welfare. This would be relatively 
more acceptable to full-time and part-time farmers, absentees and old farmers 
without young successors in farming. Such a corporation could also extend to 
include a number of villages.
Such a corporation with physically unwithdrawable private land shares is 
similar to a modern capital share-holding corporation whose share-holders can 
earn dividends and sell shares in the market but cannot reimburse them from the 
corporation. But they are also different. (1) In a capital share-holding corporation, 
capital shares could be devalued even overnight. But land is scarce and the prices 
tend to be high and stay high. (2) Capital equipment can be out-moded easily, but 
land is always productive (as long as it is properly maintained). (3) Selling capital 
shares would reduce the capital value of the corporation, but selling land shares 
would not affect either the physical value of the land, or its productivity. (4) The 
poor management of a capital share-holding corporation may be unimprovable and 
lead to its bankruptcy, but the management of such a corporation, as long as it 
still holds land, is improvable, because the contracts the village gave to 
contractors could be stopped/disrenewed if they did not operate land properly. (5) 
In a capital share-holding corporation with many capital share-holders, it is the 
large holders who direct the use of shares, while in such a corporation, it is the 
public administration by one or a number of villages (composed of officials, 
representatives of land and capital share-holders and laborers) which directs the 
use of land.
The result is what I summarize as a corporate-individual mixed economy, 
with public infrastructure land, corporate ownership of agricultural and housing 
land with physically unwithdrawable private land shares, private/public ownership 
of other means of production, corporate/individual/eooperative management and 
capitalist wage labor employment. The above-mentioned shortcomings in 
consolidating and expanding the fragmented small farms by private use of private 
land through individual lease, sub-village and village-wide collective use of 
private land with physically withdrawable private land shares could be avoided.
This is actually tit phase 3 in my hypothesis for overcoming the fragmented small 
farms by variable mixed economies: collective use of either public land, or 
physically unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, 
exercising village-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the 
basic operation level at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including a 
number of households, as a third way between the centrally planned economy and 
free market system.
Needless to say, intervention of governments, education of public opinion, 
and active participation of peasants are necessary. Details (specific ways of 
establishing corporate land ownership; land-contract length and fee; proportions 
of dividing revenue among production land shares, capital shares and labor, etc.) 
should be determined through experiment, public discussion, and expert 
consultation. Just as with carrying out land consolidation under private land 
ownership, majority agreement by land owners in the village should be sufficient 
for establishing corporate land ownership, but great efforts should be made to try 
to reach consensus. (Zhou, Jian-Ming 1997)
The corporate land ownership with unwithdrawable private land shares 
would also consolidate and expand the fragmented small farms, which is different 
from both the Japanese and Chinese models and may be regarded as a new model.
A proposal is a proposal. It might be adopted either in the exact form or 
revised form and either immediately, or in the near future, or remote future, or 
never. Nonetheless, the task of scientific research is to search possible solutions. 
An idea might be despised as "no value at all" but proved as precious later. In 
contrast, a measure might seem valuable but then be demonstrated as not quite 
so (e.g., land sale in Japan was encouraged and subsidized in the 1960s but then 
failed). Therefore, experiments are necessary. Proposal 1 could be practiced in 
parallel with other experiments.
A Suitable, Natural and Logical Further Development of Land Tenure 
System
In Japan, the village-wide collective use of private farmland (as a 
production cooperative) was a spontaneous effort by village officials and peasants 
to resolve the last obstacle. This form could remove boundaries among parcels
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and reach large-scale farming. Ii has been hailed by Tahata as "a Japanese 
approach to land extensive farming" and recommended by NIRA to be "actively" 
promoted (Tabata 1990: 22. NIRA 1995: 173). But neither author notes that the 
three above-mentioned problems may still remain. Moreover, Tabata is not aware 
that it is not a "Japanese” approach, but is what the Chinese elementary 
agricultural producers’ cooperatives had experienced up to Apr. 1956 (during 
May 1956 - 1957 quitting with land was forbidden).11
In China, the land reform (May 1946 - June 1950 in the earlier liberated 
areas and from then to the spring of 1953 in the rest of country) turned the feudal 
landlord ownership to individual land ownership, and maintained fragmented 
small farms: 0.47 ha - 1.67 ha per household, divided into several parcels, each 
smaller than 0.067 ha (ER 1965: 13. Huang, Xi-Yuan 1986: 410). It brought 
peasants huge incentives to production and raised their living standard. But the 
fragmented small farms were too weak for the farmers to sustain rural develop­
ment. Thus the period of Dec. 1954 - Apr. 1956 was dominated (covering more 
than 50 % of rural households) by what I summarize as an individual-collective 
mixed economy, including temporary mutual aid teams (labor exchange; common 
use of labor, private animals and tools; quasi mixed economy), permanent mutual 
aid teams (plus collective ownership of some assets; mixed economy to higher 
extent) and elementary cooperatives (collective use of private land; typical mixed 
economy). All the three forms started before 1949, but the mutual aid teams were 
predominant during Dec. 1954 - autumn 1955, and the elementary cooperatives 
prevalent during Dec. 1955 - Apr. 1956 and existed also in 1957, so that much 
experience in individual cases had been gained.1 2 Due to the length limit of the 
thesis, only the major features of the elementary cooperative and its main 
shortcomings most relevant to the Japanese practice are briefly presented below.
Ownership and possession. Members kept individual ownership of land but
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11 The following paragraphs about the elementary cooperatives and relevant 
institutional changes in China are based upon my preparatory work for this thesis. 
The references exceed 100 and are thus not listed here.
12 For example. Walker notes that "An unrivalled collection of materials, on 
how cooperatives of every province had handled all kinds of problems, an 
instruction book for cadres, is ‘The Socialist High Tide in the Chinese Countrysi­
de’, 3 volumes. Many of the reports were first published separately between 1954 
and 1956." (Walker 1966: 29)
gave it to the cooperative for collective possession. Land reclaimed by the 
cooperative was in collective ownership. Once joined, land sale and tenancy were 
banned so that restoration of the feudal landlord ownership was precluded within 
the cooperative (the then rural areas were still at a low wage economy with little 
off-farm employment; outside of the elementary cooperatives, land sale and 
tenancy were allowed so that quite a few peasants, owing to difficulties in 
production and living caused by natural disasters, diseases, debts, etc., re-lost land 
ownership and became tenants again). Members kept individual ownership of 
farm animals and large tools but could lease or sell them to the cooperative. The 
cooperative could also buy non-land means of production from other sources into 
collective ownership. The scope of an elementary cooperative was about 25-50 
households. Some cooperative covered a whole village. Even in cases not all 
households of a village joined the cooperative, where parcels of the cooperative 
members were neighbor, boundaries could be eliminated (although members could 
still recognize their original parcels), so that the individual fanning units were 
joined into relatively larger land units. The economies of scale of land were 
raised.
For example, in Qijiazi, Hecheng and Fanshen Villages of Fuyu County 
of Jilin Province, the land was originally divided into 3,440 pieces. The 
cooperatives joined them into 650 pieces, so that the area of cultivation was 
increased by 67.8 ha (1,017 mu). (Zhao, Fang-Chun 1955)
In Chadian District of Ninghe County, Hebei Province, under individual 
operation, upon small parcels of 0.27-0.33 ha (4-5 mu), one new type plough 
drawn by horse could only plough 0.4-0.53 ha (6-8 mu) per day. The cooperatives 
eliminated the boundaries among parcels and established large land units of 3.33 
ha (50 mu) or so. Then, one same tool could plough 0.8-0.93 ha (12-14 mu) per 
day. (DGAA 1952)
Operation and management. Due to better division and coordination of 
labor, some of the labor force, previously under "disguised unemployment", was 
now released from crop-agriculture to sideline production (i.e., non-crop 
agriculture and off-farm activities), infrastructure construction and wasteland 
reclamation. The labor force remaining in crop-agriculture was thus less than 
before and could operate larger land per labor force. (Of course, the released labor 
force in the then low wage economy was not so much as in the high wage
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economy as in Japan in the late 1950s and some areas of China in the 1980s).
For example, in Yu Luo-Shan Cooperative, Gedan Village, Sisha of Ji 
County, Hebei Province, before the seuing-up of the Cooperative, in order to sow 
cotton seeds in their farmland of 4.7 ha (70.5 mu), divided into 22 parcels (on 
average 0.21 ha or 3.20 mu each), dispersed within 1.5 square km, these (future 
member) households had to use 36 able-bodied persons with several drills for one 
and a half days. The Cooperative reorganized cotton culture into farmland of 3.82 
ha (57.3 mu), divided into 11 parcels (on average 0.35 ha or 5.21 mu each) in a 
concentrated area. Then three able-bodied persons could fulfil the sowing by 
using one drill for one day only. (Geng, Yan-Ling 1952). In this case, not only 
economies of scale of land were raised, but also much of the labor force was 
released.
The cooperative exercised collective-individual dual level operation of 
farmland with the household as the basic operation level. The cooperative 
contracted work or output quota to groups, laborers or households, linking 
workpoints with the fulfillment, of which, contracting output to households was 
the superior (this was the origin of the Household Contract System popularized 
since 1978). Land (including those units owned by other members) and other 
means of production could be distributed to the contractor for fulfilling the quota. 
The major reason why land was contracted to households for operation was that 
although large-scale farming by using large machinery could be physically 
possible since large land units might be formed, it was still not feasible in 
economic and technological terms, because not enough labor force could be 
released from crop-agriculture and large machinery was not available. The 
cooperative was responsible for investment, procurement, sale, machinery, 
technology and other services, construction of infrastructure and general 
management. As a result, the economic strength of the cooperatives was stronger 
than the individual farming units and mutual aid teams.
Payment. Revenue was distributed (in the following order of priority) for 
general cost of production; remuneration to leased privately owned non-land 
means of production (farm animals, large tools, etc., as capital shares); agricultur­
al taxes to the state; a common welfare fund for aiding the poor; a common 
accumulation fund for increasing the collectively owned non-land means of 
production (farm animals, large tools, warehouse, etc.); management expenses
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including managing costs and payment to managers as a kind of remuneration to 
labor; remuneration to land shares; and remuneration to laborers (non-managers). 
The remuneration to labor was according to the workpoints the laborer earned 
during the year. Workpoints were linked to the fulfillment of the contractual work 
or output quota.
Remaining shortcomings. One of the major shortcomings, as also in Japan, 
was that building of infrastructure occupying private land (changing parcels into 
non-farmland) was hampered by private land ownership. The economies of scale 
of land and construction of infrastructure were hence limited. Joining cooperative 
was voluntary and quitting with land free (until Apr. 1956), so the latter could 
cause re-fragmentation.
For example, in 1955, in Neiqiu County of Hebei Province, Daleidong 
Village intended to construct a dam to save more than 13.33 ha (200 mu) of good 
land from flood. But because the members who owned relevant land did not 
agree, it could not be realized. Heinao Village planned to build a road that could 
be used by carts so that 10 man-days could be saved. However, no single member 
allowed to build it on his (her) land. (Li, Ji-Ping 1956). Also in 1955, Zheng 
Nong-Mu Elementary Cooperative of Houyu Township of Fuzhou city owned a 
two-wheeled double-shared plough. Since the members did not agree to build 
broader paths on their own fields, it could not be used. (Ye & Liu 1956)
Even if this shortcoming could be resolved by land exchange to 
consolidate private parcels, the other relevant shortcoming remained, i.e., quilting 
with land from the cooperative was free (before May 1956), which could 
obviously result in re-fragmentation.
Even though a quitting member could be persuaded to accept land in the 
periphery of the joined land of the cooperative as an exchange with his original 
land, so as to avoid re-fragmentation, the farm size to be operated by the 
remaining full-time farmers of the cooperative would still be reduced, to which 
there was no easy solution.
These shortcomings prompted the elementary cooperatives, under the 
initial generally speaking proper guidance of the government, to voluntarily turn 
private land without compensation to collective ownership of the advanced 
agricultural producers' cooperatives which also started before 1949 and had 
gradually developed since. But speeded by the government’s rash and immature
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compulsory action in mid-1956 on those elementary cooperatives which were not 
yet ready to transit to the advanced cooperatives and those households which had 
not yet even joined the mutual aid teams or elementary cooperatives, the 
advanced cooperatives (containing about 150 households) dominated in May 1956 
- July 1958, and were then succeeded by the people's communes (including 
several townships or even one county) in Aug. 1958. In Sep. 1962, a three-level 
system of ownership of the means of production was set up, i.e., ownership by 
the commune (lowered to comprise one township), by the production brigade 
(covering one administrative village or about 150 households) and by the 
production team (containing one natural village or about 25-50 households), with 
the team as the basic ownership and also operation unit of land.13 *5
From May 1956 to 1978, Chinese agriculture in general was not 
successful. One of the major responsible factors was the replacement of the 
household contract system by the unique collective land operation (labor was 
given workpoints which could not exactly reflect one’s marginal productivity on 
the varied farm work). In cases in which (as happened from lime to time) the 
collective land ownership was combined with the household contract system, i.e., 
lowering the operation unit to the family level, it worked well. Therefore, the 
collectivization of land ownership itself was not misguided.
Finally, as Chapter 5 will elaborate, in 1978, China started the economic 
reform which, drawing both positive and negative lessons from the past, kept 
collective land ownership at village level, but introduced the household contract 
system. This again brought huge incentives to peasants for production upon the 
numerous newly established fragmented small farms.
But although some rural areas (especially in the Central and Western parts) 
still remain in the low wage economy, more and more of the others have 
successively moved into the high wage economy where this farming structure also 
hampered sustainable rural development. Thus, in the 1980s, the Dual Land 
System, Leasing System, Single Land System and Corporate-Holding System 
were invented. Where practiced, they achieved large-scale farming and hence
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large or several smaller natural villages. Hereafter, unless specified specially,
village in the Chinese context refers to administrative one.
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overcame the last obstacle. This also is a third way between the centrally planned 
economy and free market system. It is based on collective land ownership so that 
land cannot be taken away by individuals. Under my proposed corporate land 
ownership, private land could not be physically withdrawn by the quitting 
members, thus the same goal would be reached.
Similarly, in Japan, the collective use of private land by production 
cooperatives (from sub-village to village-wide) is a measure to overcome the 
shortcomings of the private use of private land. But some major shortcomings still 
remain mainly owing to the withdrawability of private land. Therefore it may be 
a temporary or transitory solution as the Chinese elementary cooperatives, but not 
a fundamental one. Turning private land to corporate ownership with physically 
unwithdrawable private land shares would thus be a suitable, natural and logical 
further development so as to finally resolve the last obstacle.
Dynamic Determination of Farm Size
To what extent should a farm be enlarged? This is a practical question to 
which the answer varies across time and places. For example, in 1994, in Saitama 
Prefecture of Japan, the critical size for a viable rice farm has been established 
at 15 ha or more (Kurita 1994: 511), while in Taiwan a survival area for a full­
time rice farm was 4.4 ha as mentioned above. As time passes, the economic 
structures (urban-rural, industry-agriculture, import-export, etc.), technologies, 
managing and tilling skills as well as the ratio of cost/profit in rice and other 
agricultural production change. Thus, farm size could be adjusted accordingly by 
joining compact farms for expansion or separating them for contraction.
Theoretical Discussion
Concerning the historical evolution of land tenure system, we can see that 
in order to promote sustainable rural development, variable mixed economies as 
sub-village and village-wide individual-collective mixed economy at phases 1 and 
2 in my hypothesis had been experimented in China in the 1940s-50s in the form 
of the sub-village and village-wide elementary cooperatives. But was despised by 
main-stream Western economists and politicians as "communist collectivization". 
However, apparently even without being aware the Chinese precedents, the similar
sub-village and village-wide collective use of private land have been practiced 
spontaneously and independently in such a strong and leading capitalist country 
as Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party or its coalition with the Socialist 
Democratic Party since the 1970s toward a direction just opposite to the over­
whelming global wave of decollectivization and privatization, a surprise for the 
advocates of free market forces. The village-wide collective use of private land 
is acclaimed and recommended to be actively promoted in the 1990s when the 
global decollectivization and privatization reached its peak as the former socialist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe have all privatized agricultural land 
ownership (Russia did it in early 1996). Therefore, without political or ideological 
preconception, it may be claimed that a mixed economy to some degree comb­
ining public and private economic factors, especially the collective use of private 
farmland, may be a necessary condition for realizing sustainable rural develop­
ment at least in monsoon Asia, irrespective of the political system or ideology in 
any specific country or economy.
Regarding Proposal I - collective use of physically un withdrawable 
private land shares under corporate ownership - we can see that for overcoming 
the fragmented small farms obstacle, although sub-village collective use of private 
land is better than private use of private land, and a village-wide one further 
better than a sub-village one, three major shortcomings still remain, mainly due 
to the withdrawability of private land from the cooperative.
Here, the Coase transaction costs approach can be applied. Private land 
ownership incurs higher transaction costs chiefly because private land owners hold 
strong bargaining power. A cooperative/enterprise with physically withdrawable 
private land shares is not a typical "firm*' in which individual bargains are 
eliminated and everybody follows the authority of the entrepreneur as Coase 
supposes, but a special "firm" composed of individual land owners with strong 
bargain power. Due to various problems within a cooperative/enterprise. rather 
than settling them within the "firm” which may also lead to high transaction costs, 
some members may choose to use their right to quit so as to operate land 
individually or form another cooperative/enterprise which may re-fragmentize the 
joined land and would certainly reduce the farm size.
Thus once village-wide collective use of private land has reached its 
production frontier, the negative externalities imposed by private land ownership
Chapter 4 181
may hamper the achievement of dynamic or long-run (technological) Pareto 
efficiency, A new round of institutional changes, turning private land to either 
public or corporate ownership as a higher phase of variable mixed economies, 
may have to be made. Hence a new mixed economy, either large-scale farming 
public-individual mixed economy or corporate-individual mixed economy as phase 
3 of my hypothesis, is recommended.
However, turning land to public ownership may also face high transaction 
costs, as the public institutions may not afford to pay compensation (exchange 
costs) and private land owners may not wish to sell (strong bargaining power); 
land owners may not agree with a scheme without compensation cither (also 
mighty bargaining power). Thus, turning land to corporate ownership would be 
more suitable. Applying Approaches 1 and 2 of assigning property rights, 
agreement by the majority of land owners in the village should be sufficient for 
establishing corporate land ownership but great efforts should be made to reach 
consensus.
Just like public land ownership, corporate land ownership leads to lower 
transaction costs mainly because physically unwithdrawable private land share­
holders do not have strong bargaining power. The corporation as the physical land 
possessor could behave like a real "firm" to reduce or eliminate individual 
bargains between the various cooperating factors o f production so as to smoothen 
land consolidation and expansion. The Dual Land System and Single Land System 
based upon either public or corporate land ownership are compatible with both 
capitalist markets and Nuti’s model of market socialism presented in Chapter 2 
and incentive mechanism stated in Chapter 3.
Similar to starting land consolidation under private land ownership, 
agreement by the majority of land owners in the village should be sufficient for 
establishing corporate land ownership, but great efforts are needed to try to reach 
consensus. This is the application of Approaches 1 and 2 of assigning property 
rights in mixture so as to eliminate negative externalities and reach Pareto 
efficiency.
The above-analyzed evolution from private use of private land to sub­
village, then village-wide, collective use of physically withdrawable private land 
shares, as well as its remaining shortcomings in China and Japan, further to 
collective use of collective land in China, and prospective collective use of
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physically unwithdrawable private land shares under corporation ownership in 
Japan, is consistent with the following trend shown in Chapter 3: (1) the 
development of production, technology and market, which induces (2) new 
benefit-cost possibilities, which in turn shows (3) gains of internalization (or 
efficient production) of negative externalities that exceed its costs, which 
subsequently raises (4) the need for internalization (or efficient production) of 
negative externalities, which finally requires (5) a change of the existing property 
rights structures and (6) a new institutional and legal framework for enforcement. 
It has also provided evidences for my hypothesis that the fragmented small farms 
as the last obstacle imposed by the monsoon in sustainable rural development of 
monsoon Asia may be overcome by variable mixed economies, increasingly along 
three main phases. Phase 1: sub-village individual-collective mixed economy 
(sub-village-wide cooperative/enterprise collective use of physically withdrawable 
private land shares, exercising collective-individual dual level operation of large 
land units, with the basic operation level at one household or at a farming unit 
including a number of households). Phase 2: village-wide individual-collective 
mixed economy. Phase 3: either large-scale farming public-individual mixed 
economy or corporate-individual mixed economy (collective use of either public 
land, or physically unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, 
exercising village-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the 
basic operation level at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including a 
number of households, as a third way between the centrally planned economy and 
free market system).
As fo r  the dynamic determination o f farm size, Coasc’s transaction costs 
approach may also be applied. A firm becomes larger as additional transactions 
(which could be exchange transactions coordinated through market price 
mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he 
abandons the organization of such transactions. A firm will tend to be larger (1) 
the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase 
in the transactions organized; (2) the less likely the entrepreneur is to make 
mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the 
transactions organized; and (3) the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the 
supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size. As time passes, the 
economic structures (urban-rural, industry-agriculture, import-export, etc.),
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technologies, managing and tilling skills as well as the ratio of cost/profit in rice 
and other agricultural production change in a specific locality, economy or 
country. Thus, farm size could be adjusted dynamically according to the 
transaction costs.
IV. Other Rice-Based Economies under Private Land 
Ownership
Other rice-based economies under private land ownership in monsoon Asia 
may be generally regarded as at lower stages along the Japanese model of rural 
development. To examine their performance along all the nine features of the 
Japanese model is not compatible with the length limit of this thesis, although the 
situation concerning land reform in these economies has been reviewed in Chapter 
2.
Group 1: Taiwan and South Korea together with Japan
Japan completed the first transition in I960 (when the share of the 
agricultural labor force in the total labor force fell to one third) and the second 
transition 1974 (when the service sector overtook the industrial sector in size of 
labor force), and Taiwan concluded them during 1970-73 and 1994 respectively, 
as already mentioned. South Korea finished the first in 1980 (FEA 1981-82: 666), 
and its labor force in services was more than that in industry during (data 
unavailable before 1974) 1974-76, 78-87, 89-95, and less only in 1977 and 1988 
(FEA 1975-76: 917. FEA 1976-77: 904. FEA 1977-78: 605. YLS 1978: 100-101. 
FEA 1979-80: 645. FEA 1980-81: 652. FEA 1981-82: 666. FEA 1982-83: 676. 
FEA 1986: 557. FEA 1989: 585. FEA 1992: 483. FEA 1997: 512). But to 
determine when it finished the second transition is not the task of this thesis 
(similarly this thesis is not involved in explaining the phenomenon that the labor 
force in services was/is already more than that in industry even during the first 
transition in some other rice-based economies of monsoon Asia). Taiwan and 
South Korea as "newly industrialize/ economies" have repeated the Japanese rural 
development process - and problems - and may thus be put together with Japan 
in Group 1. My Proposal 1 would be useful to them.
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Group 2: Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are at the lower stage 
of the Japanese model and may be classified as Group 2. The speed of industrial­
ization of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia since the mid-1970s, 1986 and 1988 
respectively has been so high that they have been called "newly industrializi/i# 
economies", and, together with Group 1, "high-performing Asian economies". 
(Edwards 1997: 572. Dixon 1997: 1020. Hobohm 1997: 380. World Bank 1993: 
1). In particular, Malaysia finished the first transition in 1985 (FEA 1989: 642). 
The Philippines entered this group in 1994 (Hodgkinson 1997: 920). They have 
made various great efforts in strengthening rural development. But income 
disparity unfavorable to rural areas and within rural areas still exists (unlike 
Group 1 which achieved equity during rapid growth) (Edwards 1997: 572-573. 
Dixon 1997: 1028. Hobohm 1997: 380. Hodgkinson 1997: 922. FEER 1993. 
Giordano & Raney 1993: 136-138. Hjort & Landes 1993: 62. Levin 1993: 11). 
In some areas (especially Malaysia), much of the rural labor force has been 
induced to abandon agriculture to go to cities (Edwards 1997: 574). Thus 
fragmented small farms have started to become an obstacle even before the 
overcoming of other obstacles to rural development (a difference from Group 1). 
They should strengthen rural development according to domestic emphases along 
features 1-8 (except for rice import protection) and start to overcome the 
fragmented small farms obstacle in feature 9 of the Japanese model.
Group 3: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are at the further lower stage 
of the Japanese model and may be placed in Group 3. Industrialization has been 
pursued but less speedy than in Groups 1 and 2. Thus the order of sequencing 
them is alphabetical. Although they have also made various endeavors to promote 
rural development, the majority of Asia’s poor are in this group (and Group 4) 
and inequity in income distribution also exists. (Khan 1997: 122. Baru 1997: 320, 
323. Taylor 1997: 873. De A. Samarasinghe 1997: 989. Levin 1993: 11). 
Therefore, they should overcome social instability and strengthen rural develop­
ment along features 1-8 of the Japanese model (except for rice import protection).
Chapter 4
186
Group 4: Bhutan and Nepal
Bhutan and Nepal, two of the world’s poorest nations, are at the bottom 
of the Japanese model and may be joined into Group 4. They are also listed here 
alphabetically. Although progress in road-building was achieved, rural develop­
ment remains behind that in other groups. Inequality in wealth is more serious. 
(Brown 1997: 672-673, 676. Shaw 1997: 146). Thus they need to accelerate the 
progress along features 1-8 of the Japanese model (except for rice import 
protection).
Conjectural Proposals 2-4
While Proposal 1 for Japan might also be useful for other rice-based 
economies in monsoon Asia under the private land ownership once the fragment­
ed small farms have become an obstacle to sustainable rural development, 
additional proposals for these economies would be as follows.
Proposal 2. Raising economies o f scale o f land should be gradual and 
follow the progress of diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture and off-farm 
activities. If before the absorption of surplus peasants by the development of these 
sectors, much land were already transferred to large-scale fanners using large 
machinery and hiring fewer laborers, small peasants would be hard put to survive. 
Such a situation has appeared in, for example, India (Baru 1997: 320). Those 
peasants who have been crowded out from their small-scale subsistence farms had 
to become vagrants, slaves, city slum dwellers. Some of the other economies 
seem to be making their own way out of the Japanese model. But such a program 
is hazardous. Land reform with a limit on land holding and rent and protection 
of tenants from eviction is needed. As these sectors developed, such controls 
could be gradually relaxed and large-scale fanning promoted.
Proposal 3. To those rice based-economies in monsoon Asia which have 
not yet completed land reform from the feudal ownership (as presented in Chapter 
2), a complete land reform could be made without maintaining the fragmented 
parcels. The peasants could be given one or a few relatively larger joined land 
units through exchange of the fragmented parcels they held under tenancy.
Proposal 4. Population control should be strengthened. Otherwise, due to 
inheritance and other factors, not only the present fragmented small farms would
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be further fragmented, but also the already consolidated farms would be re­
fragmentized. For example, in India, although land consolidation has been pursued 
as indicated above, the problem of re-fragmentation is not prevented (Trivedi & 
Trivedi 1973: 186).
Although the Japanese model has not overcome the last obstacle imposed 
by the monsoon in sustainable rural development, its features 1-8 represent the 
correct stages or paths in overcoming all the obstacles before the last. Needless 
to say, other rice-bascd economies in monsoon Asia have the right to create their 
own models of rural development. Nevertheless, deviation from these features 
(e.g., rejecting a complete land reform, failing to set up a village-household mixed 
economy to provide services to individual households, promoting unmatured 
large-scale farming before non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines could absorb 
surplus peasants) would only result in slowing the progress of rural development.
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Chapter 5
The Chinese Model versus the Last Obstacle
I. The Chinese Model in General
The Chinese model of rural development, a third way between the 
centrally planned economy and free market system, started in 197X, although 
much work had been done before as stated in Chapter 4, It combines 12 major 
features or stages as already concisely introduced in Chapter 1. Since the focus 
of this chapter in on feature 9 plus 10, other features are presented relatively 
briefly.
1 . Institutional changes for a small-scale farming and collective- 
individual mixed economy.
A "System of Contracted Responsibilities on the Household Basis with 
Remuneration Linked to Output", briefly "Household Contract System", was set 
up. After experiments on various forms, the following two prevailed.
The major form : "Bao Gan Dao Hu" - contracting responsibilities to 
households and leave the total residual output to them without the involvement 
of workpoints.
(1) Ownership. Land was owned by village (equivalent to brigade) and 
could not be sold without the state's permission and could never be turned to 
individual ownership, all the other means of production could he privately or 
collectively or jointly owned.
(2) Land use. Normal farmland (as opposed to waste land) was divided 
into two parts under two systems respectively.
Equal Land System, (i) Family plot (ziliu di) was given to each household 
equally on per capita basis for production of some vegetables for self-consump­
tion. (ii) Responsibility land (zenen tian) was contracted to households for 
production for the state, family and market equally either on per capita basis 
(adopted by the majority of villages) or according to the ratio of labor force to 
population of each household (L/P): larger amounts went to those with higher L/P 
ratio, so that households with more laborers could contract more land (implcment-
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ed by a minority of villages - 25 % of 280 villages in an investigation across the 
country (He» Dao-Feng et al 1992: 100)].
The distribution of land to households was by assigning parcels equally 
in terms of quality» quantity and distance» hence an "Equal Land System”, 
resulting in numerous fragmented small farms composed of parcels of different 
quality and size at different places in the village.
Dual Land System (preliminary form): (i) Self-sufficiency land (kouliang 
tian - grain rations land) was equally given to each household on a per capita 
basis for producing food for self-consumption; (ii) Responsibility land was equally 
contracted to labor force for fulfilling tasks for the stale and market. It was the 
preliminary form of the Dual Land System, and adopted by only a few areas 
mainly in the Eastern part of China. (Zhang, Chao-Zun 1991: 66. Wang & Ma 
1990: 33). Even under this system, parcels were fragmented because they were 
assigned equally in terms of quality, quantity and distance (RWD 1984: 30. 
Prosterman; Hanstad & Li July 1996: 14).
There were villages which distributed hog land for producing pig feed on 
a per hog basis to households (Zou; Yan & Shi 1984: 22). There were also 
villages which reserved land to meet the future demand by increased population 
or rural development, and assigned it to expert farmers for temporary use [in an 
investigation to 280 villages of the whole country, 37.9 % did so (He, Dao-Feng 
et al 1992: 100)]. Self-sufficiency land, responsibility land, together with either 
hog land or reserve land were called a Trio Land System. But because hog land 
could be regarded as either self-sufficiency land or responsibility land (if there 
were quotas to sell pigs to the state), and reserve land was temporarily used as 
responsibility land, it was still a Dual Land System.
In 1986, the per household area of cultivated land was 9.2 mu (0.65 ha), 
scattered into nine parcels as revealed by one investigation (Wu, Wei-Han 1989: 
22) (also see Table 5.8). In 1988, the per capita area of cultivated land of peasant 
households was 2.06 mu (0.17 ha), including 1.82 mu (0.121 ha) (88.4 %) as land 
under contract and 0.18 mu (0.012 ha) (8.7 %) as family plot (CSY 1989: 156). 
By calculation, an average peasant household had four people (0.65/0.17 = 3.8).
(3) Responsibilities.
State quotas. Households should contract the annual production quotas of 
major agricultural products (e.g., grain, cotton, oil crops, sugar crops) and sell
Chapter 5 194
Chapter 5 195
them to the state at state-decided prices (quota prices). Due to natural disaster the 
quota could be reduced or exempted and the households would gel relief from the 
government or collective.
The slate decided the national quotas [e.g., in 1988 it accounted for 12.7 
% of China’s grain output and 41.7 % of its commodity grain1 (EBMC 1989 & 
SYC 1989)] and provincial quotas which were different across provinces. The 
provinces further broke down quotas to prefectures» and in turn to counties, 
townships» villages and finally to households. According to a national sample 
survey on the state compulsory purchase system» grain sold at the quota prices, 
depending on places, took 13.5 % - 21.6 % of the total grain output in 155 
sample villages in 1988. (RCRD 1989)
The length of contracts of the first round was initially about three to six 
years as decided locally, which was extended by the state in 1984 to 15 years 
(i.e., 1978-93) (CPC 1984: 224), and for poor areas, 30 years (CPC & SC 1984: 
297). That of the second round was established in 1993 as 30 years (i.e., 1994- 
2024) for all areas (CPC 1993. CPC 1994). The contracts were renewable.
Collective quotas. The village collective could also contract waste land 
[mountain, hill, beach, gully - as four wastes (Wang, Xue-Xi 1995: 23)] and 
waste water to households equally for reclamation if the village’s population 
increased, so that the existing cultivated land was not enough lor fulfilling the 
state quotas, or to expert farmers through competitive bidding for higher quotas 
to the collective up to 100 years (Prosterman; Hanstad & Li Nov. 1996: 94-95). 
The quotas could be waived during the period of reclamation and then phased in 
(Peng; Zhang & Yang 1988: 18). But not every village had waste land or water 
to be reclaimed.
State tax. Upon contracted responsibility land, households should also pay 
agricultural tax to the state in monetary form. The averaged state agricultural tax 
was 3.7 yuan per mu (0.0667 ha) in 1988, as up to about 4 % of the net income 
per mu (SYC 1989: 174, 663. RCRD 1989).
Collective fees. The State Council stipulated in 1991 the following two
1 Commodity grain refers to the grain sold to the slate at both quota prices 
and negotiable prices (explanation see blow) and to the market at free prices, 
rather than self-consumed.
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(i) Village drawn fees (cun tiliu). These fees were paid for ihe following 
purposes:
* Common accumulation fund  for capital construction of farmland and 
water conservancy, afforestation, purchase of productive fixed assets and 
establishment of collective enteiprises. Some villages also charged contractual fee.
* Common welfare fund  for supporting households enjoying the five 
guarantees (i.e., wubao hu: childless and infirm old persons who were guaranteed 
food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses), subsidizing households 
with special difficulties, cooperative medical and health care and other collective 
welfare facilities or services.
* Management expenses for remuneration to village officials and manage­
ment costs.
(ii) Township uniftedly financed fees  (xiang tongchou fei). This was for 
schools at township and village, family planning, special care given to disabled 
servicemen and to family members of revolutionary martyrs and servicemen, 
militia training, road construction in township and village, and other undertakings 
run by the local people and subsidized by the state.
These collective fees should not exceed 5 % of last year’s per capita net 
income of peasants of the village and township in question. In developed areas, 
this percentage could be appropriately raised, subject to the approval of the 
provincial government. The amount of these fees paid by land contracting 
peasants was subject to the area of contracted land or the number of family labor 
force. (SC 1991: 12-13). (In reality, the forms, titles, amounts of the collective 
fees varied across the country and many areas incorrectly exceeded the 5 % 
ceiling after 1984.)
Labor services to collectives. The State Council also prescribed in 1991 
the following two types of labor services.
(i) Rural obligatory man-days (nongcun yiwu gong) were mainly for 
afforestation, flood-prevention, road construction, schoolhouse repair, etc. Each 
rural laborer should provide 5-10 man-days of this kind each year. Local 
governments could increase such man-days in case of fighting against natural 
disasters.
(ii) Labor accumulation man-days (laodong jilei gong) were chiefly for
capital construction of farmland and water conservancy, and afforestation. Each 
rural laborer should deliver 10-20 man-days of this type each year. Under some 
conditions, subject to the approval of the county government, such man-days 
could be appropriately increased. They were mainly taken in slack seasons of 
fanning. (SC 1991: 13)
(4) Remuneration. After selling products in quota to the state at quota 
prices (as one price track) and fulfilling other responsibilities, households could 
dispose the residual output for self-consumption or sale to the state at higher 
state-decided prices - from 1985 on, to the state at negotiable prices or to the 
market at free prices (another price track) - hence a Dual Track Price System2. 
Households could produce and sell minor agricultural goods to the free market, 
and also dispose of the products above the collective quotas if they contracted 
waste land or water.
The above responsibilities - state quotas (around 20 % of grain output), 
agricultural tax (up to 4 % of the net income per mu), collective fees (no more 
than 5 % of per capita net income), labor services to collectives (about 30 man- 
days) - were not very heavy. Thus the residuals as remuneration to peasants were 
high, hence also their incentive.
(5) Land transfer. Not only official transfer (returning the land to the 
village for redistribution) but also personal transfer [sub-contracting (zhuan bao) 
of land but still keeping the title of contractor in front of the village, and making- 
over (zhuan rang) of the contractor’s title to another household] could be done on 
a voluntary basis and with the village’s approval. The investment and improve­
ment made by the transferor could be reasonably reimbursed. (CPC 1984: 224)
(6) Disciplines. It was forbidden to desolate the household contracted land, 
or build housing and grave on, or take away earth from it. Compensation should 
be paid if the fertility were lowered due to exploitative operation. Abandoned or 
‘desolated land should be withdrawn by the village. Land should also be returned
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2 The quota prices (pai jia) were also called fair prices (ping jia), often lower 
than the market prices by 50 % - 100 % (Zhu & Jiang 1993: 449). The state 
negotiable prices were higher than the quota prices, and usually equivalent to or 
lower than the market prices. But after a very good harvest, the market prices 
may fluctuate toward lower than the pre-determined quota prices and negotiable 
prices. Such a trend was clear after the brilliant summer harvest of grain in 1997, 
as Vice Premier Zhu Rong-Ji claimed on July 7, 1997 (Zhu, Rong-Ji 1997).
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to the village if the household in question was not able to till it or had shifted to 
other jobs. (Summary 1981: 119* CPC 1984: 225). These regulations, however, 
were widely ignored in practice.
(6) Capitalistic operation. Quasi-capitalist (hiring less than eight laborers) 
or capitalist (hiring eight or more) operation of land was allowed (CPC 1982: 
172. CPC 1984: 225), but in fact not necessarily needed by the small farms. For 
instance, when an average household had four people and operated 8.24 mu 
(0,549 ha) of land, two laborers using farm animals could suffice for effective 
operation and still have some seasonal surplus labor (SY 1989). Therefore, the 
individual farming units prevailed.
(7) Village duties. The village had the duty to fulfil the general manage­
ment of the contract system and provision of services, hence a village-household 
dual level operation of land with the household as the basic operation level. The 
village also was responsible for managing social welfare, infrastructure construc­
tion, natural disaster control, overall rural development, etc.
Gradualism was used in popularizing this system upon the willingness of 
peasants. By the end of 1983, it had been implemented in 96.6 % of households 
and 95.7 % of the cultivated land (Niu; Guo & Chen 1991: 54).
The minor form: "Bao Chan Dao Hu" - contracting output quotas to 
households and linking the fulfillment with workpoints which were then linked 
to remuneration.
(1) The main features were that the village undertook planning of planting, 
paid basic production costs, disposed of products (including paying lax and selling 
grain to the state), with the remuneration to households based on a basic income 
mainly in kind (grain and other products) subject to a bonus or fine (CEST 1996: 
38).
The village as the contractée, and a laborer (representing a household) as 
the contractor, signed a contract, stipulating the annual quotas of (i) output of a 
certain kinds of products the contractor had to fulfil, (ii) man-days (workpoints) 
related to the output quota and (iii) production investment the contractée should 
provide to the contractor (i.e., the contractor had to bear the extra production 
costs).
The household could use a certain amount of land, farm animals, and tools 
distributed to it by the village. The village should also provide other means of
production to the contractor within the production investment quota, and was 
responsible for procurement, sale, machinery, technology and other services, 
construction of infrastructure and general management. Thus, the land was under 
village-household dual level operation with the household as the basic operation 
unit.
If contractors could fulfil the output quota, they could get the normal 
workpoints related to that quota. If they overfulfilled it, they would be rewarded 
by more workpoints or a part (e.g., 20 % - 80 %) or total of the above-quota 
output. If they underfulfilled it, they would get less workpoints, or had to 
reimburse the loss of the production investment of the village, or compensate a 
part (e.g., 40 %) or whole of the unfulfilled gap. In the distribution of payment 
at the end of the year, they would still get a minimum payment for subsistence, 
but the above-subsistence payment would be reduced in proportion to the loss. 
(Liu & Hu 1982: 30, 38)
(2) Major merits. Regarding the village, a merit of the system was that it 
could make more scientific arrangement and improvement in agriculture and rural 
development and ensure relatively easily that the tasks for the state and collective 
could be fulfilled by households (by contrast, under Bao Gan Dao Hu. households 
had more autonomy but the vitlage less). Land consolidation and expansion were 
also easier. Concerning the households, because contractors were responsible for 
fulfilling the output quotas to earn correspondent workpoints, they had to attach 
importance to the quality of the daily farm work since it would affect the final 
output. Since overfulfillment of the quota would bring more workpoints as a 
bonus and underfulfillment incur less workpoints as a fine, both incentive and 
responsibility were introduced directly to the households. Shirking in terms of 
work quality could thus be minimized. Family members including the aged, 
children and women also had an incentive to fulfil their tasks.
(3) Principal remaining problem. The system made workpoints as a 
linkage between output quota and remuneration. It thus was different from Bao 
Gan Dao Hu, which abolished them. During the year, the contractors accumulated 
workpoints. At the end of the year, the general cost of production of the whole 
village and management expenses including subsidies to managing officials, 
among other items, had to be deducted from the total final revenue. Only the 
residual could be divided by the total workpoints and distributed to the contractors
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accordingly. But village officials might manage production less efficiently, which 
would lead to higher general cost. They could also claim that they had worked 
harder and deserved more subsidies. It was not so easy lor the ordinary members 
to exert day-to-day monitoring on their performance. Therefore, the remaining 
revenue to contractors was affected by the general cost of production and 
management expenses. In other words, the payment to contractors did not 
necessarily match their marginal productivity.
Only those villages with very efficient and fair cadres could adopt the 
system. Thus it was not popular. During 1990-94, on only 0.23 % of the total 
farmland of the country, about 7,000 villages which accounted for 0.15 % and 0.2 
% of all villages in 1990 and 1992-94 respectively still implemented it. (CEST 
1991: 33. CEST 1996: 38). For this reason, the following analysis will concentrate 
on the major form of Bao Gan Dao Hu.
The commune-brigade-team system was formally abolished during Oct. 
1983 - the end of 1984 (Hu, Sheng 1991: 511-512). The commune was turned to 
township as the lowest level government, brigade changed to village, and team 
became villagers group. But before the formal change, this system was already 
being replaced by the village-household collective-individual mixed economy.'
2 .  Government policies supporting rice production and rural develop­
ment. These included making market-oriented policies, establishing laws and 
regulations, regulating state agricultural taxes, purchasing quotas and prices, 
providing financial, technological and material support, importing grain when 
necessary, combating corruption and crimes, and policies supporting features 1 
and 3-12.
Besides institutional changes, technological progress also contributed to 
economic growth, which was embodied in features 3-8 and 10-12.
3 .  Construction of rural infrastructure.
4 .  Higher yields and multiple cropping o f rice and other grains.
5 .  Diversified cropping and non-crop agriculture. 3
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3 There have been also state-owned farms. The "Household Contract System", 
farm-household dual level operation of land with the household as the basic level, 
and transition from small-scale farming to large-scale one are relevant to them 
too. Due to the length limit, except for citing a few examples, this chapter does 
not analyze them.
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6. Off-farm employment.
7. Peasant migration to cities and work in town and village firms. 
Compared with previously being bound within the countryside, peasants could 
now enter cities to be employed. Both villages and individuals could also set up 
enterprises in cities. But in order to avoid urban congestion, peasants (except for 
being approved to live in cities as university graduates, newly recruited employees 
of state enterprises, etc.) were not entitled to permanent city residence, commodity 
grain at prices subsidized by the state, housing allocated hy the state at subsidized 
rent, state subsidies for inflation, labor insurance by the state, or other social 
welfare which city residents could enjoy. Instead, peasants were encouraged to 
industrialize and urbanize rural areas by establishing collective township and 
village enterprises (TVEs), individual, capitalist (called private), urban-rural joint, 
external4 and foreign single or joint enterprises, and developing towns into small 
and medium new cities.
8. Agricultural mechanization with small machinery.
Features 1-8 in general were similar to their counterparts in the Japanese 
model (the major differences being the individual land ownership in feature 1 and 
rice import protectionism during 1961-93 in feature 2 of the Japanese model) and 
have had the similar positive effects as in Japan.
Also, similar to Japan, the fragmented small farms began to be in viable 
for rice and other grain production as the low wage economy moved to the high 
wage economy, hence a second round of institutional changes (which will be dealt 
with in the next section of the chapter) starting roughly around 1985:
9. Institutional changes fo r  a large-scale farm ing and collective- 
individual mixed economy to achieve economies of scale of land, which resulted 
in
10. Agricultural mechanization with large machinery.
There are also two features reflecting regional transfer of development.
11. Earlier development in some (chiefly Eastern and costal) rural areas, 
and its promotion in other (mainly Central and Western) areas especially from
4 "External" refers to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, which are not 
"foreign".
the early 1990s on.5 This feature was not so conspicuous in Japan probably 
because it is not very big in size and such a transfer was much quicker.
1 2 .  Introduction o f more advanced technology and management, larger 
investment, and domestic and international markets to agriculture by urban- 
rural joint enterprises, and external and foreign joint and single ventures. In 
Japan, the introduction of foreign technology was marked, but foreign investment 
and venture in agriculture were not so, because the private land ownership even 
constrains land lease to Japanese citizens.
Features 11 and 12 really need a further analysis. But, in this chapter, only 
some examples will be given.
There is still much room to improve in all the 12 features. 3-12 cannot be 
regarded as completed. Nevertheless, some real success has been achieved. Table 
5.1 displays the during 1978-95, China has steadily progressing toward the 
completion of the first transition (agriculture-industry), as the labor force in 
agriculture declined. Table 5.2 indicates that rural labor force in farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery decreased whereas that in industry and services 
increased. Off-farm employment and peasant migration to cities and work in 
towns and villages have been promoted. Thus the first transition in based upon 
overall rural development, rather than on unique industrialization which neglected 
rural areas. Table 5.3 shows that per capita output of grain and cotton was higher 
in later years than in 1978, indicating success in agriculture. The per capita output
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Table 5.1 Employment by Main Sectors in China 1978-95 
(in percentage)
Year Primary Secondary Tertiary %
1978 70.5 17.4 12.1 1(H)
1985 62.4 20.9 16.7 I(K)
1990 60.0 21.4 18.6 UK)
1995 52.9 23.0 24.1 100
Sources: CSY 1995: 83. CSY 1996: 88.
5 This is a general statement. It does not exclude different speeds of 
development within the Eastern and costal rural areas. For example, Jiangsu 
Province is in Eastern China. But its Southern part - the Sunan region - has been 
much more developed than its Northern part - the Subei region.
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of oil crops and meat rose, demonstrating positive results from diversified 
cropping and non-crop agriculture.
Theoretical Discussion
After WWII, in order to overcome dualism and the "vicious circle" of 
poverty inherited from the prewar period, both China and Japan undertook land 
reform and established individual land ownership. With an individual-cooperative 
mixed economy, plus features 2-8, Japan had succeeded by 1960. China guided 
peasants to an individual-collective mixed economy through temporary mutual aid 
teams, permanent mutual aid teams and elementary cooperatives, and then 
collectivized land ownership in 1956. Thereafter until 1978, China abandoned the 
mixed economy but exercised a combination of collective ownership and 
operation of land under the centrally planned economy. This failed and China 
then fell behind Japan. However, this period was not completely wasted since it 
provided valuable experiences. During 1978-83, China founded a small-scale 
farming and collective-individual mixed economy with success. Therefore, the 
achievement in both Japan and China was thanks to a mixed economy, as stressed 
in Chapter 2: multiple structures of public and private ownership plus government 
intervention rather than ownership.
Chapter 2 presented Nuti’s model of market socialism as a third way 
between the centrally planned economy and free market system: an economy wh­
ere the ownership of all means of production and their further reproduction is in 
the hands of the state, but these means are leased in competitive markets to 
private entrepreneurs who retain a residual claim to both income and capital gains 
and are able to transfer those claims. In the Chinese case, the land was owned by 
the village collective, but contracted to households which retained a residual claim 
to both income and capital gains and were able to transfer those claims. Thus the 
small-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy in China was in 
common with Nuti’s model of market socialism and was a third way between the 
centrally planned economy and free market system.
Chapter 3 pointed out that in the case of a transaction involving several 
people supplying labor, physical inputs, and so on, if some of the parties involved 
receive fixed amounts of value specified by a contract and there is only one
residual claimant, then maximizing the total value received hy the residual 
claimant is just the same as maximizing the total value. If the residual claimant 
also has the residual control, then just hy pursuing his own interests and 
maximizing his own returns, the claimant will be led to make the decisions 
reaching Pareto efficiency: in an economy there is no other productively feasible 
allocation which makes all individuals in the economy at least as well off, and at 
least one strictly better off, than they were initially. Under the Chinese Household 
Contract System, a household as a single individual both had the residual control 
and received the residual returns after fulfilling the state and collective tasks, thus 
the residual decisions made would tend to be Pareto efficient ones, just as under 
private land ownership in the Japanese model.
Approach 1 of assigning property rights (permission for the relevant 
parties to exchange property rights through a political or legal process, followed 
by market exchange) was used in establishing the small-scale farming and 
collective-individual mixed economy: households were given land for producing 
products to be sold to the state at quota prices (in general lower than the 
negotiable and market prices) and fulfilling other responsibilities in exchange for 
the right to dispose the residual for self-consumption and sale to the state at 
negotiable prices and to the market.
Both of the two general methods in the evolution, adjustment or change 
of property rights structures, as reviewed in Chapter 3, were adopted in 
establishing the Household Contract System. The first general method is to make 
gradual changes in social mores and common law precedents. At each step of the 
adjustment process, it is unlikely that externalities per se are consciously related 
to the issue being resolved. The moral, practical and legal experiments may be 
hit-and-miss procedures to some extent. In a society that weights the achievement 
of efficiency heavily, their viability in the long run will depend on how well they 
modify behavior to accommodate to the externalities associated with important 
changes in technology or market values. Indeed, even during 1956-78, the 
Household Contract System was already implemented by peasants and grass-roots 
officials time and again in different areas, which showed its superiority over the 
combination between collective ownership and operation of land.
The second general method is to make a conscious collective endeavor, 
such as a major reform or revolution at a certain stage of the gradual changes in
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the first general method. Finally during 1978-80, as a part of feature 2 of the 
Chinese model, the state decided to legalize and popularize the Household 
Contract System as the beginning of an overall economic reform.
China’s success upon the establishment of the Household Contract System 
also supports the thesis emphasized in Chapter 1 that it is the institutional 
component that is most important in the interaction of institutions and technolo­
gies underlying the growth of developing countries, and of so many variables for 
rural development, the institutional changes are the keystone.
The first round of institutional changes paved the way for technology, as 
another long-term ultimate cause, and labor, capital, education, structural change, 
etc., as proximate sources of economic growth to play important roles. Hence 
features 3-8 and 11-12 of the Chinese model, similar to features 3-8 in their 
Japanese counterpart.
Chapter 2 indicated the many disadvantages and few advantages of the 
fragmented small farms. Nevertheless, they succeeded during 1978-84 in China, 
just as in the 1950s in Japan, because they were suitable to the then relatively 
backward economic, social and technological conditions. This affirms the point 
of view in Chapter 3 that there is no basis for believing that all existing 
externalities should be corrected. Only when the gains of correction exceed costs, 
should the existing externalities be internalized.
Features 1-8 in the Chinese and Japanese models are analogous. This 
reflects that the rice-based economies in monsoon Asia have common features and 
tasks in overcoming the common obstacles imposed by the monsoon.
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 4 on the significance of the Japanese 
model is applicable to that of the Chinese model, and therefore does not need to 
be repeated here.
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II, The Emergence of the Last Obstacle
Table 5.3 showed that China’s per capita output of grain, rice and cotton 
reached a peak in 1984, but declined by a large margin in 1985-88. Many factors 
were responsible, including the over-optimism by the central and local govern­
ments that China’s agricultural problems had been solved once for all, thus failing
to support agriculture continuously; the improper shift of priority by many local 
governments from grain production to developing non-grain agriculture and off- 
farm lines; the reduction of farmland acreage due to rural industrial and housing 
construction; the exorbitant charge of collective fees well over peasants’ capacity 
(5 % of last year’s net income) for rural development (corrupt misuse also 
occurred); the insufficient services by villages, resulting in weak operation of land 
by single households; the starting of economic reform in industry and granting of 
autonomy to industrial enterprises for partially deciding prices in 1984, leading 
to higher expenditure by peasants on buying more expensive industrial materials 
for agricultural use and higher costs for grain production; the reduction in rice and 
grain consumption as people became richer and demanded more vegetables, fruits, 
meat, aquatic products, just as what happened in Japan, etc. But, here, the focus 
is on the inviability of the fragmented small farms for rice and grain production 
in the high wage economy.
Increasing Smallness and Fragmentation of Land due to Population 
Growth
Under the Equal Land System, land should he returned to the village from 
those who have left due to death, marriage, etc., and new comers from birth, 
marriage, etc. were entitled to an equal share of land (Yang, Zuo-Hua 1995: 48). 
Births outnumber deaths since China’s population is still increasing, while 
farmland acreage is decreasing. The Equal Land System put no control on and 
even encouraged higher fertility of population.
Village reserve land, which was kept not only for increased population but 
also for overall rural development, had to be assigned to new people and was 
gradually exhausted. For example, in 1986, Luoshui Town of Shifang County of 
Sichuan Province6 had 220 net increased people, including 158 as the newly bom 
and 120 as immigrated. In 1987, 26 % or 16 of 61 villager groups had finished 
their reserve land. Still, it had to register marriage by more than 200 people, 
receive a number of immigrants, and arrange a quota for 50 births, a part of 
whom, however, could not be given any land. (Zhou, Da-Fu 1987: 29)
Redistribution of already assigned land had to be done which made the
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fragmented small farms smaller (Wang, Gui-Chen 1989: 16. Yang, Wen-Bo 1995: 
43). Minor redistribution - only involving the land of those households whose size 
was changed - could be done either at the lime the family size altered or over 
several years. Major redistribution - whereby the land of all households was 
returned to the village for redistribution - was done each three-six years. 
(Prosterman; Hanstad & Li 1995: 40). Such a redistribution of land, although 
generally accepted by peasants for equality consideration, violated the land use 
contracts, led to instability and low confidence in maintaining contracted parcels, 
discouraged long-term investment and encouraged the short-term behavior [i.e., 
getting the highest output in the short-run by depleting land fertility in exploit­
ative ways, such as applying large amount of chemical fertilizers and reducing or 
abandoning organic ones, resulting in the hardening of soil (Wang, Song-Pei 
1989: 32)]. A major redistribution involving a whole county would cost huge 
expenditure, e.g„ 2 million yuan in Lulong Country of Hebei Province7 (Yang, 
Wen-Bo 1995: 43). In those areas where land was not readjusted for a long lime, 
land contracted was not proportionate to changed family size, hence seriously 
unbalancing interests among households of the village (Qin & Wang 1995: 42).
Inefficient Use of Land by Part-Time Farmers and Absentees
Income from grain production declined relatively, while that from 
diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture and off-farm activities grew quickly, 
due to development on these lines. According to an investigation, during 1984-88, 
net income per mu (1/15 ha or 0.067 ha) increased by 12.1 % in growing grain, 
but 313 % in cash crops; net income per yuan investment decreased by 15.6 % 
in planting grain but increased by 270 % in cash crops and 10.1 % in forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery; net income per man-day increased by 15.1 % in 
producing grain, but 96.5 % in cash crops, 73.8 % in forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishery and 45.9 % in off-farm lines. (RSO 1990)
Thus, peasants naturally wanted to produce less grain, and be engaged 
more in other agricultural lines and off-farm activities. Hence also peasant 
migration to cities and work in town and village firms. As Table 5.2 showed, 
during 1978-95, rural labor force has been declining in agriculture but increasing
7 Hebei Province is in the Eastern part of China.
in industry and services. This has led to feminization and senilization in 
agriculture. Apparently, in the high wage economy, it was difficult for the 
remaining full-time farmers to survive on rice and grain production by tilling the 
fragmented small farms.
Low willingness to transfer land. In order to make the remaining full-time 
farmers viable and maintain/increase rice and grain production, the land 
inefficiently used by other peasants should be transferred to them, so that they 
could enlarge farm size, use large machinery, reduce costs, and gain increasing 
returns to scale. But under the Equal Land System, the land transfer was 
voluntary. In the areas where the off-farm activities were relatively developed and 
a lot of peasants had got jobs there to earn higher income, an investigation 
showed that, of 3,366 households whose income from grain production was lower 
than 20 % of the whole income, only 4.5 % were willing to officially transfer 
land (RCSC 1996). Another revealed that 10.8 % of households were willing to 
do so (Lu, Xiu-Jun 1989; 52). A questionnaire to 1,039 workers of rural firms in 
Changshu City of the Sunan region where off-farm lines were highly developed 
demonstrated that 33 % of them were willing to till self-sufficiency land only and 
return responsibility land, and 20 9c willing to leave farming completely, as long 
as their land was taken over by someone else (Jiang, Zhong-Yi el al 1992 (c): 77- 
78]. An investigation to 4,015 peasant households in the suburbs of Shanghai 
Municipality8 where off-farm activities were the most developed, indicated that 
45.7 % were willing to partially or completely transfer land (Meng, Fan-Qi 1988; 
13). But regions like Shanghai and Sunan were few.
The major concern o f peasants was that land was the last resort for their 
living and served a back-up basic social welfare in case they have lost jobs in off- 
farm activities. Peasants who have transferred to work in rural off-farm 
enterprises in general could not guarantee their jobs. The majority of them were 
small firms. Closures and bankruptcy were frequent. For example, during 1979- 
87, about one million TVEs had gone bankrupt (ED 1988). In Yanbci Prefecture 
of Shanxi Province9, during 1981-86, the total rural labor force increased by 
77,000. In 1983-84, employees of rural firms increased by 130,000. Due to
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difficulties met by the firms, however, 54,900 and II,(MX) had to return to  
agriculture in 1985 and 1986 respectively. (Shen, Shou-Ye 1987: 28). But no ru ral 
instability was caused since they could still till the household contracted land.
80 % of peasants who left their localities to earn income outside (m ainly 
in cities) during periods of economic expansion were manual labor (Zhang, S h i- 
Yun 1996: 17). During economic contraction, they both needed and also could 
return to the countryside to till land. Primarily due to the back-up social welfare 
function of the household contracted land, city slums which are common in m any 
developing and even developed countries are not found in China (recall the 
reappearance in the 1990s of jobless and homeless people in Japanese cities 
originated from rural areas indicated in Chapter 4). (Zhang & Hou 1995: 27)
Low occurrence o f  personal land transfer. Chiefly as a result of this 
concern on the supply side, during 1984-92, of 7,012 households across the 
country, 93.8 % did not make any personal transfer of farmland; 4.2 % did a 
partial transfer; and only 1.99 % transferred their whole farmland (ED 1994). In 
1994, merely 1.06 % of households of the whole country carried out personal land 
transfer (CEST 1996: 38-39).
Inefficient use o f personally transferred land. In cases where such transfers 
were carried out, they were mainly done spontaneously among relatives, so that 
parcels were often non-contiguous and still fragmented, and in short-term, 
seasonal and unstable (Zhang, Shi-Yun 1996: 17). An investigation to 1,879 
households which were engaged in persona! land transfer in Langfang Prefecture 
of Hebei Province before 1987 showed that even the longest contract was no 
more than four years (Cao & Liu 1987: 36) (of course, when the village 
implemented minor or major land redistribution following the changes of family 
sizes, transferred parcels would not be excluded, which shortened the holding of 
them). Accordingly, receivers had little incentive in long-term investment in land 
(Liu, Zong-Xiao 1987: 64).
On the demand side, where income from grain production was much lower 
than that from other lines, quite often no villager wanted to accept a personal land 
transfer (RWD 1984: 31). Those who transferred a part of their land normally 
singled out poor land (as reported in Yanbei Prefecture of Shanxi Province and 
the Sunan region], which nobody was interested in. This promoted careless 
farming or even led to desolation of land. (Shen, Shou-Ye 1987: 28-29. Qiu, Wei-
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Some peasants engaging in off-farm activity sub-let land to outside farmers 
who were mainly from poorer rural areas. The lessors charged a hit or no sub­
letting fee, or even paid some fee to the lessees for fulfilling state quotas. The 
length varied (e.g., from two to seven years in the Pearl River Della of 
Guangdong Province10). The lessors still kept the title of contractor within the 
village. The outside farmers could earn higher income and learn more advanced 
technologies, farming skills and new ideas. But many of them changed to produce 
cash crops or turned land to ponds for fishery, affecting grain output. They were 
also engaged in the local off-farm activities, hence part-time farming. Moreover, 
a lot of them left their original rural areas to escape family planning rules and to 
have more children in other areas. (Tao, Xiao-Yong 1986: 16-18)
Part-time farming prevailed. Many peasants only farmed in busy seasons, 
without taking care of plants in the rest of the year. A lot of able-bodied males 
worked in cities, while their old parents and wives cultivated the land. Because 
the farms were tiny, it was possible for peasants who worked in nearby firms to 
just till land in early mornings, noons and evenings during slack seasons, and to 
concentrate on farming during the short busiest periods by leaving the firms 
temporarily. They were satisfied with producing for self-sufficiency (so that they 
did not need to buy grain and vegetables) and fulfilling state quotas (which was 
not their aim but a condition), unwilling to produce more for the state and market, 
to transfer land or make more effort in farming. (Zou; Yan & Shi 1984: 23. Ding; 
Wei; Yang & Sang 1995: 23. Yang, Wen-Bo 1995: 43. Zhu, Qi-Zhen 1996: 35- 
36)
For example, in Suzhou City of the Sunan region, during 1978-85, the 
ratio of the agricultural labor force to the total rural labor force dropped from 76 
% to 38 %. The total rural labor force increased by 340,000, hut labor in farming 
decreased by 780,000. Most agricultural laborers were the aged, weak, female and 
children. In order to let workers attend to farming in the two busiest periods, the 
firms had to stop working half a month each lime, their revenue being directly 
affected. (Qiu, Wei-Lian 1987: 28). In Lulong Town of Lulong County of Hebei
10 G uangdong Province, near Hong Kong, is in the Central (costal) part of
China.
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Province, the family of Ji Shu*En had three members including one laborer, and 
contracted more than 3 mu (0.2 ha) of land. He was engaged in off-farm activities 
in the slack seasons and in farming only in the busy time. (Lu, Nong 1988: 42). 
The family of the head of the Industrial Company of Lianglukou Township o f 
Shifang County of Sichuan Province had seven members, four in firms. With his 
wife of age over 50 and two children in home, they had to hire somebody for 
farming. In the busy spring season of 1987, they could find no body to be hired. 
Thus the transplanting for 2.8 mu (0.187 ha) of wet rice land was delayed by 10 
days. (Zhou, Da-Fu 1987: 29)
Both off-farm work and farming increasingly require more knowledge o f 
sciences and technology (recalling that technological progress also contributes to 
economic growth and is embodied in features 3-8 and 10-12). Objectively, it 
would be difficult for the part-time farmers to learn such knowledge in both jobs. 
Subjectively, they were not interested in learning more to improve farming 
beyond the goal of self-sufficiency.
Even worse, some farmers planted cash crops on their land to earn more 
money and purchased grain in quota from the market - at higher prices - to sell 
to the state - at lower prices, thereby creating a false output. Or they just paid 
cash equivalent to the gap between the quota price (lower) and stale negotiable 
price (higher) of grain to fulfil the contract so as to save the cost of transporting 
grain back from the market (Zhu & Jiang 1993: 449). Others even refused to sell 
grain in quota or pay tax to the state at all (Qian; Shi & Xie 1996: 27). In 
Shifang County of Sichuan Province, 10 % of peasant households did not pay 
collective fees for common accumulation fund and common welfare fund in 1984. 
In 1985, this ratio increased to 30 9fc. (Ma, Bing-Quan 1988: 48)
Desolation o f  farmland. Further and worse, much farmland was partially 
or even completely desolated by part-time farmers and absentees, or occupied by 
new housing, or used for burial (Ran & Yang 1985: 15-16. Qin & Wang 1995: 
42). Partial desolation (called careless farming) was dominant, because farmers 
feared that the villages would punish them by withdrawing land. Thus they either 
just planted crops, without taking care of them afterward; or grew a bit in the 
summer and a bit in the winter, pretending they were still tilling the land. (Ran 
& Yang 1985: 15)
For example, in 1984, in Langfang Prefecture of Hebei Province, 50 % of
land was operated by 50 7c of peasants who %vere also engaged in 113.000 firms. 
In seven villages of Wen-an County, 20 7c - 50 7c of households were careless 
farmers. In some villages, more than 5 7c of land was completely desolated. In 
Xinglonggong Township, nearly 1(),(XX) mu (666.67 ha) of land was carelessly 
farmed, and over 2,(XX) mu (133.33 ha) desolated. Four of the seven villages paid 
cash equivalent to the gap between the quota price and the state negotiable price 
of grain to fulfil the contracts. (Cao & Liu 1987: 32, 36)
In 1986, in Jing-an Village of Lianglukou Township, there were 486 
households, 1,677 people, and 1,006 laborers. 60 7c of the labor force had shifted 
to off-farm activities, but the Equal Land System was still held, with 1.14 mu 
(0.076 ha) of farmland per capita. 10 % - 20 7c of land were carelessly farmed, 
and over 3 mu (0.2 ha) desolated. (Zhou, Da-Fu 1987: 28-29)
Shipai Town of Zhongxiang County of Hubei Province11 was famous for 
its bean curd. By 1988, of 8,829 peasant households, 1,800 had left in whole 
families for other places in bean curd business, but only 57 transferred whole of 
their land. 11,(XX) laborers, or 62.6 7c of the total labor force had left the Town, 
but they only transferred 3,820 mu (254.67 ha), as 15.3 7c of their contracted 
land. (Peng; Zhang & Yang 1988: 19)
In the winter of 1993, in Zhejiang Province1 2 13, about 466,900 ha of 
farmland was made idle, and the multiple cropping ratio of grain dropped from 
223.5 % in 1980 to 214.9 % in that year (Ding; Wei; Yang & Sang 1995: 23).
In Feidong County of Anhui Province1 \  of the total labor force, more 
than 40 7c went outside, 20 7c were engaged in local off-farm activities, leaving 
less than 40 % in agriculture; of the whole farmland, 8 7c or 6,7(X) ha were once 
idled. But during the major redistribution of land in 1994, many peasants who 
during several years had never returned home also came back to "contract" land. 
(Zhang & Hou 1995: 24)
Desire for more land by full-time and expert fanners. While the part-time 
farmers and absentees held land without efficient use, there were some full-time 
farmers who were good at farming and would like to contract more land. Even
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in the areas where income from grain production was much lower than that from 
non-grain agriculture and off-farm activities, some farmers were willing to 
contract more land if the scale was large enough for them to earn an income 
equivalent to or higher than that from off-farm employment. (Gao & Liu 1984: 
20. Yang, Wen-Bo 1995: 43). For example, in the above-mentioned questionnaire 
in Changshu City, 72.6 % of the 1,039 rural firm workers expressed willingness 
to till land if the income from farming rose to 3,000 yuan, or 125 9c of the 
average net income per local household around 1990 [Jiang, Zhong-Yi et al 1992 
(c): 77].
Possibility to transfer land by part-time farmers and absentees. As long 
as a back-up basic social welfare could be reserved/provided for them, many (but 
not all) of part-time farmers and absentees were willing to transfer their land 
partially or even wholly. Some of them have spontaneously done so.
For example, the family of Li Zheng-Xiang of Qianli Brigade of Caiji 
Commune of Quanjiao County of Chuxian Prefecture of Anhui Province had six 
members including two laborers in 1980. They contracted 10 mu (0.667 ha) o f 
farmland from which they could earn a net annual income of l,3(H) yuan only. 
They also raised 13 hives of bees. Because they could not manage both 
agriculture and apiculture, bees escaped eight times, causing a loss of 400 yuan. 
In 1981, they earned an income of over 2,000 yuan from raising 20 hives. In 
1982, they raised more hives and income approached 4,000 yuan. Thus, they 
retained 4 mu (0.267 ha) as grain-rations land for self-sufficiency and returned 6 
mu (0.4 ha) to the Production Team. (Qu; Chen & Bao 1982: 56-58)
Lack o f mechanism. The Equal Land System lacked an effective 
mechanism to systemize and organize the transfer of land to full-time farmers.
For example, in 1982, in Zhongshan City of Guangdong Province, rural 
firms competed for labor, leaving the aged and female in farming. Peasants would 
rather transfer the land bearing contracts for grain, sugar cane and mulberry, and 
retain some land for self-sufficiency without obligations. Since there was no 
mechanism to organize it, in Beiqu Village of Xiaolan Town, of 190 mu (12.67 
ha) of sugar cane land, 150 mu (10 ha) were desolated. 170 mu (11.33 ha) of 
mulberry fields were not fertilized, weeded or harvested. (GT 1988: 17)
By 1988, in Tielou Village of Guanyindang Town of Jiangling County of 
Hubei Province, 48 households had left to live in the nearby Town to earn higher
Chapter 5 214
income from commerce and transportation- They wanted to transfer 1 ,(MH) mu (67 
ha) of land but could find no villager to accept. (Peng; Zhang & Yang 1988: 19)
An obstacle. Therefore, in those areas (mainly Eastern and costal part) 
which had entered the high wage economy, the fragmented small farms had 
emerged as the last obstacle in sustainable rural development as early as at the 
beginning of the 1980s, just as in Japan at the beginning of the 1960s. In some 
Central and Western parts (e.g., Anhui and Sichuan Provinces), off-farm 
employment was not yet developed and the local economy has not reached the 
high wage stage. But many peasants there migrated to the Eastern and costal areas 
to earn higher income, while still holding land use contracts and leaving land 
resources wasted. (Yang, Yong-Zhe 1995: 217). For example, in Daehuan 
Prefecture of Sichuan Province, over 40 % of agricultural labor transferred to 
work in rural off-farm lines or to cities. In one county of this Prefecture, more 
than 800 ha of farmland were desolated. (Yang, Zuo-Hua 1995: 50). Where this 
has happened, the fragmented small farms became an obstacle together with other 
obstacles even in the low wage economy.
Thus while China required more grain to support its growing population 
and economy, much land was held by part-time farmers and absentees in 
inefficient use. This contributed to the exceeds of grain imports over exports in 
most years during 1982-95, as shown in Table 5.4 [During 1979-81, 15 million 
tn of grain were imported each year, but the trade balance data are unavailable 
(Chen, Yun 1978:6. Wan. Li 1982: 135)]. This has in turn pushed up grain prices 
in the world markets and affected other, especially poor, grain importing 
countries.
Subsidies did not w’ork. Facing the situation that the costs of grain 
production were increasing and that many peasants did not use their land 
efficiently, many rural areas where TVEs were developed diverted a part of their 
profits as direct subsidies to farming mainly in the form of a certain amount of 
money per mu14. This, however, did not stimulate the part-time fanners and
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14 The aim of subsidies to grain producing households was to raise their 
income near, equivalent to or higher than that of non-grain agriculture and off- 
farm workers. Direct subsidies were a certain amount of money directly paid to 
them. Indirect subsidies were expenditure on the indirect means, e.g., improve­
ment of services, infrastructure, technology and purchase of machinery, to
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absentees to invest and work more in land, hut was used by them in consumption. 
Moreover, now that holding land itself could earn direct subsidies, their tendency 
to hold on to the land without transfer to full-time farmers was strengthened. At 
the same time, it seriously weakened the strength of the newly established TVEs. 
(Tao, Xiao-Yong 1986: 18, 61. Lin, Cong-Jun 1987: 18. Zhou, Xin-Jing 1988: 8)
Table 5.4 Years of Import Exceeding Export of Grain in China 1982-95
(1,000,000 tn)
Year Export (mainly 
rice)
Import (mainly wheat, 
barley, maize, dried beans)
Import exceeding 
over export
1982 0.81 16.15 15.34
1983 1.15 13.53 12.38
1984 3.19 10.41 7.22
1985 9.33 5.97
1986 9.42 7.73
1987 7.37 16.28 8.91
1988 7.17 15.33 8.16
1989 6.56 16.58 10.02
1990 5.83 13.72 7.89
1991 10.86 13.45 2.59
1992 13.64 11.75
1993 15.35 7.52
1994 13.46 9.20
1995 2.14 20.81 18.67
Sources: SYC 1984: 388, 393. SYC 1986: 487, 490. CSY 1988: 649, 652. 
CSY 1990: 608, 611. CSY 1992: 583, 586. SYC 1994: 515. 518. CSY 
1996: 589, 592.
Conclusion. Therefore, a new round of institutional changes for a new land 
tenure system was called for, which should not only effectively expand farm size 
for full-time and expert farmers but also provide a back-up basic social welfare 
to those peasants who were or would be engaged mainly in non-grain agriculture
promote their competitive strength so as to earn a higher income through their 
own better performance.
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and off-farm production.
Summary. Deng Xiao-Ping points out in 1990: "From a long-run point of 
view, there should be two leaps in the reform and development of China’s 
socialist agriculture. The first leap was to abolish the people’s communes, and 
implement the responsibility system mainly in the form of household contract 
with remuneration linked to output. This was a very big advance, and should be 
maintained for a long time. The second leap is to develop appropriate economies 
o f scale on land operation and collective economy, according to the need of 
scientific cultivation and socialization of production. This is another very big 
advance, and of course, a very long process." (Deng, Xiao-Ping 1990)
As Howe correctly claims, during the economic reform, attention from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s tended to focus on industry, foreign trade and foreign 
direct investment. There was a tendency to assume that food and agricultural 
problems were no longer serious. This was partly because the rise in Chinese 
incomes diverted demand away from grain; and partly because in the first phase 
of reform (1978-84), the agricultural sector did grow impressively. In recent 
years, however, the situation has become more serious. It is clear that the "once 
for all" gains from raising peasant incentives have been made and that the 
trajectory of production is being affected by lack of investment and other 
problems. In the "People’s Daily" one can find stories about the shortage of rural 
labor, while there was also unemployment. The problem is that the right people 
with the appropriate skills are not where they are needed. Thus, the government 
is encouraging a further transformation of agriculture, this time toward large-scale 
farming rather than the small-scale one that produced positive results in the first 
phase of reform. This larger scale will be accompanied by improvements in water 
control, greater mechanization and a higher quality of managerial expertise. 
(Howe 1997: 222-223)
Theoretical Discussion
The theoretical discussion on the emergence of the fragmented small farms 
as the last obstacle to sustainable rural development imposed by the monsoon in 
Japan in Chapter 4 is also applicable in this context and therefore not repeated 
here.
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However, one major difference beiween Japan and China is worthy of no­
te. In Japan, there was a land holding ceiling until 1962, land rent control until 
1970, tenancy protection from eviction (for long-term) until 1970 and (for short­
term) until 1975 and 1980. Before such restrictions on market exchange were 
removed, the negative externality imposed by the part-time farmers and absentees 
was technological; and thereafter, pecuniary. But in China, voluntary transfer was 
allowed even at the beginning. Therefore, such an externality was immediately 
pecuniary.
Another major difference was that China, due to its large size, the regional 
difference in development was much more conspicuous than in Japan. In Japan, 
in the low wage economy stage, fragmented small farms could prosper. Only at 
the high wage economy stage, did they become an obstacle to sustainable rural 
development. When the whole of China was in the low wage economy, this 
farming structure also prospered. But once the Eastern part has entered the high 
wage economy, although the Central and Western areas still remained in the low 
wage economy, many peasants there already started to migrate to the Eastern part 
to earn higher income, leaving their land idle. Where this phenomenon has 
appeared, before the overcoming of other obstacles, the fragmented small farms 
already became an obstacle, earlier than in Japan. This is similar to Group 2 
(especially Malaysia) reviewed in Chapter 4 where much rural labor force has 
abandoned backward agriculture to go to cities. Nevertheless, in the sense that the 
fragmented small farms, as long as they are tilled, could prosper while overcom­
ing other obstacles in the low wage economy, they are still the last obstacle.
For eliminating the above-mentioned negative pecuniary externality in 
China, on one hand, free market forces or laisser-faire could not work, because 
voluntary land transfer by peasants themselves was not effective. On the other, 
any obligatory scheme of land transfer should provide peasants with a back-up 
basic social welfare, so that even in cases of closure of rural Firms and economic 
contraction, peasants would not be squeezed out to city slums, but could always 
have a last resort of living in agriculture.
Thus, variable mixed economies (varying relations between the public and 
private sectors, and their dynamic change over time in relation to changing needs 
in economy and society, as reviewed in Chapter 2) should be adopted for reaching 
dynamic or long-term Pareto efficiency (as indicated in Chapter 3) not only in the
Eastern part where the fragmented small farms have become the last obstacle, but 
also in those Central and Western areas where they have become one of the 
obstacles.
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III. A Large-Scale Farming and Collective-Individual 
Mixed Economy
This section is intended to show that large-scale farming could be achieved 
in a collective-individual mixed economy (different from the large-scale farming 
with the combination of public ownership and operation of land under the 
centrally planned economy which had failed). Since as early as the beginning of 
the 1980s, in those areas where the fragmented small farms had emerged as an 
obstacle, experiments on reaching appropriate economies of scale of land 
operation or large-scale farming had already been made and success achieved. 
"Appropriate" in this context meant to raise the scale gradually in accordance with 
the extent to which the surplus peasants were transferred to non-grain agriculture 
and off-farm lines, rather than squeezing out peasants who were still relying on 
land. Cases before 1985 will be cited in order to stress the much smoother 
transition in comparison with the slow progress in Japan.
There have been jour principal forms in this new land tenure system.
Dual Land System  (formal form)
Self-sufficiency land (grain-rations land) was equally contracted in compact 
form to households on a per capita basis for planting mainly grain for self­
consumption. Contractors were required to pay either (1) both a contractual fee 
to the village and agricultural tax to the state, or (2) only a contractual fee (Wang 
& Ma 1990: 33), or (3) only an agricultural tax (CEST 1991: 33), or (4) no fee 
at all (Wang & Ma 1990: 33).
The use of self-sufficiency land was almost free of charge (as a basic 
social welfare) because the contractual fee and agricultural tax (if imposed on it) 
were low. In general, the higher the degree of development of the village’s non- 
grain agriculture and off-farm lines, the less the payment required for using the 
self-sufficiency land.
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Large-scale farming was not excluded on self-sufficiency land. For 
example, in 1987, 24 households in Yanhe Villagers Group (previously a 
production team) of Hujiadu Village of Yanqiao Township of Wuxi County of the 
Sunan region contracted their 72.5 mu (4.83 ha) of personal self-sufficiency land 
in compact form to four expert farmers to form a farm. All of the grain was sold 
to the village, which retained seeds for next year’s production, then sold grain in 
self-sufficiency amounts to all the member households (including the four 
experts*) at prices lower than the quota prices, and the rest to the state (the sale 
could be at negotiable prices). This revenue went to these experts. In so doing, 
although the 24 households had to buy grain, they could save time and energy to 
earn higher income in other jobs. (Hu; Yu et al 1988: 63). By 1995, some villages 
in Xishan City of the Sunan region had put self-sufficiency land together for 
large-scale farming as well (Lu; Gao & Li 1995).
Responsibility land was contracted also in compact form on the conditions 
of fulfilling output quotas of the state, paying agricultural tax to the state and all 
collective fees. The contractors could dispose of the surplus products on the 
market.
In general, the higher the degree of development of the village’s non-grain 
agriculture and off-farm lines, the more competitive the distribution of the 
responsibility land. There were four basic categories.
Category 1: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm employment 
were little developed and peasants almost completely relied on grain production 
for living, responsibility land was equally contracted to households on a per  
capita basis.
Under the Equal Land System, the increase of population was actually 
encouraged and led to land redistributions which made the land smaller and more 
fragmented, among the other problems already indicated above.
Under the Dual Land System, the contracted land of each household was 
divided into two. The increase of population of a household would lead to the 
deduction of its responsibility land but an increment of its self-sufficiency land 
(children born beyond the family planning limit were not taken into account). The 
decrease would lead to the increment of its responsibility land but deduction o f 
its self-sufficiency land. Thus, as the family size changed, the area and location 
of the household’s land kept the same, only the proportion of the two kinds of
é
land was changed on the account. This was called the Dual Land an Account Sys­
tem. Households were thus encouraged to produce less children in order to get 
more responsibility land within their total contracted land so that they could 
produce more to sell in the market at higher prices. The economies of scale of 
land would at least not be lowered due to further smallness and fragmentation and 
may even be raised. (Wang & Ma 1990; 34)
Category 2: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm employment 
were modestly developed, responsibility land was equally contracted to every 
labor force. Here, some laborers already worked in non-grain agriculture and off- 
farm lines. But jobs there were not secure, so that they were not yet willing to 
transfer their responsibility land. Such areas were richer than those in Category 
1, thus non-laborers (the old, children, etc.) were only entitled to self-sufficiency 
land but not to responsibility land so as to make the use of the latter more 
efficient. As the responsibility land was distributed among less people, each 
laborer could equally get more land so that the economies of scale were raised. 
(Wang & Ma 1990: 34)
Some villages set up a reserve land for both overall rural development and 
newly increased population. To those households without laborers, if the 
population grew and their self-sufficiency land was not enough, a part of the 
reserve land could be given to the new population. (Zhang; Liu & Zhang 1989: 
34-36). To those households with laborers, the "Dual Land on Account System" 
was also applied.
Category 3: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm employment 
were fairly developed, responsibility land was equally contracted to every 
agricultural labor force (for grain production). That means those laborers having 
left grain agriculture but still holding their permanent residence in the village 
were no more entitled to responsibility land, although still to self-sufficiency land. 
(Those who had got permanent city residence were obviously not entitled to either 
self-sufficiency land or responsibility land.) Because only the remaining 
agricultural labor force could equally contract more land, the economies of scale 
were further raised. (Wang & Ma 1990: 34)
Here, for adjusting the ratio of self-sufficiency land to responsibility land 
of the households of agricultural labor force, the Dual Land on Account System 
could still be applied. To the households of non-grain agriculture and off-farm
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laborers, if their self-sufficiency land was not enough due to population growth, 
a part of the reserve land could be given.
Category 4: In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm employment 
were highly developed, responsibility land was contracted to agricultural labor (for 
grain production) by competition of bidding. Here, because many peasants would 
like to concentrate on non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines to earn more 
income, it was possible for villages to contract the responsibility land to expert 
farmers. Only those who bid higher output could win the contract. The division 
of land was according to its suitability to a specific product (rice, cotton, etc.). 
Expert farmers, who could also be non-villagers, were given land according to 
their relevant expertise and ability. Economies of scale of land were highly raised.
As the villages became rich, they could provide the newly increased 
population with food at quota prices, rather than giving them self-sufficiency land.
This was regarded as the optimal standard Dual Land System, for the self- 
sufficiency land was distributed equally as a back-up basic social welfare, but 
responsibility land was contracted through competition of bidding (Wang & Ma 
1990: 33-34). It combined both competition and cohesion.
For example, in 1982, Changyuan Brigade of Linxiang County of Hunan 
Province15 arranged 27 households which were competent and active at non­
grain agriculture and off-farm lines to till self-sufficiency land only, and 138 
households which were good at farming to produce grain on responsibility land 
(RO 1984: 14).
Rural industry in the Sunan region started a long time before the economic 
reform and developed much faster after the reform. The implementation of the 
Household Contract System was completed with the Dual Land System in the 
preliminary form in 1983. The average area of household contracted land was 2-3 
mu (0.13-0.2 ha) but divided into 7-8 parcels, forming various individual farming 
units (RT 1991: 23). In 1987, an able-bodied laborer was sufficient for operating 
a 4-mu (0.26 ha) farm earning 600 yuan, much lower than the annual per capita 
income of 853 yuan and that in rural industry of 1,000 yuan (Fei, Xiao-Tong 
1990: 5). Peasants swarmed to non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines but were 
not yet willing to transfer all of their contracted land. Thus, since 1983, the
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15 Hunan Province is in the Central part of China.
223
preliminary form was gradually transformed toward the standard form.
For example, in Wuxi County, in the autumn of 1983, an expert household 
contracted 22.56 mu (1.504 ha) of land in Dongge Town; in the spring of 1984, 
529 mu (35.267 ha) or 77.8 % of the total responsibility land in Rongnan Village 
of Yuqi Town were contracted to 70 laborers of 60 households, raising contracted 
land area per laborer from 1.16 mu (0.077 ha) to 7.56 mu (0.504 ha) and that per 
household from 1.57 mu (0.105 ha) to 8.8 mu (0.586 ha). In 1986, 386 mu (25.73 
ha) or 77.8 % of the total cultivated land of Yuanhe Village of Qinnan Township 
of Changshu City were contracted to 19 agricultural labor force, with contracted 
land area per laborer as 20.3 mu (1.353 ha); in Wuxi and Wu counties, 115 
households contracted 15-20 mu (1-1.33 ha) each, and 75 households contracted 
more than 20 mu (1.33 ha) each.
In 1986, in Wuxi County, the number of farming units contracting more 
than 5 mu (0.333 ha) was 4,080, holding totally 28,800 mu (1,920 ha) or 11.09 
% of the total responsibility land of the County. In 1989, this number reduced to 
3,820, holding totally 34,600 mu (2,306.67 ha) or 13.8 %; within this group, 6.5 
% or 248 farming units contracted more than 15 mu (1 ha) each, holding in total 
9,260 mu (617.3 ha) or 26.6 % of the total responsibility land of the group. In 
1989, in Suzhou City, there were 970 farming units each contracting over 15 mu 
(1 ha) and in total 43,300 mu (2,886.67 ha) or 3.6 % of all responsibility land of 
the City. (RT 1991; 23)
In 1989, Changshu City transformed the preliminary Dual Land System 
into a mixture o f categories 2, 3 and 4 of the formal Dual Land System. Self- 
sufficiency land was assigned as per capita 0.5 mu (0.03 ha); the average area of 
responsibility land was 1.88 mu (0.125 ha) per laborer, which was not given to 
those who had secured off-farm jobs, but 50 % - KM) % of which could be 
distributed to those who had not yet secured such jobs, an area larger than which 
was allocated to the expert farmers via bidding (non-villagers were included with 
priority to villagers). By the end of the year, 11,046.4 mu (736.43 ha) or 1.06 % 
of the total farmland had been contracted to 536 expert farmers to form 190 large- 
scale farms [according to the criterion of minimum area of 15 mu (1 ha) per 
laborer], with 20.7 mu (1.38 ha) per laborer as 11 times the average, and the 
largest over 50 mu (3.33 ha) per household. [Jiang, Zhong-Yi el al 1992 (c): 74- 
76, 80]
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Table 5.5 Area under the Dual Land System in China 1990-94
(1,000,000 ha)
1990 Of total household 
contracted land
1994 Of total household 
contracted land
Country 37 38.2 % 42 47.8 %
Eastern 15 n.a. 14 n.a.
Central 16 n.a. 20 n.a.
Western 5 n.a. 7 n.a.
Sources: CEST 1991: 34. CEST 1996: 39.
Table 5.6 Areas of Self-Sufficiency Land and Responsibility Land 
under the Dual Land System in China 1990-94 
(1,000,000 ha)
1990 1994
Self-sufficiency
land
Responsibil­
ity land
S:R Self-sufficiency
land
Responsibili­
ty land
S:R
18 36 1:2 13 29 1:2.23
Sources: CEST 1991: 33. CEST 1996: 39.
Table 5.7 Methods of Contracting Responsibility Land 
under the Dual Land System in China 1990-94 
(1,000,000 ha)
Per capita Per laborer Bidding
Area % Area % Area %
’90 ’94 ’90 ’94 ’90 ’94 ’90 ’94 ’90 '94 •90 *94
16 19 64 68 7 8 30 25 1 2 6 7
Sources: CEST 1991: 34. CEST 1996: 39.
During 1990-94, both the area under the Dual Land System and its 
percentage in the total household contracted land in China rose, and this system 
was also adopted in the Western part where non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
production were less developed than in the Eastern and Central parts, as Table 5.5 
shows. As revealed in Table 5.6, the area of self-sufficiency land decreased, and 
that of responsibility land increased, leading to a lower ratio of self-sufficiency 
land to responsibility land, and implying that land was more efficiently used.
Table 5.7 further indicates that, regarding the methods of contracting responsibil­
ity land under the Dual Land System, the area on a per capita basis expanded 
while that on a per laborer basis reduced, suggesting not only the population 
pressure on land, but also an increase in bidding and more market competition.
Active education of villagers was necessary since their majority agreement 
was needed to implement the Dual Land System fJiang, Zhong-Yi el al 1992 (h): 
6 8 ].
For example, three villages in Wu County (Wuxian) of the Sunan region 
began to establish large-scale farming in 1987 and 1988. The village leaders 
started it by talking with the villagers about the importance of large-scale farming. 
At least some villagers openly opposed it in all the three villages. In village 1, 
only one or two households did so because they would lose responsibility land, 
but the leaders obliged them to give it up with the rest of the villagers. In village 
2, many were against it but were persuaded to accept it. In village 3, opposition 
was stronger and initially only 15 % of the farmers gave up their responsibility 
land. In this case, a gradual approach was adopted. The leaders then look back all 
the arable land and divided it into two consolidated portions for self-sufficiency 
land and responsibility land respectively. Self-sufficiency land was allocated in 
one consolidated parcel to households on a per capita basis by drawing lots. The 
responsibility land was distributed to large-scale farmers immediately in villages 
1 and 2 in 1987 or 1988, but gradually over the following years in village 3 as 
other farmers also gave up responsibility land voluntarily or under collective 
persuasion. (Prostcrman; Hanstad & Li July 1996: 15-16)
Leasing System
The village may also lease land in compact form to expert farmers via 
bidding for higher monetary rent, which was different from contracting output. 
However, such a leasing still stipulated that the lessees should produce a certain 
type and amount of products (e.g., grain) and the village had the duty to provide 
services, hence a kind of village-household dual-level operation of land. This was 
distinctive from typical leasing for monetary rent under which the lessees may 
produce whatever they wish and the lessor did not have the duty to provide 
services. A village usually leased its reserve land, although some other land might
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also take this form. Here* the land under leasing was also a kind of responsibility 
land, hence a special form under the Dual Land System.
For example, Bai Village of Baicun Township of Dingxiang County of 
Shanxi Province had 3,073 mu (204.87 ha) of farmland. It reserved 112 mu (7.47 
ha) of saline-alkali land for leasing to produce sorghum in the mid-1980s. The 
contract was for one year and renewable. The rent was 8,(XX) yuan in total, 71.43 
yuan per mu in 1987, but raised in 1988 to 11,(XX) yuan, 98.21 yuan per mu. by 
bidding among six farmers representing 20 households. (Wu; Xu; Tian & Bai 
1988; 36-38)
In contrast, Yujiazhuang Village of Shoulu Township of the above County 
had finished its reserve land. It then divided all land into five classes according 
to productivity, and leased 290 mu (19.33 ha) of the highest class to expert 
households with more labor to produce grain, the rent being 80-KX) yuan. (Wu; 
Xu; Tian & Bai 1988: 37)
Single Land System
In areas where non-grain agriculture and off-farm production were very 
highly developed, many peasants secured their jobs there, and were not only 
voluntary but also felt imperative to formally transfer both their self-sufficiency 
land and responsibility land to expert farmers. They thereby left (grain) 
agriculture although most of them still lived in rural areas, even in the same 
villages. Their voluntary was, however, also based on the active promotion of the 
villages, which sold them grain for self-consumption at fair prices and might also 
allow them to keep some family plots for producing vegetables to accommodate 
the peasant tradition of not buying them on the market. These measures were both 
an incentive for them to hand in land and a basic social welfare. The expert 
farmers could operate land much larger than under Dual Land System, upon 
which they should fulfil tasks for the state and collective and could then dispose 
the residual for their own living and in the market. There was no more division 
between self-sufficiency land and responsibility land. "Dual Land" became "Single 
Land". (Wang & Ma 1990; 36). The single land could also be either contracted 
for output, or leased for monetary rent, via bidding to expert farmers.
In the above-cited example in Wu County (Wuxian) of the Sunan region
which started the Dual Land System in 1987 or 1988, some farmers then 
voluntarily gave up their self-sufficiency land for allocation to large-scale farmers 
in all the three villages. In one village, about 20 % of households did so. Two 
villages offered 450 kg of paddy rice per year at about 50 % of the market price 
for each mu of self-sufficiency land given up by households. (Prosterman; 
Hanstad & Li July 1996: 16)
By 1988, in the Sunan region, some other villages, even townships, had 
gathered all their land to be contracted through bidding to a number of expert 
farmers (Fei, Xiao-Tong 1990: 6).
The Dual Land System started in Qianzhou Village of Qianzhou Town of 
Xishan City of the Sunan region at the end of the 1980s. As off-farm employment 
quickly developed, it became no more suitable, since rural firms had to close for 
half a month in each of the two busiest farming periods, thus seriously affecting 
their business. In a referendum of 1991, all villagers unanimously agreed to give 
up self-sufficiency land. Thus, all the land of the Village was gathered to form 
a collective farm, which contracted land to seven member households, on the 
conditions of selling 575 kg of rice and 125 kg of wheat per mu at quota prices 
each year to the Village and being able to dispose of the residuals. The Village 
then sold grain to the state according to quotas and 147 kg of rice and 28 kg of 
wheat to each of the other villagers at prices even lower than the state-subsidized 
prices to city residents. Then, Mixiangqiao Village and Lidong Village of 
Dongxiang Town, Tan Village of Chaqiao Town and Taoshu Village of Xuelang 
Town also adopted the Single Land System. As a result, rural firms now could 
shorten the closing time by a big margin and even to zero. Unified seed supply, 
plant protection and agricultural mechanization were achieved and high-yielding 
varieties and advanced technologies introduced, in which Qianzhou Village 
became a demonstration village in the Town. The net income of farming 
households (whose laborers were usually husband and wife) in Mixiangqiao 
Village reached 22,000-25,000 yuan, 100 % higher than that of households at off- 
farm lines. (Lu; Li & Zou 1996)
In the areas where local off-farm activities were very highly developed, 
the Single Land System could also be set up directly upon the abolition of the 
Equal Land System.
For example, Matou Village was in the suburbs of Zhongshan City of
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Guangdong Province. In 1984, it had 60 households, 170 laborers, 132 mu (8.8 
ha) of land for grain, 38 mu (2.53 ha) for vegetables, 8.4 mu (0.56 ha) for fishery 
and 40 mu (2.67 ha) for fruit trees. The local industry and services were very 
highly developed and could absorb all the surplus labor force, but peasants were 
still unwilling to transfer their farmland. The Village then changed the Equal 
Land System directly to the Single Land System by assigning all land to expert 
farmer Huang Zhi-Hua’s household, and achieved the agreement of other 
households by offering to sell them grain at fair prices, and allowing them to keep 
some family plots for producing self-consumed vegetables. Huang Zhi-Hua was 
to hand in 600 kg of grain per mu (0.067 ha) to the Village which then fulfilled 
its obligations to the state and sold grain to other villagers for self-consumption. 
Huang could dispose of the surplus as he chose. (Lu & Li 1987: 33)
Shunyi County of Beijing Municipality16 started the Equal Land System 
at the end of 1983 with contracts for three years [but some villages implemented 
the preliminary Dual Land System in 1985 (Zhong & Cai 1997: 54)1, each 
household operating 3-5 mu (0.2-0.3 ha) of fragmented land. Although over 70 
% of the rural labor force shifted to non-grain agriculture and off-farm produc­
tion, personal transfer of land was scarce. It diverted profits of TVEs to subsidize 
costs on grain production of all peasant households, 50 yuan per mu per annum, 
but the money was simply used on consumption and little output was stimulated. 
Thus, in the autumn of 1986, taking the chance of renewing the contracts, it 
implemented the Single Land System. It first made experiments in the developed 
areas during Aug. 1986 - Aug. 1987, then popularized this in most other areas of 
the County by the autumn of 1989. New contracts were not given to those who 
had got stable jobs and income from non-grain agriculture and off-farm 
production, or been engaged in house work by a long time, or unable to till land. 
Those who were not good at grain-production but had not yet got other stable 
jobs were either recruited into TVEs, or into activities in diversified cropping and 
non-crop agriculture (for vegetables, fruits, fish, oxen, chickens, pigs, etc.) newly 
created for them by the special investment of townships and villages. Those part- 
time farmers who were neither active for grain production nor willing to give up 
land were required to meet conditions for carrying out large-scale farming. As a
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result, those who could not do so voluntarily handed land hack. More than enough 
grain was guaranteed to be sold at prices lower than the market levels to those 
laborers who were no more engaged in grain production and their family members 
for self-consumption. Direct subsidies were abolished. Land for grain production 
was successfully transferred to the expert farmers who earned higher income not 
through direct subsidies but by their own economic performance. (Pei, Chang- 
Hong et al 1992: 87-89, 92)
However, in general, the Dual Land System was a transitory stage between 
the Equal Land System and the Single Land System, as rural industrialization 
proceeded and could absorb more and more surplus labor force. Surpassing this 
stage might not be viable. For example, in 1984, Zijing Village of Jiangling 
County of Hubei Province established three companies, each for agriculture, 
industry, livestock and fish farming respectively and each took about one third of 
the total labor force. It implemented the Single Land System by subsidizing those 
who left land to buy grain at market prices and those who contracted larger land 
with the profits of village enterprises 41,000 yuan per year. Thus 77 9<> of over 
400 laborers completely left the land, and farmland per laborer was expanded 
from 3.8 mu (0.25 ha) to 16.5 mu (1.1 ha). In order to get more direct subsidies, 
some households contracted 60-100 mu (4-6.67 ha) of land, 30 mu (2 ha) per 
laborer, exceeding their operating ability. In 1986, however, two major enterprises 
were closed due to unprofitability and other enterprises had to rationalize. Thus, 
on one hand, half of the workers became surplus and had to return to agriculture; 
on the other, an end of subsidies from the enterprises made farmers unable to 
maintain large-scale farming. In 1987, the Village had changed to the Dual Land 
System, which proved to be suitable. (Li, Wan-Dao 1988: 57-58. Peng; Zhang & 
Yang 1988: 17-18)
By 1996, the Single Land System was still not widespread in the whole 
country.
Corporate-Holding System
The typical form  of the Corporate-Holding System was that households 
transferred their land contracted under the Equal Land System to the village in 
exchange for land shares. The village, as a collective corporation, contracted land
through bidding in compact form to expert farmers who were to fulfil tasks for 
the state and collective and could dispose the surplus products. The village then 
distributed a part of the revenue to land share-holders as dividends. The village 
also sold grain at fair prices, and gave some family plots for producing vegetables 
to ordinary households for self-consumption. These households could concentrate 
on non-grain agriculture and off-farm activities. Land share-holders could not 
withdraw land physically from the village but could transfer (including bequeath­
ing) the shares in financial form. The change of family size of the land share­
holders could not affect their number of shares so that more births were not 
encouraged, but discouraged. (Chen, Dong-Qiang 1996: 23-24)
This was similar to the functions of a modern capital share-holding 
corporation whose share-holders can earn dividends and sell shares in the market 
but cannot reimburse them from the corporation (as already analyzed in my 
Proposal I for Japan in Chapter 4). The major difference between the Chinese 
system and my proposed system for Japan is that, under the former, land is 
collectively owned but was previously contracted to households equally, hence the 
title Corporate-Holding System, while under the latter, land is privately owned, 
hence Corporate-Ownership System.
For example, Shatou Village of Jun-an Town of Shunde County of 
Guangdong Province initially contracted a farmland of 460 mu (30.67 ha) equally 
to over 600 households, each holding about 0.767 mu (0.051 ha), yielding sugar 
cane per mu only 2-3 tn. At the beginning of 1986, in response to popular 
demand, the Village took back the land, invested 210,000 yuan and assigned 
special farmers to plant litchi (a fruit). In the same year, the revenue from the 
intercrops17 already reached 210,000 yuan, over twice the previous income of 
sugar cane. In the harvesting year of litchi, the land would be contracted to expert 
farmers via bidding. A part of the revenue was to be distributed to the original 
households according to their previously contracted areas. (Lu & Li 1987: 34) 
Although this example was about fruit production, the same approach was 
applicable to grain. For instance, by 1995, 70 % of peasants in Nanhai City of
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17 Intercrops are two or more crops planted at regular intervals in the same 
field, so as to make use of positive externalities between them and use land more 
efficiently. For example, one or two drills of green gram can be planted between 
each two drills of maize.
Guangdong Province had given up their contracted land, accounting for about 45 
% of the total contracted land, to the villages to he contracted to expert farmers, 
in exchange for revenue (dividends) to their land shares (PD 1995). The expert 
farmers who contracted larger land could earn an income higher than that of the 
off-farm workers (Yang, Yong-Zhe 1995: 16).
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Inverse Leasing or Contracting (fan zu dao bao) as untypical form . The 
original contractors under the Equal Land System leased/contraded their land to 
the village which paid rent or gave grain for self-consumption to them, and then
Table 5.8 Progress in Overcoming Fragmentation in China 1986-92 *
Whole
country
Area contracted 
per household (ha)
No. of parcels contracted 
per household
Area per parcel 
(ha)
1986 0.466 5.85 0.08
1988 0.446 5.67 0.079
1990 0.42 5.52 0.076
1992 0.466 3.16 0.147
Eastern
1986 0.333 5.32 0.063
1988 0.32 5.19 0.062
1990 0.306 5.03 0.061
1992 0.333 3.35 0.099
Central
1986 0.666 5.20 0.128
1988 0.653 5.07 0.129
1990 0.62 4.70 0.132
1992 0.806 4.58 0.176
Western
1986 0.8 7.60 0.105
1988 0.706 7.10 0.099
1990 0.646 6.80 0.095
1992 0.466 2.15 0.217
* Samples from 7,983 Villages of over 200 Counties in 29 Provinces, 
Municipalities and Autonomous Regions (without Tibet and Taiwan). 
Source: CEST 1993: 48.
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Table 5.9 Land Contracted per Individual Household in China 
1986-92 (in percentage) *
Country % Under 0.4- 0.73 1.066- 1.4- 3.4 ha
0.333 0.666 3-1 1.333 3.33 and
ha ha ha ha ha over
1986 51.1
1988 52.7
1990 54.2
1992 100 48.0 31.2 11.3 5.7 3.4 0.4
Eastern
1986 61.7
1988 65.4
1990 66.2
1992 100 60.4 25.2 10.4 3.3 0.6 0.1
Central
1986 30.8
1988 38.0
1990 40.4
1992 100 26.1 44.7 12.0 8.2 7.8 1.2
Western
1986 51.7
1988 50.4
1990 51.8
1992 100 42.9 32.7 12.0 7.4 4.8 0.2
* Samples from 7,983 Villages of over 200 Counties in 29 Provinces,
Municipalities and Autonomous Regions (without Tibet and Taiwan).
Source: CEST 1993 : 47.
leased/contracted the land in compact form to expert farmers for large-scale 
fanning. Since in so doing it was the original contractors who leased/contracted 
their land to the village, it was called Inverse Leasing or Contracting. (Chen. 
Dong-Qiang 1996: 24). It may be regarded as an untypical form  of the Corporate- 
Holding System, because the rent - or grain for self-consumption - the village 
gave to the original contractors would be a part of the gross revenue of the new
lessees/con true tors as large-scale farmers, just as dividends for land shares under 
the typical form. It has been implemented in Leqing City and other areas of 
Zhejiang Province, Linquan County of Fuyang Prefecture and Dawang Town of 
Nanqiao District of Chuzhou City of Anhui Province (Wu & Hu 1995: 43. Huang; 
Xu; Zhang & Ni 1996: 60. Qin & Wang 1995: 43. Fan & Zhou 1994: 16).
The Corporate-Holding System is actually also a kind of Single Land 
System (although a special one) and its implementation requires a high 
development of rural industrialization to absorb surplus labor. Thus, relatively 
fewer regions have adopted it.
Table 5.8 shows that during 1986-90, the fragmentation of small farms 
worsened, except for Central China. But, as a result of implementing the above 
forms of large-scale farming, it has improved in 1990-92, as the number of 
parcels per household was reduced and the area per parcel enlarged. Similarly, 
Table 5.9 indicates that the percentage of the smallest-scale farms (under 0.333 
ha) in land contracted per individual household increased during 1986-90, but 
decreased in 1990-92.
Selection of Expert Farmers
It has been mentioned in the above that the selection of expert farmers to 
be large-scale farmers was through bidding. Here are some specific aspects of this 
mechanism. Chapter 2 already indicated that as a result of development of some 
40 centuries, farmers in monsoon Asia have mastered sophisticated intensive 
farming techniques, even if they might not have attended formal schools, although 
schooling is important. Villagers normally know who are expert farmers and who 
are not. The process of bidding to fulfil contracts also helps to identify expertise. 
The more competent can contract more land. Priority was given to villagers, but 
non-villagers could also be taken.
The conditions o f  contracts stipulated not only the output and varieties of 
grain and other products to be fulfilled for the state and village, but also the 
maintenance and improvement of land quality.
For example, in 1983, seeing the reduction of agriculture due to the 
development of off-farm activities, Zhangjiabian Town of Zhongshan City of 
Guangdong Province made an investigation. 90 % of peasants were only willing
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to keep a small amount of land. Thus, it called for bidding for contracting 56,(KK) 
mu (3,733.33 ha) of land of grain and sugar cane. The amount of land was 
according to the ability and willingness of bidders. Due to shortage of local 
agricultural labor, 16,000 mu (1,066.67 ha) were not taken up. It called for further 
bidding by outsiders, and 223 outside expert farmers contracted them. The largest 
contracted area by one household was 448 mu (29.87 ha), and the smallest 30 mu 
(2 ha). (GT 1988: 18)
In order to avoid re-creating fragmented small farms, Nanwen Village of 
Dayong Town in the same region and same period stipulated in bidding that the 
smallest area for contract was 10 mu (0.67 ha), but several households could 
make a joint bid (GT 1988: 18).
The conditions fo r  expert farmers to contract responsibility land under the 
Dual Land System since 1985 in Luyang Town of Kunshan County of Suzhou 
City were being able-bodied; with a certain educational level, scientific and 
technological knowledge, and practical experiences; fond of fanning, competent 
in operation, good at management, and hardworking. In 1986, the candidates were 
selected first by groups and villages, then decided by the CPC Committee of the 
Town. Compared with heads of the 29 households in 1985. of those of the 40 
selected in 1986, 70 % were under 40 years old, 12 % higher than in 1985; 32.5 
% received education at junior middle school and over, 1.5 % higher; 52 % were 
former production team directors, or accountants, or agricultural technicians, or 
mechanics, 1 % higher. (Shi & Zhang 1987: 24). In 1993, facing the situation that 
the popularization rate of senior middle schooling was only 15.36 9?, and solely 
42.41 % of labor force received education of junior middle school and over in the 
rural areas of six counties and cities within the jurisdiction of Suzhou City, the 
governments stipulated that new contractors must receive special training and get 
a "Green Certificate" (eligibility to be farmers). Thus, training and lectures on 
technologies and policies have been regularly held by relevant government organs, 
grain administrations, machinery and electricity stations, credit cooperatives, 
supply and marketing cooperatives, etc. for large-scale farmers. Associations of 
large-scale farmers also periodically organized live demonstrations and exchanges 
of experiences. (Sun, Yong-Zheng 1996: 24)
The length o f contracts. The contracts could be for one to 10 years and 
renewable (Prosterman; Hanstad & Li July 1996: 25). Although the state
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stipulated in 1984 that the length was 15 years and in 1993 30. local officials 
normally preferred a shorter period, so that they could use the renewal as an 
incentive to the contractors. The contract could be either stopped or disrenewed. 
and the contractor would even be punished, if not due to natural disasters, the 
farming season were missed, field desolated, land quality reduced, superior 
varieties mixed with the inferior and degraded, and the contract therefore not 
fulfilled (Shcn, Shou-Ye 1987: 32).
Attention has to be paid to the possibility that short-term contracts may 
affect the incentive of the contractors for long-term improvements to the land. 
However, there were offsetting factors. (1) Because the contract was renewable, 
the incentive of the present contractor might be stimulated so as to earn a good 
reputation and win the next contract. This was different from the situation under 
the Equal Land System in which the actual short period of contract discouraged 
long-term investment, because the parcels might certainly be redistributed to 
others due to population change, rather than being kept or renewed. (2) In order 
to win the next contract, the present contractor and his competitors must bid for 
higher output, or rent, by better measures conducive to land fertility, and, once 
won, implement them. (3) The basic requirement to the contractors was that the 
land fertility should not be reduced. This could be disciplined even by a short­
term contract and thus provided the basis for the long-term use of the land. Then, 
for large long-term infrastructure construction, the village may rely on TVEs for 
their financial strength and collectively mobilizing and organizing peasants, more 
than on the individual contractors whose financial and physical abilities were 
weak. The village could also invest the revenue (or rent) paid by the winner in 
long-term improvements to the land. Actually, even large-scale farms in monsoon 
Asia are quite tiny compared with those in Europe and the US. Investment by a 
farmer, no matter how long the term is, is not beyond his land. Construction of 
infrastructure covering the whole village would have to rely on the collective 
action. (4) If the winner were not able to operate a large land unit as he had 
expected, he would not be obliged to hold the contract for too long. (5) A short­
term contract to be won via bidding would also be helpful to control corruption 
of village officials who might have interest in giving a long-term contract to a 
relative/friend even if his performance could not justify it. (6) How long a 
contract should be is not yet concluded but still being tried through active local
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experiments. If short-term contracts were indeed harmful, local officials/peasants 
would have interest in prolonging them.
For instance, in the above-mentioned one-year lease of 112 mu (7.47 ha) 
of saline-alkali land of Bai Village of Baicun Township of Dingxiang County of 
Shanxi Province, in 1987, one of the lessees, Gao Wan-Nian, operated 56 mu 
(3.73 ha), applied 50 kg of chemical fertilizer and one cart of superior chicken 
manure per mu, and reached a sorghum yield of 375 kg per mu, or 2.5 times the 
1982 level. In 1988, four households of Gao Gui-Lan et al won the contract and 
immediately renovated the land. They decided to build a ditch of 112 m to 
transform it into an irrigated land, apply chemical fertilizer UK) kg and farm 
manure 50 kg per mu, so as to raise the yield to 500 kg per mu. (Wu; Xu; Tian 
& Bai 1988: 38)
Yang Town of Shunyi County of Beijing implemented the preliminary 
Dual Land System in 1985. In changing to the Single Land System in 1986, its 
Tianjiayin Village First introduced in a one-year lease system via bidding. Its 
success made it possible for the Town in the early 1990s and County in 1995 to 
popularize it in suitable villages. By 1996, of the total 27 villages of the Town. 
21 adopted it on 26,000 mu (1,733.3 ha), or 65 % of 40,000 mu (2,666.7 ha) of 
the total grain land of the Town. (Zhong & Cai 1997: 54-56)
In their practices, bidding was called for every year on Aug. 18. Grain 
land was divided into compact units of 7 mu (0.467 ha), 15 mu (1 ha) or 30 mu 
(2 ha) depending on different villages. According to the quality and distance, a 
bottom contract fee (or rent), 100-200 yuan per mu, to each unit was announced 
three days earlier. A bidder could be one or several households, and, in order to 
bid, should pay a deposit of 300-500 yuan, which would not be reimbursed if the 
bidder failed to till the land after winning the contract. The units were contracted 
to the bidders offering the highest contract fees. About 60 % - 70 % of 
households could get land, the rest would seek other jobs or be arranged to Firms 
by the villages. (Zhong & Cai 1997: 55)
The contractors should pay the contract fee (on average 265 yuan per mu), 
deposit for selling output in quota (30 yuan per mu), production costs on uniFied 
collective services for seeds, fertilizer, pesticide, machinery, ploughing, irrigating, 
harvesting, land clearing, etc. (90 yuan per mu) within two days after winning the 
contracts, and would bear the economic results after fulfilling them. Because some
■385 yuan were already inputted, contractors naturally had the incentives of not to 
lose but to gain, which promoted them to learn and apply more science and 
technology, carry out intensive farming and make more investment. As a result, 
there was indeed surplus. For example, in 1996, the average yield of grain was 
750 kg (twice cropping), gross income 1,100 yuan, and net income 500-600 yuan 
for each mu. More than 10 years of experiences have shown that not only no 
short-term or predatory behavior occurred, but also, to the contrary, more land 
was efficiently used. For example, in 1987, Tianjiayin Village still had 400 mu 
(26.67 ha) of waste land, which were then all turned to farmland via bidding for 
the one-year contracts. Agriculture was further strengthened by the village 
collectives through feeding back the contract fees. By 1996, the collectives of the 
Town owned 406 motor-pumped wells, 168 sets of spraying irrigation facilities, 
23,808 kilowatt of agricultural machinery power, 0.59 kilowatt per mu of grain 
land, which had cost investment of over 45,000,000 yuan, mainly from the 
contract fees. The collective water, electricity and machinery services charged less 
fees. For example, in Tianjiayin Village, the cost of irrigating one mu of land was 
20 yuan, but the collective only charged 10 yuan, the rest being borne by the 
contract fees. Hence "from the peasants and to the peasants". (Zhong & Cai 1997: 
55-56)
Major Problems
The major problems discussed in this context concern the process of 
promoting the new land tenure system, rather than concerning all aspects of 
agricultural and rural development of China.
There have been both the problems of not promoting large-scale farming 
where land was already inefficiently used by part-time farmers and absentees, and 
of promoting it prematurely. While in the early 1980s, the former was the main 
problem (Gao & Liu 1984: 21), in the 1990s, the latter outweighed it.
For example, in many areas where rural firms could not yet absorb enough 
peasants, quite a few villages, under the excuse of "introducing market mecha­
nism”, without the majority agreement of villagers, have enforced category 4 of 
the Dual Land System by reducing self-sufficiency land and enlarging responsibil­
ity land, and allocating the latter through bidding, so as to charge more village
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drawn fees. Those peasants who could neither win responsibility land nor find 
jobs in other lines had to subsist on the tiny self-sufficiency land. Hence the 
strong resentment. (CEST 1993: 46. CEST 1996: 39)
One extreme case was reported. Hougu Village of Shendan Town of 
Dengta County of Liaoyang City of Liaoning Province1* had 2 ,lfK) persons and 
5,028 mu (335.3 ha) of farmland. In 1983, each household contracted land and 
had become well-off since. In 1993, however, despite the requirement of further 
prolonging contracts by the central government, the Village, without seeking the 
agreement of peasants, took back all the land and implemented a mixture of 
partial Dual Land System and partial Single Land System. Only 28 peasants got 
self-sufficiency land, while a few farmers contracted all the responsibility land, 
as decided by the leader personally. The contract fee per mu for self-sufficiency 
land and dry land was as high as 120-130 yuan, while that for the profitable wet 
land only 40 yuan. Most peasants had no land to till, and had to sub-lease land 
from these "large-scale farmers" with high rent, or rent land in other villages, or 
do odd jobs, resulting in the decline of their living standard year after year. (LD
1996) . In this case, corruption might be involved.
Such wrong doings attracted the attention of the media. The government 
has repeatedly stressed the appropriateness in promoting large-scale farming 
following the degree to which peasants have found jobs in other lines, established 
new regulations and laws and launched campaigns to combat corruptions. For 
example, on July 7, 1997, Vice Premier Zhu Rong-Ji publicly required provincial 
leaders to stop the wrong practices in some rural areas of withdrawing the 
responsibility land from peasants and re-distributing it via bidding for the purpose 
of charging high contract fees, regardless whether surplus peasants could find 
other jobs or not, thus increasing financial burdens of peasants. (Zhu, Rong-Ji
1997)
Trend of the Evolution of Land Tenure System
The trend of the evolution of the land tenure toward overcoming the 
fragmented small farms as the last obstacle imposed by the monsoon in China 
may be from the Equal Land System, through the Dual Land System (including
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** Liaoning Province is in the Northeast part of China.
Leasing System), toward the Single Land System (including Leasing System and 
Corporate-Holding System). The necessary condition is the development of rural 
industrialization which can absorb surplus peasants. The Dual Land System is 
more significant, since the back-up basic social welfare it provides to peasants 
does not need them to buy grain for self-consumption, while that provided by the 
Single Land System requires them to buy it although at prices under the market 
levels. Meanwhile, it could also raise economies of scale of land even in the areas 
where rural non-grain agriculture and off-farm activities are less developed. Thus 
it would be more suitable to China and would last for a longer time.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the state already raised the issue of 
promoting appropriate large-scale farming wherever relevant conditions were ripe 
(Yang, Yong-Zhe 1995: 17). In 1982 and 83, the state and Deng Xiao-Ping 
himself supported the emerging large household contractors (CPC 1982: 169. 
Deng, Xiao-Ping 1983: 184). In 1984, the state called on the concentration of land 
toward the expert farmers (CPC 1984: 224). Practices across the country have 
shown that the ideal conditions for appropriate large-scale farming by expert 
farmers (as category 4 under the Dual Land System, Leasing System, Single Land 
System and Corporate-Holding System) were that 70 % of rural labor force have 
shifted to non-grain agriculture and off-farm activities, which have generated 80 
% of the local revenue and 90 % of peasant households’ income, the village had 
strong economic strength, competent leadership and an overall service system to 
farmers. However, not many rural areas could meet these desirahle conditions. 
Thus, as long as some households were no more interested in grain production, 
a basic condition was already there, whereby the village could organize the 
transfer of their land to the full-time farmers in an obligatory way, rather than 
passively relying on their voluntary personal transfer. (Yang, Yong-Zhe 1995: 17). 
This could be done even before adopting the Dual Land System in the whole 
village. As the local conditions gradually approach the ideal ones, economies of 
scale of land operation could be raised accordingly.
As Table 5.5 shows, by 1994, still less than 50 % of total household con­
tracted land had adopted the Dual Land System. In other words, more than half 
were still under the Equal Land System (mainly in the Western part). This is 
primarily because both urban and rural population of China has been increasing 
during 1949-96 (CSY 1991: 61. CSY 1996: 69. Bulletin 1996) while farmland
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area was decreasing and the speed of rural industrialization especially in the 
Central and Western parts has not been fast enough to absorb the surplus 
peasants. The Dual Land System was popularized generally in the areas with per 
capita farmland of 0.08 ha; where it was smaller than 0.067 ha, responsibility land 
(if divided out from self-sufficiency land) would be too small to gain profits 
(CEST 1996: 39). Even in the Eastern part, although on one hand its rural 
industrialization was quicker, on the other it also held the densest population, 
which would certainly constrain the development of large-scale farming. For 
example, at the beginning of the 1980s, some densely populated villages in Wuxi 
County of the Sunan region, already had no responsibility land to be contracted 
to laborers (Prosterman; Hanstad & Li July 1996: 20). The criterion for 
appropriate large-scale farming varied across the country, but many regions 
determined it as about 0.67 ha per laborer. In 1994, the area under appropriate 
large-scale farming was 6,056,300 ha and accounted for only 6.5 % of the total 
farmland area of the country. (CEST 1996: 40)
Overcoming the last obstacle. Nevertheless, some effective ways to 
overcome the last obstacle have been found. Where they were implemented, quick 
progress was achieved. For example, of 2,347 villages in the plain of the suburbs 
of Beijing, by the end of 1986, 30 % or 706 villages had earned out large-scale 
farming; under further government intervention, in just two months of 1987, an 
additional 45 % or 1,051 villages did so, or 75 % of the total; in Shunyi County, 
94 % did so (Meng, Fan-Qi 1988: 13). By 1996, in the Yangtze River Delta, 
large-scale farming units had become the backbone of agricultural production. In 
Zhejiang Province, two thirds of grain in state quotas was sold by large-scale 
farmers. (Shi; Zhu & Zhang 1996). As population growth may reach its peak 
sometime in the 21st century and then go down, and as the development in the 
Central and Western parts is accelerating since the 1990s, the prospect of 
overcoming this obstacle should be bright. In comparison, the rural households 
of Japan have been decreasing during 1950-95 (JSY 1997: 225) and off-farm 
activities had already been highly developed by 1960. Thus hardly any excuse in 
Japan could be found for the persistence of the last obstacle.
In 1993, in order to overcome the frequent redistribution of contracted 
land due to changes of family size and the use of farmland by housing construc­
tion, the state stipulated that for starting the second round of contracts (1994-
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2024), farmland might be redistributed, but persons born over the family planning 
limit (i.e., a third child in rural areas) could not be given land; housing construc­
tion was to be regulated and standardized; then, the land of a household would 
not be reduced due to the deduction of its family size (thus encouraging family 
members to leave agriculture and render the remaining members more land), or 
increased due to its expansion (hence discouraging new births and obliging the 
newly increased persons to seek non-grain agriculture and off-farm employment); 
appropriate land transfer mechanism also should be established for achieving 
appropriate large-scale farming (Zhang & Hou 1995: 23-24. Zhang, Shi-Yun 
1996: 17). However, on one hand, issuing these regulations itself could not 
guarantee a precise implementation of them (since in China, as in many other 
developing countries, the enforcement of laws and regulations are less effective 
than their establishment for the time being). On the other, specific and effective 
ways for reaching general goals have always been found by local officials and 
peasants through their own initiative, active and vigorous experimentation (e.g., 
temporary mutual aid teams, permanent teams, elementary cooperatives, advanced 
cooperatives, various forms of the Household Contract System and large-scale 
farming were all grass-roots inventions), to which the already established 
regulations should also be adapted.
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IV. Functioning of Large-Scale Farming
Organizations of Large-Scale Farmers
Once expert farmers had been selected to be large-scale farmers, various 
forms of organization were created, as each rural area was allowed and 
encouraged to make experiments to find the most suitable ways. The principal 
forms are presented below.
Individual household farm.
This was the dominant form across the country (RG 1987: 17). In 1995, 
in Zhejiang Province, it accounted for about 90 % of the area under large-scale 
farming (Zheng, Ke-Feng 1996: 67). In the same year, in Wu County (Wuxian) 
of the Sunan region, it included 94 % of the large-scale farms (Prosterman; 
Hanstad & Li July 1996: 13).
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A much earlier example is as follows. In 1976, Jingwang Brigade (Village) 
of Yanlu Commune (Township) of Lingbi County of Anhui Province assigned 60 
mu (4 ha) of farmland to expert farmer Jing Xue-Rong to lead 10 farmers for 
scientific experiments. Due to collective operation, neither experiments nor normal 
production succeeded. Only 7,500 kg of grain were harvested, just offsetting the 
costs. At the end of the 1970s, the land was divided and contracted to a number 
of households, and in ƒ 957, contracted to Jing’s household alone (six members, 
three laborers). Just in the same year, it harvested 14,000 kg of grain and sold
10.000 kg to the state. In 1982, although suffering from floods, it received over
28.000 kg and sold over 22,500 kg to the state, more than two times the quota of 
the Brigade. In 1983, by further enlarging farming scale and applying scientific 
methods of multiple cropping, it reaped 22,560 kg of wheat on 70 mu (4.67 ha),
6.000 kg of soybean on 40 mu (2.67 ha), 19,500 kg of dried white sweet potato 
on 30 mu (2 ha), 250 kg of sorghum on 1 mu (0.067 ha) and 125 kg of peanut 
on 1 mu, sold over 40,500 kg of grain to the state, and earned an annual income 
of over 13,000 yuan - per capita over 2,100 yuan - higher than the average local 
level. Its 48,310 kg of grain were equivalent to 128 % of the total grain output 
of the Brigade in 1978. (Gao & Liu 1984: 21)
Songke Brigade (Village) of Xiaomiao Commune (Township) of Feixi 
County of Anhui Province had a waste low-lying land of 93 mu (6.2 ha). Under 
the Equal Land System, it was divided to be contracted to a number of 
households, but could never be tilled well, resulting in a loss of several hundred 
yuan each year. In 1983, the Brigade auctioned its use to anyone who could pay 
700 yuan as collateral. Gao De-Ming’s household contracted it, planted rice, 
harvested 36,500 kg, sold to the state 32,500 kg, and earned 11,225 yuan in the 
same year. (Gao & Liu 1984: 21)
In Shunyi County of Beijing, in 1989, 22,000 mu (1,466.67 ha) of 
responsibility land were contracted to the individual household farms, with 12.1 
mu (0.807 ha) per laborer (Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 93).
Joint-households farm  as a cooperative.
This was also one of the forms of organizations of large-scale farming 
across the country (Liang & Wang 1988: 17). At its preliminary stage, they were 
unstable, mainly due to difficulties in supervising and calculating remuneration 
to manual labor in the varied farmwork within the member households. For
example, there were 29 joint-households farms in grain production in Jiangsu 
Province in 1984. Owing to such difficulties, most of them were dissolved later. 
(Jiang, Ji-Fen 1986: 23). However, what evolved was a corporate-holding system 
in operating land. Land was owned by the village and contracted to the joint- 
households who won the bid. They mainly used large machinery so that farm 
work could be standardized and supervised. Remuneration was distributed among 
their respective shares of capital, machinery and labor. For example, in Leqing 
City of Zhejiang Province, in 1994, of 67 large-scale farms operating over 1(K) 
mu (6.67 ha), eight were share-holding joint-households farms. Wan Xian-Yu, 
Wan Xian-Jian and Chen Yao-Xi contracted 380 mu (25.33 ha) of paddy fields 
in 1993 and 403 mu (28.87 ha) in 1994, being the largest farm of grain 
production in the City. (Wu & Hu 1995: 42)
There were also cases in which the members of a joint-households farm 
were few, all with relevant expertise and hardworking, led by one household, and 
could supervise work and distribute remuneration according to each’s labor 
contribution, although large machinery was not necessarily relied on. For 
example, in the mid-1980s, in the areas formerly flooded by the Yongding River 
and areas with more sandy land and fruit trees of Langfang Prefecture of Hebei 
Province, the village collectives could not provide effective services while single 
household operation was too weak, 1,135 joint-households farms emerged, on 
average contracting 55 mu (3.67 ha) per farm. In 1986, nine households of Ren 
Si-De et al contracted 160 mu (10.67 ha) of land. All the nine principal laborers 
were experts, three for fruit trees, two for melons and vegetables, and four for 
grain. They gathered funds of 11,000 yuan, dug a motor-pumped well, built six 
farm houses, planted 4,(XX) fruit trees, produced grain and oil crops on 1(X) mu 
(6.67 ha), melons and vegetables on 60 mu (4 ha), and could earn 18JXX) yuan,
2,000 yuan per labor. (Cao & Liu 1987: 34-35)
Collective farm 1: operating and accounting unit at household.
In such a collective farm, the operating and accounting unit was still at 
household, the farm being a managing unit only. The village appointed and paid 
one or two managers who were then responsible for unified planning in planting, 
coordinating and managing those farm works which needed collective work, and 
arranging technical services to the member households. The households were to 
fulfil the whole process of farm work and the contracted output quotas, be
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responsible for their own profits and losses and could dispose of surplus products. 
(Bai; Zhao & Pei 1988: 41). Such a household was actually also an individual 
farm (although not so called in practice) and was not much different from the 
above-mentioned individual household farm* except for its collective coordination, 
which could give the member households special services and help them to solve 
special problems so as to be competent in large-scale farming. (Zhang; Wang & 
Guo 1987: 15)
For example, in Shunyi County of Beijing in 1989, there were totally 497 
collective farms, with 43,656 laborers, operating 648,(XX) mu (43,200 ha) of 
farmland, on average 1,304 mu (86.93 ha) per farm and 15 mu (1 ha) per laborer. 
63.78 % or 317 of them were collective farms 1 (Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 
93).
Collective farm  2: operating unit at household level, accounting unit at 
both collective and household levels.
In the first section of this chapter, Bao Chan Dao Hu as the minor form 
of the Household Contract System was reviewed. It was also adopted for 
organizing expert farmers for large-scale farming.
The village assigned a few managers to organize a farm and contracted a 
large land and output quotas to it (which could also he attached to a rural 
collective firm TVE as its agricultural workshop), the farm was thus not only a 
managing unit but also an accounting unit. The farm further contracted output 
quotas to the member households. The farm undertook planning in planting, paid 
basic production costs, could dispose of products, with the remuneration to 
households based on a basic salary in money (although also could be in kind) 
subject to bonus and fine. The household was to fulfil the whole process of farm 
work and the contracted output quotas, hence functioning as both an operating and 
accounting unit (such a household was actually also an individual farm, although 
not so called in practice). (Bai; Zhao & Pei 1988: 41)
For example, in the above-mentioned 497 collective farms in Shunyi 
County of Beijing in 1989, 36.33 % or 180 were collective farms 2 (Pei, Chang- 
Hong et al 1992: 93).
In some collective farms of Wu County (Wuxian) of the Sunan region, 
there was an internal responsibility system called "five certains" - a certain 
person, certain land, certain yield, certain expenses, certain salary. Members were
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assigned certain parcels, given a certain target yield, and allowed a certain amount 
of expenses. If they met the target yield while staying within the target expenses, 
they could receive a fixed salary. The annual salary was 5,2(X) yuan in one village 
and 10,000 yuan in another, both exceeding the average pay for a village factory 
worker. If members exceeded the target yield, they could receive a bonus, and if 
they exceeded the target expenses, they would be penalized. If the collective farm 
as a whole earned a profit, 50 % of it would be given to the members. (Prosterm- 
an; Hanstad & Li July 1996: 18-19)
In some areas where TVEs were very strong and income from grain 
production was low, such a farm was attached to a TVE as a workshop for 
agriculture. The TVE could use its profits to pay expert farmers a salary 
equivalent to or higher than that of a firm worker, as an incentive for them to 
concentrate on grain production and a direct subsidy and support to agriculture.
It was called "integration between agriculture and industry" (Ran & Yang 1985: 
17) or "management of agriculture by industry" (RWD 1984: 31).
For example, during 1982-84, Xinxu Brigade (Village) of Huangtang 
Commune (Township) of Jiangyin County of Wuxi City of the Sunan region set 
up an agricultural workshop and recruited 16 households which had previously 
produced 1,500 kg of grain (as commodity sold to the state) upon 3 mu (0.2 ha) 
of responsibility land (as opposed to self-sufficiency land) as agricultural workers. 
A worker should produce an annual yield of 650 kg of grain per mu (0.067 ha), 
and the workshop paid him cost 80 yuan, agricultural tax 12 yuan and salary 160 
yuan per mu. He could retain straw, surplus grain output and cost savings, but 
inversely was liable for excess costs and should reimburse reduced output. The 
workshop took his revenue from selling grain, plus direct subsidies to his grain 
production by the Commune, and paid 8 yuan per mu to his Production Team as 
his dues for the common accumulation fund and common welfare fund. (RWD 
1984: 31)
Collective farm 3: both operating and accounting unit at collective.
The village designated some managers to set up a farm (which could also 
be attached to a TVE as its agricultural workshop) to contract large land and 
output quotas. The farm employed a number of laborers to conduct partial 
farming (their family members could always help them). The collective was thus 
not only a managing and accounting unit but also an operating unit, while a
laborer (or his family) no more constituted an actual individual farm. The internal 
responsibility system was "contracting work to laborers (households) - Bao Gong 
Dao Lao (Hu)". If the workers could fulfil the work, they could earn a fixed 
salary. Better or worse performance would lead to a bonus or penalty respectively. 
However» this type of collective farms was still relatively few.
For example» Songjiang County of Shanghai started large-scale farming in 
1984. Miaobang Village o f Xinqiao Township set up a farm by gathering 205 mu 
(13.67 ha) of grain land from its three villager groups (previously production 
teams), the director of the village being the manager concurrently. Under the 
investment by the Village and Township, in 1989, the whole process of wheat 
production and sowing of rice were mechanized, and irrigation facilities 
completed. Farm laborers were responsible for the work which still could not be 
done by machinery, like managing field and harvesting rice under single cropping. 
The average income of members of the farm was a bit higher than that per local 
laborer. [Jiang, Zhong-Yi et al 1992 (a): 51, 58]
In Wu County (Wuxian) of the Sunan region, one collective farm of 303 
mu (20.2 ha) had four member farmers and one manager. Another collective farm 
of 250 mu (16.7 ha) had three member laborers, a manager and a deputy 
manager. Each member farmer did the weeding and irrigation on his assigned 
land, but the plowing, transplanting, fertilization, pesticide application and 
harvesting were done jointly on a uniform basis. The managers had duties for 
oversight and technical advice. The member farmers were obliged to follow them, 
and if not, they could be replaced by others who would. (Prosterman; Hanstad & 
Li July 1996: 19)
In general, the above collective farms were also called specialized 
teams19. Being able to receive collective help, such farms (teams) developed 
relatively quickly. Table 5.10 shows that in the per household contracted land in 
specialized teams, the smallest (under 0.666 ha) decreased during 1986-92, except
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19 In some areas, e.g., Shunyi County of Bei jing (Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 
93), only collective farm 1 was called so. In some others, e.g., Langfang 
Prefecture of Hebei Province (Cao & Liu 1987: 35), collective farm 2 was also 
called so. In some further others, e.g., Jiangsu Province (Jiang, Ji-Feng 1986: 23), 
only those not attached to TVEs were called so. But they were all called so by 
CEST.
for the Western part in 1990-92; and the average land area increased during 1986- 
92, except for the Eastern part in 1990-92. The ratio of the area contracted by the 
specialized teams to the total contracted farmland area of the country was 1.6 % 
in 1990 and increased to 2.6 % in 1992 and 5.9 % in 1994 (CEST 1991: 37. 
CEST 1993: 45. CEST 1996: 38).
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Nevertheless, in 1994, of 6,056,300 ha of land under appropriate large- 
scale farming, 83.8 % or 5,074,100 ha were under individual household farms
Table 5.10 Land Contracted per Household in Specialized Teams of China
1986-92 (in percentage) *
Coun- Aver- % Under 0.666- 1.4- 3.4- 6.733- 13.4- 33.4
try age 0.666 1.333 3.333 6.666 13.333 33.333 ha
area ha ha ha ha ha ha and
(ha) over
1986 4.5 16.5
1988 5.17 12.5
1990 5.68 11.5
1992 6.8 100 10.3 82.1 1.2 1.5 2.7 2.1 0.1
East-
cm
1986 4.53 18.6
1988 5.47 13.0
1990 6.4 11.4
1992 5.34 100 10.6 84.2 1.3 0.7 1.8 1.3 0.1
Cen-
trai
1986 3.93 22.5
1988 5.47 18.1
1990 6.2 11.9
1992 12.94 100 8.3 70.7 2.1 10.0 6.2 2.7 0
West-
em
1986 3.87 8.6
1988 4.07 8.6
1990 3.87 8.4
1992 8.526 100 10.3 80.1 0.5 l.l 4.0 3.6 0.4
* Samples from 7,983 Villages of over 200 Counties in 29 Provinces, Municipalities and
Autonomous Regions (without Tibet and Taiwan).
Source: CEST 1993: 48.
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Table 5.11 Organizations of Large- Scale Farmers
Changshu City of China 1989
Individual Joint- Collective
household households farm 2
Total large-scale 
farming units:
% % %
190 145 76.32 9 4.74 36 18.95
Total area:
11046.4 mu 8037.1 72.76 564 5.11 2445.3 22.14
(736.43 ha) (535.81) (37.6) (163.02)
Total laborers: 
536 343 63.99 27 5.04 166 31.03
Area per unit: 55.4 62.7 68
mu (ha) (3.69) (4.18) (4.53)
Area per laborer: 23.4 20.9 14.7
mu (ha) (1.56) (1.39) (0.98)
Source: Jiang, Zhong-Yi et al 1992 (c): 80-81.
(including the joint form), and only 16.2 % or 982,200 ha under collective farms 
(CEST 1996: 40) (Table 5.11 shows the similar ratio in Changshu City in 1989). 
The collective farms were also based on households as the operating and 
accounting unit (in 1 and 2) or on internal responsibility system closely related 
to the individual worker’s performance (in 3), and thus different from the 
previous collective faims under the unique collective operation of land before the 
economic reform. In Songjiang County of Shanghai, Yuyao City of Zhejiang 
Province and Changshu City of the Sunan region, there existed all the above- 
mentioned forms of individual household farms, joint-households farms, and 
collective farms. Farmland operated by a farming unit in each form varied from 
15 mu (1 ha) to 1,000 mu (66 ha). (Jiang; He; Wang et al 1992: 15-16)
Urban-rural joint enterprise.
This is not strictly within the focus of the chapter. However, in order to 
show that public land ownership could allow urban enterprises to participate in 
agriculture for large-scale farming in such a scope that cannot be expected under 
the present private land ownership system o f Japan, some examples are given.
In 1995, dozens of enterprises in construction, textile, brewery, etc. of
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Shaoxing County of Zhejiang Province started to invest in agriculture, including 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and related off-farm activities. They 
all made large investments (over 1 million yuan once in each item), used high 
technology and implemented economies of scale. As a result, they all gained 
profits and then reinvested them in agriculture. Yongli Group - a large enterprise 
of textile machinery - of Yangxunqiao Town planted rice in over 100 mu (6.7 ha) 
of land and achieved output of over 50,000 kg. Xianheng Group of brewery look 
over Jiefang Reservoir of Lanting Town, built water conservancy projects which 
ensured stable yields despite drought or excessive rain to nearly l.(HK) mu (66.7 
ha) of farmland in the nearby nine villages, and gained profits from developing 
fishery in 800 mu (53.33 ha) of water surface. Green Group signed contracts with 
3,000 peasant households for producing vegetables without pollution and selling 
them to the Group for export. Totally 4,000 mu (266.67 ha) of waste mountain 
and 1,000 mu of waste water were reclaimed. (Xin & Zhao 1996)
Since the beginning of 1995, over 50 large and medium industrial 
enterprises of Guangdong Province have, with the plan of investing totally several 
billions of yuan, invested more than 1 billion yuan in agriculture of not only the 
Province itself, but also Heilongjiang Province, Jiling Province, Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region, Hexi Corridor (in the West of Yellow River) of Gansu 
Province, and plain between the Yellow River and Huaihai R iver0. Via 
investment, cooperation, purchase, etc., Shennong (meaning magical agriculture) 
Development Corporation Ltd established by Sanjiu Group of Shenzhen City (a 
Special Economic Zone near Hong Kong) has entered agriculture. The assets of 
the agricultural enterprises it held has reached over 1 billion yuan in 1996, 
yielded taxes and profits of 100 million yuan from agricultural items, and 
increased the income of over 300,000 peasant households in 1995. In Heilongjia­
ng Province, Haowei Group of Shenzhen City invested 220 million yuan in 
developing Zhenbaodao Farm of 385,000 mu (25,666.67 ha) of land together with 
some partners there, which was the largest overall agricultural development 
project invested by urban enterprises of the whole country. Once completed, it 20
20 Heilongjiang Province and Jiling Province are in the Northeast part, 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Gansu Province Western part, and the 
plain between the Yellow River and Huaihai River Central part of China.
could produce over 58 million kg of grain and soybeans, IO,(XX) oxen for meat, 
350,000 kg of fish, and over 500,(XX) kg of vegetables. (Wang, Yun-Feng 1996)
External and foreign venture.
Chinese public land ownership could permit external and foreign ventures 
into domestic agriculture in large-scale, which is unimaginable under the private 
land ownership system o f  Japan.
In Panshidian Village of Panshidian Town of Haiyang County o f  
Shandong Province21, there was a land of 300 mu (20 ha), in which the peasants 
had been reluctant to make more investment so that the yield of taro could not be  
raised for many years. In the spring of 1995, the Village signed a contract w ith 
Chen Zong-Tong of Singapore who had established the Tongda Food Company 
Ltd under single venture in nearby Yantai City: the Village leased it to the  
Company for 10 years for setting up Tongda Farm for producing grain, oil crops 
or vegetables only; land could not be desolated and no buildings be constructed 
upon. The annual rent of 100,000 yuan, plus salary to farmers in the Farm, cou ld  
bring net revenue of 200,000 yuan to peasants, equivalent to over three tim es 
average revenue under normal harvest years. The rent was used in establishing 
off-farm projects and welfare services to villagers. The Farm invested in th e  
renovation of water conservancy facilities, applied sufficient base fertilizer before 
sowing, and invited highly eligible agricultural scientists and technicians to g u id e  
farmers in scientific management of taro cultivation. Yield would be over 2,5(K) 
kg per mu, 70 % higher than the average local yield. Taro would be sent to th e  
Company to be processed and then exported. After examining the Farm in  
August, foreign businessmen were very happy with the quality and orders already 
extended to Aug. 1996. Meanwhile peasants not only learned advanced 
technologies, but also gained a new idea "To earn high revenue from planting 
taro, large investment is necessary". (Gong & Wang 1995)
In the Yangtze River Delta (including Shanghai, a part of Z hejiang  
Province and Jiangsu Province) which has the best natural conditions, d en sest 
population, highest output of commodity grain, and highest living standard in  
China, companies from over 20 external regions and foreign countries including 
Taiwan, Hong Kong; Australia, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, U S
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Shandong Province is in the Eastern part of China,21
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have invested in agriculture in recent years. During 1994-96. in the state farms 
in its southern part - Hangjiahu plain of Zhejiang Province, over 40 external and 
foreign ventures, with a total investment nearing US$ 100 million, were set up; 
while in its northern part - the Sunan region, 700 ventures, over US$ 200 million. 
In its further northern part, Nantong City of Jiangsu Province, an external overall 
agricultural development zone with 28,000 ha of sea beach was founded in Oct. 
1995. It was planned to develop it for the production, process and export of grain, 
cotton, oil crops, fishery products by 2001. The state has given incentives in 
terms of taxes, land use, etc. By June 1996, over 10 joint ventures had been 
established, with total investment of 17 million yuan. (Zhang; Zhu & Shi 1996)
In sharp contrast, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is one of the areas 
with the most unfavorable natural conditions, scarcest population, largest waste 
land (10 million ha of reclaimable land plus mountains and the Gobi Desert), and 
lowest living standard in China. At the beginning of the 1990s, the state decided 
to develop the Region into the largest base of cotton production and an important 
base of grain production of the country. It implemented various favorable policies 
(including long-term land leasing) to attract domestic, external and foreign 
investors to reclaim waste land, with the first 500,000 ha to be achieved by 2001. 
Since 1994, businessmen from Hong Kong, Canada, Israel, US, etc., together with 
Chinese domestic industrial and commercial companies from the Eastern and 
Central parts, have invested on a large scale. Compared with the previous 
reclaimers, they made much more investment, carried out much larger-scale 
farming with higher level of mechanization and more advanced technologies. (Li, 
Da-Dong 1996)
The above examples in urban-rural joint enterprises and external and 
foreign ventures, and their stretch into the Central and Western parts of China 
also reflected features 11 and 12 of the Chinese model of rural development.
Concerning the trend in the organizations o f large-scale farmers, 
according to Tables 5.9 and 5.10, small-scale farms in both individual household 
farms and collective farms would be decreasing and large-scale ones increasing. 
Even in the long run, individual household farms may still be the major form in 
the whole country, but collective farms may grow more quickly. Urban-rural joint 
enterprises and external and foreign ventures in China’s agriculture may well 
develop further.
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Agricultural Mechanization with Large Machinery
After getting more land to operate, the family labor force of the large-scale 
farmers was usually not enough. Take for example a household in Tanjia Village 
of Lulong Town of Lu County of Hebei Province which contracted 95 mu (6.33 
ha) of land in 1987. Due to still using cattle plus hoes by family members, net 
income per mu reduced to 80 yuan, less by over 100 yuan than that in small-scale 
farming. (Lu, Nong 1988: 42)
Thus, wage labor employment by large-scale farmers had been widespread 
across the country by the early 1990s (Caidisi 1992: 165). In some areas, 70 % 
of them did so (Liang & Wang 1988: 18).
Various problems occurred. For example, in some individual large-scale 
farms in Xinzhou Prefecture of Shanxi Province, hired labor force accounted for 
60.2 % - 80 % of their total labor force, thus labor productivity was not raised. 
Most of them were hired for the busy seasons, few for the whole year. Due to 
shortage of local skillful able-bodied laborers who were mainly engaged in off- 
farm production, most of the local employees were aged, female, weak, less 
skilled, and were only available after they had finished farm work on their own 
land, thus missing the best liming, and harming the output for the employers. It 
was difficult to supervise varied manual farm work with simple tools, which led 
to careless farming. Labor costs rose quickly and reached 31.2 %, even 45.7 %, 
of the total costs. (Zhang & Xing 1985: 54). Laborers from outside also were a t 
lower quality, because most of them were from poorer rural areas, with low 
literacy levels, and highly mobile, as reported, e.g., in Suzhou City of the Sunan 
region (Shi & Zhang 1987: 23).
Thus it became necessary for the large-scale farmers to use large 
machinery to reduce costs, especially labor costs. Dividing land into compact 
forms (rectangular or square) and constructing roads among them made large 
machinery usable. Table 4.1 "Comparison of Rice Production Costs by Farm Size 
in Japan 1953-94" in Chapter 4 showed that as farm size increased, by using large 
machinery since 1970, total costs, labor costs, machinery and power costs 
decreased significantly. Such data for China as a whole are unavailable. But 
individual reports indicate the same trend. For example, labor costs continuously 
rose year after year in the Sunan region. In 1987, manual transplanting of rice
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seedlings per mu cost 20 yuan, while a transplanter costing 4,000 yuan could 
serve 200 mu (13.33 ha). Therefore, if it were bought, the investment could he 
offset within one year by savings in labor costs. According to such calculation, 
Ouqiao Village of Miaoqiao Town of Zhangjiagang City bought five transplanters 
in 1986, which demonstrated good results. In 1987, 50 were bought in the whole 
Town. In the same year, Zhengyi State Farm of Kunshan County decided to use 
mechanical transplanters for all transplanting. Besides, during the busy seasons, 
inviting relatives and friends to help with farm work meant incurring entertain­
ment costs. A table of good meal cost 40-50 yuan. Thus peasants were willing to 
pay fees for machinery services. (Qiu, Wei-Lian 1987: 29)
Owning machines was better for farmers than no machines. For example, 
an investigation of nearly 200 expert grain farmers in over 310 counties of 27 
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in 1983 showed that on average 
those households which owned motive power machines [some of them even 
operated over 500 mu (33.3 ha) of farmland] could sell over 1,450 kg of 
commodity grain and earn 720 yuan, while those without any machines could 
only sell over 1,100 kg and earn 558 yuan (both in terms of per capita), the 
former being 32 % and 29 % higher than the latter respectively (Zhou, Xiao 
1984: 35).
However, owning machines also implied constraints. For example, it was 
found in Suzhou City of the Sunan region and Beijing that households could not 
afford large investment, especially in buying complete sets of large machinery; 
the use of self-owned machinery was limited, resulting in diseconomies of scale 
and high cost; it was difficult for farmers to both till land and manage and 
maintain machines, which also required special knowledge and much time (Fan, 
Kun-Tian 1987: 63. Bai; Zhao & Pei 1988: 41-42).
Therefore, while (1) encouraging those large-scale farmers who could 
afford to buy and efficiently use large machinery to do so, many areas also 
promoted (2) specialized individual households, or (3) joint households, or (4) 
collectives to give machinery services to large-scale farms. For example, 
Lingkuang Town of Zhongxiang County of Hubei Province had all four of these 
forms (Wang, Wei-Jia 1987: 35). An investigation of 2,277 specialized house­
holds in over 310 counties of 27 provinces, municipalities and autonomous 
regions in 1983 revealed that 66 % or 1,500 of them were specialized in
providing machinery services to farming, livestock raising, repairing, transporting 
and processing (Zhou, Xiao 1984: 35). In 1989, Jiangxiang Village of Changshu 
City of the Sunan region invested 465,(XH) yuan in setting up a collective general 
agricultural service station, which employed 47 technicians and provided services 
in agricultural machinery, technology, irrigation and plant protection to all 
households, priority being given to large-scale farms. 80 % of transplanting and 
99 % of harvesting were mechanized. By charging fees, the station earned gross 
revenue of 120,000 yuan and net income of 4,(XX) yuan in 1991. During 1989-91, 
the investment in agricultural machinery in the whole City was 9,320.000 yuan 
which added 1,675 sets with 14,000 horse-power to the existing machinery. 
[Jiang, Zhong-Yi 1992 (c): 82-83]
As large-scale farming proceeded, in Zhejiang Province in 1994, there was 
a "hot wave" of purchasing large machinery including irrigating and draining 
equipment, trench diggers, walking tractors, manure vehicles, manure appliers, 
ploughing machines, sowers, factory-style plant and equipment for raising rice 
seedlings, motor transplanters, insect eliminators, ordinary harvesters, comhine 
harvesters, electric threshers, motor boats, trucks, etc., mechanizing the whole 
process of grain production including ploughing, irrigating, draining, raising rice 
seedlings, transplanting, protecting plant, applying fertilizer, harvesting, threshing 
and transporting (Ding; Wei; Yang & Sang 1995: 25), In 1995, on 650,000 mu 
of land in Jiangyin County of the Sunan region, there were 1,5(X) sets (kits) of 
large and medium tractors and combine harvesters. The degree of machinery 
ploughing and threshing reached almost 100 %. Each village had machinery 
service team. (Liu; Kong & Liu 1995). Hence feature 10 o f  agricultural 
mechanization with large machinery in the Chinese model of rural development.
Optimal Size o f Large-Scale Farms
Various practices in China have shown that large-scale farms have been 
better than small-scale ones in achieving lower costs, higher labor productivity, 
higher output, higher commodity grain rate22, higher income per worker/househ­
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22 Commodity grain rale is the ratio of commodity grain quantity to the total 
grain output. For example, if of 1(X) kg of grain, 80 kg were sold, then the 
commodity grain rate was 80 %.
old and higher yield per land unit, or higher overall appraisal combining all these 
indicators (even if some of the indicators may be worse than in the small-scale 
ones). By gradually hiring less wage labor, using more machinery on larger land, 
and phasing out direct subsidies, costs of large-scale farms could be lowered from 
the initially higher level. But labor productivity, output, commodity grain rate, and 
income per farm would be raised even with the same yield, as long as the 
expansion rate of land exceeded that of labor force. Thus, the key indicator of the 
better economic results of large-scale farms was higher yield. These practices 
have also demonstrated that if farms were larger than an optimal size, the above 
indicators would be sub-optimal. The optimal farm size, however, varied across 
time and place, and was dynamically determined by the degree of agricultural 
mechanization, infrastructure, services, the operating and managing skills of large- 
scale farmers, the economic structures (urban-rural, industry-agriculture, import- 
export, etc.), cost/profit ratio, etc.
For example. Table 5.12 shows that as the degree of agricultural 
mechanization was enhanced, farm size could be enlarged. It also points out the 
optimal size of large-scale farms under different degrees of mechanization in three 
major areas of grain production of the country in the mid-1980s.
Tables 5.13,5.14 and 5.15 indicate that while large-scale farms were better 
than small-scale ones, there was also an optimal size per household. This was 20- 
30 mu (1.33-2 ha) in six counties and cities (rice, wheat and maize) across the 
country in 1990-91, 35-39.9 mu (2.33-2.66 ha) in the suburbs of Bei jing (wheat 
and maize) in the mid-1980s, and 10.1-15 mu (0.673-1 ha) in Wuxi County in 
1986. Table 5.13 does not provide data on costs. In Table 5.14, the optimal size 
gave the highest per mu cost of all farm sizes, but its overall appraisal combining 
all indicators was also the highest. In Table 5.15, the optimal size earned the 
highest per mu income without direct subsidy implying the lowest per mu cost, 
and the highest per mu yield.23
The optimal size of large-scale farms should be ascertained by practice and 
experiment. For instance, in 1993, large-scale farmer Wan Ying-Gan of Xintang 
Village of Lecheng Town of Leqing County of Zhejiang Province operated 8 ha
Chapter 5 255
23 The observations in Tables 5.12-5.15 are not large enough for running 
regressions. More detailed data, however, are unavailable.
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9
of grain land. In 1994» however, rather than expanding farm size gradually, he 
immediately enlarged it to 16 ha, leading to the decline of his net income from 
16,800 yuan to 16,000 yuan. In 1995, he reduced the size to 7 ha, resulting a net 
income of 75,000 yuan. (Wu; Yu & Zhu 1996: 15)
Subsidies and Self-Reliance
As already stated, in the high wage economy, income from grain (and 
other major agricultural products like cotton, oil crops) production upon small 
farms was very low in comparison with that from other lines. Raising income of 
expert grain farmers by enlarging their farm size was, however, constrained by 
not squeezing out those peasants who could not yet find jobs in non-grain 
agriculture and off-farm activities, insufficient services (irrigation, machinery, 
etc.), inferior infrastructure, the operating and managing skill of the expert 
farmers themselves, etc. Under such circumstances, large-scale farmers should be 
helped.
Initially, as the first stage, villages and local governments (townships, 
counties, prefectures) might have to use direct subsidies gained from non-grain 
agriculture and off-farm lines to promote the formation of large-scale grain 
farmers, so that by contracting larger responsibility land, grain producers could 
earn an income equivalent to, or higher than that from other lines. An investiga­
tion into 253 villages in 26 provinces and municipalities around 1990 showed that
23.7 % of them implemented a policy of subsidizing agriculture by industry (yi 
gong bu nong). The forms varied from giving a certain amount of money to grain 
farmers on the basis of per laborer engaged solely in farming (6.7 9c of the 
villages, on average 26.5 yuan per month), or per mu of responsibility land (16.7 
%, 42.7 yuan), or in proportion to the output in quota (26.7 %, 13.6 yuan per l(K) 
kg), or to the extra output sold to the state (6.7 %, 22.5 yuan per 100 kg); to 
charging less or no fees on providing collective services (68.3 %), in which 3.8 
% of poor villages (annual per capita income up to 3(X) yuan) subsidized 6 yuan 
per mu, 1.9 % of lower-middle income villages (300-450 yuan) 2 yuan per mu,
12.8 % of middle-income villages (450-650 yuan) 6.18 yuan per mu, 20 % of 
upper-middle villages (650-900 yuan) 13.5 yuan per mu, 43.2 % of high income 
villages (900 yuan and over) 13.66 yuan per mu. Therefore, contracting larger
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land and producing higher output could get more direct subsidies, hence incentive 
to become large-scale grain farmers. (Jiang; He; Wang et al 1992: 31-32). Other 
forms were to charge more collective fees (village drawn fees and township 
drawn fees) from non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines, but less or no fees 
from large-scale grain farmers; give direct subsidies to them in proportion to their 
yield per mu; or divert a part of profits of TVEs to them (as in the above- 
mentioned agricultural workshop of TVEs).
For example, in 1983, communes, brigades and teams of Yanhei Prefecture 
of Shanxi Province charged more collective drawn fees from non-grain agriculture 
and off-farm lines, but less or no fees from large-scale grain farmers. 2-3 million 
yuan as part of the financial resources in reserve of the Prefecture, counties and 
communes was used on direct subsidies to large-scale grain farmers in 1983. (Lin 
& Tao 1983: 7)
At the second stage, as the large-scale farmers became able to stand on 
their own feet to earn an income equivalent to or higher than that from other lines 
in a competitive way, the direct subsidies could and should be phased out, so that 
they would not rely on them.
For example, Huangjiabu Town of Yuyao City of Zhejiang Province 
started the Dual Land System (although called trio land system: self-sufficiency 
land, responsibility land, plus reserve land which before being used on other 
purposes in rural development was treated as responsibility land) in two villages 
in 1993 and four in 1994-95. Responsibility land was contracted for live years to 
expert farmers. Initially, it was distributed without via bidding (larger land to 
farmers with more expertise and smaller land to those with less expertise judged 
upon their previous performance). Villages subsidized them by a certain amount 
of money per mu and machinery services in ploughing and ini gating free of 
charge. Then, bidding was introduced in Huajia Village and Xihua Village which 
allowed non-villagers to participate with priority to villagers. In order to win the 
competition, some expert farmers not only did not need the direct subsidies per 
mu, but also wished to pay contract fees (or rent) per mu and fees for machinery 
services, thus won. In early 1996, in the whole Town, 1,288 mu (85.87 ha) of 
farmland were operated by expert farmers, with 20 households contracting over 
10 mu (0.67 ha) and 10 households over 100 mu (6.67 ha). (Qian; Shi & Xie 
1996: 27-29, 32)
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During 1985-86, large-scale farmers in Jintan County of the Sunan region 
voluntarily contracted larger land without direct subsidies, achieved grain 
production better than that by small-scale farmers and earned an income higher 
than that of off-farm workers (Qian, Wei-Zen 1987: 16-17).
At both the first and second stages, villages and local governments could 
also divert a part of profits of non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines, as indirect 
subsidies, to the improvement of services, infrastructure and technology in 
agriculture, which could significantly reduce costs in grain production, help large- 
scale grain farmers to get rid of direct subsidies earlier and upgrade the overall 
rural development. This was usually called constructing agriculture by industry 
(yi gong jian nong). The indirect subsidies were more significant, fundamental, 
long-term and wider benefiting than the direct ones. Much importance should be 
attached to and emphasis put on them by villages and local governments over a 
long period. Villages could also reinvest gains contributed by large-scale grain 
farmers themselves (e.g., contract fees, rent) in the improvement of services, 
infrastructure and technology in agriculture.
Take an example of the indirect subsidies at the first stage. In the above- 
mentioned Yanbei Prefecture, Liaohuozhuang Brigade realized a revenue of
200.000 yuan from non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines in 1982. Besides 
giving direct subsidies, it spent 60,000 yuan as indirect subsidies on farmland 
infrastructure, built three irrigation stations and 6,000 m of canals, and levelled
6.000 mu (400 ha) of land. (Lin & Tao 1983: 7)
Such an example at the second stage was the aforementioned Huajia 
Village and Xihua Village of Huangjiabu Town of Yuyao City of Zhejiang 
Province where large-scale farmers did not need direct subsidies and paid fees for 
contracting land and receiving services in 1994-95. Nevertheless, the Town and 
Villages still gave indirect subsidies to the improvement of services, construction 
of infrastructure (including ditches, canals, roads), and the adoption of new 
technology and techniques, and purchase of large machinery by these large-scale 
farmers. (Qian; Shi & Xie 1996: 29)
A more significant example was Changshu City of the Sunan region where 
the large-scale farmers formed via bidding under the Dual Land System in 1989 
could not enjoy direct subsidies and had to pay a contract fee per mu plus other 
collective fees which were then reinvested in the promotion of services,
infrastructure and technology in agriculture. During 1989-91, the City’s invested
9,320,000 yuan in agricultural machinery, which increased by 1,675 sets (kits) 
with a total of 14,000 horsepower. In 22 large-scale farming units of eight 
demonstration villages situated around Xiaoshan Village of Dayi Town, the whole 
process in rice and wheat production was basically mechanized. Thus, mechanized 
sowing of rice was carried out on 76.5 % of the total farmland, and combine 
harvesters for both rice and wheat were used on 82.6 lor realizing modern 
irrigating and draining system, 1,325,000 yuan were invested, 128,600 man-days 
put and 312,000 cubic meters of earth completed in constructing 30 km of under­
ground cement pipelines for carrying water, covering 7,337 mu or 60 % of the 
whole area of these villages. As a result, higher yield was achieved. The average 
annual per mu yield of grain was 727 kg, higher than that of these villages and 
of the City by 4.1 % and 11 % respectively. In 1990, due to unfavorable natural 
conditions, the average per mu yield of wheat of the City dropped to 184 kg, 
lower than that in 1989 by 21.7 %, but that of these large-scale farming units 
reduced to 230 kg, lower than that in 1989 by 1.9 % only. In 1991, the same item 
of these units recovered to 281.5 kg, 4.8 % and 9.8 % higher than that of these 
villages and of the City respectively. Higher labor productivity was reached, as 
the average annual output of grain per laborer went to 11,300 kg, 9.7 limes that 
of the City. Higher commodity grain rate was realized. Their average annual rate 
of 90.4 % was higher than that of the City by 65.2 %. Thus they were no more 
traditional self-sufficient small farmers, but modern commodity grain producers. 
Higher income per laborer was earned. Their average annual net income per 
laborer increased to 4,148 yuan, 2.2 limes that of TVEs of the City and 2.48 
times that of the City. High input-output ratio was gained. Although they had to 
pay for machinery services, due to economies of scale, the ratio was still as high 
as 1:1.82. [Jiang, Zhong-Yi et al 1992 (c): 81-841. Although other factors also 
contributed to the above achievements, the policy of constructing agriculture by 
industry played an important part.
At the third stage, the large-scale farmers became more competent and 
could even give up the construction fees by the industry. Of course, there is still 
a long way before reaching this stage in the whole country. In 1990, however, 
Shunyi County of Beijing was already near it, which is shown below as an 
example.
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Each year before 1986-87, under the Equal Land System, the County, 
townships and villages had to divert 30 million yuan of off-farm profits to 
agriculture, which were dispersed in direct subsidies to agricultural tax. collective 
fees, irrigation, tillage, electricity, fertilizer, etc. Each year since then, under the 
Single Land System, the large-scale farms could accumulate 40-50 million yuan, 
thus the direct subsidies were changed to indirect ones on improving services and 
infrastructure like agricultural machinery and water conservancy. As the large- 
scale farms could become stronger and stronger on their own feet, they could 
gradually reduce and even finally waive the "blood transfusion” from off-farm 
profits. (Liaison 1989: 38). The strength of the large-scale farms, as some of the 
major benefits of the large-scale farming and collective-individual mixed 
economy, is indicated below.
Increase o f income o f agricultural labor force. Compared with the annual 
income per laborer of 400-600 yuan by contracting 3-5 mu (0.2-0.33 ha) under 
the Equal Land System, it was raised to 1,800-4,100 yuan by contracting 26.2 mu 
(1.75 ha) on average in 1988. (Liaison 1989: 36)
Growth o f grain production. During 1985-89, although the area of grain 
land continuously declined, the total output, per mu yield, and sale of commodity 
grain to the state successively increased as Table 5.16 shows. In 1989. the 
commodity grain rate of the large-scale farms reached 56 accounting for 93 
% of the total commodity grain of the County. In 1990, the total output and per 
mu yield continued to increase. (Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 94). Their sale of 
grain to the state increased by a big margin, because they wanted to contribute 
to the state by selling more grain (even though compared with the free market 
prices, the quota prices were much lower and negotiable prices might also be 
lower), so that the state could strengthen its position in grain reserve and stabilize 
the grain supply situation of the country.
Progress in agricultural mechanization with both small and large 
machinery. During 1986-88, 200 million yuan were invested in agricultural 
machinery by the County, townships and villages. 384 large and medium tractors, 
and 1,053 small ones, 1,252 trucks for agricultural use, 459 combine harvesters, 
150 maize harvesters, 136 large, medium and small seeders, 146 precision maize 
seeders, nine stove drying machines were purchased. Motive power of the 
agricultural machinery and that per 100 mu (6.67 ha) of grain land were raised
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from 516,000 h.p. (horsepower) and 73.7 h.p. in 1985 to 642.000 h.p. and 91.7 
h.p. in 1988 respectively. Machinery sowing and harvesting lor wheat reached 100 
% and 87 %, for maize 63 % and 14 % respectively. The period for major farm 
work like planting, tilling and harvesting in the summer and autumn was reduced 
from about two months to 15-20 days. (Liaison 1989: 37). The composition and 
procurement of machinery were according to the goal of finishing harvesting and 
planting in the summer within seven days, and those in the autumn within 10
Table 5.16 Growth of Grain Production 
in Shunyi County of China 1980-89
Year Area of grain 
land (ha)
Total output 
(tn)
Yield per mu 
(kg)
Sale to the 
stale (tn)
1985 48216.9 426.520 589.5 96,245
1986 46785.3 431,505 615 107,370
1987 46801.3 471,590 671.5 158,785
1988 46769.5 496,000 707 160,000
1989 46468.9 512,110 734.7 200,000
Source: Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 87. Liaison 1989: 36.
Table 5.17 Possession of Agricultural Machinery (set) 
in Shunyi County of China 1987-90
Machinery 1987
quantity
1988
increment
1990
increment
1990
quantity
Large & medium tractor 1898 500 600 3000
Wheat combine harvester 574 200 250 800 *
Maize harvester 55 300 450 8(H)
Maize sower 61 140 50 250
Wheat rotary sower 123 297 420
Grain stoving machine # 4 30 16 50
Truck for agricultural use 1378 500 1000 3(KX)
Irrigating sprayer 3(H) 400 1300 2(XH)
Spraying area (ha) 4666.7 6666.7 22000 33333.3
* Original sum may be wrongly calculated. The sum is 1024.
# Stoving 15 tn per set per hour.
Source: Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 94-95.
days (Pei, Chang-Hong et al 1992: 94). Table 5.17 provides a general picture.
Popularization o f advanced technology. The area of chemical weeding was 
enlarged from 256,000 mu (17,066.67 ha) in 1985, 333,000 mu (22,200 ha) in 
1986, 626,000 mu (41,733.33 ha) in 1987 to 740,(XX) mu (49,333.33 ha) in 1988, 
and that for wheat from 40 % in 1985 to 97 % in 1988. Compared with canal 
irrigation, spraying could increase yield by 20-30 %, save water by 30-50 7t and 
raise the utilization rate of land by 7-10 %. The area using airplanes to prevent 
plant disease and insect pest was maintained at about 4(K),000 mu (26.666.67 ha), 
accounting for 63.5 % of the wheat land. Plastic film, fertilizer in prescription, 
stoving of grain, returning of straws to land, bacteria to increase yield, fine seeds, 
etc. were also popularized by a big margin. (Liaison 1989: 36-37)
Promotion o f  non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines. Since the 
implementation of the Single Land System, of the total 223.000 laborers of the 
County, only 23,800 remained in grain production. 40,000 were released to non­
staple foodstuffs, 10,000 to commerce and 150,000 to TVEs. In 1988, the output 
of egg, poultry, meat, and vegetables reached one quarter of the total output of 
Beijing. The total income of the rural firms increased from one billion yuan in 
1986 to 2,2 billion yuan in 1988. (Liaison 1989: 38)
Major Problems
Regarding the technical aspect in promoting large-scale farming, the 
problems were mainly the insufficient services and technological progress. 
Therefore, they should be strengthened, especially in improving infrastructure and 
machinery. For example, in 1995, in one village of Wuxi County of the Sunan 
region, the large-scale farmers did not use machinery to harvest rice, because the 
fields were too wet for the domestically manufactured combines owned by the 
village, while the Japanese combines which would work were prohibitively 
expensive for the village even with the indirect subsidies on machinery purchases. 
They had to hire migrant workers to harvest the rice. (Prosterman; Hanstad & Li 
July 1996:22). In 1995-96, in Yuzhuang Village and Xikong Village of Tengzhou 
City of Shandong Province, per mu yield of wheat had been raised to over 600 
kg. But the existing combine harvesters o f various trade marks could not work in 
the fields with per mu yield higher than 500 kg. (CCJ 1996)
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V. Theoretical Discussion
Concerning the Elimination of Individual Bargains
Compared with in Japan, land consolidation and expansion to overcome 
the fragmented small farms as the last obstacle imposed by the monsoon in 
sustainable rural development of Asia were much smoother in China. The 
fundamental reason was the land tenure system. Under the village collective form 
of land ownership of China, the bargaining power of the part-time farmers and 
absentees who held contracted land for inefficient use and imposed negative 
pecuniary externalities on the full-time farmers and the society was much weaker. 
Thus, the village could function as a typical firm within which, as Coase 
supposes, the individual bargains between the various cooperating factors of 
production are eliminated and a market transaction is substituted by an administra­
tive decision by an entrepreneur who directs resources with authority. Their 
inefficiently used land could be transferred to full-time and expert farmers for 
efficient use at much lower transaction costs - educating them on the importance 
of efficient use of land and large-scale farming; providing them with self- 
sufficiency land for establishing the Dual Land System, and selling them self­
consumption grain at prices lower than market levels plus family plots for vegeta­
bles for setting up the Single Land System, which could render them a back-up 
basic social welfare and win the majority and even unanimous agreement of them; 
obliging those who still refused to give up land to participate in bidding together 
with expert farmers, thus either winning or losing the contract. Approach 1 of 
assigning property rights for eliminating negative externalities (permission for the 
relevant parties to exchange property rights through a political or legal process, 
followed by market exchange) and Approach 2 [implementation of social actions 
(law, tax, etc.) to oblige the externality-yielding party to exchange property rights, 
followed by market exchange] were applied, which were also applications of 
mixed economy: multiple structures of public and private ownership, and 
government intervention.
Collective land ownership has always been despised as anti-market 
economy by the main stream Western economists (represented by Hayek and 
Friedman). Since the end of the 1980s, decollectivization has been in fashion in
Eastern Europe and Russia. Interesting enough, under private land ownership in 
Japan, land could not be operated according to market principle of competition 
(recalling that "competitive" means that resources can move smoothly in response 
to prices, i.e., without being monopolistically or oligopolistically held with 
bargaining power, as reviewed in Chapter 3), thus indeed anti-market economy; 
but under collective land ownership in China, it could, hence pro-market 
economy. Therefore, collective land ownership not only does not exclude a 
market economy, it even strengthens it under a collective-individual mixed 
economy.
Government intervention has also been scorned and regarded as closely 
related with public ownership of the means of production by the main stream 
Western economists. Therefore, private land ownership should require less 
government intervention. Ironical enough, however, in order to promote land 
consolidation and expansion, the Japanese government made much more 
intervention, spent much more money, efforts and time than the Chinese 
government which mainly relied on, plus issuing guidance to, the initiatives of 
local officials and peasants and financial resources of villages and townships. The 
major problem with the Japanese government intervention was that it remained 
outside the land tenure system, regarding private land ownership as untouchable, 
which resulted in even more government intervention and still little progress. By 
contrast, to achieve the same aim, collective land ownership in a collective- 
individual mixed economy in China led to much less government intervention.
Therefore, the key question is not whether government should intervene 
or not, but with what and how it should intervene. A major reform of private land 
ownership and introduction of relevant public factors into it may result in much 
less government intervention.
Hence the possible value of my Proposal 1 to Japan as elaborated in 
Chapter 4 - collective-individual dual Jevel operation of physically unwithdrawa- 
ble private land shares under corporate ownership, which, by preserving private 
land ownership but adding public factors to it, would weaken the bargain power 
of the private land owners in land consolidation and expansion and overall rural 
development, thus introducing a competitive market economy into land use and 
reducing (although not abolishing) government intervention.
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Regarding the Appropriateness of Large-Scale Farming
The large-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy in China 
pursued appropriate large-scale farming, i.e., it expanded the farming scale from 
the Equal Land System first to the Dual Land System (self-sufficiency land to 
everybody; responsibility land to everybody, to every labor force, to every 
agricultural labor force, to expert farmers via bidding) then to the Single Land 
System (responsibility land to expert farmers; self-consumption grain at lower 
prices and family plot for vegetables to everyone else), according to the extent to 
which the development of non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines could absorb 
surplus peasants, rather than squeezing those peasants still relying on land. This 
was in accordance with the principle of variable mixed economies - varying 
relations between the public and private sectors, and their dynamic change over 
time in relation to changing needs in economy and society, and with the liming 
of changing existing property rights structures - following the development of 
production, technology and market, which induces new benefit-cost possibilities, 
that in turn shows gains of internalization (or efficient production) of negative 
externalities that exceed its costs, which subsequently raises the need for 
internalization (or efficient production) of negative externalities, that finally 
requires a change of the existing property rights structures and a new institutional 
and legal framework for enforcement.
Although the village could function as a typical firm with an entrepreneur 
directing resources with authority, the leaders (entrepreneur) could not do it 
arbitrarily. For carrying out the Dual Land System, majority agreement had to be 
achieved, and for the Single Land System, majority or even unanimous consent. 
There have been cases in which village officials, in order to charge more village- 
drawn fees for rural industrialization or probably also for their corrupt use, 
violated the appropriateness of large-scale farming and forced the mass peasants 
who could not yet find jobs in non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines to subsist 
on tiny self-sufficiency land or, in one extreme case, gave them no land. But such 
wrong doings would exert negative externalities on the mass of peasants and 
society as a whole, tending to be reported by peasants, exposed by the media and 
penalized by the government which attaches extreme importance to keeping rural 
stability and removing poverty.
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Thus the large-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy 
based on public land ownership in China, (1) could eliminate the negative 
externalities by the part-time farmers and absentees on the full-time farmers much 
more easily than in Japan; and (2) could control the speed of expansion of large- 
scale farming so as to prevent the negative externalities on the mass of peasants 
who still needed land, thereby also avoiding such a situation as in India (as 
reviewed in Chapter 4) from happening in China.
Considering the Functioning of Large-Scale Farming
Under the Chinese model of rural development, not only fragmented small 
farms could thrive at the low wage economy just as under the Japanese model, 
but also large-scale farmers could prosper at the high wage economy, which has 
been constrained under the Japanese model.
Various organizations of large-scale farmers (individual household farms, 
joint-households farms, collective farms 1, 2 and 3, urban-rural joint enterprises, 
external and foreign ventures) could work well within a framework of public land 
ownership, which gives supportive evidence for Nuti's model of market socialism 
as a third way between the centrally planned economy and free market system, 
in which incentives for large-scale farming and Pareto efficiency could be 
achieved.
Again, of the many variables for rural development, the institutional 
changes are the keystone. It is the institutional component that is most important 
in the interaction of institutions and technologies as the underlying long-term 
ultimate causes that sustain economic growth of developing countries. But once 
production has reached the frontier permitted by the established institutions, even 
though the increase of production is technologically possible, it would be 
hampered by the vested interests - the part-time farmers and absentees who held 
land for inefficient use in both Japan and China. At this stage, variable mixed 
economies were also needed for reaching dynamic or long-term Pareto efficiency, 
and another round of institutional changes required to allow sustainable rural 
development. It did not take place in Japan, hence feature 9 of the Japanese 
model (persistence of the fragmented small farms). But it did take place in China, 
thus feature 9 of the Chinese model (large-scale farming and collective-individual
mixed economy), which made its feature 10 (agricultural mechanization with large 
machinery) possible, and facilitated its features 11 (promotion of development in 
poorer areas) and 12 (urban-rural joint enterprises and external and foreign 
ventures in agriculture). Hence the superiority of the Chinese model over the 
Japanese.
After agricultural mechanization with large machinery was made possible, 
there existed the problems that ordinary individual farming households might not 
afford to buy machines and, even if they could, might not use them in economies 
of scale. Thus, economies of scale in holding large machinery were also applied 
and promoted: machinery services to large-scale farms were given by specialized 
individual households, or joint households, or collective service stations.
The optimal size of large-scale farming reflected technological Pareto 
efficiency by which there is no way to produce more output with the same inputs 
or to produce the same output with less inputs. But the optimal size varies across 
time and place and changes as the economic structures change, hence also 
dynamic efficiency.
The three stages in providing direct and indirect subsidies from industrial 
profits to large-scale farmers give evidence for the thesis that market forces 
should be fostered. As reviewed in Chapter 2, there are some who are impatient 
with the inefficiencies of government and want to shift to the market, which they 
consider the most efficient allocator of resources. But the market is only as 
efficient as the forces making up the market. It took some time for the West to 
evolve and nurture these forces. It is well known that the (former) socialist 
countries are encountering difficulties in shifting from a planned to a market 
economy. It will take some time before market forces are developed, especially 
the ability of entrepreneurs to finance and market their production. Indeed, an 
important historical function of government in the process of development is to 
mold these forces so that the market becomes an efficient resource allocator. 
Therefore, the large-scale farmers initially required both direct and indirect 
subsidies by villages and local governments. As they became stronger, they could 
relinquish the direct subsidies first, and even indirect subsidies in the future.
The evolution from the small-scale to the large-scale farming collective- 
individual mixed economy followed the two general methods of changing existing 
property rights structures: the first is to make gradual changes in social mores and
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common law precedents, and the second to make a conscious collective endeavor, 
such as a major reform or revolution at a certain stage of the gradual changes in 
the first general method.
Chapter 5, together with Chapter 4. has provided evidence for my 
hypothesis that the fragmented small farms as the last obstacle imposed by the 
monsoon against sustainable rural development in Asia may be overcome by 
variable mixed economies, increasingly along three main phases. Phase /: sub­
village individual-collective mixed economy (sub-village-wide cooperaiive/enterp- 
rise collective use of physically withdrawable private land shares, exercising 
collective-individual dual level operation of large land units, with the basic 
operation level at one household or at a farming unit including a number of 
households). Phase 2: village-wide individual-collective mixed economy. Phase 
3: either large-scale farming public-individual mixed economy or corporate- 
individual mixed economy (collective use of either public land, or physically 
unwithdrawable private land shares under corporate ownership, exercising village- 
individual dual level operation of large land units, with the basic operation level 
at one household or at cooperative/enterprise including a number of households, 
as a third way between the centrally planned economy and free market system).
VI. Other Rice-Based Economies under Public Land 
Ownership
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Agricultural land has been under public ownership in Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, North Korea and Vietnam. They have all adopted market-oriented rural 
development measures, although to distinctly different degrees. In the sense that 
they still keep public land ownership, they could be regarded as within the 
Chinese model. According to the criteria that China has achieved the fastest 
economic development with average annual growth rate of gross domestic product 
of 12.1 % during 1992-96 (Jiang, Ze-Min 1997), avoided new landlessness in the 
low wage economy and controlled inefficient land-holding in the high wage 
economy, China might be considered as at level I. Myanmar, whose average 
annual growth rate of GDP reached 8.1 % during 1992-96 (Vokes 1997: 644), and 
whose land tenure system has avoided new landlessness in the low wage economy
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and could also control inefficient land-holding in the high wage economy, may 
be regarded as at level 2. The average annual growth rate of GDP was 6.35 % 
during 1994-95 in Cambodia (Summers 1997: 188), 6.5 % during 1990-95 in 
Laos (Gainsborough 1997: 539), and 8.2 % during 1991-95 in Vietnam (Demaine 
1997: 1063). But following the establishment of a nominal state - but tie facto 
private - land ownership, both new landlessness and inefficient land-holding have 
immediately appeared. Therefore they are rated as at level 3. North Korea in 
principle still keeps the centrally planned economy, and its annual growth rate of 
gross national product was -3.9 % (note negative) during 1990-95. Hence it is put 
at level 4 . Due to the length limit, the following review is concentrated on their 
land tenure reforms.
Level 2: Myanmar
The Constitution of Sep. 24, 1947 of Myanmar which gained independence 
on Jan. 4, 1948 established a state land ownership with the right of tilling land 
given to the actual tillers. They include mainly private individuals, but also state 
economic enterprises, cooperatives, domestic-foreign joint ventures and other 
organizations. Upon application by peasant households, village people’s councils 
allocated parcels of land to farmers with a maximum duration of 30 years, but 
renewable for lifetime, and decided who should till the land after their death. 
Thus small land-holders have been dominant. (Steinberg 1981: 125. Silvcrstcin 
1997: 634-635. Steinberg 1987: 273. Kyi Win 1997)
During 1962-86, there was a compulsory stale rice procurement quota 
system. In principle, the state had a monopoly of alt major commercial sales of 
rice, inter-township paddy shipment, and exports. Quotas were set for procure­
ment from individual farms. The farms could retain fixed amounts for home 
consumption plus a small amount for seeds and ceremonial activities, were 
required to sell most of the surplus up to the quotas to the state agency, and could 
then sell the residual to any individual consumer within the township (in specified 
rice surplus townships, also beyond the township) (like Bao Gan Dao Hu, the 
major form of the Household Contract System in China). The state procurement 
prices, although raised several times, were generally lower than the market prices, 
hence a Two Track Price System for rice (analogous to but implemented before
the Chinese practice). During 1987-88, the state liberalized the marketing of rice, 
first by allowing cooperatives to operate alongside the state agency, and then, in 
September 1987, by opening trade to private agents. Their introduction, however, 
coincided with a decline in paddy production and a period of rapidly rising rice 
prices which contributed to growing unrest in urban areas in 1988. Thus, since 
1989, the compulsory state rice procurement quota system has been reintroduced. 
In 1990-91, the state purchased about 15 % of total paddy output, cooperatives 
bought around 7 %, and the rest was open to private agents (similar to China too). 
Although the quota prices were lower than the market prices, the slate provided 
fertilizer and credit at subsidized prices to farmers. (Steinberg 1981: 133. 
Steinberg 1987: 274. Vokes 1997: 646)
Rice still dominates the economy, and is the main source of employment 
and principal export earner. Production is dependent on the weather. As a result. 
Myanmar remains one of the poorer countries in Asia. (Vokes 1997: 645-646). 
Its land tenure system, which is quite similar to feature 1 of the Chinese model, 
functions well as it has avoided new landlessness in the low wage economy, could 
control inefficient land-holding in the high wage economy, and has guaranteed a 
basic food security via the state compulsory procurement quota system. But it also 
is currently under revision in order to realize a more market-oriented rural 
development (Kyi Win 1997).
Level 3: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
In contrast to China and Myanmar, Cambodia (1981), Laos (1988) and 
Vietnam (1993) have founded a nominal state - but de facto private - land 
ownership.
In Cambodia, agricultural cooperatives under the rigid centrally planned 
economy were replaced in 1979 by krom sanutki (solidarity groups), each 
composed of 10-15 households, with three different classes. In class 1, production 
was fully collectivized. Whether they were shirking or working hard, members 
could gain the produce according to the man-days they worked (like that in the 
Chinese communes). In class 2, major means of production were collectively 
owned, but only limited work was conducted collectively. Land was divided into 
parcels allocated on a family basis corresponding to the number of family
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members, and managed by families. In class 3, land officially belonged to the 
state but all the other means of production were privately owned, and families 
were engaged wholly in individual production. While in 1981, 20 % of the krom 
samaki were in class 1, and 60 % in class 2, in 1989, almost 90 % were in class
3. In the same year, it also was decided to abandon the krom samaki. Rural 
residential land was turned to private ownership and could be sold and bought; 
farmland belonged to the state but possession was given to peasant households 
with tax to be paid for using it; if a farmland was not used for one year, the 
authorities could take it away; the possession of farmland was also salable and 
farmland could be converted into residential land, both subject to the approval of 
government offices. (Summers 1997: 187. Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 87- 
90)
Laos halted the new establishment of agricultural cooperatives in 1979, 
and abandoned them in 1986. In 1988, long-term usufructuary rights to land were 
granted to peasant households, inheritable and salable to natural and legal persons. 
This was confirmed in the 1991 new constitution which also made clear that all 
land belongs to the state. (Gainsborough 1997: 538-539. Kirk 1996: 108). Any 
land left idle could in theory be recovered by the village chief and reallocated, on 
a temporary basis, to another family. Since 1993, the state has required that 
villages pay land tax in cash, refusing the traditional payments in paddy. (Groppo; 
Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 14-15)
In Vietnam, before 1979, a workpoints system was carried out in 
agricultural cooperatives (as in the Chinese communes) which resulted in 
equalitarianism rather than incentives. In that year, it was supplanted by a system 
of contracting output quotas to households and linking the fulfillment with 
workpoints which were then linked to remuneration (like Bao Chan Dao Hu, the 
minor form of the Household Contract System in China). To achieve equality in 
land quality, quantity and distance, land given to households was fragmented 
(which was not necessarily consolidated in the later reforms). The tenure length 
was three to 15 years. By 1988, it was further replaced by a system of contracting 
output quotas to households, leaving the total residuals to them without the 
involvement of workpoints (like Bao Gan Dao Hu, the major form of the 
Household Contract System in China). In 1988-89, the compulsory procurement 
quotas were displaced by a land tax of 10 % of normal output (as average in the
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past)23 and land use rights were given for 15 years to households which agreed 
their own contracts for sale for whatever crops they chose to cultivate* (Demaine 
1997: 1057. Hayami 1994: 1,9-10, 13, 19). The 1993 Land Law declared that all 
land was formally owned by the state but households were given land use rights 
which were further exchangeable, transferable (salable), leasable (maximum three 
years normally), inheritable, and mortgageable for loans. The local administrations 
(such as the people’s committee of communes and districts) were supposed to 
judge the need for land sellers or lessors to reduce their land holdings and also 
to assess the capacity of buyers or lessees to use the increased holdings 
efficiently. The limit of agricultural land for annual crops of each household was 
3 ha. The use period was 20 years for planting annual crops and aquaculture, 50 
for perennial crops, and renewable if lawfully used. If the land was not used for 
one year, it could be withdrawn by the state. If the state needed to recover land 
for the public interests, compensation would be given to the households affected. 
(LLV 1993: 40, 43, 45, 49, 56). In order to record and protect private land use 
rights, the government has been conducting a nationwide cadastral survey and 
land registration and begun to issue Land Use Right Certificates (LURC). But this 
would need 15 years to complete and is extremely costly. (Hayami 1994: 9, 12)
Because in these three countries, since the new land tenure reforms, the 
state-owned farmland could be used just as private land, there is no state 
compulsory procurement quota, the possession of land could be sold and bought 
like private property, and in Cambodia residential land became privately owned 
and salable, such land use rights have "become little different from private land 
property rights in modern market economies in their effects on resource 
allocations, even though ‘state ownership of land’ is maintained” (Hayami 1994: 
9).
Level 4: North Korea
In North Korea, agricultural land is either collectively owned (more than
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25 But Haque and Montesi report that the land-use tax rale is fixed at 7 % of 
the average value of output achieved during the previous three years. The tax 
rates vary from 50 kg per ha to 550 kg per ha for various categories of annual 
cropland, and up to 650 kg per ha for perennial cropland. Once defined, the land 
categories remain unchanged for 10 years. (Haque & Montesi 1997 Part One: 9)
90 %) or state-owned. A centrally planned economy is still in place. In 1995-96, 
a new stress was made on transformation of collective farms to state ownership. 
Since 1991, output has declined and serious food shortages occurred, especially 
since 1993 due to flood damage (FEA 1995: 466. FEA 1997: 488). Rice was an 
important export commodity until the mid-1980s, but has to be imported, together 
with wheat, in the 1990s. Although the labor force in agriculture was reduced to 
32.6 % of the total labor force in 1991 (FAO-YP 1993: 29), this did not mean 
that it had completed the first transition, but reflected relative labor scarcity in an 
economy disproportionately engaged in heavy industry and with a large military. 
In fact, the armed forces had to be deployed in agriculture in 1996. (Chung 1997: 
481-483)
A few signs of economic reform have, however, also appeared. Industrial 
joint-ventures with foreign - including capitalist - countries, following the 
Chinese-style special economic zones, started in 1984, although with limited 
success. In 1994-96, emphasis was switched from heavy industry to agriculture, 
light industry and foreign trade. (Chung 1997: 481-483). More significantly, in 
1996, the state allowed 30 pyong (0.(X)99 ha; 1 pyong equals 3.3 square meters) 
of backyard cultivation for each civilian household and 100 pyong (0.033 ha) for 
a soldier’s family (Shim Jae Hoon 1996: 30), which were similar to the family 
plots of China, and it was reported in 1997 that massive collective farms have 
been reduced in size (similar to feature I of the Chinese model: institutional 
changes for a small-scale farming and collective-individual mixed economy). It 
also was reported that some farmers have been permitted to plant crops twice a 
year (double-cropping) which had long been forbidden (both feature 4: multiple 
cropping of grains and feature 5: diversified cropping). Peasants in the hard-hit 
northern provinces have been told to fend for themselves, allowing them to trade 
privately with China (feature 2: market-oriented government policies). With help 
from the UN Development Program, there have been a few scattered experiments, 
providing credit to individual households to buy chickens or goats and allowing 
them to sell eggs or milk on the open market (feature 5: non-crop agriculture). 
(Richburg 1997: 4). North Korea is thus at the bottom of the Chinese model of 
rural development.
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An Analysis of the Nominal State - But De Facto Private - Land 
Ownership
The designers and advocates of the nominal state - but de facto private ■ 
land ownership (including Hayami whose advice for setting up such a land tenure 
system was adopted and honored in Vietnam) either did not expect or excluded 
the ensuing problems, especially the following two.
(1) New landlessness in the low wage economy.
As indicated in Chapter 2, in monsoon Asia, when yields of rice and other 
grains are low, and rural infrastructure, diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture, 
and off-farm employment not yet developed, peasants can find few employment 
opportunities in non-grain production. Thus their income is very low. In such a 
low wage economy, their ability to cope with problems in production and living 
is also very weak. In both the Chinese and Japanese models, however, new 
landlessness after the land tenure reforms has been avoided mainly by feature 1 
(institutional changes for an individual-cooperative or collective-individual mixed 
economy), showing two major differences in comparison with Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam.
The First is prohibition or strongly restricted private land ownership. In 
China, private ownership of either residential or any other land is not allowed. 
Everybody is guaranteed some land under the Equal Land System and self- 
sufficiency land under the Dual Land System. The possession of responsibility 
land is not equal to private property because there are state compulsory 
procurement quotas. The possession of any land cannot be sold and bought, 
although the contracted land can be transferred and the transferor can charge 
remuneration for the improvement he made. Under the Single Land System, those 
who have left farmland to earn an income higher than that from small-scale 
farming are sold self-consumption grain at lower prices and given family plots for 
vegetables. In Japan, after the land reform for an individual ownership, until the 
1960s, land sale and lease, although allowed, were seriously restricted by a 3 ha 
ceiling on land holding, protection of tenants from eviction, and control of land 
rent at a very low level.
The Second is collective support to individual farms. In China, land is 
under village-household dual level operation. The households are the basic level,
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but the village has the duty to provide services and support to them, and reduce 
or waive their state procurement quotas in case of natural disasters. In Japan, 
during the 1950s, when peasants were still poor and weak, the national rural 
cooperatives network provided extensive collective services and support to 
individual households. Therefore, poverty due to weak single household operation 
of land and emergence of new landlessness have been avoided in both China and 
Japan.
By contrast, in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the permission of selling 
state-owned but individually possessed land gave the possibility for peasants to 
be forced to sell land for dealing with natural disasters, diseases, debts (including 
gambling losses) and other difficulties, or be induced to sell land to industrial and 
urban developers/dwcllers for earning easy and high short-term profits, thus 
becoming newly landless. The abolition of the agricultural cooperatives together 
with their services and support to individual households resulted in single 
individual household operation which is weak when peasants are still poor. The 
difficulties they met strengthened the necessity for them to sell land and become 
newly landless.
Most rural areas of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are still in the low wage 
economy. For example, in Cambodia, agriculture remains the mainstay of the 
economy. Employment opportunities outside agriculture are extremely limited. 
Agriculture itself is dominated by rice subsistence farming. Production is 
vulnerable in adverse weather conditions. Irrigation systems remain largely 
inoperable. 38 % of households were below the poverty line in 1996. Cambodia 
is one of the poorest countries in Asia and the world. (FAO/WFP 1996: 2)
When krom samaki were abolished, land was distributed to member 
households according to their family size at that time and was to be registered at 
the district land office. Under the new system, privately owned residential land 
could be sold and bought with the permission of the district land office. State- 
owned but privately possessed farmland could also be sold and bought, and 
converted into residential land, with the permission of the provincial land office. 
But the management of land by the authorities was not serious. Some people tried 
to record more land than they had and when the officers came to check, they 
borrowed others’ land temporarily. Many peasants got farmland without 
registering it with the district land office at all so as not to pay the registration
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fee. Even so, they could still sell their possessed land with the signatures of the 
local authority. In one case, a poor woman’s farmland was partially occupied by 
her neighbors, but she could not win justice from the village committee because 
she could not afford to invite the officers for meals and drinks. Hence the 
superficial and arguably chaotic land management in the young Cambodian 
market economy after the abolition of the cooperatives. (Kusakabe; Wang & 
Kelkar 1995: 88-91)
Abolished with the krom samaki was also their support to individual 
households. Owing to the loss of men in the wars, women make up 54 % of the 
adult population over 15, head 20 9« of rural households and hold possession title 
to substantial paddy land. Peasants in general do not want to sell land, as a group 
of women cried: "If I sell land, where shall I live?" (Summers 1997: 189. 
Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 89-91)
But due to difficulties from weak individual land operation, poverty, 
illness, and even gambling losses, quite a few peasant families, especially those 
headed by widows, had to sell their possession of farmland. A widow sold land 
because her family could not afford to keep the land after three years* bad rice 
yield and their income from fishing was not sufficient. Although sale of land 
formally requires all the relevant people’s signatures, this regulation seemed 
unimportant in practice. Owing to gambling losses, a man sold the possession of 
his family’s farmland even without informing his wife, although it had been 
registered under both of their names. There were also women who, due to 
marriage, separated from their parents but found that the latter refused to give 
them farmland owing to family unhappiness, so that they had to work as wage 
laborers in other farms. They all became newly poor landless. (Kusakabe; Wang 
& Kelkar 1995: 89-91)
On the other hand, there were people who sold residential land and 
possession of farmland along the roads at high prices to earn more money, and 
thus also joined the newly landless. They could not easily survive if they have 
spent the easy money while still having not found secure jobs in non-agricultural 
production which as yet is underdeveloped in the poor rural areas. A widow sold 
land and bought weaving machines to weave silk skirts to be sent to Phnom Penh 
for sale. But it was unclear how she and her family could live if market demand 
fell. (Kusakabe; Wang & Kelkar 1995: 89-91)
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In Laos, the agricultural sector is continuously vulnerable to adverse 
weather and pests. The country is land-locked, with a poorly developed 
infrastructure and a serious shortage of skilled labor. Economic disparities 
between the more developed areas, especially the Vientiane Plain and the southern 
Mekong towns on one hand, and the rest of the country on the other, have 
increased since the reform of the late 1980s. Laos is also one of the poorest 
countries in Asia and the world. (Gainsborough 1997: 539)
Cultivable land is scarce, while population pressure is increasing. The 
early settlers and their heirs have occupied more land, leaving less or no land for 
the villages to distribute to the new families. Inheritance also made land more 
fragmented. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 11, 17, 31). 
Because salability of land requires the individually possessed public land to be 
fixed to the possessors, officials have no means to take a part of land from those 
households possessing more public land and allocate it to those households 
holding less or no land below the subsistence level, or to consolidate fragmented 
parcels.
With the salability of the state-owned but individually possessed land, 
from 1993-94 on, property transactions near Vientiane mainly involved the sale 
of agricultural land, mostly along or near roads, to urban dwellers. Peasants with 
a large land area (5 to 10 ha) have been able to sell at high prices, thus rapidly 
increasing their capital investment potential while still retaining sufficient 
agricultural land. In contrast, families with little land (1 to 2 ha) have been unable 
to sell any land and were having problems meeting their basic requirements on 
the farm as they were below the sustainability threshold. The social gap has been 
widening. In the present context of greater market integration and gradual 
economic opening up, they will probably find it difficult to avoid proletarianiza­
tion or poverty. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 16-18)
Land sale to urban dwellers was for high prices reflecting future industrial 
profits rather than agricultural earnings, thus those farmers who really needed land 
for survival could not afford to buy it at all. While few villages still have land to 
allocate to new population, the property market has absorbed a large land area. 
For example, in one village with 15 landless families and no land to allocate 
because there was none left, no less than 75 ha have been sold in barely two 
years. (Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 17). Meanwhile, the
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obligation to sell land due to difficulties in the weak single household operation, 
natural disasters, diseases, debts, gambling losses, etc. has occurred.
As a result, landless families as a new category of inhabitants - agricultural 
proletariat - began to emerge in many villages. Around Vientiane, it accounted for 
about 10 % - 15 % of the total rural families. In one village, 71.6 of the 
households were landless. In another village, five families held no land but lived 
with their parents-in-law, who possessed a fair amount of land. The possibilities 
for these families to possess land are virtually nil. There is insufficient agricultur­
al land for rent to alleviate the lack of appropriate land. Those who could not rent 
land had to rely exclusively on wage labor in the village or in Vientiane. 
(Groppo; Mekouar; Damais & Phouangphet 1996: 11, 23, 42)
In Vietnam, in 1994, 6.8 million or 17 % of labor force were either 
unemployed or underemployed. There are sharp contrasts in development between 
different regions, especially lowlands and uplands. Infrastructure is still backward. 
(Demaine 1997: 1056-1057, 1063). More than half the 75 million people still 
living under the poverty line, although major cities have become much richer 
(Economist 1997: 66).
However, during 1988-94, over 2,950 agricultural cooperatives (17.4 % o f 
the total) had been dissolved. By the end of 1994, a total of 16,243 agricultural 
cooperatives still existed, covering about 64 % of all farm households. But there 
were great differences in their operational performance. An estimated 15.5 % of 
them that had recorded good performance in the past {"good" cooperatives) were 
still able to provide necessary services to member households. "Middle" 
performing cooperatives accounted for 40.4 % of them and were mainly engaged 
in providing irrigation facilities and services. They did not have sufficient capital 
and funds to cover increased expenses, and many members have quit. Thus lots 
of them have become dormant and nominal. Non-operational {"bad") cooperatives 
accounted for 43.3 % of the total. Although the leadership of these cooperatives 
remained in place, they neither canned out economic activities nor provided any 
services to members. The management costs were mainly paid out of debt 
recovered from the members. In many regions, however, members refused to 
provide any additional funds. As a result, the number of "bad' cooperatives has 
been increasing. In the South, cooperatives have largely disappeared. The farm 
tasks that require group actions, such as irrigation management, have had to rely
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on voluntarily formed production teams, which appeared in both the North and 
South. (Harms 1996: 1-3. Hayami 1994: II). Therefore, the majority of farm 
households are carrying out single household operation of land which is weak.
Under such circumstances, following the permission to sell the individually 
possessed state-owned land in 1993, newly landless has appeared. In early 1997, 
the government raised its concern about this issue during a meeting of provincial 
leaders in the Mekong Delta. No official data relating to this situation is yet 
available, but a survey on the new landlessness in the Mekong Delta is being 
carried out. (Messier 1997)
Hayami, however, has excluded the possibility of new landlessness and the 
related trend of polarization, claiming: "The highly polarized agrarian structure 
and oppressive landlordism observed in some developing countries have emerged 
mainly as the result of colonial exploitation policies, including exclusive land 
allocations to colonial elites. This situation is diametrically different from that of 
Vietnam today. Therefore, it is not necessary to be overly concerned about such 
an inequitable agrarian structure emerging in this country". (Hayami 1994:15).
' The immediate appearance of the new landlessness has shown that such an 
: assertion was arbitrary.
(2) Inefficient land-holding in the high wage economy.
As analyzed in Chapter 4 and this chapter, in monsoon Asia, once yields 
of rice and other grains are raised, and rural infrastructure, diversified cropping, 
non-crop agriculture, and off-farm employment developed, peasants can find 
sufficient employment in non-grain agriculture and off-farm lines. Their income 
is greatly increased and there is no need for them to rely on rice production. If 
; land were fixed to the possessors, then, in such a high wage economy, there 
would be a tendency for the possessors to become part-time farmers and 
absentees and keep the land just as an asset without tilling it efficiently, nor 
selling and leasing it to the full-time farmers who wish to concentrate on rice 
production. Even in those rural areas which still remain in the low wage 
economy, many peasants may go to cities or other rural areas which have entered 
the high wage economy to earn more income, while still holding their land 
without efficient use and even leaving the land desolated. The newly rich peasants 
may change farmland into residential land for more housing. Moreover, urban 
developers, who have bought agricultural land when its prices were relatively low
i
in comparison with its future prices, may leave the land idle for years before 
making construction, or repeatedly sell the land between speculators in expecta­
tion of continually higher prices.
While the Japanese model, due largely to relying on free market forces, 
has not been able to overcome this last obstacle, the Chinese one has, by 
implementing variable mixed economies. Besides controlling inefficiently used 
land in agriculture, China has also curbed idle farmland transferred for urban 
development. If the contracted investment did not come within a reasonable 
period (e.g., one year), the contract would be stopped and the land would be 
either transferred to another developer or turned back to farmland.
Unexceptionally, the inefficient land-holding has occurred immediately 
after the setting up of the nominal state - but de facto  private - land ownership, 
at least in Laos near cities where wages are much higher. It has been mentioned 
in the above that around Vientiane from 1993-94 on, following the salability of 
the state-owned but individually possessed land, much agricultural land, mostly 
along or near roads, was sold mainly to the rich urban dwellers. But much 
purchased land was just left idle. Although in theory unused land is to be 
withdrawn by the village, the mechanism to prevent inefficient land-holding and 
land desolation is neither sufficient, nor effective. (Gmppo; Mekouar; Damais & 
Phouangphet 1996: 17, 44)
Disregarding the above two major problems, however, Hayami argues that 
free market forces should be allowed to play a much greater, even full, role. He 
criticizes the 1993 Land Law of Vietnam for putting private land transactions 
under several regulations (such as the maximum ceiling on land holding, 
justification by local officials of the need for land sellers or lessors to reduce their 
land holdings and the capacity of buyers or lessees to use the increased holdings 
efficiently), on the grounds that in his judgement of the experiences of other 
countries, such regulations, once strongly enforced, became a source of extremely 
large inefficiency (e.g., in Japan) (Hayami 1994: 14-15).
Hayami’s prescription is that ’T h e  proper policy design should limit 
application of the regulations on land market to the cases in which significant 
externalities or social costs, such as water pollution, are involved. Land 
transactions involving no such costs to society should be approved automatically." 
(Hayami 1994: 2). In short, public land should first be fixed to individuals, and
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then private land transactions should not be restricted.
However, Hayami does not note a dilemma in his free market recipe, i.e., 
certain strongly enforced regulations in the land transaction market in the low 
wage economy may become a source of inefficient land-holding in the high wage 
economy; but without them, newly landless would appear in the low wage 
economy. Hayami is unlikely to find any solution to this dilemma within free 
market system. Evidence for its solution is found only in variable mixed 
economics.
Therefore, it was correct for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to abandon the 
centrally planned economy, but incorrect to turn to the opposite extreme - largely 
relying on free market forces and paying little (at least insufficient) attention to 
the intervention by governments, and management and support by villages and 
cooperatives.
Hayami acclaims the nominal state - but de facto  private - land ownership 
(in Vietnam) as "beyond China’s reform in assigning and protecting of private 
land rights” (Hayami 1994: 4). But the fact that new landlessness has appeared 
immediately after the land tenure reforms in the low wage economy in Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam already shows that this model is inferior to the Chinese. In the 
high wage economy, if the state failed to oblige the part-time farmers and 
absentees to transfer their land to full-time and expert farmers due to the high 
transaction costs in dealing with the peasants who hold strong bargaining power 
by possessing LURC (Land Use Right Certificates), then it would fall into feature 
9 of the Japanese model in front of the last obstacle, and thus also be worse than 
the Chinese model. If the stale, to the contrary, by its ownership right, succeeded 
in effecting such a transfer, this still would not be beyond the Chinese model 
(albeit specific methods could be different).
Although Hayami claims that his favorite nominal slate - but de facto 
private - land ownership (in Vietnam) "may serve as a model, which many other 
countries in transition to market-oriented economies may well be advised to 
follow" (Hayami 1994: 9), Diouf, Director-General of FAO, comments just to the 
opposite: "The tremendous achievements of China in realizing food security have 
attracted worldwide attention. The Chinese experience should be taken into 
account by other developing countries." (Diouf 1997). Therefore, Hayami himself, 
and countries like Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, may well be advised to study the
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Chinese model, especially its features 1 and 9, as a means for overcoming not 
only poverty, but also "the last obstacle".
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Conjectural Proposals 5-7
Proposal 5. For carrying out market-oriented rural development in 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, it was justifiable to keep the state ownership of 
land, rather than privatizing it. But it should be noted that a nominal state but de 
facto private land ownership may still lead a part of the peasantry into landless­
ness in the low wage economy, and part-time farmers and absentees to hold land 
for inefficient use in the high wage economy.
In particular, both the Chinese experiences and those of these countries 
have shown that for a market-oriented rural development under public land 
ownership, (1) private land sale and mortgage are not only unnecessary, but also 
harmful, as they make new landlessness possible; (2) strongly enforced conditions 
for land-holding are necessary for the efficient use; (3) cadastral certification for 
a de facto  private land ownership are unnecessary and detrimental, as it not only 
incurs high costs (in money, time, human resources, etc.) and disputes (Gordillo 
de Anda 1997: 3), but also tends to fix the land to the possessors and hinders land 
transfer from inefficient holders to full-time farmers in the high wage economy; 
(4) state compulsory procurement of quotas of grain is beneficial and may even 
be a necessary condition of guaranteeing a minimum grain security for the whole 
country.
It therefore is recommended that Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam should 
draw these lessons, abolish the nominal state - but de facto  private - land 
ownership and pursue the Chinese model.
Proposal 6. In the revision of the present land tenure system for a more 
market-oriented rural development, Myanmar should not establish a nominal state
- but de facto private - land ownership. Rather, it would be beneficial for it to go 
alongside features 2-12 of the Chinese model.
Proposal 7. North Korea is the only rice-based economy in monsoon Asia
- and the last country in the world - still sticking to the centrally planned 
economy. It is advised to begin agrarian reform and rural development with 
feature 1, and then proceed with other features, of the Chinese model. Neither
privatization of land ownership, nor establishment of a nominal public - but de 
facto private - land ownership would be suitable, as shown by the Japanese model 
and the experiences of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam respectively.
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